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ARGUMENT 
coherent conceot of nossession i::, the Common J,aw. that 
. . , 
the.re are, rather, disparate s for the use of the 
separate branches or areas of the 
li;nf. Against this it shall be argued here that 'possession r 
initi8.lly enters the law not 
an infre.-jural relation of fact 1 recognised and protected 
by the .law and used by as the basis for obvious but 
impm.'tant rights and obligations. The possession so 
recognisetl 1 for the purposes 01~ law as every-day life, 
is fcu:nded. on the idea of control. The belief the.t the 
om any unified treat:r1ent of 
posses on these terms, I shall art;ue 7 rests on the 
fc:d1ure to grasp fully the ramifications oJ:' the term 
t con-tr ol t e Co11tro]. lies I " of " " ' i'' a ~ pov1e1-- aeaJ .. :Lng ·111 L.n 
the thL;,g '· ~ son '· gre, +'i on. s, in turn, implies tb,~.t he exoh1des 
. 
it from ·tl1e C{)ntrol of otl1ers an.d act.s, in t11e fj.r1al an2<lysis, 
1 self-conscious' relation: it requires a general knowledge 
oJ: as ctr1 exercise 
of control" These two si(Ies of possession - often treatecl 
separate elemen!!;s, but as linked aspects of a contro1-
situation, each capable of making up for some deficiencies 
in the other or of giving rise to the reasonable pres1xmption 
that the other exists. It is th:Ls control-situation, I 
shoulcl argue, which the law recognises as possession, and 
which should be sharply distinguishecl from the legal right 
to enter into such a situation and from the legal rights 
and obligations ascribed to those who have entered into it. 
Part I, after indicating the jurisprudential 
problem about possession, traces the nature and function 
of seisin in the early Common Law and attempts to show how 
and ·why the Common I,aw begins with the protection of actual 
use and enjoyment and how it regards such enjoyment as the 
primary basis of rig.hts. Part II turns to the consideration 
of three areas of uossessicrn comn1onlv seen as areas in 
. . 
which the term has acauired a distinct technical meaning 
or has been stretc:hed or distor·ted as a result of 1policy 1 
considerat:tons. At the seJne time, the use of 1possession 1 
in each of these areas is seen as ha:ving no connexion with 
the use of it in the remaining areas. I a.ttempt to show, 
on the contrary, thiJt each area highlights a specific 
aspect of control (control through another, person as an 
instru.'l!ent in the case of servants, control of an un.k:novm 
object through control o:r an area in the modern finding 
cases, control to the exclusion of others as ths element 
ii 
distinguishing the ba.ilment from the charge or lL'.)ence to 
use). But not only do the:se areasilluminete the mea.11ir.g 
contr , the recognition of control as the content of 
possess:lon enables us to solve important problems in these 
areas and to criticise reject, in each case, one of 
two contradictory trends. Thus in finding and bai1ment, 
the emphasi:~ on intentional deposit stemming from the old 
action of de'l:;:i.riU8 sur_bailment is :rejecte;l in favou::- of 
the recognition that possession itself is erucial, as was 
recognised in detinue on a devene.r-..uit ad .!lJ.p.nus. On 
basis, a general theory of bailment not based on contrs.ct 
or the bailor•s consent becomes possible. 
In Part III~ the aspects of ccintrol recognised 
by courts in corine:;cion 11d.th the problems aiscuss in the 
preced:i.ng Parts are brought together 1 the differences 
of emphasis in various contexts are exa:m1r.1ed explP.inedo 
the tlistinctimi. is drawn between 'static' and 1 dynamic 1 
pr·oblems posses on. An attempt :!.s made to show th&.t 
claims to elucicla.te the 'nature' possession L'l Common 
Law are not merely stipulative, but it is argued tha.t no 
;J ~ • • t • l ' ' 'l d .... _ • t • L• «eI1n1 ion can rep ace ae·~a1 e· a:°ll!'l'!jl!i--.. acqua1n ance wi,,n 
the cases anc1 th<e specific problems and ramifications of 
control explored in thell).. 
iii 
A final Postscript (Part IV) argues that the 
widespread use a:nd independent passj_ng. of in(1.ioo of title 
itl 
has limited the function of possesslonAmany commercial 
areas of the law, and that possession must therefore be 
distinguished more carefully than ever from situations in 
which the courts are confronted with disputes concerning 
rights to possess. 'Delivery' and tactual receipt', 
though often involving possession, may involve only the 
passing of rights, and a clarification of the concept of 
possession in the Cornman Law requires us carefully to 
distinguish the two types of problems. The problems 
ra:i.sed by the independent passing of rights to possess are 
not examined here, Similarly, the movement in larceny 
away from the paradigm of violent incursion into possession 
toward the paradigm of dishonest attempt to alienate title 
is not examined for its own sake. 
iv 
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PART I : 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
2 
ls . THE CONCEPT OF POSSESSION AND THE COMI10lr !Aili 
nA complete theory of possession, 11 Sir John Sal-
mond wrote optimistically, 1 11falls into two parts: first 
an analysis of the conception itself, and secondly an ex-
position of the manner in which it is recognised and applied 
in the actual legal system.'l There is no doubt that Salmond 
thought such a complete theory possible. Yet the judges and 
legal writers to whom we look for an analysis of the concept 
of possession in the Common Law - including Salmond himself -
prove surprisingly disappointing. Conscious that they will 
later have to wed the concepts they formulate to the com-
plexities of the Common Law, trained to make distinctions 
rather than to see connexions, they smother analysis and 
ppevent clarification by a welter of conceptual terms. In 
the law made or interpreted by judges we meet one posses-
sory term after another: 'physical possession', 1 actual 
possession', 1 de facto possession• and 1 possession1 ; 
'right to possession', 'right of possession', 'construct-
ive possession' and •possession'; 'possession in law•, 
'legal possessiont and •rightful possession1 ; 1property 1 
1. Salmond, Juris)ruden~e ( 1 Oth ed., ed. by Glanville L. 
Williams, 1947 , p.2 7. 
3 
•special property' and 'limited property'• To make ooni'us-
ion worse confounded, the distinctions are not rigidly ob-
served, in the course of their judgments, by the very men 
who have drawn attention to them. 2 
Legal writers, far from cutting through this 
tangle of special terms and distinctions to a primary con-
cept or logical 1 cluster1 of concepts, add or superimpose 
their own subdivisions. Bentham distinguishes physical pos-
session from legal possession, exclusive possession from 
possession in common, possession of things moveable from 
possession of things imrooveable, possession of services 
>ft1m and possession of fictitious entities.3 Continental 
2. Earl Jowitt has dra-wn attention to a tYPical example: 
11Under English lal!f where there is a simple contract of 
bail:ment the possession of the goods bailed passes to 
the bailee. The bailor has in such a case the right to 
inm1ediate possession and by reason of this right can 
exercise those possessory remedies which are available 
to the possessor. The person having the right to immed-
iate possession is, however, ff'equently referred to in 
English law as being the possessor." His Lordship goes 
on to add 1 quite correctly: ••In truth English law has 
never worked out a completely logical and exhaustive de-
finition of possession: 11 - u.s. of A;merican & Republic 
f France v. Dolli'us Mie" et Cie S A. & pk_ of England 
195 A.c. 2 at p., 0 • We shall see below how ;judges 
who have distinguished 'custody' from 1 possession• a.'1d 
•possession' fran 'propertyt will go on in their judgments 
to use one term when they mea.'1 the other. 
6f~'il 3. Bentham, ~eneral View of a Comolete CQd~in CQlleeted 
Works, vol.III, p.188. 
Romanists and Civilians bring out ~llegedly fundamental 
contrasts between poss~ssio and detentio and between posses-
sion with animus domini and possession with animus possid-
endi7 as well as the distinction between possessio naturalis, 
possessio civilis and nossessio ad interdicta.4 Traditional 
Common Law writers stress the importance of keeping apart 
'possession as a laJ concept', tde facto possession1 and 
1possession in law 1 or (alternatively) 'actual possession1 , 
'civil possession' and •constructive possession'; some of 
them counterpose 'corporeal possession' to 'incorporeal 
possession•, 1 immediate possession' to •mediate possession•.? 
The unsatisfactory state of conceptual analysis 
and juristic fol"!llulation in the field of possession is now 
widely recognised. Some ascribe it to the difficulties in-
herent in whatever basic concept of possession there may be; 
others to confusions of terminology, a Driori imposition of 
theory and a misguided endeavour to reduce decisions that 
4. These distinctions form the crux of Savigny•s influential 
Tr~atise on Possession. 
5 
5. This is the barrage of distinctions with which one emerges 
after reading the main older works on possession: Pollock 
and Wright, ?Qesession in the Cgnmon Lay (1888), John M.. 
Lightwood, A Treatise on Possession of Land (1894), Salmond, 
Jurispruden9e (1902rr.), chapters 13 & 1~ and Henry T. 
Terry, 11 Possessionn, (1918-19) 13 Ill. L. Rev. 312, Wigmore 
Pelebration Lega.J. Essaxs, 170. Keaton's The Elementary 
Principles of Jurisprudence (1930), somewhat surprisingly 
for a book by a modern writer, accepts most of Salmond's 
distinctions. 
have developed in the context of specifj.c branches of law 
and Of separate remedies to smooth components of a coherent 
system. urn the whole range of legal theory there is no 
conception more difficult than that of possession,1t Sir 
John Salmond writes at the beginning of his cussion of 
possession¢ 6 " 1Possessiont;• we read in the cases, "is a 
word of ambiguous meaning,. 7 - "there is, perhaps, no legal 
conception more open to a variety of meanings than 1posses-
sion'. u 8 Winfield, characteristically optimistic, pu·ts the 
main v1eight on car.fusions of terminology: ttQur law has a 
fairly good working scheme of possession although it has 
not indulged in much scientific dissection of the idea. 
Its weakest spot is its slovenly terminology."9 Dias and 
Hughes, all too ready to resolve the problem into matters 
6. Salmond, Jurisprudence, (10th ed.), p.285. 
7. Per Erle, C.J., in Boufffte v1 Fosbrooke (1865) 18 C.B. W.s.) 515 at P• 526, 1 E.R. : ' 545' at P• 5!J-9. 
8. Per Fry, L.J., in Lyell v1 Kennedy (1887) 18 Q.B. Div. 796 at p.813. 
9. Winfieldl Law of Tort (4th ed.), p.306. Note that 
Winfield s editor is less optimistic and has changed 
the pas sage to: u0ur law has not worked out a 
consistent theory of possession in any of its branches 
and it l:ias not indulged in much scientific dissection 
or the idea. Its weakest spot is its slovenly termino-
logy:" (6th ed.? ed. by T, Ellis Lewis) at p.364. 
For similar criticisms of judicial terminology see 
Pollock and Wright, op, git., p.2, Albert Kocourek, 
Jural Relations (2nd ed.) 1 p.365 and George Whitecross 
Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence (2nd ed.), p.4'.)!+. 
6 
of convenience and policy, prefer to blame their less 'em-
pirical' forerunners. nrr a topic has ever suffered from 
too much theorising," they write, 10 "it is that of posses-
sion, and nowhere else is the danger of an a priori ap-
proach to jurisprudence better illustrated. The actual 
working of the law has not only been obscured by a fog of 
speculation, but, what is worse, decisions have been fal-
sified so as to fit them into same preconceived theory. 11 
The period since the First World War bas seen a 
marked decline in the confidence that men have in universal 
intellectual systems and in the pervasive application of 
fundamental 1 rational 1 principles. The Western world, and 
especially the English-speaking world, has moved into an 
age of ad hoc adjustment and manipulation, of piece-meal 
social engineering, of the utilitarian subordination of 
principles, systems and traditions to the requirements of 
men living in specific circumstances at a specific time. 
The most 1modern 1 legal writers put less and less weight 
on the conception of law as a systematic development of 
principles striving toward the highest possible degree of 
coherence and mmre and mmre emphasis upon law as an 
10. Dias and Hughes, Jurisprudence, p.308. 
7 
instrunent in the service of competing masters. For rational 
coherence with its alleged rigidity they prefer to substitute 
ad hog flexibility, for 'principles of lawt attitudes, 
presumptions and policies, for concepts specific rules 
established for specific situations. The worst of the 
1moderns' seek, where at all plausible, to reduce law to 
disparate rules resulting solely from judicial policy and 
social requirements; the best of them argue that the ration-
ality of the legal system lies in its formulation of open-
ended principles and defeasible concepts. Thus Messrs Dias 
and Hughes, on the one hand, assure us that 11 the idea of 
possession is no longer tied to fact, and it has become a 
concept of the utmost technicality1111 , which, to them, means 
that each branch of the law has made up its own rules. Mr 
D.R. Harris, on the other hand, after referring with approval. 
to Professor H.I,.A. Hart's view that legal concepts cannot 
be defined, but only described12 , argues that there are 
a number of ,tractors relevant to possession' recognised by 
8 
the courts which nevertheless cannot serve to define poseession) 
~1. Dias and Hughes, op, cit., p.317. 
12. Hart, 11Defini ti on and Theory in Jurisprudence1t 
(Inaugural Lecture), Ox:rord 1953, (19)\+) 70 L.Q.R. 37. 
9 
because no single factor is decisive and because not all 
13 factors are always relevant. Their relevance or irrelevance, 
14 like the defences to Professor Hart's defeasible principles, 
cannot be subsumed under a general rule. 
A living body of law cannot be tied into the strait-
jacket of an a priori conceptual system: but to insist, 
as a matter of principle, that we should not ask for general 
conceptions underlying what appear to be specific rules 
separating one possession from another, is to live in the 
intellectual Ice Age in which the first forms of action 
were born. The rigid procedural requirements of the early 
law, by their very emphasis on certain common aspects of 
recurring situations, introduce conceptual distinctions into 
the law and force it to develop them. It is the recognition 
of intellectual connexion that distinguishes the Leges Hen-
rici Primi from the Laws of Aethelred; it is the presence 
of conceptual development and continuity that distinguishes 
the history of law from a mere chronicle of Acts. 
13. Harris, "The Concept of Possession in English Law" in 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (ed. by A.G. GUest), 
pp.69-106. 
14. Har;t~ 11The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights", 
(19'+/j-9) 49 Proc. Arist. Soc. 171. Professor Hart's 
view has been effectively criticised by J.L. Mackie, 
"Responsibility and Language••, (1955) 33 Australasian 
J. of Philos. 143, in terms whlch I would generally 
accept and which tend to support my insistence that there 
are general rules and workable definitions or character-
isations creating a 'concept' of possession0 
10 
In law, we have to recognise unity as well as separation, 
the historical development or a system struggling to ac-
c+ate new requirements and competing demands. Litigants, 
in the first place, look not to contract, or tort, or agency, 
or sale, but to the law: it is as aspects of the law that 
its distinct branches have developed; even if we were to 
put aside, for the moment, the extent to which judges 
handing down decisions in one field are influenced by con-
cepts and decisions that they and other judges have laid 
down in another, we can gain full understanding of what 
remain as the specific requirements of specific fields 
only by contrast and comparison with other legal require-
ments and other legal remedies. 
The defect of the traditional writings on posses-
sion is not their search for a rational understanding of 
the law as a whole. Neither were they necessarily wrong, 
simply because their search for such understanding foraed 
them to make a plethora of distinctions. The point is 
rather that these distinctions did not arise convincingly 
out of the course of their wwqnrg111u11'1l:btx argument, but 
confront us as ad hog distinctions, as saving devices, 
forced upon them in the process of fitting their scheme to 
the law. In Salmond, the process of matching his concept-
ual scheme and the law leads to vicious falsification of 
legal developments and decisions; 15 in Pollock, a similar 
process leads to so many modifications and to so mai"1.y con-
trasts between conceptual and 1 legall possession that we 
virtually come to forget the hesistant conceptual analysis 
with which Pollock began. From Pollock, as from the con-
sciously •modern' writers, we end by knowing the rules 
without understanding possession. 
The fault, I should argUe, lies not in the aim 
of reaching a complete theory of possession that Sir John 
Salmond had set himself. The fault lies in his separatinn 
of the analysis of the concept from the study of its work-
ing in the legal system. Concepts are cpncepts in use, 
1possession1 is a term with a certain role. To understand 
possession, we must look, not at the word, but at the way 
in which possession entered our legal system, the parts it 
was called upon to play in it, the character and problems 
of its development.. Ir we do this, I shall seek to show 
in this thesis, we do emerge with a general concept of pos-
session implicitly recognised and applied in our law. Only 
17., Dias arid Hughes find their natural butt in Salmond and 
expose his falsifications in some detail, op. cit., 
p.316 et,seg. See also Glanville L. Williams, "Language 
and the Law - IV", (19!.r;)) 61 L.Q.R. 384 at pp.390-1 and 
(for the distortion of decisions on finding by Salmond 
as well as other writers) A.L. ·Goodhart, nThree Cases 
on Possession", (1928) 3 Cam. L • .J. 195, Essays in Juris-
prudence an<L_~he Com,'llon Law, pp.75-90. 
11 
in terms of such a general concept, I shall argue, can we 
understand the special problems that have arisen in speci-
fie fields. 
One word about the doctrine of stare decisis. 
In any study of the law, as opposed to a mere catalogue of 
decisions, some judgments will be held by the author/ bet-
ter than others, some cases will appear to him wrongly de-
cided. It is one thing to falsify the law; it is another 
to refuse to treat it as a sequence of sacred and immutable 
fiats. In tracing the deyelo~ment of the corw:non law, over 
a period of nearly 900 years, one is concerned with a chain 
of legal reasoning extending over time; the :i!llportance of 
cases is as links in that chain. It is as links that I 
have striven to understand them. The loose ends that need 
to be severed from the chain do not occur (at least in my 
field) as often as one might expect. 
* * 
12 
Writers with a logical or sociological bent 
have frequently sought to gain a preliminary understand-
ing of the concept of possession by contrastL>g it with, 
or relating it to, the concept of awnership. lleither con-
cept, it is clear, can be divorced from social or legal 
sanctions and/or physical powers that establish or protect 
ownership and possession and thus give the terms mea..'ling 
and force. In a society in which no one had or claimed 
the control of anything to the exclusion of others, the 
terms 1 ownership 1 and 'possession' would not be part of 
the language. But in societies where such control is 
found, the two terms will tend to establish themselves and 
to display certain general features that transcend the 
specific arrangements and definitions of any one particul-
ar legal system. One such general contrast suggested by 
the drawing of a distinction between ownership and posses-
sion is the contrast between an ultimate, non-contingent 
right and a limited, temporary and derivative one. This 
contrast, often based on an untecbnical view of Roman Law, 
has occasionally intruded upon the Common Law and has ac-
quired a certain importance in such modern arrangements as 
the registration of title and hire-purchase agreements; 
it does not play, and has not played, any fundamental role 
in the development of the Common Law~ It is also a legally 
13 
sophisticated contrast, moving into the forefront in those 
societies that have economic and legal arrange~ents by 
which ownership and possession frequently part company. 
In early Western societies, as law developed, this was not 
so. There, ownership and possession were normally fused 
in a single person, the owner-possessor who came before 
the law demanding protection or restitution of sanething 
he had held by virtue of unchallenged right and of uncon-
tested physical use and control. The contrast here is the 
more primitive one between 01/lnership as the asertion of a 
right against others and possession as a physical fact, as 
a relation to the thing. That the concepts of ownership 
and possession, in this second sense, arise in law as two 
aspects of a single situation has been emphasised by 
Rudolf von Ihering in a brilliant passage: 
Possession is the objective realisation of owner-
ship. It is in fact what ownership is in right. 
Possession is the de facto exercise of a claim; 
ownership is the de jure recognition of one. A 
thing is owned by me when my claim to it is main-
tained by the will of the State as expressed in 
the law; it is possessed by me, when my claim 
to it is maintained by my own self-assertive 
will. Ownership is the guarantee of the law; 
possession is the guarantee of the facts. It is 
well to have both forms of security if possible; 
and indeed they normally co-exist. But where 
there is no law, or where the law is against a 
man, he mtj.st content himself with the precarious 
security of the facts. Even when the law is in 
one's fava~r, it is well to have the facts on 
14 
one's side also. Beati possidentes. Possession, 
therefore 1 is the de facto counterpart of ovmer-
ship. It is the external form in which rightful 
claims normally manifest themselves. The separ-
ation of these two things is an exceptional incid-
ent, due to accident 7 wrong 7 or the special 
nature of the claim 1n question. Possession 
without ownership is the body of fact, uninformed 
by the spirit of right which usually accompanies 
it. Ownership without possession is right, un-
accompanied by that environment of fact in which 
it normally realises itself. The two things tend 
mutually to coincide. Ownership strives to real-
ise itself in possession, and possession endeav-
ours to justify itself as ownership. The law of 
prescrip~ion determines the process by which, 
through the influence of time, possession without 
title ripens into ownership, and owner~hip with-
out possession withers away and dies.· 
16. Ueber den Grund des Besitzschutzes, p.179. (I cite the 
translation by Salmond, op. cit., pp.311-2.) Holdsworth 
makes the same point in the modern context and less suc-
cinctly: "Modern systems of law regard ownership as the 
relation of a person to a thing which gives to the per-
son indefinite rights enforceable at law to or over the 
thing. When considering a question of ownership we at-
tend not so m~ch to the physical relation between the 
person and the thing, as to the question whether the re-
lation between them has been so constituted that the law 
will annex to it these indefinite rights; for owmership 
is pre-eminentiy a right. Possession, on the other 
hand, expresses the physical relation of control exer-
cised by a person over a thing. The possessor may or 
may not be owner, according to whether or not this 
physical relation of control has been constituted under 
conditions to which the law annexes the rights of owner-
ship. If in all cases where such physical control 
exists the law annexed the rights of ovmership, the law 
relating to possession wrn1ld emerge in the law relating 
to ownership ••• The relationships between persons and 
things grow more complex with the growing complexity of 
social relations; and the law must define the many 
kinds of subordinane control exercised by persons over 
things, which co-exist together with or in opposition 
to the principal control which it calls ownershipo 
Thus we get a law of possession which, both in Roman 
15 
To the corru~on lawyer, Ihering's analysis sdems 
paricularly apt, for it is a;nply confirmed by t:ie earlier 
concept of seisin in the English law. Seisin, says F. 
J~on des Longrais in a great work, 17 n1s an enjoyment per-
vaded by the elements of right, fused with right in all 
its forms and by nature indistinguishable from it.n Such 
fusion of right and enjoyment, expressed in the paradigm 
case of the 0111ner-possessor (as Ihering suggests), is nat-
ural to early law: the situation where enjoyment and right 
to enjoy coincide in a single situation is least disturbing 
to social order and crude conceptions of justice. But 
disturba.~ces do occur: men lose and acquire possession 
through violence, accident, fraud and other wrong. If so-
ciety is to vir:dicate any conception of justice a~ove the 
mere ratification of l!llight, it must recognise and concede 
that enjoyment and the right to enjoy can part company• 
The problems that arise from the possible dis-
junction of enjoyment and the right to enjoy, of possession 
16. (Contd.) 
16 
and in English law, covers many species of subordinate 
control, and exists side by side with a. law of owner-
ship. •t - Historical, Introdu~on to t~e Land Law, ppo123-4., 
La conception sng~~ise de la saisine du XIIe au XIV9 
sHfcle1 vol.I P• :---nc 1est une jouissance toute ii p€netr~e dielements de droit, elle se fond a.vec le 
droit sous toutes des formes, et n'en distingue pas sa 
nature." 
and the right to possess, permit of marked differences in 
legal approach. Ancient Rome, with its tight and author-
itarian familial and social structure, placed primary em-
phasis on the conception of right. Historically, rights 
may have stew.med from possession as right stems from might; 
Raman law is concerned with this only to the extent of per-
mitting the severely restricted procedure of usucapion and 
even then it treats the very candidate under such procedure 
not as a possessor but as a candidate for title. 18 For 
the Roman legislator and jurisconsult, the paradigm right 
to enjoy is absolute title, good against the whole world, 
in principle capable of proof and vindication in court 
without any reference to possession Mi::t:llw whatever. 19 
18. Thus it was essential for possession intended to ripen 
into ownership by usucapian to begin with a iusta causa 
or iustus titulus and for the possessor to have done 
everything in his power to become owner, requirements 
that sharply separate such possession from the posses-
sion recognised by the interdicts (infra). Again, the 
remedy of one who was only in the process of acquiring 
title in via usucapiendi was nevertheless not confined 
to the interdicts but included a special action, the 
actio l?;gbliciana, which must be classed as proprietary: 
sesi Buck~and and Mc11air, Roman Law_ and <f omr:i.ijff: Law (2nd 
ed9 , revised by F.H~ Lawson), esp. pp.6j & 7. 
19. This, of course, is the paradigm; in practice, the 
plaintiff in a vingicatio would normally be justifying 
a ·title open to doubt and might seek to rely on usucap-
ion as well as the reputation of ownership. But usucap-
ion here is a technical mode of proving title, not a 
general claim to rights in virtue of possession and it 
is significant that Roman jurists consider that success 
or failure in a possessory action is no bar to success 
or failure in a proprietary one and ~ca versa. See 
Buckland and McNair, op. £.U,,,, PP• 75- • 
17 
There are rights based on physical possessj"on as well. On 
the one hand, they are sharply marked off from rights based 
on title and are to be established by recourse to quite 
separate remedies, the interdicts; on the other hand, such 
possessory rights do not follow from mere ~hysical control 
but depend on a view of possession that confines it to 
those who in principle could become owners and behave as 
though they were. 20 
In ancient Germanic and early English law, form-
ulated in conditions of a far looser social structure and 
a:mid the far greater prevalence of self-help, might and 
right were and remained more closely linked. Ownership 
did not become clearly divorced from possession; in 
ancient Germanic and English law it was not possible either 
to ga:i.n recognition of a right of ultimate possession good 
against the whole world or to vindicate any right to pos-
sess without reference to possession itself. The primary 
20. Thus, ''no one who has a thing in virtue of a contract 
recognising the ownership of another person can possess, 
and the same is true even of a person who has a real 
18 
right of limited extent, such as usufruot, though such 
persons have quasi-possession, protected by a special 
interdict. There are, it is true, four types of persons 
who are regarded as possessors even though they hold 
under a contract, namely the pledge creditor, the tenant 
for a perpetual or very long term of years, the tenant at 
will, a.11d the stake-holder. But these cases can a:;.:;. be 
explained away on practical or historical grounds. In the 
classical or later laws they must be treated as exceptions~ 
Conversely, the bailor or lessor usually retains possession 
concept - indeed, the only concept available - was the 
concept of seisin, a concept which emphasises that all 
proprietary rights stem from physical possession but also 
insists that these rights can..~ot be destroyed merely by 
destroying possession. In an authoritarian society, 
especially one welded together by the primacy of potestas, 
~ 
the tendency is to derive right from authority; in the 
looser, more make-shift and hence more democratic society 
of central and northwestern Europe the tendency is to 
derive rights from the facts. The man who is seised has 
both possession and right; a right not simply conferred 
by authority, but deriving from the facts and therefore 
seen as part of his seisin. 
The original nature of seisin was obscured from 
view for several centuries by the 15th century developments 
that made 'seisin' a technical term of the law of real 
property, divorced and distinguished from possession of 
chattels. Thus, in 1757, L9rd Mansfield gave this well-
known and long-accepted definition o:f seisin: 21 itSeisin is 
20. (Contd.) 
of the thing . . he has bailed or let:" Buckland and 
McNair, op. cit., P• 73. 
21. Taylor dem, Atk.vns Ve Horde (1757) 1 Burr. 60 at 
at p.107, 97 E.a. 190 at p.216, 2 Sm. L.c., (9th ed.) 
p.6.:13 at p.700. 
19 
a technical term to denote the cOfilpletion of that invest-
1 ture by which the tenant was admitted into the tenure, and 
without which no freehold could be cons ti tu ted or pass. 11 
20 
But this is true, as the subsequent work of ¥..aitland h.as 
taught us to see, only of seisin in and after the 15th 
century. Before that century, seisin was not a term confined 
to freehold land, but was the only term used in law for 
virtually all instances of possession. 22 "[T]!lhmghout the 
22. Joshua Williams 1 Law of Real Property (23rd ed. 1 ed~ by T. Cyprian Williams), p.154': 11Seisin ••• originally 
meant any kind of possession, but was not afterwards 
used to denote any but freehold possession. 1t Pollock 
and Maitland 1 History of English Law, vol.II, pp.31-2: 
"In the first i}lace, it would seem that for at least 
three centuries after the Rorman Conquest our lawyers 
had no other word whereby to describe possession. In 
their theoretical discussions, they, or such of them as 
looked to the Roman books as models of jurisprudence, 
could use the words possessio and possidere; but these 
words are rarely employed in the formal records of liti-
gation, save in one pa!lticular context. The pa~son of 
a church is 'in possession' of the church: - but then 
this is no matter for our English law or our temporal 
courts; :!.t is ma$lter for the canon law and the courts 
Christian; and it is all the more expedient to find 
some other term than 1 seised 1 for the parson, since it 
may be necessary to contrast the rights of the parson 
who is possessed of the church with those of the patron 
who is seised of the advowson. 11 Maitland notes that 
"for a smewhat similar reason it is not uncammon to 
speak of a guardian as having possession of the wardship, 
while the ward is seised of the land@" 
thirteenth century and in the most technical documents men 
were seised of chattels and in seisin of them, of a fleece 
of 'liJ;001 1 of a gammon of bacon, of a penny. People were pos-
sessed of these things; law had to recognise and protect 
their possession; it had no other word than 1 seisin1 and 
therefore used it freely." 23 In the Leges HenriciPrimi, 
in Glanvill, Bracton, Fleta and Britton, in statutes and 
rolls from the times of Richard I 7 Henry III, the three 
Edwards, Richard II and Henry IV, even to the opening years 
of tho reign of Henry VI, we find consistent reference to 
2!+ the seisin of chattels. From about 1443 1 when uncore 
detient comes to supplant the phrase uncpre seisi in res-
pect of chattels, we enter a transitional period. In 
Littleton's Tenures, written between 1l+7l+ and 14-81, the 
distinction between 'seisin' and •possession' familiar to 
later English lawyers was decisively proclaimed: 
when a man [in pleading] will show a feoffment made to him, 
or a gift in tail, or a lease for life, of any lands or 
23. Pollock and Maitland, yol. cit., p.32. 
24. Maitland has presented the detailed evidence in his 
11The Seisin of Chattels"~ (1885') 1 L. QoR• 321+, Collect-
ed Papers, vol.I, at p.3jO. 
21 
tenements, then he shall say, by force of which feoffment, 
gift, or lease, he was seised 1 etg., but where one will 
plead a lease or grant made to him of a chattel, real or 
personal, then he shall say, by force of which he was pos-
sessed, ~.1125 
From the latter half of the 15th century seisin 
becomes an increasingly technical term in the law of real 
property. It is sharply iistinguished 1 as we have seen, 
frnm 'possession' in the law of personal property; as its 
uses become more tech.,ical it is also distinguished, not 
only from the possession of a leasehold but also from the 
1mere 1 possession of land. 26 The later conception of 
seisin thus moves away from the early concept of seisin 
toward a notion of title or right; the connexion between 
25. S.32~; Coke on Littleton, 200ob• 
26. See Holdsworth, op. cit., pp.121-31 7 and consider the pas sage at p.122: "This change in t:erminology is due 
to the fact that the inciden~s of the seisin protected 
by the real actions, particularly the co.~ditions under 
which it could be recovered by these actions, came to 
differ from the incidents of the possession protected 
22 
by personal actionso It is true that, fundamentally, 
the main principles applicable to the seisin of freehold 
estates were then and always have been the same as those 
applicable to the possession of chattelso But for all 
that differences had arisen, CMing to the development 
of these two allied conceptions ir. the sphere of differ-
ent classes of actions, which could be apt;ly represented 
by this differentiation of terminology." See also Holds-
worth, History ot;_ English~ (3rd ed.), vol.iii, pp. 
351-60. 
the early concept of seisin and the later tech.~ical use of 
the word is therefore far less intimate than the connexion 
between the early concept of seisin and the English law 
23 
on possession which came to replace it. For beneath the lcth!r 
distinction between real and personal actions emphasised 
by Holdsworth lay the distinction between actions based on 
right 
!tti:Da and actions based on possession. 
* * 
The social and juridical fu.~ction of the concept 
of seisin in its original form is to serve as a basis for 
resolving the problems that arise when enjoyment and the 
right to enjoyment appear to have parted company. The con-
cept of seisin attempts such resolution without conceding 
in principle that rights to enjoy can be established in-
dependently of enjoyment or can long last without it. 27 
The Roman lawyer, forced to recognise the possible bifurcat-
ion of enjoyment and the right to enjoy, was satisfied to 
look to the question of right, to derive title from p~evious 
title and to fl!'"'"""ft recognise rights flowing frow physical 
possession or enjoyment only in so far as such possession 
24 
or enjoyment could be treated as a (deficient) form of 
ownership, of the assertion of a right. The early English 
lawyer looks primarily to the possession or enjoyment itself 
and sees rights as flowing froo it. The assize of novel 
disseizin, the assize of mort dlancestor and the other 
special assizes that followed all recognise only one ultimate 
27. Thus the right to enjoy (expressed in the ftrm of a right 
of entry) of a person who has been ejected from his land 
lasts only as long as he makes 'continual claim 1 , ice. 
agitates on or about the land. The period for which he 
could do so was always limited, and as soon as it or his 
agitation had expired, he lost any direct right to enjoyment 
a..'ld was left only a right~to an action. 
way of establishing a right to enjoy - that is to show that 
you or your an.cestor had enjoyed before the defendant or his 
ancesto~ and that your enjoyment was taken away unlawfully 
cY \,e.\o.-._ ';jov. \,;1.;,\ -\;""~ ~o +.,1;.e, g.e;~z"' 1'-S ht\r. 
and without your consent3j.. The extent to which rights were 
independent of title (in the sense of rightful claim to the 
enjoyrnent) and seen as flowing from the fact of enjoyment 
alone may be judged from the rights, powers and benefits 
that automatically ac,::rue to the disseisor. 28 He may make 
a feoffment and convey an estate in fee simple even though 
he has disseised a tenant for ltfe; the rights appendant 
to the estate go to him and he forms a stock of descentj 
25 
his heir will inherit the property and his widoww be entitled 
to dower, while if the disseisor be a woman, her husband 
is entitled to curtesy. The ordinary incidents of tenure 
affect the dj.sseisor as though he had been a lawf\tl tenant, 
and if the disseisee die without heir, the land wil1 not 
escheat as long as the disseisor or his stock are seised. 
Bereft of their foundation in enjoyment, rights wither 
and die away. 29 The disseisee can neither make 
28. (1313) Y.B. 6 1 7 Edwo2 (S.S.) 189 1 pe~ Scrope 1 J.: disseisor claimeth fee and right and reehold till 
tort be proven". 
"the 
his 
Partridge v. Strange (15'53) Plowden 77 at p.88, 75' E.R. 
123 at p.140, Mountague, C.J. 1 said: 11At common law, he who was out of possession might not bargain, grant, 
or let his right or title, and if he had done it, it 
should have been void." 
26 
feoffment nor aliena,te the estate; he can .. 'lot assign anifi his 
heirs cannot inherit his right of action or his right of entry 
under continual cle,im; his widow cannot claim dower, and, if 
the disseisee he a woman, her husband is not entitled to 
curtesy. 30 So strong was the refusal to treat a right as 
something abstract, incorporeal and detach.able from physical 
fact 1 that even rights other than the right to enjoy could 
be established at law only by showing that the)',had been 
exercised and enjoyed. 1\s Maitland puts it: 31 
A man is in seisin of land when he is enjoying it 
or in a position to enjoy it; he is seised of an 
advowson (for of 1 incorporeal thingsr there may be 
seisin) when he presents a parson who is admitted 
to the church; he is seised of freedom from toll 
when he successfully resists !ll:mi demand for payment. 
30. Thus, in 1218 1 a plaintj.ff who was seised under a tort;ious 
feoffment succeeder} in novel disseisin against a true 
owner who had disseised the plaintiff; the owner, the 
Court held, 11may pursue in another ·way if he wants to": 
E:vre_Rolls (SQS.m, vol. 53), r10"38o For deta.i],ec1 d.iscussiorJ. 
of the nature of disseisiri cJnd its effects on the rights 
of the parties see ¥mitland, nThe J:l,;ystery of Seisin", 
(1886) 2 I,.,Q.R4 481, Coll. Pan. 1, pp.35'8 et. ses. and 
"The Beatitude of Seisin", ( 1888) 4 L. Q.R.Jit,,if~) Col4 §ap. 1 1 
r;p.l+o7 et seo.1 Ames, "The Disseisin of Chattels", 1 90) 
:; Harv. L.R. 2.j, 313 337, Se 1 e,.m; Essa;ys_.ix+_j,l}"lo-Amer:lc:an Leg~J_I:1i,st2,;ri1 vol. If I,' 5"+1., Lectures on(Leg~l HistQU,, 1, 72i Percy Bordwell, •tPropert;y in CJ;iattels" .1, 191 4)-29 Baw., 
L,,,:Q.. 374,, 5, 01 1 7,',3f; ·,,' ~d, L,, i§h,·,,tw' o',',·,0, d, ',A, Lr7atise on Pos~7$~0n 
ot , pp.4;,r-;6. ~, a:~s'i• ftf m~ df'~~"al!Wo\111~ m"t~~iat' 
-If ~~n~ilui: ~ fi"'{i!'/ t!!ll!ll~ tmligli'!li ~th 'impunit"y enter 
orl' land still vacant after a death, had to recognise the 
passing of a right to seisin to the heir and to make this 
independent of the actual passing of seisin to him. But the 
heir's right was still grounded in his ancestor's seisin ani 
was itself only the right to an action. The same is true of 
the later writs of entry: the demanda11t' s right was grounded 
in his own previous seisin or that of his ancestor (or person 
through whom he claims). 
31., Pollock and Maitland~ vol.. ci;t., p.34. 
The conception that a man may be t possession 1 of a r:lght 
is not psrt of' our modern law; it was part of medieval l1n~ 
precisely because mecii(l"val law saw such rights a.s forms of 
enjoyment and therefore in phys al terms. 
The intimate fusion of right and enjoyment, wi tb 
enjoyment formine the primary ground, comes out in the 
prescribed form of the trtinsf.er of land in ancient German1c 
27 
law. The transferor of land :made a public but oral declaration 
of :tntenti on to transfer, kl:101tm as the sa~. To bee ome 
ff "'i . t• • h''- b ,,., "b 'h e. ec" ve in any way? ne sa.1.a, • aa "o e 1 o.i.".O\vea y 't.1e 
gewerida$ a ritualistic and actual transfer of the la.'1d, 
including the solemn handing over of material representing 
the lax1d and of material symbolising dominium over the land, 
followed by a formal abjuration on the part of the transferor 
a.nd an e.ctual entry on to the land and carrying out of acts 
indicative of ownershlp on the part of the transferee9 3? 
32. See S.E. Thorne, "Livery of Seisin111 (1936) 52 L.Q.R. 347, at pp.348 1 352 1 for a fU11er accrnm" of the early sal~ and ~d ~e}f~:ida and f_?r referen,ce to ~ontinent~l a:nd Er"/'.l ish 
r.,searcn, also Pol.Lock and :!<iaitlanu 1 Jol. {it. pp., 8<+-6. Francis 1'2. Finch in his ari;icle "Se1s in" 1 1919) l+ Cornell L .. Q .. 1 1 accounting for the concreteness or the ritual 
emphasises the need in early law for "some visible and 
suggestive ceremony which the 'crr.nsaction witnesses san see 1 
which they can accurately and readily remember and which 
supplies the want of record and of writings" (at p,,2) 1 and 
tre.ces the effects of this requirement of visibiJJ.ty on all 
branches of law, dominated as they were, by the doctrin'3 of 
seisin. But, as I suggest below, the valuable point that 
rights had to vislbly ex"Pressed must be supplemented by 
the recognition that rights stemmed from enjoyment. 
26 
The English caun.terpart of these ceremonies 1 the feoffment axid 
livery of seisin, brings out the same point; one cannot 
tra.nsfer a right to enjoy w:l thout transferring with lt the 
actual physical enjoyment on which it is based. The tr;;tnsfer 
of the enjoyment, may, when the law permits 1 be symbolic, but 
what is syrobolis is the tre.nsfer of actual enjoyment and 
the transfer of a right to enjoy. Fer j.t is not only that 
early rmanic and medieval Engljsh m.an cannot conceive of 
disembodied right; it is also that he insists that right 
car.:not come into being or be transferred without the enjoyment 
on which it rests. 
Seisin, then, i'or all its incorporatior1 of a concept 
of right, is enjoyment. In asking whether a man has seis:t.n, 
we ask whether he has actual physical enjoyment; in transf'el'.'"ring 
seisin we transfer actual physical enjoyment. Logically 1 
seisin incorporates right only because in English law enjoyment 
immediately and d:Lrectly gives rise to right, at the least to 
the right of peaceful and quiet enjoyment against the t spasser 
and the thief'. It is precisely because the concept of seis 
!!£!;. founded on right that the thief himself can have have 
se1sin; it is because all p:;:<oprietary and possessory rights 
ultimately stein from enjoyment that seisin lies at the very 
root of the development of the English law of property. 
The logical implication of even fundamental concepts 
used in the law can be obscured or distorted by the social 
climate in which the law operates. In the 12th century this 
might almost have occurred. The writ of right was in form 
a 1droitut•a1 1 writ in which the demandant's pleading alleged 
tts. f:rrt, re d~ ~ec to 
a claim in dominico suo ut de foedo et iure; I. it vias brought 
in the Court Baron of the lord under whom the land was held, 
where the righ'c could presumably be traced to j.ts source in 
feudal authority and not simply in actua.l possession. The 
assize of novel disseisin, on the other hand, specifi.cally 
focused attention on the fact of possession, and was tried 
in the Ro;j;!al Courts. For a space of years this distinction 
may well have carried within it the seeds from which a 
distinction between proprietary and possessory actions in the 
Roman sense might arise. But the comparative lack and 
29 
ur,.reliabili ty of records, the effect of the statutes of 
limitation in confining the tracing of rights '<!ithin a eertain 
period, and the fact that the tenant to a writ of right could 
not plead a jus tertii, all combined, even within this wi•it 1 
to bring the claim back to evidence that the demandant or his 
ancestors had enjoyed seisin, collected rents and profits and 
had been wrongfully deprived by the tenant or his ancestors. 
11..,;;l Wl'or> '~ tnt<J 
At the same time, further assizes~were'being created - assizes 
IAlll~ INr;b 
/..that invaded more and more of the grou.nd covered by the wrii; 
of right while insisting even more firmly that the only basis 
of right was seisin, recent or remote. The writ of rj.ght, 
being the most technical and cumbersome of the real actions, 
full of essoins and liable to interminable delays through 
vouchers to wa.rranty - fell into disuse and the doctrine that 
30 
seisin was the bas 
established. 33 
of right was thus even more firmly 
~'he fact tha.t seisin was fundamentally enjoyment and 
that right could arise only from enjoyment is fully confirmed 
by all the best-known rules of the law of real property, 34 
is by the r,z,tui·e of the protection g:i_ven to chattels in 
early English law. The anc:tent remedy by self-help, the 
raising of l:rae and cry, could onJ y be used by him who had been 
in possession; trespass 1ay only for him who was in possession, 
and even the bailer-at-will could only sue under the ficticn 
that he h.<td possession. When the 19th century reformed the le:w 
of real property to allow rights to exist and to pass 
33. There must r.aturally hE been some tension between whs.t one 
might call the pol1 tic ally democratic concept of seisi.n and 
the importance in feudal society of acquiring grants or 
enfeoffments from feudal superiors. There is little doubt 
that the c.herter of a great baron and the charter, word or 
deed of the King success.fuJ.ly put an end to rival claims. 
But the interesting point is that such feudal acts clo not 
seem to become part of the law as a system; they rather 
suspend legal process J. putting aI1 end to litigation by the 
authority of power. l!iVen later, when th6 law of real 
property had come to recognise rights existing independently 
of enjoyment, the inferiority of 'seisin in deed' to 'seisin 
in fact• shows the continuing weakness of right sans enjoyment 
within the law. This Brac'ton, who recognised a very high 
degree of royal power, but strove to bring as much of this 
power as possible wit~ the law, wrote that royal charters 
may be questioned by no justice or private person and that 
questionable interpretation alleged falsificaiions and 
erasures must be brought coram ipso rege: see B. 1 34t II, 109-10 1 and for a general discussion. S.J.T. M111er1 1 The Position of the King in Bracton and E~aumanoirn, (1~56) 31 
Sveculum 263. 
This is the very theme of Joshua Williams t Sti,~lin of. the 
""feehold a,nd of John M. L1ghtwood 1s TreatJse on 'f'ossession 
_Land, where ample confirrrmtion may be found., 
independently of possession35 it thereby revolutionised 
the fundamental part of that law. 
* * 
The 15th century device of conveying land to X to the 
use of Y (in o:rdeB to avoid feudal disabilities, dues 
and other incidents of tenure) created a situa~ion in 
which Equity but not Common Law came to recognise a 
right to seisin independently of having been put in 
seisin. The 16th century Statute of Uses, permitting 
greater freedom of open conveyance at the price of 
registration and payment of dues, sought to reunite 
seisin and right by giving the seisin to Y, but in 
doing so was in fact conceding a certain priinacy of 
r:tght. The ir,volved history of its effect on the law, 
and its failure in the long run to maintain the union 
of seisin and right is traced in Plucknett, A Goncise 
History of the Common Law (5th ed.), chapter 7 and 
Holdsworth, Hist. .tntrQQ,, to the Land Law 1 Pi'" 151-66~ 
31 
The early history of se in, then, shows us 
that seisin is enjoyment from which, simply because there 
is enjoyment (no matter whether rightful or wrongful), 
certain rights immediately follow. The enjoyment that 
lies at the heart of seisin is not seen as the exercise 
of a legal ri,ght or as a legal relation: it is recognised 
by law as ~ simply a fact~6 The man seised of land 
32 
or a thing stands in a relation to that land or thing that 
can be understood quite independently of law: he manages, 
uses, controls and deals with it; in doing so, he is assert-
ing his power of control and enjoyment and excl~des others 
from usurping it. Until someone successf'ully usurps such 
power, he has and remains in seisin; if he is unable to 
gain or maintain such power, he has no seisin. 
36. Thus in the assizes based. on disseisin a..'1d in the action 
of trespass based on possession all that the demandant 
or plaintiff had to shaw was that he had been in seisin; 
how he had acquired this seisin had no relevance (see~ 
~~' the case from the Eyre Rolls cited in footnote jO, 
sµpra). Most writers on possession in the English law. 
recognise that the Courts have been primarily concerneo 
with asking whether there~ possessior.; some writers, 
however, recognising that it is the acquisition or loss 
of possession that brings cases to court, have falsely 
concluded that English courts judge possession in terms 
of the question: 1Had the man before us .€!£9Uired possessior:.?1 • 
But in fact? the assizes and the action of trespass encouraged 
the courts "to do no more than look at a p:st static situati.on 
and rest content with evidence that the man was exercising 
~ontrol, harvesting, collecting rents, et~. before the 
interference. 
The enjoyment which the 13th and 1 li-th centuries 
called seisin, men to-day call possession. The 15th century 
changes that substituted 1possession 1 for 1seisin 1 in the 
33 
law relating to chattels were in this area purely linguistic: 
the 'possession 1 of a chattel in 151 O d.iffers in no way 
from the 'seisin' of a chattel in 1420. Enjoyment or seisin 
is possession in the common intondment of the word; from 
now on we shall cal1 it possession. 
Lawyers do not always use words in their corrJllon 
intendment. But possession, we have striven to show, did 
not enter English law as a technical concept or term of 
art. It entered the law as what Kocourek haooptly called 
an 'infra-jural relation137, as a fact of life which the 
law recogn:i.ses and protects merely as a fact of life. 
'.:;he rights wh:lch the law awards do not constitute possession, 
but are awarded because of it. As Holmes puts it: 38 
Every right is a consequence attached by the law 
to one or more facts which the law defines ••• 
When a group of facts thus singled out by the 
1aw exists in the case of a given person, he is 
said to be entitled to the corresponding 
rights ••• The word 1possess1on' denotes such a 
gro1xpc. of facts. Hence, when we say a man has 
37. Kocourek, Jural __ Relations, esp, at pp.307-9, 315, 1~10-3 
and 419-200 
38. Holmes 1 The G9]11T:on L~ 1 at P• 21l+o 
possession1 we affirm directly that all the facts 
of a certain group are true of him, and we convey 
ind.irectly or by implication that the law31ffill give hit1 the advantage r of the situation. 
To say that possession is a fact and that legal 
rights fol:.ow only after such poss.ession is not to deny 
that there is interaction between physical facts and situ-
ations created by law. The sanctions against trespass 
and the general public respect for them may be as much 
part of a rnan1 s physical control of his land or cl:'.attels 
as the fact that he keeps a large and savage dog trained 
to attack strangers. But their role in the fact of posses-
sion is not their legality but their effectiveness as a 
form of physical control; just as illegal incursions may 
destroy the fact of a man's possession, so illegal sanctions 
l l t . .... . it may ,1e. p o main ca1n • 
39. HoJ.mes 1 use of the term 1 advantage 1 , like the identifi-
cation of seisin and possession with enjoyment, suggests 
that possession normally appears in the law as a bene-
fit and not as a burden. This, of course 1 is not so, 
as our discussion afi bai lment below will il'll:ttJD:t.i:n!:x 
indicate. In the relevant tortj.ous actions, too, the 
plaintiff finds it oo cessary to prove a nexus between 
the defendant and the object causing harm: normally 
this is possession. Thus, in the cases of liability 
for damage done by animals where the scienter rule 
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applies, only those who have possession-control of the 
a.YJ.imal can be liable:. North v. Wood (1914] 1 K.B. 629; 
fott v. London County CounCll' [193lt] 1 K.B. 126; a~mo:id,~Law of To:ts_(12thTt;id. 1 :~·by R.F¢V. Reuston), P•?91, a.nd G.L. Williams, ,;.,J.abJ.lJ.-cv for Ani_mals, pp.32lf-6. 
In the early law, then, possession was simply 
the 1 infra-jura1 1 fact of effective occupatton or control, 
accepted by the law as a fact fuYJd protected accordingly. 
Only when the factual situation gave no guidance, when 
neither party ha.d succeeded in making its occupatian 
effective and excluding the other, did the law resolve 
uncertainty by calling in extraneous right and making 
· f lJ +•.t1e. 40 • • 'h 1 1 · possession o .av1 v.c ~ ,.s .1.ong as i:; e aw was pr mari-
ly concerned with comparatively simple issues of seisin 
and disseisin 1 the elements that might make up occupation 
and control were not much to the fore: a man either was 
or was not on the land, he held the chattel or he did not. 
But as cases accu.'11Ulate, and as soci life grows in 
complexity, issues of possession confront the courts in 
more complex and varied guises; whether a given group of 
facts constitutes 1the fact of possession• no longer appears 
so simple. 
The development from here on may take different 
paths. The law may simply convert 'possession' into a term 
of art, leaving behind the fact and common intendment and 
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4o. The principle is stated, and its application carefully 
limited1 in Littletont s.701. See also Maule, J. 1s well-kno•m d:tctmn in Jones V• CW,mgan (1847) 2 Ex. 803, at 
J?.821 and, for a recent dtscussion, Wuta-Ofti,_Y,,_11,q_nguah 
L1961] 3 A.E.R. 596. 
treating possession more and more as a legal relation to 
be imposed on the facts according to definition a.~d con-
i r l " ~ • ' fi i ti d · · th n ven ence o , aw, .:>ucn ae n_ . on an c onven.ience may ei 
vary from. one branch of the la''' to another. Alternatively, 
the legal development may lead simply to a deepening anal-
ysis and fuller appreciation of the limits and implications 
of the cO!lLmon intendment of the term, to an awareness of 
the :11m~b:lcti:m complexity of the :tacts which recognises 
the need for fixing brymdaries and stipulating require-
ments without thi:r.king that these are just arbitrarily im-
posed on the facts. 
'wvhich of these paths has been taken, we can tell 
only by look:i.ng at the law. 
36 
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2i THE POSSESSIOii~ OF SERVAN'.I:S 
The possession of servants is normally regarded 
as excellent, even if limited, ground for distinguishing 
between 1physical' or de. facto possession and 'legalt 
possession. The seemingly different principles applied 
to servants receiving from their masters and servants re-
ceiving from strangers, and the development of these 
predominantly in the context of larceny, have been taken 
as evidence for the further proposition that 'legal 1 
possession is not a single concept, but has different 
meaning and cri terj"a in different contexts. 1 In begin-
ning with the possession of servants, then, we appear to 
be beginning with an area in which the fact of posses-
sion - 1possession' in its common intendment - as ex-
pressed in the early concept of seisin has little bearing 
on subsequent development and the present position. 
1. See,~., JosephW. Bingham, "The Nature and Importance 
of Legal Possession11 (in two parts), (1911J.5) 13 Mich. L. 
Rev.S35' & 623 and Burke Shartel, 11The Meanings of Pos-
session", (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 611, as well as Dias 
and Hughes and D.R. Harris among the writers on posses-
sion cited in the Introduction. The possession of ser-
vants is treated as ground for distinguishing 'possession 
in fact' from 1 legal possession' in Paton's A Text-Boo~ 
of Jurisprudence (chap. XXII) and elevated into a special 
kind of possession - 'mediate' possession, not entirely 
~~)~ricted to servants, by Salmond (lurisprudenc~, chap. 
39 
The traditional law of larceny requires the 
taking of the property in question from the possession of 
another. 2 It is for this reason and in this connexion 
that courts from early times have had to apply their 
minds to the question whether the g©ods a servant holds 
for his master are in the possession of the servant or of 
the master. The question at issue is stated, with admir-
able clarity, in a 15th century Year Book: 
If a taverner serve a man with a piece, and he 
take it away 1 it is felony, for he had not pos-
session of this piece; for it was put on the 
table but to serve him to drink: and so it is 
of my butler or cook in my house j they are but 
ministers to serve me, and if they carry it away 
it is felony, for they had not possession, but 
the possession was all the while in me; nut 
otherwise peradventure if it were bailed to the3 servants, so that they are in possession of it. 
2. It also requires an intention to stea+ whtlch must not 
be formed lajer than the moment of taking. The need 
for action against persons who receive lawfully, or 
take without felony or by mistake, and then convery 
against the owner's title has led to such technical 
devices as the doctrine at breaking bulk, the doctrine 
of continuing trespass, the dev~lopment of larceny by 
a trick and the distinctions associated with mi: accident-
al mistake in the 'letter cases 1 • It has also led to 
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the statutory definition of larcen3 to include convers-
ion by a bailee (20 & 21 Viet. c. 54-, s.,4, substituted by 
24 & 25 Viet. c.96 1 s.3, now Larceny Act, 1916, s.1). What s1gnifi.cance possession retains in these various 
circumstances - circumstances which reflect a develop-
ment toward treating larceny as an offence against t~tle -
is discussed in Part III below. Here we are concerned 
with larceny only in so far as it focuses attention on 
the question of posstission. . . c .. _1 
3 44 [{\-~"~· b" Je1~,.,,~ t\.aJl, ~Q(\-, lal<.l llwl ..::>oo.il.r-t , )wl<.l!.,PP· • (1 7) Y.B~ 49 Hen.4. Mich. pl.9,( Tlie same view had been 1-~ 
taken in 1353, 27 Lib. Ass. pl.39 (tra.~s. by c.s. Kenny, 
The distinction made here is between the bailee, who has 
possession, and that lawi'ul recipient who has no possession, 
who is but a user or a 'minister to serve•. That one who 
holds in his hand, or keeps in his charge, may not have 
possession seemed quj.te clear to the judges; though in 
subsequent cases they often express this as if. it were a 
matter of law, there is no reason for supposing that they 
had initially accepted the ~:bm: principle as a technical 
deviation from common sense or the common usage of 1posses-
sion. t Possession, even to the rudest mind, is not invar-
iably synonymous with a physical holding. As Stephen puts 
it: l+ 
The distinction between a charge and possession 
readily suggested itself. A man who tells his 
servant to hold his horse for him, or who allows 
his guest to drink out of his cup in his pre-
sence, was felt to retain his control over the 
horse or the cup as much as if he held the 
bridle or the cup in his own hand, and it was 
agcordingll asserted that if the servant in the 
one case, or the guest in the other, made away 
with the thL11g in his char~e 1 he was guilty of 
theft. [Italics added.] 
As the 1 accordinglyt suggests, the law is thus far still 
following com.milm factual distinctions. In 1488, it is 
3. (Contd.) 
Select Cases on Criminal Law, 7th ed., p.,219) 1 where a guest in the house of a rich man removed sheets and 
linen given to him to sleep in to the hall with intent 
to steal them. 
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!+., Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol.. III, 
p.151. 
true, Brian, C.J., and his associate judges set their face 
against this distinction, and held - despite the success 
of previous prosecutions - that a servant who had charge 
of a thing could not commit felony of it: 
HUSSEY put a question. If a shepherd steals the 
sheep which are in his charge, or a butler the 
plate which is in his charge, or servants other 
things which are in their charge, whether it 
shall be called felony. And he cited a case 
which was, that a butler had stolen certain stuff 
which was in his charge, and was hanged for it. 
HAUGH (J.) cited the case of Adam Goldsmith of 
London, who had stolen certain stuff which was in 
his charge, and was hanged for it. 
BRIAN (C.J.) - It cannot be felony, because he 
could not take vi et armis, because he had charge 
of it. And the justices w're of the same opinion, 
and so no discussion, etc. 
Brian, C.J.ts difficulty was most probably visual: though 
he would have realised well enough that vi et a:rrois no 
longer required force or violence, he would probably have 
thought of it as Xl!!'lppl: requiring a tangible, visible act 
of disseisin. The subsequent cases do not attempt to 
meet his objection, as one could meet it, by arguing that 
a servant•s actions may violate his charge, and show that 
he has disseised by ceasing to hold for his master and 
beginning to hold for himself. Instead, they simply 
ignore(: his objection and reaffirm the distinction between 
him who is given possession and him whp is but a user or 
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minister to serve, the latter being but an instrument of 
another's possession. But the problem of the servant qua 
servant was still left open: he may be but a minister to 
h b b il f hi t 6 By 1~06 i·t serve or e may e a a ee rom s mas er. j 
was held unequivocally that property in or about the house 
of the master is in his possession and that his servant 
has mere custody in or charge over this property and is 
!J.Uilty of felony if he convert it: 
Pigot, an apprentice-at-law, asked this question 
of Cutler, a Serjeant: - If I deliver a silver 
ring to my servant to keep, and he flees away 
from me and takes the ring, will this be felony? 
Cutler: It will. For so long as he is in my 
house or in my service, whatever I have deliver-
ed to him is held to be in my p©ssession. Thus 
if my butler, who has my plate in his custody, 
goes off with it, this is felony. And the law 
is the same if he who has charge of my horse 
goes off with it. The reason is that the things 
continued all the while, to be in my own possession. 
But if I deliver to my servant ••• a ring to take 
to London, and he goes off with it; there is no 
felony. For it was no longer in my possession 
and he caine by it lawfully. 
Pigot: A right distinction; for in the latter 
case the master has a good right of action against 
6. It was xl:mx left thus open in the Carrier's Case, (1473) 
Y.B. 13 Ed>'1.l+~ f.9, Pasch. pl.'.), where the Year Book 
passage (1~47J was cited with apparent approval. 
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him 1 in detinue or in account.7 
Possession, then, is not manual detention; in 
the case of cha~tels, it is rather control. There is 
nothing peculiarly 1 legal' or technical in such a viewo 
People do not normally keep their belongings chained to 
their lnrt:!rks wrists; cases of such pure physical detent-
ion rarely confront the law. Men keep their belongL~gs 
in their houses, their city offices and in their yard; 
to-day, they leave their cars in the street, in former 
times they grazs'!.their horses in the field and their sheep 
on the c0111mon~ Such things are in their possession because 
and as long as it is they who rr:aintain effective control 
over them. A man does not necessarily lose this control 
by using another person as an instrument or means, whether 
he be in my house or 1 in my service 1. As Pollock puts 
44 
7. (1506) Y.B. 21 :a:en .. 7, Hil. pl.21 (Kennyt Select Cases, 
p .. 216). Pigot is a muddled student; his final argument 
is circular: the masterts right does not justify Cutler's 
decisiont it depends on it. The view put by Gutier is 
elaborated EJt in Coke 1 Third.Jnsti tute§, 108: 1' lT]here is a diversity be11Ivreen a possession and a charge; for 
when I deliver goods to a man, he hath the possession of 
the goods and may have an action of trespass or an ap-
peal, if they be taken or stolen out of his possessionj 
but my butler or cook, who in my house hath the charge 
of my vessel or plate, hath no possession of them, nor 
shall have an action of trespass or appeal as the bailee 
shall, and therefore if they steal the plate or vessel it 
is larceny, ax1d so it is of a shepherd; for these things 
be ili o~erelnet 112n in.~61l)e§§_:i,.Q);'"e pr,i, coci, pauor;l,, 
etc,.' c,f. on,.ymous (1 "!- Kely. 35', 4 3.:a. 1070, whl!'l's 
a workman coming to work in the nouse of a silk throwster 
•t 8 l • 
• 
If we regard acts according to their apparent 
intent and effect, as measured by the common 
llnowledge of mankind, we can hardly say that a 
groom exercising his master's horse is even in 
de facto possession of the horse. He is in 
appearance as much as in fact, in fact as much 
as in law, the master's instrument for exercis-
ing the master's power. There is no appearance 
of acting on his own behalf9which could mislead a,man of ordinary judgment. 
That this is also the line talten at law, is again re-empha-
sised by Gould 1 J., in 1789: 10 
••• in the case of a butler, or other servants, 
to whose care a master entrusts his plate or 
7. (Contd.) 
was held to have only custody of silk given him to work 
on. Coke's attempt to linlc absence or presence of posses-
sion with the right to an action of trespass or appeal of 
larceny raises certain difficulties discussed later in 
this section. 
8. Pollock and Wright, PQssess.ion in the Common Law, p.18. 
9. "The same," Pollock continues 1 anticipating the legal development traced below, 11may be said of a gardener at 
a country house when the house is left empty, of a 
tradesman's messenger driving a cart with the tradesman 1 s 
name on it, of a porter in the service of a railway 
company or other carrier handling goods in transit, and 
the like." Pollock is concerned to argue - not implaus-
ibly - that possession is pretected in English law because 
it is apparent or prima facie ownership; he therefore 
rightly regards the servant's lack of possession as no 
anomaly in the law not only because it corresponds to 
people's ordinary judgment, but ,also because 11a servant•s 
custody is often so manifestly exercised not on his own 
account but on his master 1 s that it has no colour of 
apparent ownership." 
10.Ro v. Wilkins (1789) 1 Leach 520 at p.)23, 168 E.R. 362 
at p.363J}. 
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other goods, it has uniformly been held, that [ i] 
such servants are gu1hlty of felony by embezzling 1 
such plate or goods1 or taking them fraudulently away: and this doc~rine is not confined to 
menial servants only; for it appears both by 
Hale and Hawkins, that if a shepherd, who hes 
the care of sheep, and who, from the nature of 
his employment, must be constantly in the 
pastures, take away any part of the flock with 
intent to steal it, he is guulty of felony 
although in both cases the plate is actualiy 
delivered to the butler,and the sheep to the 
shepherd, for the possession still remains in 
the master. And this law prevails in all cases 
where servants have not the absolute dom:L"lion 
over the property 2 but are only entrusted with the care or custody of it for a particular 
purposec 
The final sentence, though too imprecise to serve as a 
statement of the law, nevertheless correctly brings out thet 
the law must pass, by its own logic, beyond the rough-and-
ready distinction between servants in or about the house 
and those abroad. For this distinction is nothing but an 
11. The modern statutory offence of embezzlement was created 
ten years later. llp to that time, the term •embezzle• 
or 'imbezzle 1 had been used in some statutes as a synomyn 
ff5s~)r3~n~1~i.~,s~~5~~1~~1in&(~~26lr~2:e~:~5,c(~?o1) 
1 Anne, c.18), and in others - statutes of very limited 
reference leading toward the new offence - as a synomyn 
for whet was more generally called 1purloiningl from a 
master, where the possession of the object maz have lain 
in the servant. (The latter include (1742) 1,- Geo .. 2, 
c.13, directed at officers and servants of the Bank of 
England1 (1751) 24 Geo.2, co11, s.3, directed at servants 
of the 8outh Sea Company and (1765) 5 Geo.3, c.25, relat-
ing to employees of the Post Office.) Here, Gould, J., 
is using j~e term as meaning larceny by a servanto 
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approach to the central criterion, na.'l!ely, whether in the 
relevant situation, the servant is or is not the mere 
instrument of his master 1 s control aver the chattel. 
The issue of control underlies the early law 
cited above; it comes out most clearly as Ji.h!l. fundamental 
criterion for deciding whether the servant has .possession 
or a charge in those cases where the master has delivered 
goods to the servant. The implied presumption that the 
servant qua servant is there to execute his master•s will 
as an instrument emerges slowly in the law; 12 the crucial 
12. In this respect the legal development fails to support 
Holmes t well-known contention that such dicta as t the 
servant 1 s possession is the master1 s possession' are re-
lics of the servant's earlier status as a slave (The Ogm-
mon Lawj Lect.VI 1 p.226 et seq.) and of the authoritarian househol.d reflected in the patria notestas and the frith-
~ or frarJtpledge (''Agencyn, (1890-1) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 
j~}-64). English law, on the contrary, appears to begin 
with specific situations of control or lack of control 
and to work only slowly toward considering the position 
of the servant qua servant. This is an interesting 
contrast to the political climate; as Professor C.B. 
Macpherson has shown, even the Levellers, the most rad-
ical of the 17th century's radical parties, excluded 
servants and aL"lls-talters from their demand for universal 
suffrage on the ground that these had forfeited their 
birthright as free-born Englishmen by surrendering their 
will to their employers or those who support them: 
The Political Theor of Possessive Individu lism: 
HObl:ieS to Locke, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 19 2, pp.123-l+, 
146, 282r. Holmes admits a certain rationality in 
treating the servant in or about the house as a mere 
instl'Ulllent and regards the later extension of thlts to 
servants receiving from their masters and taking abroad 
as lll1!.liwRl~ undermining the pseudo-rational form that 
earlier cas had given to the servile status of the 
servant• The Common Law, p4 226. But when he says 
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question whether the master :tn delivering to his servant 
surrendered sufficient of his control to make that delivery 
a bailment was recognised om the start. Imp1ied in this 
latter u1®mBtt recognition is the legal principle that a 
master ~ fUlly control a thing through the manual con-
trol of his servant: that so-called 1mediate 1 possession 
is simply possessionQ 13 The vacillations of the earlier 
law concerning the servant dealing with his masterts 
chti;ttels outside the master's house and yard are thus not 
doubts about •mediate' possession as such, but doubts 
about the continuation of the master's control. It was 
12. (Contd.) 
that "the servant has as much the inient to exclude the 
world at large as the borrower11 , treating this as a 
test of possession (p.227) 1 theni even if we accepted 
this as sufficient test, we shou d have to say that the 
servant gua servant cannot and does not exclude the 
master in the way in which the borrower can and does 
exclude the lender ~ill the loan be determined. 
13~ Gordon v. Harper (1796) 7 T.R. 9 at p.12, 101 E.R. 828 
at p.829, per Gorse, J.; Ward Macaul~ (1791) 4 T.R. 
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489 a~ p.490 100 E.R. 113 , peK Buller J.; Warg v. 
Turner (1752) 2 Ves. Sr. 4 11 2 E.R. 2??; East, Pleas 
of the Crown, vol.2, p.)64 .£.1,_!U!..Q.. The force of the 
finding that the servant".has no possession has been sl!Lght-
ly obscured by the common formulation: 11The servantts 
possession is the master• s possession°. The son, under 
simimar direction and control, also has no possession, 
"being to this purpose as his father's servant": ner 
Holt,, C.J., in an Anon:rmous Case (undaJ;ed) 1 Salk.~9, 
91 E.11. 25b; R.. "· Fo..,\\\!.i (tf7S) J~ w ~. l\)...b3; ~" ().d'U '"' \1ii:L Cofru:'1~. er tll(K <:d ,Sliiitv,i' .\b .\I~ ~l\:'.i:<J ~J~oM~ u.n1/1i.:kA. 
fin 'rnAldt_'\\.ill\"' di,a.1 i;Mg ~:1w ~i!l.111'4 ll,IM~t:::i .. :::. t 'lM tflitO'iAe/1 1£- \i1u ~Q~\ l 1\M. V\IJi.IWi~ '!>.I.I- R. )"_s;: VirJ: c .Clb, .S..~), 
establ:tshed that a servant who, by the nature of his em-
ployment, would regularly deal with his master's chattels 
outside the house, away from his direct supervision but 
not far from it(~., a shepherd), had no possession but 
only a charge; it was also established that delivery to 
a servant of the master's horse to ride to market, of the 
master's goods to carry to another town, or of money to 
buy goods, did pass possession to the servant.14 The 
rationale of these groupings is that of control: in days 
when social life was unsettled and communications were 
slow, effective control of either persons or things was 
not thought of as extending far beyond a man•s porch. 
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Between the groupings there remained an area of 1.ulcertainty. 15 
From the beginning of the 18th century, the 
principles governing whether a servant who has received 
chattels from his master has possession of them become 
clearer. The courts now consistently find larcm:ty against 
14 .. (1!ii'.lf.) Y.B. 21 Heno7 1 14, pl,,21; Case (16o4) 13 Coke 07 at p.69 , 
and authorities cited therein. 
15. The uncertainty is especially disturbing bece:use there 
was no criminal action lying against a servant convert-
ing property of which he had lawfUl possession. The 
piecemeal legislation beginning with 21 Hen.8, c.7 
(the Embezzlement Act of 1529), providing remedy in lim-
ited circumstances, culminated in the statute of 1799 
that created the modern crime of embezzlement. The 
history of this development and its effects, if any, on 
the concept of possession are discussed below. 
a servant who converts chattels which the master has allow-
ed or instructed him to take from the master's premises in 
the master's interest; even where the servant is allowed 
a wide discretion in dealing with the thing on his mastert s 
16 behalf possession is not taken to pass. Traditionally, 
there was a point where the mere width of the discretion 
was held to create a bailment: masters of ships were a.1-
ways held to have bailment of the ship and cargo from the 
owners whose servai1ts they were. 17 That these decisions 
an 
should not have been treated as creating/isolated technic-
al rule, but are to be understood as applications of the 
central cviterion of control in possession was brought out 
in 1927 in the case of The Juoiter18 , where Hill, J., 
16. Cf. Pollock, Law of Torts (15th ed., ed. by P.A. Landon, 
195$): "Perhaps the best reason why a bailee-at-will 
should have possession and a servant should not is thft 
the bailee, while the bailment lasts, can deal with the 
thing in any way con.sistent with his contract~ while 
the servant must de11,:j. with a thing in his custody ac-
cording to h;j.s master's will, not the less so because 
that will may be and often is to give the servant some 
discretion" (at p.259). 
17. Pitt v. Gaince (1700) 1 Salk. 10, 91 B:.R. 10 1 1 Ld Raym. 5'58, 91 E.R. 1272 and Moore v. Robinson (1831) 2 B. & 
Ad. 817, 109 E.R. 1346. 
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18. [ 1927] P. 122: "In former days, when the master on a 
foreign voyage passed altogether beyond the control of 
the owners, and. perhaps sold the outward cargo and bought 
a homeward cargo on the owners 1 account, it might be 
possible to regard him as a bailee of ship and cargo ••• 
But to the conditions of modern commerce these consider-
ations are quite inapplicablea('* n·\'!>l).In Noore v. Robinson 
I J -" ' 
treats the greater control exercisable in modern cond:i.tions 
as reason for rejecting the authroity of the previous cases 
and finding that the master of a ship now has only the 
custody of the ship and cargo. 
The precise criteria of control to be applied in 
doubtful or borderline cases of delivery by the master are 
not the subject of clear authority. I should lili:e to sub-
mj.t the following rationale of the way the decisions tend: 
so long as the servant's actions in relation to a thing 
are part of the master 1 s use or enjoyment of the thing, of 
his continuous dealing with it, the thing remains in the 
master 1 s possession. It is not the recipient's (possibly 
very limited) discretion, but his ability, within :lz;!aese 
limits, to deal with, use or enjoy the thing in his own 
interest that distinguishes the bailment from a custody or 
charge. The bailor, in creating a baj.lment 1 creates an 
area in which the bailee can exclude him frcm dealing with, 
18. (Contd.) 
supra, where the preliminary issue was whether the master 
of a canal boat who hired and paid a single assistant 
had possession of the boat to sustain his action for 
trespass, counsel for the defendant had sought to dis-
tinguish the case from Pitt v. Gaince, supra, on the 
ground that that case had involved "the master of a 
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ship, laden, and ready to sail for Dantzick". Such a 
master might have full powers and authority conferring 
possess:i.on upon him; these powers should not be imputed 
~o the master of a canal boat who was but a mere servant, 
liJo:e \;he car~er who drives a cart 11 The Court held the 
plaintiff to nave been entrusted with the management of the 
vessel with a man under him and therefore found the cases 
to be not distinguishable. 
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using or enjoying the thing, as long as the bailment lasts.19 
There is, thus, the vanishing point which the bailment 
approaches when it is a bailment for safe-keeping purely 
in the interests of the bailor; such a lbailment• may be 
held a £charge~ and not pass possession even though the 
•bailee' does not stand in the relationship of servant to 
the 'bailor•. 20 In general, where the recipient is a 
servant, the court will presu.me that there is no bailment 
unless there is evidence that the·::Inaster did not give it to 
the recipient in his character as servant or that the master 
specifically wanted possession to pass. 21 Conversely, 
19. 
200 
It is in this light that the 'interest• of the bailee is 
to be understood. He need npt have any enjoyment from 
the thing his own interest may lie simply in dealing 
w::l.th the lhurden1 according to his own convenience., 
See, ~o, the facts of Ancona v 9 Rogers (1876) 1 Ex. Div. 285, especially as discussed by ~.e111sh~ L.J., at pp.290-1. 
Thus, the Court in Bloss v, aolma!;;I {158ti) Qwen 52, 7~ E.R. 
8(93, said: H ••• the law will not presUllle that the goods 
given into the hands oilr the servant] were out of the 
possession of the (master].» But "the mere fact of service 
does not prevent the servant from playing a different part 
at the same time increspect of." other relations,. A servant 
who takes his masterts things in a manner wholly outside the 
scope of his employment may be regarded as a mere stranger 
in this respeoto Again, if the master gives money to the 
servant even for the purposes of his employment, still, if 
the master means to part with the property in the money 
wholly to him, and to treat him as a debtor or accountant, 
the master's possession is transferred together with the 
right of property to the servant": Wright 1 in Pollock and Wright, .£12.L cito, Po 138. In Savage v$ Walthew (1708) 11 Mod 
135 8~ E.R. 9~8, Holt, c.J. bad no doubt that a servant 
couid, in principle, have bailment from his master. As 
Pollock put it: 111We do not know of any case in which a 
delbery by the master to the servant with intent to deliver 
possession beside custody has been proved as ma~ter of fact. 
The hol!l!:er of goods may make his servant his bailee if he 
thinks fit, and the holder of land may make his bailiff a 
tenant at will; but the law does not regard this as a 
normal state of things, and probably r~ther strict proof 
will be required. There is no reason ~bl.!lever to doubt that 
«n<'h "''° int'.~ni" .. if' '>11f'f'i,..iPn1'1v """'"'"' 1n ;;i ni>t"tic.ular--· .._,, 
~s far as the servant receiving from his master is concern-
ed, we may then say that possessiorc does not pass when the 
servant receives the thing gµa servant to deal with 1 1n 
the course of his employment', on his master's behalf and 
in his master 1s interest,. The possession wil~ remain with 
the master and not pass to the serva..".lt as long as the serv-
ant continues to act qua servant, subordinating himself to 
the master's will and dealing with the thing in the master's 
interest,. When the servant converts :J>he thing to his 01m 
use, or deals with it so as to termj.nate his masterls con-
trol, he breaks the continuity of the master's possession 
2~ 
and c0!1ll!lits larceny. L 
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22. Thus, there was larceny where a non-resident clerk given 
bills of exchange by his master with directions to send 
them by post to various persons instead cr.anged one of 
them and made away with th1'rest: ttThe possession of the 
master had not in any way been cha:'Jged, and • • • it was just the same as if he had stolen the bills out of his 
master 1 s desk:" per Gould, J. in R .. v. Paradice (1766) 
2,Eastt P.c. ')65,, at p.567, and discussed by G!:'11ld, J., 
h:unselr in Rt v, dilkins, supra, at PPo523-4, ~.R. at 
p.364. Again, there was larceny where a servant to 
whom a package had been delivered by his master to carry 
to a customer sold it and converted the money to his own 
use: " ••• the [master] could at any time have counter-
manded the delivery of lthe goods]. The pr'isoner, there-
fore, by breaking open the package, tortiously took 
them from the possession of the owner," Il!}r Hotham, B.,, 
in R, v, Bass (1782) 1 Leach 251~ at pp.2 1-2_, 168 E.B. 
228, See also R. v. Metcalt (18j5) 1 Mood. ~cj4, 168 EaR• 
1333 (conversion of a cheque). 
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recognition in the law that the scr-vant carrying goods for 
his master alxroad will not have possess:i..on soon raised a 
difficulty: Could the serva..-it defend his master 1 s posses-
master's absence by hj.mself brj.nging an action 
for trespass or a prosecution for larceny if the goods were 
The general develop-
ment of the principles of possessi;Jn as applying to servants 1 
should be noted 1 has not taken place in the context of 
resolving this difficulty. Only in connexion with the 
ma.sters of ships r.ave the main decisions on possession 
been given for the purpose of determining whether there is 
a right of action; for all other servar,ts, these decisions 
have bean handed clown the context of larceny. The 
special treatment, before The Jugiter (suprg,) 1 of the master 
cf a ship, it is true, m:L3ht be partly ascribed to the 
caurts 1 willingness to grant him possession to ensure that 
he have the obviously convercient right of action. Neither 
l?itt v. Q:11ince nor Moo~~ Robi:Q!?..QU (both supra), however, 
refers to this convenience, whereas both contain statements 
by counsel and the cou.rt treating the issue of control as 
central. Generally, then, it clear that the right of 
action has not been used to determine the principles of 
possession. 
In considering whether a servant has this right 
of action we 11 have before us four separate issues: 
1. What are the criteria for determ).ngng possession? 
2. How do the facts of this parti.cular case measure up 
to these cr:i.teria? 
3. Is it possible for the servro:t not to have possession 
~J: vis-a-vis his ter but to have possession vis-
~-vis the trespasser or thief? 
1,.. Is it possible for the servan.t to sustain a right of 
action on an interest short of, or other than, posses-
sion? 
In the few cases in which a servant's rlght to 
bring the act:l .. on or prosecution has been an issue, counsel 
for the plaintiff or the C:::'own have understandably sought 
to reopen the question whether a servant away from his 
master's house should not deemed to have possession. In 
doing so, they reJ.y for authority on 15th and 16th century 
cases, decided at a time when servants takL."lg goods to 
market or to another tC1<rn were generally held to have 
possession and 11:hen the more unsettled s te of the country 
and the even greater difficulty of conm1unication :ent more 
plausibility to the view. Z3 :Eiu.t by 1800, there is no doubt 
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23.See esp. R. v. Deakin and Smith (1800) 2 Leach 862, 168 E.R.. 
530, where cou .. "lsel for the Crown relies heavily on the Year 
Book casesq R r l:!r 1 11!1 (11i!U!lt a iraael:t 'Mli1Ji; ti.Ji .. ':'.z\il G&li., 
illl l!L!J] :£JI '.l@c 1 ]?Tl111f--9H9'£1ziia Jfb3cjg 0 27 1 ] Je Cfm·i"!pr 
" 
tha:t the courts will not follow them back to the fJarlier 
law. 
In R. v. D!3akin and Smith, supri;i,, the indictment 
against the prisoners charged with stealing goods from a 
coach laid property of these goods in certain named owners 
of the coach, in the employee-driver and in persons ur1-
other 
Jrw::town (the consignees, consignees or/owners). The first 
group, having been wrongly named, was ahandoned by the 
prosecution, the third was struck out by the Court. The 
issue then became whether the employee-driver had posses-
sia.n of the goods or some other interest that could sus-
tain the prosecution. Del:l:vering the opinion of the 
Twelve Judges, Hotham, 3., said: 24 
The material question was, Whether the driver had 
the possessiQn of the goojs or the bare charge of 
them only? but in these cases the driver must, 
in contemplation of law, be considered to have 
not the charge only but the possession alsot and 
therefore this case is not open to that dis·,inct-
ion: for alth<Jugh as against his employers the 
masters of the coach, he, as mere driver, can 
only have the bare charge of the property commit-
ted to him1 and not the legal possession of it, 
which remains in the coachmasters, yet as against 
the rest of the world he must be considered 
to have such a special property therein as will 
support a c~unt charging them as his goods, for 
24. At pp.875-6, E.R. at pp.536-?. 
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he has in fact the possession of and controul 
over them; they are entrusted to his custody 
and disposal during the journey; and the in-
convenience would be great indeed if the law were 
otherwise: the difficult:tes and mistakes which 
'llllll::i: must unavoidably arise in hunting after all 
the persons who may be concerned as proprietors 
of the stage-coach, for the purpose of prosecut-
ing an indictment of this nature would be end-
less mnd insurmountable. The law therefore on 
an indictment against the driver of a stage-coach1 
on the prosecution of the proprietors, considers 
the driver to have the bare charge o;f;, the goods 
belonging to the coach, but on a cha:age against 
any other person for taking them tor'tiously and 
feloniously out of the driver•s custody, he must 
be considered. the possessor. 
Among his other pronouncements, then, Hothmm 1 B. 1 
does take the view that a servant may not have possession 
vis-~-vis his master and yet have possession vis-a-vis 
those who interfere with; his custody or charge. To hold 
such a view, I should argue, is to confuse the fact of 
possession with rights awarded by law. Rights may hold 
good against one person and not against another; facts 
stand by themselves. The principles of possess5.on relating 
to servants as we have traced them apply criteria of con-
trol that are either satisfied or not, no matter who the 
contesting party may be. If it were true that control 
tn the extent required by possession were in the coach 
driver (as M:m.uxrngggKlt Hotham, B., suggests at mQDqi:l'Lt 
am other point of the judgment), then it would not be true 
t.b.AJ;t the coacbmasters have possession. 
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Hotham 1 B,'s attempt to suggest that the coach 
driver has possession against one person and not against 
another in fact makes it clear that he has in mind not 
the factual situation but the rii:;hts of the coach driver. 
This is confirmed by his moving from possession to the 
phrase "such a special property therein as will support 
a count charging them as his goods"; the reference here 
is to an inte:f'est. Now 1 although possession has been 
the general and primary ground for maintaining actions 
for trespass and prosecutions for larceny, the law has 
recognised since early times at least one exception: the 
bailor-at-will could sue or prosecute on the basis of a 
fictitious possession that amounted to no more than his 
imrnediate right to possess. The decision ant'! portions 
of the reasoning in R. v. Deakin and Smith could be inter-
preted as holding that there yet another interest short 
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of possession which will maintain such action or prosecution: 
this is the servant 1 s custody of and responsibility for 
goods that have been wrested from him. Apart from the 
obvious convenience of such a principle, to which Hotham, 
B. , rightly refers, such a view would have the advantage 
of mai.ntaining continuity with the well-established principle 
in earlier law, admittedly then based on granting the servant 
possession, tb.at the servant carrying his master 1s goods 
ab1•oad shall be able to take action against trespassers 
d .._. . 25 an vnieves. R.s. Wright, unhappy with this denigrat-
ior: of the fundamental importance of possession, wished 
to argue from the language of the c-lecj.sion that it appearecl 
26 to be expressly limited to the case of a coach-driver; 
since his time, the case of R. v. Harding27 has given 
further support for the view that 1special property in 1 
goods may lie in a servant who has not possession (in 
this case, in a servant who vlas in the master's house 
while the master was in the garden) and be sufficient to 
sustain an indictment for robbery. Our suggestion, then~ 
is tr.at the term 1 special property I as us in this context 
25. Heydqi;1 and Smith's. Case, supra, per Coke, C.J.: "A ser-
vant who is commanded to carry goods to such a place, 
shall have an ;;iction of trespass or appeal" (at po69, 
E.R. at p.1478;. The earliet Statute of Hue and Cry had 
also admitted such a servant to its provisions. 
26. Pollock and Wright, op. cit., Po139. Cr. 
27. (1929) 46 T~L.R. 1051 21 :l!iR.l~pp.Rep. 166, wher·e the prisoners broke into the house, battered a maid-servant 
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anc1 demanded r:io~ey and cl?t~~s ~ rece~ vint; from her, em-
ployer 1 s mack1ni;osh, The in(n.ctment r or robbery la.Ld 
property of the mackix:tosh in her and was held to be good. 
I'he case, together with R. Vi_HJJak~lLlJ.p.d Smith, is discu~sed 
· J. L1. e J. Edwarcls, "Possession and. Larceny", (1950J 
3 Current gel Problems 1 127 at pp .136...S. 
is not synonymous vii th possession and_ has no bearing on 
its definition, that the o.uestion of the servant 1 s right 
to action in the situations discussed above is no longer 
necessarily a quest1on about possession ;s_nd that, as a 
matter of hj_storical fact, this question has not influenced 
the conceptualisation of possession in the law rslating 
t t 28 o servar1 s. 
* 
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28, A very special problem, which does bear on the question 
of ,!:he na~ure of the servant 1 s holding, r,as b:_~n rais~ 
by r.ast (rl~;;L-2;l:'_ the Crown, vol.2, Pi1•6)1+, ):;l:l). If,R[i -
master sena his servaxit wj_th money and then waylay him 
and rob hjm with ir:tent to charge the b:undred, ii; is 
lllelony in the master because in these circumstances the 
servant has special property as having a clear right 
to defend h:ts possession against the master 1 s u:blawfUl 
demand. '.I'hrccJe po:tr:.ts should be carefully distinguished 
here. 1. If the master confronts the servant purely in 
the character of robber, the servant has the right to 
remain faithful to his charge and to rep the robber 
and refuse to sur:'ender the goods, even though he recognises 
who he is. This is because his master does not confront 
hirr: as master and does not give him orders as such: jJ1 
fending the goods, the servant is defending the master 1 s 
possession and whatever 'special prope:'ty 1 he has through 
such rights does not aniount to possession. 2. If, in 
the cuc:trse of the waylaying, the maste1, reveals himself 
as master and deria.nds the goods as such, the servarit, I 
should argue, has a duty to surrender; his legal duty 
and rig!1t to refuse to participate :i.n any criminal action, 
such as a fraud on the hundred 1 cloes not cover a lawful darnand t~o give ttte gocK:1s to tl1e 1Easter, a dem~vid \vhich 
:tn itseJ~f is r1ot criminal. 3. Sir.cce t11e servan·G has 
riot possessj~c)r'J., the n:a,S"ter, even h5_s cl:1ctracter of 
robber, would be taking from h:Ls 011m possess:ton c>nd 
depri v:t:ig himself of title; whatever other crimes he may 
cotimit, he can:iot commit larceny. 
Where a servant receives goods for his master 
from another (i.e., a 1 stranger'), the law has always 
held that possession passE1s, in the first instance, to the 
servant. 29 It was to deal with conversion by such serv-
ants that the modern crime of embezzlement was created by 
Sir Matthew Hale, A History of the Pleas of the Crown, 
vol.1, p.668: "If I deliver to my servant a bond_ to 
receive money, or deliver goods to him to se11 1 and he 
receives the money upon the bond or goods, and go away 
wj_th it, this is not felony; for though the bond or 
goods were delivered to him by the master yet the 
money was not delivered to him by the master"; Unnamed 
Case heard in 1687 1 cited in the two cases that follow; R. v. Meeres (1688; 1 Show·. 50~ 89 E.R. 4-41; R. v, 
Bazeley (1799) 2 Leach 835, 16b E.R. 517 1 2 East, P.C. )71; R. v. Bull, cited in H. v. BazeleZ' ~u-)ra, 2 East, P.~. 572 a.nd referred to in R. v,. Reed 18 r b" Cox c.c. 
28Lr; a1~~i for a case decided after t~~ statute of 1.799, R. v. ~1 son (1839) 9 C. & P. 27, 17J E.R. 725. The 
facts of two of the c§oses mentioned show clearly how 
firmly the proposition was held. In the Unnamed Case, 
the prisoner was a journeyman employed to sell goods 
and receive money for his master's uso. He s9ld a large 
parcel of gi!:lilids and received 160 guineas; he deposited 
ten of these in his trunk in the chamber in his master's 
house where he slppt and, on being discl:>...arged from the 
master's servicer he took away with him the remaining 
150 guineasi having put none of the money into his 
master 1 s ti 1 or in any other way giving it into the 
master's possession. Before this loss was discovered 
and after his discharge, he broke into the master 1 s 
house at n:ight and took the remaining ten guineas from 
the trunk. He was acquitted, "because the taking of 
the money was no felony; for although it was the 
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maste r 1 s money in right, it was the servant 1 s money 
in possession." In R. v. Bull, the prisoner, a shop 
assistant, received money f'rom a customer in his master•s 
shop (which money had been deliberately marked by the 
master with the intention of being able to prove any 
misappropriation) and instead of putting it in the till 
put it in his pocket. He was acquitted of larceny on 
the same grounds~ 
statute. The tasl<: of deciding when and how the servant 
in such cases brought the goods into the posses on of 
his master remained with the Common Law. 
The principle that the servant l'eceiv:tng for his 
master from a stranger receives into his own possession 
(even though he charged the goods to his masterts account 
as told to do by the master30) suggests at first sight 
that the courts in this area tend to link possession rather 
closely 11i th manual pmss:l!! detention. The cases oa1{e it 
clear that in prL11ciple this is not so: in eauh case the 
court has considered not only whether the master have 
1 actual possession' (i.e., direct i!ihysical cor:trol or 
detention), but also whether he have 'constructive posses-
sion' {i.e .• , whether he have control of the thing tr.at 
amot:ints to possession althou.gh exercised throo.gh an 
instrument or at a distance). 31 Further, the law has held 
30. R. Y• Reed, sunr&• 
31. This distinction between 1 actual1 and 1 constru.ctivet 
possess.ion, used even by writers, has, I submi.t, no use-
fUl function in the law. Possession through detention 
or direct control readily shades off into possession 
through control at a distance or though an instrument; 
the two types do not raise separ<!!.te principles and are 
merely different instances of 1 possession 1 • The term 
tconstructive possession• is best reserved for those 
cases of (fiil:Jtlitious) possession where possession is im-
puted, despite the facts, for the purpose of granting 
possessory remedies, !l!..&•, the constructive possession 
of the bailor-at-willo 
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that the sarvac~t may divest himself of possession not only 
by placing the goods in the master 1 s hands, but by putting 
them in 1 the place of ultimate or final depos1t or destin-
1 32 on • 
The servant receiving from the master and the 
servant receiving from a str<ocnger, then, are treated ac-
cording to different principles - a fact stronely criticls-
ed by all the writers concerned with it33 and one tha.t is 
given no general logical reason or justification in any of 
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32. See, e.g.: R. v. Waj.te (1743) 1 Leach 28, 168 E.H. 117 
(bonds never deposited in the vault of the Bank, prison-
er eping them with him after receipt fro,"!! stranger); 
R. v. Hayward (184'+) 1 Cart & K. 518, 174 E.R. 919 
(deposit of I1E.y in yard of master 1 s houEis held placed 
into master's possess1c:n); R,. v. Harding ( 18ot;l') R. &: R. 
125, 168 E.R. 717 (goods received from stranger and put 
in master's cart in master 1 s posseessi~1); R. v. Reed 
(185'1+) 6 Cox c.c. 284 (coal n1aced in master 1 s cart); 
R. v.yi;;ears (1798) 2 Leach tl25;1 168 E.R. "l12, 2 East, 
P.c. :>60 and R. v. Abral:<..E,t (1790) 2 Leach 824 168 E.R. 
511 1 2 East, P.c. 569 (:i.Jil both c_'lises..l corn delivered 
i-¥to master 1,s lighter); I\. v. N'or\!a.t L!•1;J+Jt-) 1 (Jrf, lv. &..14£: 
lfl..UJ{ -\11f'fW; ~ !tAuA '(\I\ Vll\MW \!. U....I?), 
• See, e.g.; Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Lai:h p.491+ 
et sea* &.nd J. Jv1le J. E;l~"Ie.rds, n1>ossession end Larceny 1t, (;9i§'o) 3 Current '.Legal Problems, 127 at pp.135-6. 
the A prelhnina.ry rationale of the cases might 
be suggested along the following 2.ines: Where a servant 
qua servant rect,ives from his master, the law presu.rnes, 
unless there be clear evidence to the contrary, that he is, 
and will remai.n 1 in respect of the goods, an instrument of 
his master's wil:'.. Where the servant receives from a 
stranger, the law ref'u.ses to make this presumption. Since 
the servant is not a servant of the stranger it presumes 
the relationship between them to be that of ballment and 
the goods to be i11 the servant's possession unless there 
be clear evidence that they have been placed in the 
master's possession. 
The function of the doctrine of 1 the place of 
final deposit' is to establish a criterion fc.>r judging 
such lid:ll'.1:i:i1mE evidence. The act:ton requirea. contains two 
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34 " ~. t . b"' . , 1 ~ ' , th '·h , .• i:-.c .Ll.rs s1g lv, ir4aeec..., vre are presen..,ect W.:.. v e anaTu:.t~-Y 
tha~t. t11e presc;)nce of the eoods in "the me.st(~rt s hou,se or 
premises is taken as clear evidence of the masterls 
possession where he has handed to the servant, but is 
cor.sidered il'!'elevant if a third pars on .!Jas handed tp 
the servant, even if he did so while they were both in 
the masterts house or pre;nises. A justification of the 
rule for some cases is g1ven in Higgs v. Holidav (1600) 
Cro. Eliz. 7t1-6, where Anderson, J., suggests th.at the 
:master CaJ:JnOt have possession Of goods that he does !JOt 
know s servant.to have received. This special aroblem, 
whether a ma.1 ca!1 control and therefore possess,: tLings 
he does not lr.now about, will be discussed he low, and 
again our sec~io11 t'Jn fi1:i/iing.Q 
elements: (1) the servant .has to put the goods into a 
place that is in his master's possession, (!h.£.,, in the 
car§ which the mast~ delivered to the se.rvant for the 
purposes of collecting goods, or in the mas ter1 s d:raw2r) 
or in his master's direct control (outside the master 1 s 
:'ront: clool""); (2) the servant, b:t doing so, makes attorn-
ment, ac¥~'1owledges that he is act:Lng as the instru.l:'lent of 
his master 1 s will. The cases tend to er1phasise the first 
element; though this element has often been reduced. to 
a technica;i. pol.nt capable of leading to ridiculous results, 
as when we say that a servant has not possession of the 
cart given h:lm by the naster to co11act coal or of the 
he has already placed within it, b1_1t 
has possession of the rernaJ.ning five bags not yet loaded 
. 35 on to rt. The importa.nce of the second eleBent emerges 
wrwre there is doubt whether a place is to be treated as 
the place of final deposit; here the sc:rvant 1 s i::i.tention 
'"o sub ..... 'l'e ·tn' 4 ~ ~ '·s te,..'s "on+'·o·'<, c,.,~ .. se·r-ve ~. s ,, !lll \; ,; " i.ug ,,o nl ~- -.; - v,; - ulc - '" 
a criterion. The first element, then, taken by itself, 
. . . ~ 1S r1gJ..,.;i, purely technical; the second, I should 
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~ng···ie Ct~- u. ' more funda>nental and capable of explain-
:Lri.g the first element. It links, once more, the ~uestion 
of possession with the general concept of control. 
Legal writers, we have mentioned 1 unax1L1100.sly 
"" criticise the 'sL11gular cl.octrine 150 which distingu hes 
between serva11ts receiving from a master and servants re-
ceiving from a stranger; they do not suggest a solution. 
I shauld like to suggest that the solution can be provided. 
by u.nderstanding an.a. applying the conceptual content of 
the doctrine of attornr:rnnt. The crucial question is 
wheth er or not the servant is dealing with the goods in 
h:l.s capacity as an instrument of the master 1 s will, sub-
sive to his master's general control and directio.'11. He 
c arly is doing so when he is sent by the master to col-
lect, receive, tra.r1sfer or otherwis~; de8.l with goods the 
mas1;er wants dealt with - his mere obeying of these 
orders, I submit, is all the attornment necessaPy to give 
the ter posses on. Similar 
argue 1 is made when the se:tvant receives goods in his 
l:1as ter 1 s name, a.rid there is no inconven:i.ence in holding 
that the servant who receives such goo:is with secret 
d!raudulent intent and then converts them to his own use 
comai ts ,,.,r,,eny against the master and not the stranger9 
The solution suggestea., though admittedly in 
the face of es tatilished principles of law, can be ·,vorked 
36. Stephen, Digest, p.494. 
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out with a minimcun amount of disturbance to the general 
principles of law in this area. We rest firmly on the 
general criteria of possession, as they are applied 
where a servant has had delivery from the master, and as 
they have been treated above. We accept that where the 
master has delivered to the servant there is an under-
standable presumption in favour of the master 1 s possession, 
and that where the servant receives from a stranger whom 
he does not serve there is an equally understanda~le 
presumption in favour of bailment to the servant. But 
this is only a presumption, defeated if we have evidence 
that the servant is receiving qua servant, is being asked 
to deal with the thing in the course of his employment 
and on the master's behalf. Such evidence will be most 
obvious if the servant is asked to do so by his master, 
if it is his duty as an employee to receive for the 
master, or if he receives on his master's account. But it 
may also exist if he is asked to receive :tn such a way by 
the stranger and accepts the commission, in which case 
the stnanger is giving possession directly into the hands 
of the master, with the servant remaining a mere 
instrument~ 
The special difficulty that may be felt here is 
the difficulty of treating the servant as the instrument 
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of the master 1 s will in ibontrolline things of which the 
master may not know. This is not a problen that just-
ifies a special rule covering all the cases of servants 
receiving frotl straxigers: it does not occur in all these 
cases and it is not confined to them, playing a rrmch more 
"1 important rble, for instance, in cases of f:!.nding. In 
general terms 1 we might say that there is no legal reason 
why things of which a man is not a;;,1;;"re might not pass into 
his control and possession by becoming part of a wider 
whole that under his cont:col or by becoming 1 attached 1 
to a person or thing that he does control. This is n:::iw 
becoming generally recognised of things found on land; 
nor has the law felt special dif:iculty in giving the 
farmer possession of le.nd or things wa~hed onto his iDlit 
river-barJs:, or of calves produced by his cows without his 
k:'.1owlel'lge. In the findlng cases, as we shall see, there 
have indeed been decisicrns going beyond this to the 
specific proposition that the servant finding in the 
course of his ernploy1nent acquires possessi!bn on behalf of 
his me"ster and has no possession himself. 3 7 These finding 
cases have seen the proposition relating to servants as 
37. M7~owel~ v. UJsteE.Bank ~1899) 33 Ir.L.Times 1 2_2,?,~i:ea. 
w:i.th ap1J1'0Val by LJJ.XOn~ .;. , as he 0hen was, 1n w:u .. cey 
v. Syn10;ri, ;nqrrxx ( 193'7 J 57 c. L. a. 200, at p. 
Grafstein v. Holme and Freoman (1958) 12 D.L.R. (2d) 
727 a.'1d Corporation of L9ndo~ App1eyard. [ 1963 J it 
2 A.E.R. ~3'+. 
68 
part of the general theory of possess:lon so strikingly 
developed in recent decisions ±elating to finding: there 
is no reason, I suggest, why the problems relating to 
possess:lon in larceny by servants could. not have been 
solved 
38 ment. 
the same spirit and as part of the same develop-
The fact that these problems have not been ap-
proached and solve~ in this spirit has led quite early 
the history of the law to another area of inconvenience 
38. Stephen, in the Appendix ti:e Notes to his D:!,s:est, does 
approach the problem of the servant1 s posses3ion in 
this irit: "Suppose ••• that instead of the master 
having given his horse to his groom, or his plate to 
his butler, a horse dealer has del5:vered the horse to 
the groom, or a silversmith has delivered plate to 
the butler for his master: I should have thought 
that there w as no real difference between these cases; 
that inasmuch as the servant in each case was acting 
for the master in the discharge of a duty towards 
him, and under an agreement to execute his orders, 
the master would come into possession of the horse or 
the ulate as soon as :U:B: his servant received it :L'"rom 
the deilil.er or the silversmith, ;just as he remains 1"n 
possession of the horse or the plate when he gives the 
custody j"t to his groom or his lratler. I should 
also have thought that the servari.t who appropriated 
his master's property to his ~;111 use, after receiving 
it from another on his master 1 s account, was for all 
purposes in precisely the sa111e position as the servant 
who did the same thing after receiving it from his 
m§,ster. The Courts 1 however 1 decided otherwise" (at 
P t:.91·) • ' 't" • 
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and conflision: the need for an offence of embezzlement 
and its relationship to larceny. The 16th century period, 
in which there was still general uncertainty concernini:; 
the possession of servants, saw the beginnings the at-
tempt to remove its unfortur,ate practical effects with-
out in any way attempting to resolve the problem of pos-
session itself. The first statui!';e, 21 Hen.8, c.7 (the 
Embezzlement Act of 1529) 1 recited the nroblem39 and made 
it felony in any serva'1t, not 'being an apprentice or 
under 18 years of age 1 to steal or to convert to his use 
contrary to the trust and confidence reposed in him, any 
caskets, jewels, money, goods, or other chattels delivered 
to him for safe-keeping" Incomplete as the remedy was, 
ju('iicial construction made the situatiac'1 worse by confining 
the statute to cases in which goods had been delivered by 
39. " • • • for the Punishment of such Servants as shall 
withdraw themselves and go away with their Haster:!s 
or~ J:;Iis ·t.rrasse 's Caskets or Goods cor:-imi tt;ed t<J '.'.Chem 
j_n Trust to be kept.n Of such A_ishonest appropriation, 
the statute states that it is "doubtful in the Common 
Law, ther it were Felony or not": cited from 
Russell, Crime (1950), 10th ed. ed. by J •• Cecil 
Tul·ner, vol.2, chapter 56, p.1076. The meaning of the 
last words cited_ - whether they denied the offence of 
embezzlement by a servant Corri!llon Law - was discussed 
'n R "tr ',f;,1rir1" Si1"n!'~• 
.4 - ~~- '"..\.. i X1m-.- \J' ""'-W-~ 
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th t 1 f f , . l+o · e mas er pure y · or sa e-Keeping. Confusion was thus 
worse confounded, another distinction was introduced into 
the law of larceny wh:l1e xm ambiguous cases of con-
trol were in no way resolved. A weaver to whom yarn had 
been delivered to be worked up at his house could still 
not be indicted for larceny of the yarn, under statute or 
at Common Law. 7lhe Legislature, it is true, pe:rs:i.sted in 
the passing of statutes meant to dea1 1 :1.n a piecemeal 
fashion, with breaches of trust in specific offices or 
"1 tradesL" - no clear principlo il!or determin:lng the crimj.nal 
4o. For 
tl1e 
a cussion cf the extent of the apn~ . .c"" 
t t t ~ ~ t - ~ t ~'2 ·5 s·a u e, see~ ~as 'rouo a pp.~o--. 
ion of 
41. E.g., 9 knr:e, c.1 O { 1711), dealing with servants of 
tl::e Post Office, replaced by Geo.3, c. 25 and then 
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7Geo.3 1 c.50whiche:xtended ; 15Geo.21 c.13 (1747) 1 dealing with officers and ser·vants of the J:laxik of E11gland 
and twice reenacted under o.3; 24 Geo. 2 7 c.11 ( 1751) 
terms identical with 15 Geo.2, c.13, dealing w:l.th 
officers and servants of the South Sea Compa!1y; other 
statutes flicted punisht!lent, usually on m:i.mmary con-
viction, on serve..nts particular bra:nches of trade -
~· , weavers, tailors, r:1anufacturers in felt, fustian 
~· - who lim!:bl1!Xr:h!li!j; er.1bezzled or~ as it was genflrally 
called, 'purloined' .i::rom their r'.'.asters. 
liability of servants emerged from such statutes. The 
statute of i 799 that created the modern crime of embez,zle-
42 
ment 1 it is true, ,,iid make the offence a generGJ one , 
so that the servant 1 s dishonest taking to his own use would 
be either larceny z embezzlement, But the principles 
determinine whether a servant had possession, and therefore 
whether his offence was that of larceny or of embezz,lement, 
remained with the Conun.on Law; because some of these prj.n-
cip1es, as we have been arguing, were an unconvincing de-
parture frorn the general crlilteria of possessJon by a master, 
the distir:ction between larceny and embezzlement became 
The uncertainty of the distinction created the situation 
where a man could escape conviction for larceny because he 
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had commit eel embezzlement; the artificial:ity of the distinct-
1 d . J f ' "' "" "'b L • , . to 
·"on ma .e J. c seem per: eccJ.Y proper I or ,; "e ,eg:i.s_, ai:;ure ... 
42. 39 Ge o.3, c. 85: " ••• if a,ny servant or cler1i: 1 or any person employed for the purpose in the capacity of a 
servant or clerk, to any person or persons whomsoever, 
or to any body corporate or pol:ltick, shall, by virtue 
of such employment, receive or take into his possession 
any money, goods, bond, bill, note, banker's draft, or 
other valuable secur:i.ty or effects, for or in the name 
or on the account of his master or masters or employer 
or emp1oyers, and shall frauclulehtly embezzle, secrete, 
or make away with the ~~WHl1;, or any part thereof, every 
such offender shall be deemed to have feloniously stolen 
the same," The Act was repealed by 7 & 8 Geo.4, c. 27, 
reenacted by 7 & 8 Geo.4, c.29, and again reenacted with 
some omission by 2t1- & 25 Viet., c.96, s.66. The law is 
now consolidated in 6 & 7 Geo. 5, Co 50 (the Larceny Act, 
i 916) , s.1 7, as amended by the Crirnir:al Justice Act, 
1948. 
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to close this loophole by allowing a conviction for embezzle-
} ') 
'+"• ment on a charge of larceny and vice vers§. ~ 
sharply criticised as "perfectly useless" by Stephen, wou.ld. 
he.ve no point if cur suggestion concerning the possession 
of servants receiving from strangers •,1ere ace tea.. It 
should be noted the conditi.ons set down for the crime of 
embezzle:nent (having received fr,)r or the name or on 
account of his master) are precis(;ly those conditions 
which we have argued the servant should be held to receive 
into his master 1s possession. In so as larceny is an 
offence against possession, then, the development of the 
crime of embezz,le:uent may be regarded as indication and 
partial admission of the fact that the law has erred in 
denying the master 1 s possession of che.ttels and money 
received for him from a stranger. 
l+3. J,arceny Act, 1916t s.lr4(2) :b.tmri - the sec'~ion dates 
back to the legisJ.ation of 18~7 - : 11 If on the trial 
of any ::bl~t:i:E in<lictmt?nt fo~· ax1y offence against 
s.1"? of this Act [ ating t;o embezzlement] it proved 
that the defendant stole the property in ques on, the 
jury may find him l!J.Ulbl ty of stealing, and t hereupon 
he shall be liable to be punished for stealing; and 
on the trial of any indictment for stealing, the jury 
may in like manner find the defendant guilty of embezzle-
ment or of fraudulent disposition, as the case may be, 
and thereupon he shall be ble to be punished according.'1 
The Legislature 1 of course 1 c;~nnot avoid the more general 
principles of the criminal law: if a jury were unable to 
decide whether the crime committed ·1vas larceny o:b embezzle-
ment, it would have to acquit of botho 
Th.ere 
' 
ii 
" 
js true, a second tr~en<l in the le.w 
of larceny dating back as as the C51rr1Q.r' s Casel+l1- and 
the doctrine of breaking bulk. This t ' .j. ' t ne ,,enaency o 
treat larceny as aI1 offence against title, which, as we 
shall argu.e in a later section, also operates the attemp 
to postpone the noment of 'taking' to the time when the 
intention permanently to deprive is formed. This tendency 
emerges nakedly in the Victorian provisiontf5 that conver-
sion by a bailee shall be larceny even if bulk l:>..as not been 
broken; it has been taken :bl!:tmo::1uct furthest by the 
Indian Penal Code in :l.ts creation of the offence of crim-
'· 6 . .,_ inal breach of trus't. In such an offence, the it·{~, t.,&Q.,.L 
question of possess:ion is no longer relevant. 
( 1473) Y.B. 13 f.9, Pasch. pl.?. 
45. 20 &. 21 Viet., c.)4-, s.,lt-; now Larceny Act, 1916, s.1~ 
46. Indiar1 Penal Code; 1860, s .l+05: "Whoever 1 being in any 
manner entrusted with property, or with any dorniriion 
over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts 
to his ovm use tl:JE.t property, or dishonestly uses or 
disposes or that property :Dl::lr.tl'l in. violation any 
direction of law prescribing the mode in which such 
trust is to, b~ ~isch':rf?ed, or of an~ 1;gal ;ontract,~, 
express or LIDI,lJ.ed, which he maoe ootlChJ.ng the ,,1.s-
charge of such trust, or wil1'u11y suffers any other 
person so to do, commits 1 cri•.ninal breach or trust'." 
In ia and such territories as adopted the Indian 
ovision, 'criminal breach of trust' is the most collll:lon 
of proceedj_r1g against <.t dishonest lc~1 ee. 
74 
75 
3. POS§!.SSION AND THE HISTORY OF FIND!fili 
For the cOllllllon lawyer outside the United States, 
and for the jurisprudential writer seeking a coherent 
doctrine of pas.session, Bridges Vt, Hawkesworth 1 remains a 
problem, The difficul·t;y of reconciling it with the later 
English decisions2 has led a sizeable proportion of 
English writers to regarding the case as wrongly decided; 
many or those who justify the decision have ;ended to do 
so, as Professor Good..lliart has shown,3 on grounds not to 
be found in the judgment itselfo L~ the united States, 
on the other hand, the appDoach of Patteson, J., in 
Bridges v. Hawtasworth ~..as generally been correctly under-
stood and his decision has been adopted with enthusia!m. 
What Patteson, Jo, decided was that notes which had been 
dropped 1 by mere accident' on the floor of a shop by an 
1. (1851) 21 L.J.Q.B. 75, 15 Jur. 10790 
2. Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co. (1886) 33 Ch~ Div. 562 and Soutb 
Staff9rdshire Water C_9, y, Sharman L 1896] 2 Q.B. 44. 
3. A.L. Goodhart "Three Cases on Possession"$ in his ~in Jurlsnrn.deJce and the Comm,on Law, PPo75-90, 
esp. pp~78-8~, t192S 3 Caml:lb. t.J. 195. 
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unknown person and had not been intentionally deposited, 
were not in the custody of the occupier or within the 
protection of his house before being found, and that the 
possession of these notes, as 'lost property', therefore 
lay with the finder. He specifically criticised the 
learned judge in the lower court, whose decision he was 
reversing, for having erroneously held that the place in 
which the notes were found(~., its being within a 
shop) made any legal difference,. This approach is that 
which Aroerica.11 co-.lrts adopted before and after Brid.ges 
v, Hawkesworth. As we shall see below, they develop it 
into a distinction between 1lost• and •misplaced1 articles 
meant to override emphasis on the place of finding as 
1private' or 'public• in charactero The later English 
cases, on the other hand, though unfortunately very tew 
in number, have tended to bring the issue between finder 
and occupier on to the question of the kind of control 
exercised oVlll.' the premises where the article was fOU!"'.d 
and the legal relationship, if any, existing between the 
claimants. Later, I shall attempt to show that the u.s. 
distinction cannot be coherently or convincingly applied 
in many important situations, that the u.s. courts are 
themselves forced to depart from it, and that the distL~at­
ion succeeds neither in resolving nor in by-passL~g the 
fundamental problems of findingo If I am right, this would 
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provide additional support for Professor Goodhart 1 s modest-
ly diffident suggestion that Bridges v, liawke:s:worth was 
incorrectly decided. First, however, I should like to 
approach the matter in another way. Br~dges v. fiawkesworth, 
I shall argue, in spirit is not the first of the modern 
English decisions on finding, but the last of the earlier 
decisions: it is the culmination of a development moulded 
by the forms of action, bound by technical considerations 
and failing to arrive at conceptll.al understanding of the 
issues involved. 
* 
In 13?2, Robert Knoll, Chevalier, brought a writ 
of trespass against certain persons for gold, silver and 
other chattels taken and carried away.4 The defendants 
plea.iad that the plaL~tiff's ~cods were cast into the sea 
by tempests, that they had taken them. up and kept them till 
they came to land and that they had then delivered them to 
the plaintiff's agent for the plaintiff' use. Cou...~sel for 
the plaintiff objected that the answer was 'double1 : (a) 
that the goods were cast on shore and so out of the plain-
tiff 1 s possession, which amounts to a denial of taking fl'l!!m 
the plaintiff 1s possession; (b) that they were kept and 
delivered to the plaintiff's agent for him. The defendants 
elected to rest on the second answer. Persay, then of 
counsel but seem~y appearL~g for neither party, first 
defendantl! 
objected that the '.f'f .. &ti! ltif!?tt second answer showed no 
authority for the action alleged by them, but then claimed 
judgment against the plaintiff 1 s writ because the writ 
supposed a taking against the peace, when there was none. 
The Court, however, allowed the plaintiff to maintain 
his writ. 
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The judgment contains certain important but curious 
features. The Court is prepared to hold, despite Persay•s 
-------------~-~----,_, ______________ , 
4. (1372) Y.B. 46 Edw.3, ~ p.15, pl.1, tra.:ns. by R.s~ w i ht 
in Pollock and Wright, Pos§~ssi9n in tne Common Law , J.~7J! 
objection that there was no taking vi et armis contra 
pacem, that the act of taking by finding does constitute 
trespass. By immediate implication, it has also held 
that goods cast into the sea by tempest are in the pos-
session of the owner. This, indeed, appears to be the 
view generally taken in the earliest law. There is a 
number or rigidly defined 11ost1 objects - treasure 
trove,5 wreck6 and waif? - which are deemes'. ownerless and 
cannot be the subfect of trespass or larceny,8 though 
t:!!k1ng them is an offence against the King and his prerog-
ative over them..9 Another •lost' object - the estray10 -
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A-G. 
-
6. Constable 1 s Case (1600) 5 Coke 106a, b, 108a, 77 E.~. 218, 
:!19-20, 223; Coke, qecond Instlitutes, 167. 
?,. I Bl, Comm.? 296; Com, Dig,, tit. 11Wai:f"1 F; . Foxle;v Ve. 
Annesley (1599) Cro. Eliz. 693, 78 E.R. 929. 
8. Staundeford, Plees §el Coronae, lib.1, c.16 1 citing Fitz. Abr .. Coron., pp.187, 265, 
9. (131+8) Y.B. 22 Ass. p.107, pl.99: ar'l'ote that punishment 
of treasure trove taken and carried away, of wreck and 
waire, is by imprisonment and fine, and not of life and 
member. 1• 
10.Called "animalia vagantia" by Bracton; Constable's Case, 
rn; Brownlow (' L§'fert ( 1 599) Cro. Eliz. 719, 78 E .. R. 
950; fl· Y• Wood 1849 3 Cox c.c. 45'3. Some o:f the early 
aut11orities (h&•, CO!!!t Dig., at the place cited above) 
consider it inappropriate to call the animal \!stray' till 
the period before forfeiture has elapsed. 
is deemed ownerless only after a year and a day and then 
goes to the King or the lord of the manor as holder of the 
franchise. Apart from these, the earliest law seems to 
regard all things that have once come into h:uman posses-
sion as either remaining in such possession or being com-
pletely abandoned. There is no conception of an inter-
mediate category of •lost' things in the com:milm sense of 
the word - things that are not abandoned but have passed 
out of anyone's present possession and control. Where 
things have not been abandoned, the early lawyer can see 
them passing out of a man's possession only in one of two 
ways: by violence or by consent. 11 Since I did not con-
sent to the finder•s taking up of the object I dropped, 
he is a trespasser.12 
That this is indeed the early position is con-
firmed by the development, in the second half of the 1'th 
century of 1 the law of charity• (as Coke was to call it), 
designed to make it possible for a finder, in certain 
circumstances, to pick up and hold without liability for 
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Seisin, as we have seen, made almost all rights depend-
ent on possession; the law waa therefore reluctant to 
recognise the loss of possession (and the consequent loss 
of rights) when··this possession (and thes.e rights) had 
been acquired by anyone else, and until possession of a 
thing had been passed or abandoned by me, or had been 
wrested from me, it remained with me. . 
12. (1429) Y.~ {l HE1n.,,6,_ p,.22,-tl.l.,3!!_ L1485) Y.B. 2 R.3, p.,15', 
pl • .:19; (1 -;Off) 21 nau.-r, P•'r!:'/t ti •5• 
trespass. As Ned.ham, J., put it in 1467: 13 
••• if a man lose a thing in the road and I come 
and find the thing in the road and take it to 
guard for the use of him who lost it if he 
bring trespass against me of this thlng I shall 
plead this to the action and not to the writ 
for it was allowable for me to take it for the 
use of him who lost it. 
The basis olll' the justification was brought cmt more 
clearly by Dorufington in 1484: 14 
Also, it was said by soma, if one lose his goods 
and a..~other find them the loser may have a wnit 
of trespass if he w11i, or writ of detinue; but 
if the goods so lost were in any jeopardy, then 
he may well justify for the sake of saving them. 
That the 1 law of charity1 initially supports instead of 
denying the treatment of the finder as trespasser is 
brought out in the fact that bptb of the judges cited see 
it as a justification in defence of the action and not as 
an answer to the WBit; as further evidence, one should 
note that the 1 law of charity' was eq11ally applied to the 
non-finding trespasser rescuing things from a burning 
houseo 15 
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___________ , _____________________ _ 
13. (1467) Y.B. 7 Edw.4, po3, pl.9, Pollock and Wright, 
oo. cite, p.175. 
14. ( 1484) Y.B. 2 R~3, p .15, pl.391 Pol+ock and Wright 1 p.176. By this time the action of detinue sur troV£r had emerged; 
but Donington1 s reference to it is not germane to the 
point being made here. 
1). (150;) Y.B. 21 Hen~7 1 p.27, pl.5'., 
The 1 law of charity 1 begins as a justification 
of an act of trespass freely admitted. While the courts 
zealously guard against any attempt to turn jeopardy into 
mere fiction, in the area of finding it is possible and 
indeed reasonable to argue that objects exposed to passers-
by and seeming to be lost are in real jeopardy and that 
the finder therefore has reasonable excuse to take them up 
and guard them for their owner4 Gradually, this legal ex-
cuse becomes the foundation on which the finder is held 
to have possession without trespass, by bailment: either 
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on the basis that the owner's consent to the taking may 
reasonably be implied from the fact of' jeopardy or on the 
basis that the law authorises him, in the situation of 
jeopardy and on the basis of charity, to take possession. 16 
Making the finder a bailee met some of the objections that 
were making themselves heard in the 15th century, even before 
the formulation of the 'law of charity•, to glossing over 
the requirement of vi et armis, but the 15th century concept-
ion of bailment, with its emphasis on consensual delivery, 
16. The analogy here is with the distrainor, who has author-
ity of law and against whom trespass does not lie. The 
analogy does not hold :f'ully because the distrainor's 
anthority converts his initial right of self-help iI1to 
a service for the law: he takes the godlis (or cattle) 
into the possession 1 of the lawt, net his own, and if rob-
bed on the way to the pound, or after he has placed the 
chattels into it, must bring the writs of rescous or 
Darco f'racto (not founded on his property or possession) 
because he has ~o ~ossession to m~intain tre.spass. See 
B.. J£2 Cotton (t75t) Parker 112, 11+5 E.R. ?29. 
made it virtually impossible to treat finding as bailment 
without either implying consent or treating it as a special 
bailment by licence or authority of law. The law of char-
ity provided a basis for either of these solutions. 
To say that in the earliest law taking by find-
ing always appears to be a trespass is not to say that the 
true oll!ller seeking to recover the lost goods must always 
allege a trespass. 11 In Bracton' s day the appeal of larceny 
could be converted into an action de re adirata by emitting 
the words of felony;" 17 the loser thus had an informal 
action in the manorial court by which he could recover 
from the finder without alleging felony, though if the 
finder refused in court to restore the chattel the plaint-
iff had to count afresh, this time with words of felony .. 18 
By the middle of the 13th century, the action de re adira]a 
had fallen out of use, but soon after the ai:tion of detinu.e 
developed out of debt, providing in the King's Court a 
remedj vert)J similar to that which had earlier been available 
in the manorial cou.rts. 19 The action throws emphasis on 
17. Pluck:nett, A Concise History gf tpe Common Law, p,374. 
18. Bracton 7 f.1)0b, also referred to by :lam: Pluck:nett, lee. cit. 
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19. Holdsworth, indeed, suggests that the action de re adirat~ 
was superseded by a form of detinue just as the appeal of 
felony was superseded by trespass• H.E L 1·;1 p 32~ 
" .. ' - ' . /. 
the charge of unjust detention (1niuste detinet) and from 
the very beginning, as Mr Fifoot has shown, 20 appears to 
be available to those who do not allege a specific act of 
delivery to which the plaintiff is party or privy or a 
specific agreement to return. As the basis of the action 
is clar5.fied by the courts, it bifurcates into two forms. 
'Where the plaintiff alleges a delivery and a.~ agreement t~ 
return (obviously the strongest claim it supportable) he 
brings detinue sur bailplent; where the plaintiff does not 
rely on delivery and agreement, but claims that 11>J!'i!fk a 
chattel to which he has a better right is now in the defend-
ant 1 s hands, he brings detinue on a devene:runt ad mgnus. 
To shmi unjust detention, the plaintirf must have made 
demand and been refused; but both in :nm respect of the 
~ original acquisition and of the refusal to return 
no trespass is alleged. 21 
In 145!;:, in the famous cas~2that Littleton later 
described as containing a "new found haliday•t, the question 
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20. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law pp.37-42. 
Sanex of the cases are discussed in more detail in section 
6, below. 
210 (1410) Y.B. 11 Ren.4, Hil. pl.20. 
22. (14'.)!j:) Y.B. 33 Hen.6, pp.26-7, pl.12. 
whether the finder's taking and/or refusal to return 
should be treated as trespass .!2r. as detinue was raised 
for the first time. The argument ran: 23 
Wapgford for the plaintiff: If I lose a box of 
charters touchj.ng lands to which I have no title, 
still I shall have detinue. 
Frisot. c.J.: I think not; therefore in your 
case you shall give notice to the finder and re-
quest h1111 to re-deliver them, and if he will not 
'ou shall have trespass agai~st him; for by the 
finding he did no wrong, but now the wrong can-
mences by the detention when the owner was 
known. But if one A had charters of my land of 
which I was seised and he lose them and one B 
find them, I shall have detinue against him 
without notice, for A is answerable to me. 
Littleton: Semble in the case put by Wapgford, 
the loser of the charters shall have detinue 
without any other title. As if I distrain for 
rent and after the termor offer me the rent in 
arrear and I deny him the distress, still he 
shall not have the action of trespass against 
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me but detinue 1 for that it was lawful at first 
when I took the distress; but if I kill or 
work them in my own work he shall have trespass. 
So here~ when he found the charters it was law-
ful, and although he would not deliver them on 
the request I shall have no trespass but only 
detinue, for no trespass is yet done; no more 
than if one deliver me goods to guard ~~~~a-deliver 
to him, and I detain them1 he shall not have trespass but only detinue; but peradventure 
if he burn them or break the seals or the like 
the action shall be maintained. Ad qµod non 
fuit responsum. 
23. As translated by Pollock and Wright, op. cit., p.1?4~ 
2~. •Not• is omitted in Pollock and Wright. 
Until at least 1454-, as we have endeavoured to 
show, judges saw the fincler 1 s taking as a trespass. How-
ever, as we have also endeavoured to show, they at the 
same time permitted the loser (among others) to recover 
his chattel from unjust det!llntion by way of detirru.e, with-
out raising the issue of trespass. For the space of 150 
years or so, finding thus hall two separate histories. 
Prisot, C.J., and Littleton, for the first time, have 
turned to considering the general question of finding and 
to asking which of the only two actions relevant to the 
situation - trespass and detinue - is the one the plaintiff 
should use, not from the point of view of the plaintiff 1 s 
convenience but from the point of view of the court, con-
sidering the nature of the act complained of and its place 
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in a systematic development of the law. Prisot, C.J., and 
Littleton agree that the initial taking by finding is not 
itself trespass - a view they hold in the face of all author-
ity but which, as we shall see, is to become dominant. 
If the finder as such be not a trespasser, what remedy has 
the loser? The existing law provides only :tm two ready 
possibilities: the finder, in ref'using to return the chat-
tel, may convert his finding li:.ilo trespass (g,b initio) or 
he may be sued in detinue for unjust detention. Prisot, 
C.J. 1 adopts the former solution; Littleton retorts that 
the finder, in refusing to return, has not yet done any act 
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that ca..t:t be called a trespass a."ld must be sued in detinue., 2'5 
To this argument~ Prisot, C.J., offers no dissent. 
The •law of charity' developed in the casESof 
1467 and 1481+ cited above still sees taking by finding as 
at best an excusable trespass; Littleton1 s view, there-
fore, does not immediately prevail and Donington, indeed, 
upholds the earlier view that the loser may have a writ 
of trespass .21: of detinue. But frc:m Littleton's words, 
:tim:~a®kiwwx::uf: detinue sur troyer was born, adding the 
specific words per inventionem to the general count of a 
devenerun,t ad manµs, and quickly becoming the full-fledged 
action of trover, in which the :b: allegation of finding 
became a fiction capable of absorbing all cases of a 
devenerunt~6 It may well be that this specific singling 
Littleton's argument appears to be that trespass requires 
feasance and that mere refusal is not feasance. His in-
terpretation of trespass ~b initio as founded on such 
ll?easance by way of overt act, and especially his illust-
ration of it, come closer to the doctrine of 'breaking 
bulk' developed from the Carrier'' Gase of 1473, though 
one may well argue that Littleton s treatment of trespass 
~b init:i,.Q distorts the issues by failing to XK~~ 
bring out that the d1strainor's initial act was a tres-
pass, though one licensed and. authorised by law, and that 
it is his subsequent breach of such licence and authority 
that acts back to make the initial trespass an unlawful 
one. According;'. to Ames, refusal to return was precisely 
±jglxkr•aml:i: the breach for which the remedy was introduced: 
"The Historycf Trpver", (1897) 11 HarvoL.Rev .. 277 1 at 
f,Po 287-9. 
'And a man may cau..nt up on a deVfilMLI'1.lll~JJlp:!lUS generally, 
or specially per inventione,11), and one may at this day declare 
out of a finding as the very basis for one of the writs 
L11 detL'lue and the later writ of trover helped to create 
the legal climate in which finding nc longer appeared a 
trespass. Certa:L11ly, by the time of Coke, LittletoH's 
view that the finderls refusal to retu1'11 as well as his 
initial taking lll'e not trespass has utterly prevailed: 
He which finds goods, by his denial to deliver 
them, by this for him to be a trespasser, I 
utterly deny, for when possessio est vacua non 
fesans shall not make a man to be a trespasser; 
no trespass for this, vi and armis. In the 
Six Carpenters, 8 para., fol.146 ruled there 
by all, that non-fesans shall not make the party 
which nath authq;?ity or licence by tbe L<i:W', to 
be a Trespasser•-
But for the purposes of trespass, if not for detinue, the 
findj_ng shall be a genuine finding: a man shall not 
escape the charge of trespass merely by pleading th$t he 
1found 1 thin§& which were not really lost. By Coke's 
time, the 1 law of charity• serves the function of distin-
guishing that which is really lil:ist froo that wh:l.ch is not: 
If a man rightfully take goods upon a finding he 
cannot be charged in trespass, for that he found 
them when they were in danger of perdition, bt~t 
when a man takes goods upon a ~inding before they 
26. (Contd,.) 
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upon a devenerun,t ad manus, but the latter (ner inventiQU-
.fil!l) is the better ••• This is the most certain and better 
countn: IsqpCS v, Clark (161~) 2 Bulstr. 306, at p.312 1 Bo E.R. 111+'.r, at p.1148, per Coke, c.J. 
27. Per Coke, C.J., loc. cit. 
are in danger of perdition, sc. ~grore they are 
lost, trespass lies against him. 
In 1501$, :in the Year Book report of 21 Hen~ 7, p. 27, pl. 5, 
there had been a fairly detaJ.led attempt to expOlli'"ld and 
lL~it the concept of jeopardy: corn is not in jeopardy 
when it is left after cutt:Lng in the field where it had 
been growing; another's wife is not in jeopardy merely if 
she is out of her wa; so that she knOVIB not where she is, 
unless there is evidence that 11 she is in jeopardy of 
perishing by the night or being drowned with water; 11 it 
is not lawful for one to take ro:y horse on the open comraon 
for fear it will be taken away. 
The early cases of finding, then, restricted as 
they are to disputes between loser and finder, do display 
a certain logical development. Talting by finding appears 
initially as trespass, unless the chattel be abandoned. 
The •law of charity• then comes upon the scene as a just-
ification for trespass on ground of jeopardy to the cha~tel, 
especially but not exclusively applicable to finders. 
The development of detinue sur trover creates a climate 
in which taking by finding no longer appears as a wrong 
in itself': the law of charity and the concept of jeopardy 
2~. 1 Rolle, Rep.130. 
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are then used to distinguish true finding from trespass, 
the lost object fra:i thst which is not really lost. 
Having reached this final stage, the law does 
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not take it very far. The concept; of jeopardy, it is true, 
might have been used as a way of asking whether, at the 
time of the 1 finding', the chattel was already in some-
one's control and therefore not in jeopardy; this would 
have accorded with Coke 1 s lat~er recognition that the truly 
lost object is one of which no one has possession. In 
fact, the law of charity was not developed fully in this 
direction: it continued to serve a task in areas where 
possession was not an issue, it was not confronted by situ-
ations of dispute between finder and occupier and it oper-
ated in a social context where things far from one's hand 
11 . d .'29 ""'· h b norm.a y were in some Jeopar y. ~urt er, as trover e-
comes completely fictionalised, the law of charity appears 
to be used to bring true finding within detinue sur bail-
ment by implying the loser 1 s consent to the finder's takL~g 
on his behalf or by implying a bailment by authority of 
law. 
* * 
29. An occupier claiming against a 'finder' at that stage might 
well have got short shrift. The effective sanctions against 
trespass to land were weak: co~mon land abounded, occupied 
land was rarely fenced and much land was barely occupied. 
From the time of Coke until the decision in 
Bridges v. HaJl'.kesworth the problems of finding cease to 
appear in the civil reports save in connexion with prob-
lems of lien and rewara..30 We find them instead in the 
context of larceny. The initial effect of approaching 
these problems from the side of the criminal law is to 
strengthen the view that true finding cannot be trespass 
and cannot be converted into larceny by the finder's 
initial intention or by his subsequent intention or act. 
If one lose his goods and another find them, 
though he convert them animo furand,i to his own 
usei yet ig1it no larceny, for the first taking is awful. 
If A finds the purse of B in the highway, and 
take and carry it away, and hath ail the cir-
cumstances that may prove it to be done animo 
furandi, a.a32enying or secreting it, yet it is not felony. 
If he had taken the chattel innocently, and 
afterwards appropriated it without knowledge 
of the oVl!lership, it would not have been larceny, 
nor would it, we think, if ha had done so, 
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30 • .llkg., N:l,cholson y. Chapman (1793) 2 H. Bl. 2')!t,126E.R.,._£J6i 
where the issue was whether one on to whose property 
another 1 s goods had been cast was entitled to be reim-
bursed for his expenses in caring for the goods thus 
come into his possession. The Gpurt rejected the anal-
ogy of maritime salvage and held he was not so entitled. 
31. Coke, Third Institute~, 108i Isaacs v. Clark, ~upra. 
32. 1 Hale, P.V. 505. 
knowing who was the owner, for he had the law:t"ul 
possession in both caaes, and the cg~version would 
not have been a trespass in either. 
The question is, what is a true finding? Coke 
and Hale discuss lost chattels as analogous with treasute 
trove, wreck and waif; Blackstone goes on to distinguish 
between these latter, taken together with chattels ex-
pressly made derelict, and chattels that are lost but the 
property in which remains in the owner., 34- What both 
groups have in CO!fu~on - the fact that they are all in no 
one's possession before the finding - is neither discuss-
ed nor distinguished. The criminal requirement of mens 
rea in larceny is formulated strongly as the intention 
permanently to deprive the owner; criminal lawyers come 
to concede that a finder may be a thief, rr"t they do so 
by focusing attention on the relation of his act and in-
tention to the daminium. of an lCWal or possible o;mert 
litwm111:Xihlil::utxax2xa1a•!!OIJCMBDRASMS~tw1w:bt:i:Mg The question 
whether the 1 finder' is taking the chattel from the posses-
sion of someone (possibly someone other than the owner, 
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33. R.!U: Parke, Bo, in R, v. Thurborn (184-8) 1 Den. c.c. 387,~ 
~t p.398 1 169 E1.R •. 293~ at p,.297. For additional ~uthor­ity, see R. v. Wood (1c49) j Cox c.c. ~53; E· v, ~h.ristle 
(18~9) 3 Cox c.c. 573; Carrier's Case, supra, ~Brian, 
c.J. 
34. 1 Bl. ~o 9, 2 Bl. Gommo 295-6. 
~., the keeper of a public house in whose premises the 
things were picked up) is consistently avoided. Instead, 
the issue is made to rest on the question whether the 
1finder' could or could not reasonably believe in the 
circumstances that an owner would be traceable.35 
The way in which issues about possession have 
been successfully avoided and converted into issues about 
knowledge in those very examples where the initial problem 
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35. For some cases in which it was held that the cttcumstances 
showed that there was larceny f'or this reason, see: 
Lamb's Case (1694) 2 East, P.c. 664 (driver of hackaey 
carriage keeping articles and cases left behind by pass-
engers); W~e•s Case (1786) 1 Leach 413 168 .R. 308, 
2 East, P.~~61t (facts as in lrunb&s Case}; R. v. Pope 
(1834) 6 C. &: P. 346, 172 E.R. 1270 (prisoner picking 
up hat after brawl in passage of public house); R. v:. 
Kerr (1837) 8 c. & P., 176, 173 E.R. ltl+9 (servant keeping 
money picked up in passage of master's dwelling-house); 
R. v, Peters {1843) 1 c. & K. 245, 174 E.R. 795 (prison-
er I finding I v2.luable ornaments in gar(len of one who had 
employed him to Q.o some viork); L y, We§t (185'+) 6 Cox 
c.c. 417 (stall-keeper appi•opriating purse left on stall 
by custome1·); R. v, Moqrl;\ (1861) L. & C., 1, 169 E.R. 
1278 (bater-shop keeper converting banknote picked up 
on floor after a customer had purchased some hair oil); 
for cases where the circ'l.l.lllstances were held ut show no 
larceny, see: R. v~ Wood. (181+8) 3 Cox c.c. 277 (banknote 
found on open land); R. v, Dixqn (1855) 7 Cox c.c. 35, 
25 L.J.M.c. 39 (lost note without mark); R. v~ Shea 
(1856) 7 Cox c.c •. 1!+7; R. v, Christopjle_z: (185) Bell c.c. 
27, 169 E.R. 1153 (unmarked notes and purse foun(l in 
public place); R. v, Glyde (1868) 11 Cox c.c. 103 
(sovereign found in high road); R, v, Deav~s (1869) 
11 Cox c.c. 227 {prisoner's child found six sovereigns 
in public place). 
is whether a man is taking frO!:l the possession of another 
comes out clBarly in the following passage from Hale and 
East's comment on it: 
A man hides a purse of money in his corn-mow, 
his servant findin.g it, took part of it; if 
by circumstances it can appear he knew his 
master laid it there, it is felony; but then 
the circumstances must be pregnant, otherwise 
it may be reasonably interJreted to be a bare 
finding, ~8ause a..'1 unusual place for such a 
d ep OS i t'UlJl. 
Where one finds a purse in a highway, which he 
takes and carries away 1 it is no felony; al-though it may be attended with all the circum-
stances which usuai1y prove a felonious intent; 
such as denying or secreting it. However, this 
must be understood where the flnder really be-
lieves the goods to have been lost by the owner; 
and does not colour a felonious taking under 
such a pretence. Therefore where a man 1 s goods 
are in such a place where ordinarily they are 
or may be placed, and a person. takes them away 
with a view to convert them to his own use, tbs 
pretence of finding is no excuse. Thus the 
taking of another roants horse from his own or 
his neighbour's ground or common, with intent to 
steal it, is felony. One hides his purse in his 
corn-mow; his servant finding it takes part of 
it: if by the circumstances it can appear that 
he knew his master laid it there, it is felony. 
But then the circumstances l'!lllSt be pregnanti 
otherwise it may be reasonably interpreted to be 
a bare finding, becaus37the purse was deposited in so unusual a placeo 
36. 1 Hale, P.c. 507. 
37. 2 East, P.c. 66lr-5~ 
95 
The view that the 1finder1s1 taking with the 
intent of depriving a possible owner (whether :ba:l!;ea'lil'i• 
that owner would reasonably appear traceable to the finder 
or not) is insufficient for larceny, even though the 
owner were later to become known, is not necess:itated by 
the general conception of mens reg in criminal law, espec-
ially in the criminal law of that day,, In the area of 
homicide, for instance, 17th century courts felt no dif-
ficulty in imposing the sanction of the law in cases wher& 
the lac~ of intention to kill, or even to injure, was not 
queried.38 The general social feeling appears to have 
been that the absence or vi et arm;ts in case of taking 
did 
1by finding• litwJl:g not justify the dreadtul penaltties then 
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imposed on the thief. 39 This cf'iminal law treatment of 
taking 1by finding' ~!!!± right up to the day of Bridges v1 
HawJ:&eswortn thus once more helps to stem and obscure a 
development latent in the latter stages of the civil concept-
ion of finding: the possibility of focusing attention 
38. See, ~·, Weia,ver y., Ward (1616) Hob~ 134 fDE.R. l.'il"f> 
am ... d other cases briefly discussed in A.E.s. Tay z. "Moral 
wilt; and Legal Libbility", ( 1961) LX Hibbert Journal 44. 
1
•0ur law which punishes all theft with death, if the 
thing stolen be above the value of 21: 12d, and with corp-
pri'!i.l punishment if under, rather chooses to deal with 
such cases as civil than criminal offences, perhaps for 
this reason, in the case pf goods lost, because the party 
is not much aggriwed. where nothing is taken but what he 
had lost before:" Hawk. book 1, Co33, s.3. er. 1 Hale, 
P.C .. 505'., 
on the question whether 1possessio est vacua1 through 
the concept of jeopara.y and the linking of lost things with 
treasure trove, wreck and waif. 
* * * 
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Patteson, J., in Bridges v. Hawkesworth and the 
learned judge in Armory v. Delamiriel+o, which Patteson, 
J,, cited as authority, agreed that there was a general 
principle of 6om:mon Law that the possession of the finder 
is good against the whole world except the true owner. 
The development we have striven to portray shows that this 
principle, by itself, has no value in a dispute between 
'finder' and occupier. It is torn, with some violence, 
out of the works of Coke, Hale and Blackstone, where the 
context makes it clear that the learned writers were 
thinking of the thing found as having previously been 
utterly out of a.'1Yone's possession, as having returned to 
a state of :aature save for the continuing interest of the 
true owner. This dispute between 1 finder:! and occupier 
has nothing to do with the rights of the finder: the 
whole dispute is whether there was a finding or whether 
the chattel, when taken, was already in someone's posses-
sion. Neither the civil nor the criminal law before 
Bridges v. Hawkesworth had throw.n up any ~uthorities for 
resolving such an issue. Armor2 v, Delamirie is not a case 
on this issue; as many writers have Jointed out, it is not 
40. (1722) 1 Str. 505, 93 E.R. 664. 
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a case of finding at all. The facts before the Court were 
that a chimney-sweep who had found a ring witha stone 
took it to a ;jeweller to have it valued; the jeweller's 
apprentice who received the ring for this purpose prised 
out the stone and refused to return it. In finding for 
the chimney-sweep, the Court was not vindicating the 
rights of a 'finder' but the rights of a FJJl!1!fll!l!T1lfSfliJ:I: 
possessor who could even have been a thief against anyone 
except a previous possessor with better right to have pos-
session. 
This is not to say that Patteson, Jo, simply 
failed to consider whether the occupier had possession of 
the banknotes on the floor of the shop. But he dealt with 
the question of possession not by considering the presence 
or absence of effective control, but in terms of the 
strict concept of bailment devel~ within the action 
of detinue - a concept of bailment prevalent at his time 
but treated with much greater suspicion sinceo Was there 
an "intentional deposit" of the banknotes, he asked, hl•, 
was there a delivering by which possession passed tp the 
shopkeeper? if not, was the shokeeper in the position of 
an innkeeper, having a legal duty to his customers, i,e., 
was there a bailment created by licence or authority of 
law? No; then there is no possession in the shopkeeper 
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before the findingo 
The two counsel, it is true, made some attempt 
to go beyond this technical approach toward a theory of 
possession. Significantly, they could not yet find it in 
1GO 
the Common Law and had to look to the Continental juris-
prudents. Counsel for the finder drew attention to Savigny's 
doctrine of prehension (i,e,, acquiring possession by 
taking);41 counsel for the occupier very properly pointed 
out that p.e:13hension is not the only way of acquiring pos-
seaion in Savigny and that "possession of a thing may be 
acquired simply by the fact of its having been delivered 
at one's residence, even though we are absent from the 
house at the time. 1• 42 The learned judge ignored both. 
A11 this does not go to prove that l!ridges v. 
Hawkesworth gives us the wrong verdict. One might argue, 
though I should not be inclined to; do so, that the occupier 
had no possession on grounds other than the absence of 
a delivery or of a bailment created by authority of law: 
the learned judge might have stressed the occupier 1 s lack 
of knowledge or his inadequate control over the 1open1 
portions of his shop as grounds for denying hin possession., 
But this Patteson, J. 1 
Savigny, Possession 
OJie cit., p.169. 
not do. The rule enshrined in 
in the Civil Law p 17c-, 
' -0 ' ;!) 
the headnote under whi.ch :l;he Jurist reported the decision 
The Place in which a lost Article is found does 
not constitute an Exception to the general Rule 
of Law, that a Finder is entitled to it as 
against all Persons except the Owner 
is nothing but a major begging of the essential question, 
whether the article is 1 lost'. The early history of 
finding that we have traced in sane detail is relevant 
not for the authorities it establishes, but because if 
shows that the Common Law principles relating to the 
rights and duties of the finder have no bearing whatever 
on the determination of the question whether he is a 
finder. Patteson, J,., if not all of his defenders, seems 
to have seen this; he •ioes bring the question down to 
possess:i.on. But in dealing with the issue of possession, 
he substitutes for the consideratipn of the facts relate 
ing to control a technical doctrine of the ways in wh:i.ch 
possession may pass.43 Before con.Siderine the rejection of 
this approach in the subsequent English and Commonwealth 
law of finding, let us consider the systematic development 
of Patteson, J. 1s approach attempted by the courts of 
the u.s.A. 
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43. The effect of this doctrine is to deflect attention from 
the fact Of (actual) possession on to the rivht to nossess. 
In asking whether the occupier has prior possession; Pattesor 
J. 1 attempts to make such possession dependent on the 
existence of a derivative title, on a right to possess 
passedt:l the occupier by the owner by his purported 
intentional deposit or placing under the protection of 
the house., 
4. T:t!Jr. POSSESS ror~ OF__JINDE~:." A TI!.~l!JPROAGH 
The modern English 
literature on these cases is 
1C3 
cases on finding are few; the 
1 enormous. The fundamental 
problem - whether and to what extent a man can have posses-
sion of things of which he is not aware - has been rendered 
even more troublesome by the difficulty of ascertaining 
just what the leading cases decide. Writers on this sub-
ject have generally attempted to clarify the position by 
fovusing attention on one or both of two questions that 
might be asked about any finding case: (a) In what type 
of place was the article found? (b) To what relevant 
class of persons does each of the claimants belong and in 
what legal relationsh~p - if any - do the parties confront 
each other? The first question gives rise to attempts to 
decide or explain the law by distinguishing articles found 
attached to or under land, articles found on private 
premises, artj_cles on public ~ghways or in public parks 
and articles on private premises open to the public. The 
two-pronged second question leads to a set of more complex 
distinctions, often involving or subs=ing a reference to 
the type of place where the article was found. This latter 
1. The cases are cited and discussed in the section followin~ 
tr.kA!Jfi •Satn1*· of" i:b@~-msi1;~·=Ji+:ta""·al111_m rar_i11 1• £ "l' ,.::1 0 " • -- --- --- - • " - - --- - ••• - -- " - - < - ~~~ ,i,.l 
approach stresses the relationship of one of the parties 
to the place where the object was fa1.md (~., that of 
owner, occupier, trespasser)j it asks how the parties 
are related to one another in respect of the place or 
larger thing where the article was found (e.g., are they 
landlord and tenant, lessor and lessee, bailor and bailee, 
vendor and vendee ?) ; and finally, it enquires whether the 
activity during which the article was found was part of a 
legal relationship (e.g,._ 7 that of master and servant). 2 
But there is yet a third question that may be asked of all 
cases of finding, a question that focuses attention on an 
earlier stage of the article's hlstory and that presents 
us wi.th categories that seem at o_nce simpler and more 
unlversal. The question is: In what character did the 
article appear at the time of the 'finding' - was it 
abandoned, lost or misplaced? 
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In Bridges v. Hawkeswortn, suura,, and in two 
English criminal cases decided shortly afterwards, attention 
2. The writers, of course, also include the e:ase m where 
the relationship between the parties is that of finder 
and owner of the article found. I leave this case out 
of consideration since the nroblems that notori.auslv beset 
' . 
the law of finding all arise from those instances where 
neither party is the true owner. 
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is focused on to this last question. In Bridges v. Hawkes-
worth, Patteson, J., says~ 3 uThe notes which are the sub-
ject of this action were evidently dropped by accident in 
the shop ••• The facts do not warrant the supposition that 
they have been deposited there intentionally. it That the 
situation might have been treated as significantly differ-
ent if they had been so deposited is suggested by the two 
subsequent cases. In R. v~ Pierce and Anoro 4 , the prison-
ers, ~:tlivixf:mx servants of the Shrewsbury and Birmingham 
Railway Co., were indicted for stealing a dressing-case 
and other articles left by passengers in a carriage of the 
train ana. held guilty' the property (! .. t.Jl.•' possession) Of 
the articles having been laid in the railway company. The 
case is reported under the headnote: "The law with regard 
to the finder of lost property does not apply to the case 
of property of a passenger accidentally left in a railway 
carriage, and found by a servant of the company; such a 
servant is guilty of larceny, if, instead of takj.ng it to 
the station or superior officer, he aµpropriates it to his 
own use. 11 In R, v. Wes:t,5 a purchaser inadvertently left 
3. (1851) 21 L.J.Q.B. 75, at pp.77-8i reported in almost 
identical terms in 15 Jur. 1079,at p.1082. 
4. (1852) 6 Cox c.c. 117. 
5. t18~) 6 Cox c.c. 417; citation from 24 L.J.:llI.C.4; also 
in 1 Den0 c.c. 3871 Because of the special requirements of thE law relating to larceny it does not folli:lw that there would 
have been no larceny if the property had been 11ost' in the 
sense of not being put down and left. 
his purse on the prisoner's market-stall; the prisoner, 
noticing the purse only subsequently but knowing who had 
left it there, appropriated it and subsequently denied 
all knowledge of it to the owner. The prisoner's appro-
priation was held to be larceny 1 Jervis, G.J., saying: 
" • •• there was no reaso11able ground Here for supposing 
that the purse was lost. There is a clear distinction 
between property put dmm and left as this purse was, and 
property lost." 
It is this distinction between property put clown 
and left and property lost which the American cases on 
finding reached independently and then developed, seeing 
it as part of the progression misplaced-lost-abandoned. 
6 As the Court put; it in Fester v,,, Fidelity Safe Deposit Co.: 
Property may be separated from the owner by 
being abandoned, or lost, or mislaid. In the 
first instance, it goes back into a state of 
naturej or 1 as it is most CQ\ll.l!;!Qnly expressed, it returns to the cOI!llllon massL(J and belongs 
to the first finder, occupier or taker. In 
the second instance, to be lost it must have 
6. (1915') 26lt 110. 89, 174 S.W. (Mo., App,.) 376, L.R.A. 
655. Compare Ho l d v ores Pa k Hiohl ds Am (1qoi..) QQ.t) 70 Mo. 33,,? • • · , 9 m. i:> t. Rep. ? 0 
voluntarily la1d dOWJ'.l and forgotterl'is misplaced). 
7. Cf. Blackstone's distinction between things abandoned, 
which return to a state of :a:a.ture and being publici jur~s 
once morli can be acquired by the first taker and things 
intentionally hidden or deposited under the ground, i.e., 
treasure trove: 2 Bl. Comm. 9. The special rule re ating 
to treasure trove in Am.erica.n law, where it exists, reduces 
it to the category of •lost• and not «misplaced' property 
awarding possession to the finder, 
been u..~intentionally or involuntarily parted 
with; in which case it is also an object which 
may be found, and the finder is entitled to the 
possession against everyone but the true owner. 
But 7 if it is intentionally put down, it is not lost in a legal sense though the owner may not 
remember where he left it, and cannot find it. 
Why misplaced articles are not lost had been 
discussed in Lawrence v, State8 nearly 80 years earlier: 
The loss of goods, in legal and common intend-
ment depends upon something more than the 
knowledge or ignora.~ce, the memory or want of 
memory, of the owner as to their locality at any 
given moment. If I place my watch or pocket-
book under my pi~low in a bed-chamber, or upon 
a table or bureau, I may leave them behind me, 
indeed, but, if that be all, I cannot be said 
with propriety to have lost them. To lose is 
not to place or put anything carefully and 
'IPluntarily in the place you intendi and then 
forget,it, it is casually and invo untarily to 
part from the possession; and the thing is then 
usually found in a place or lh~der circumstances 
to prove to the finder that the owner 1 s will was 
not employed in placing it there. 
The emphasis on the d:tst:lnction betwmm lost and misplaced 
things in American law arises partly as a result of the 
conflict between a general American tendency to favour the 
finder and the courts' recognition that persons putting 
things down 1n particular premises may do so in the 
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8. (1839) 1 Humphreys (Tenn.) 228, 34 Am. Dec. 6lt4. See also 
J.C._ McC:Dor:z Co, ~ Hgmley, 37 Ohio App.461 1 176 N.E. :?32;. ferguson v, Ray, Ore. 577, 77 P. 600, 1 L.R.A. (NS) 477, 
102 Am. St. Rep. 648; Kuykendall v, Fisher, 61 W. Va. 87, 
56 S.E. !+8, 8 L.R.A. (if.S.) 94, 11 Am. Gas. 700. 
con:f'idence that the occupier exercises a certain control 
and supervision over the premises. The form given to this 
distinction reveals the influence of the early history of 
finding in the Common Law traced in the preceding section; 
it is not accidental that America_l'l. courts should have ap-
proached the problem of finding in the ma,'1.ner of Patteson, 
Jo, even before Bridges v .. Hawkeswort,h. The history of 
finding in the criminal law led them to focus attention on 
the manner in which the object confronts the finder; the 
linking of finding with detinue encauraged them to look 
at possession from the point of viaw of delivery. Things 
misplaced on premises controlled by an occupier have there-
fore been held to;'. have passed ttinto the protection of the 
house 119 so as to give the occupier of the premises a 
custody on behalf of the owner which is sufficient posses-
sion against the 1finder 1 • As Lurton, J., puts it in 
Deaderick v. Oulds:iO 
9. The phrase nunder the protection of the house" is used 
by Patteson1 J., i:c Bridges v. Hgwkeswo;;-~ as a criter-ion for deciding whether the occupier-shopkeeper should 
be awarded possession; Americar1 courts repeatedly cite 
birn with approval. 
JO. (1887) 86 Tenn. 14, at p.19, 5' S.W. 487, 6 Am. St. Rep. 
812 .. 
If it was evidently placed where it was found, 
it then becomes the duty of the owner of the 
premises to keep the property for the ovmer 1 as 
in such cases he treated as a quasi baileii 
and he may maintain trover against a finder.L11] 
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The question of determining whether an article has been 
lost or misplaced normally arises in suits between finders 
and occupiers, where the owner is not available to give 
evidence of the manne1· in which the article le~t his 
possession. The court, therefore, has to presume the 
manner fron the position and circumstances in which the 
article was found. This is emphasised in Foster Yt Ficlel-
it:r Safe Deposj,t Co., supr~, where the Court goes on to 
say: 
11. 
••• the law in this instance, as in so many 
others, founds its rules upon the natural act-
ions of men and not upon a possibility. Thus, 
articles of property may be such and circumstances 
may be such as to make clear they have been 
Compare McAvo~ v. Medina (1866) 11 Allen '.)48 (Mass.), 
87 Am. Dec. 75 1 where Dewey, J., said: "This property is not, under the circumstances 1 to be treated as lost 
property in that sense in which a finrler has a valid 
claim to hold the same until called for by the true 
owner. This property was voluntarj:ly placed upon a 
table in the defendant's shop by a customer of his who 
accidentally left the same there and has never called 
for it. The plaintiff also came there as a customer 
and f:i.rst saw the thing and took it up from the tableo 
The plaintiff did not by this acquire the right to 
take the property from the shop, but it was ra.ther the 
duty of the defendant when the fact became thus known 
to him, to use reasonable care for the safe-~eeping of 
the same until the ow'ller should call for it." Lurton, 
J.'s reference to quasi bailee brines out the historical 
influences we have emphasised, but on a non-consensual 
J~~N of bailment urged in section ft below, we may call 
occupier an (involuntary) bailee. · 
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voluntarily abandoned by their owner. But norm-
ally men do not voluntarily abandon their money. 
Therefore, if money be discovered in the high-
way, or on the ground, or on the floor, it will 
not be considered as xilral:lilrm!!lll:li abandoned for 
that would be unnatural, but as having teen 
lost - that is, ~ casually and unknowing-
ly dropped. But if it be discovered in a drawer, 
or on a table, it will be considered as having 
been placed there purposely by the owner, and it 
it is not classed by the law as lost property. 
The circumstance of it being afterwards forgotten 
does not go back and characterise the original 
act. 
Thus the courts have held that the 'finder 1 is not entitled 
to a pocket-book lying on a table in a barber shop, 12 to 
articles or banknotes left on a desk, 13 to property left 
by a customer on the table or a shop, 11t and to a package 
left on the seat of a street-car or railroad carrj.age. 15 
They have treated as 1 lost1 and awarded to the finder a 
roll of banknotes found lying on the floor of a factory 
by an employee 16 and another roll found on the floor of the 
public parlour by the servant of an hote1. 17 
12. Lawrence v. State, supra. 
0 
The rat¥1ale 
13. Kincaid v. Eatof::~98 Nass. 139, 93 Am. Dec. 142; Loucks 
v. Gallogly, 1 Misc. 22, 23 N.Y.S. 126. 
14. H.cAvoy v. Medina, sunra. 
State v Courtsol, 89 Com1. 564, 94 All. 
121611., ~65; Foulkes v. N.Y. Consol. Ry" 
2~9, 127 N.E. 237, OJ ft·L· ~. i3~.if 
16. Bowen v, Sullivan, (1878) 62 Ind. 281, 30 Am. Dec. 172. 
17. Hamaker v. Blanchard (1879) 90 Pa. 377, 35 Am. Jlep.664, 
of the decisions was re-emphasised in Loucks Y• Galloglx, 
suora, where the Court referred to sevaral of the cases 
just mentioned: 
The place of finding ••• is of importance as 
bearing on the question whether the property was 
really lost or merely left. In the cases last 
cited, where the money was fOfi!Od on the table of 
a barber shop, or the cOUc~ter of a store, the 
property was not considered lost, on the ground 
that the place where it was found indicated that 
the owner had piut it there purposely and volun-
tarily; therefore it was not lost and cmuld not 
be found, in the legal sense, As to the rol1 of 
bills in question, found by the plaintiff on the 
banking-house desk (one at which persons stand 
to write), what, in the absence of any direct 
proof, are we to conclude as an inference of 
fact from the situation of the money when discov-
ered by him? Is not the inference stronger &""Id 
mmre reasonable than any other that it was 
consciously and voluntarily placed there by the 
owner while temporarily engaged, writing or other-
wise, at the desk and then inadvertently or 
thoughtlessly left? Does not the fact thllt the 
money was discovered on the desk, and not on the 
floor, indicate that it had been voluntarily 
placed there with the intention of retaking it 2 
rather than that it had unconsciously and accid-
entally fa.lled frcm ·che person of the owner? If 
it had been found on the floor, as. in the case 
l'l!:f referred to, where :tiimxENtvaak a customer 
found a purse on the shop floor, and where the 
servant in a hotel found a roll of banknotes on 
the flibor of a public parlour that fact would 
lead to the conclusion that it had been invol-
untarily dropped by the owner,and hence losto 
* * * 
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At first sight, the America.'l cases on finding 
confront us as simple a11d seemingly coherent applications 
of a single rule,, 18 The dist:!.nction between 1lost 1 and 
lmisplaced 1 has been so applied as to cut across and sign-
ificantly subvert the concern of wr:tt-ers on English law 
with the categories to which the parties belong and/or 
the legal relati::mship between them: the America.11 ap-
proach tends to reduce these categories in the type of 
case under review to the categories of 1 finder' and 1 oc-
cupier 1 and to award possession to the finder when the 
article is 1 lost'. The American law thus dismisses from 
consideratlon the status or legal relati.onship of the 
parties involvea.. 19 The term toccupier•, however, and 
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18. For Arnel:'ican writing on these uroblems see: David Ries-
man_,_ J:r.. 1 "Possession and the Law of Finders", (1939) 52 liarv.L,Rev. 1105'; Rajliph Yi(. Aigler, "Rights of Find-
ers" (1922-3) 21 Hich.L.Rev. 664; Roy Moreland, "The 
Rights of Finders of Lost Property", (1927~) 16 Ky,LtJ. 
,1 and his ns;te on Silcot~ v. Lqu.~svlll!i!.[Tri1~t Co. t J;05T 
Ky. 234, 26;i S.W. b12, lt5 AL.H • .:8, in 192 -7J1? 1\.Y•'-'• 
J, 225; r.ote on Vt9kery VJ Jiardin {1922) 77 Ind. App. 
558 (Ind. App.), 1~5 N.E. 922 1 in (1922-3) 21 Mich.L.Rev. 611; Joseph W. Bingham, "The Nature and Importance of 
Leg~\1 Possession - II1t, (1915) 13 Mich.L.Rev. 623. The 
trend of 'l!;hese articles is to bring out :tome difficult:tes 
in applying the American aategories; none o.f' them goes 
beyond the discussion of borderline difficu1ties or 
anomalies to the more basic criticisms suggested below. 
19. E.g., in Bowen v. Sullivan, supra, the employee finding 
ba:.ri_knotes on the floor of a factory was treated si.'llply 
as a fin<ler az1d the employer as occupier; similarly, 
113 
the reconstruction of the situation in which the owner lost 
or mislaid the article invite the court to apply its mind 
19. (Contd.) 
in Hamaker v. Blanchard, supr2, the hotel servant finding 
banknotes on the floor of the public~ parlour was simply 
awarded P.osse~rnion as 1 finderi. Again, in Danielson Y• 
Roberts, 4lt Ore. 108, 74 P. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526, 102 Am., 
St. Rep. 627 1 the C~~rt awarded possession of ~7 1 000 in gold coin to boys who had been employed to clean out a 
hen house on the defendantts land and had faund the coin 
buted a few inches below the surface. ( 1Treasure trove 1 
was not an issue the Court holding expressly that the 
law of treasure trove had" become merged, in the State of 
Oregon, with the law of lost property generally, but the 
boys may have had the sympathy of the Court as the result 
of evidence that the defendant had sought to trick the 
boys out of the money.) These cases represent the domin-
ant trend in theAlllerica.~ law and stand in sharp opposit-
ion to the main trends in English and Commonwealth law, 
described in section 5, below. ~he ~ore modern English 
cases, as we shalJ. see, do consider whether an occupilll'r 
has possession of articles not intentionally deposited 
in or on his land either because they are attached to the 
land and thus come under his control of it Q!i;lwes v, 
Brigg Gas Co infra) or bee e they are generally li!lllliliU: in 
the occupierls area of control (the servant's activity 
may be evidence of the master-occupier's control of such 
area, as Lord Russell of Killowen took it to be in Sooth 
Staffords e v Sha an, ~nft;a).. An Irish court, in 
M owell v ter B \ 1 99, 33 Ir., L.Times 225, went 
beyond these considerations to hold that a servant finding 
in the course of his employment, llllQl bringsinto his master's 
possession. The decision, concerning a porter who had 
found a parcel of notes under a table used by persons sign-
ing cheques when he wi:i.s sweeping put the bank's premises 
after hours, flatly contradicts the main American approach, 
but the same principle has recently been reaffirmed in 
Corporation of Lo:qdon v, Apple:vard 1 inf;&'£!,• The At11erican trend has been so strong, however, that a Pennsylvanian 
lower court even awarded possession to a servant-finder of 
aeticles normally held misplaced (in this case left on the s:a· 
of a railway carriage~: T~tym v. Sharoless (1865) 6 Phila.18, 
though the Court went on o say: ™ll'e are strongly impressed 
with the utility of legislation requir:tng railway ccmpanies 
to adopt measures by which1 in every case of an article left by a passenger in a car, tne custibd.y of it shou.ld be assU1l1ed 
by the company, with the correspondinP. obli£ation lll"<:mPtly 
to deliver it ~o the owner on satisfactory proor O'.!: his loss. 
cco-.ht) 
tc the kind of premises on which the article was found. 
The strength and weaknesses of the u.s. approach may best 
be brought out by examiriing its detailed working when 
applied to various kinds of premises. 
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1o 1 Lost1 or 1Misplaced 1 in the Premises of OWner of Articles: 
The type of premises mentioned '.!here do not normally 
come to the attention or the court in civil matters, since the 
owner, if knO\•n, would claim on the basis of title 9 but they 
have some importance in the law relating to larceny. The em-
phasis on bailment or guasi bailment in the distinction between 
lost and misplaced would not be helpful 1 but the emphasis on 
the situation i.'1 which the thing was found as indicative of 
the manner in which the thing came to leave the owner's illlmed-
iate control can, on some views possession, be relevant. 
The question is whether we are prepared to bold that the owner 
of an article has nossession of it all the time so long as it 
remains in hi.s dwelling house or on land or in premisEJs · 1 $ 
19. {Contd.) On the other hand, at least some more recent Americ-
an decisions have had to concede the relevance of the status 
of the finder. In Hathews v. Harsell, 1 E.D. Smith (N.Y.) ~ 
393, Wood:t'Jfff 1 J. , said: "I am by no means prepared to hold 
that a house se!'vant who :i'inds lost jewels, money or cl:1attels 
in the house of his or her employer acquires any title even 
to retain the pos sion, against the will of the employer. I' 
will tend much more to promote honesty and justice to require 
servants in such cases to deliver the property so found to th1 
employer for the ben:ll1t of the true owner. a In Hume v.Elder 
( 1917) 178 App. Div. 652, 165 N. Y. Supp., 81+9, the Court aw ar' 
ed the finder of a bucket on the highway possession against 
his master who hired him to delivery ice, but it did so on th• 
basis that his finding was not a necessary part or his employ· 
ment. Simile.rly, in Burns v. Clark (1901) 66 Ilac.(Cal.) 12, 
an employee hired to grade public lands Wlil-S given possession 
of gold ore found the'{eon against his emn~oy~r on the same 
ground, with the Gour adding that if the e1mil0Yer had wanted 
such findings, there should have been a contre.ctual term. 
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that he occupies. If we are so prepared, the whole distinct-
ion between lost and misplaced becomes irreleva.."'lt in this con-
text.. One could argue that this is the best way of treating 
the law, lea~ing to fewest complications, consonant with 
social expectations20 and a trend in the latter English cases 
and most capable of cohering with a general theory of posses-
sion. There is little doubt, as we have seen, that the English 
larceny cases concerned with taking by 1 fi.nding ! or: or from 
premises of the wwner do not state this proposition and do not 
treat such taking as in principle different from taking by 
fi 20a nding elsewhere. IDne might then attempt to distinguish bet-
ween articles intentionally deposited by the owner on h:!.s pre-
mises (even if then forgotten) and articles casually and 
involuntarily lost, recognising only the owner~s possession 
of the former. There is no evidence that American courts 
:have. ever atterrrpj:;ed to do this in the cor'n.exion treated 
here; arA such a distinction would seem to conf1ict sharp-
ly with common social expectations and common senseo 
People who drop things in their house do not behave as th~ 
wculd if they dropped them in the street: they will often 
search only pe"functorily and wait t5 .. ll the things 1 turn 
up 1 , that is, are noticed by someone in the house. At the 
20. 't\>'ihatl if I drop a ring, my servant to take it away?" pe3 Park, J., in R, v, Ke!!I' (1837) 8 C:. & P, 176, at p.179, 
7 E.R. 449, at p.4$'1o 
20a, See Hale and East on the corn-mow, supra, p.95, 
same time, the large class of articles that are deposited 
in place X and then fall, slip or pass by some other un-
noticed means into place Y wonld raise endless difficult-
ies in any attempt to apply the American distinction. 
English courts, indeed, have preferred to rely instead on 
a specific consideration draYl!l from the criminal law: the 
principle that a 'finder 1 co~mits larceny if he converts 
to his own use an aeticle found. in circUll:'stances or be 
ing marks that give him reasonable grounds for supposing 
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~h th h ~, d 21 ~ at , e owner may ..,e uisvovere • Thus a servant finding 
and keeping mo:cey found on the floor of the passage in her 
master's house was held guilty of larceny, :primarily on 
the ground that she had not made any enquiry whether the 
money be her master• s thol:tgh the circumstarLCes of the 
findimg strongly suggested it could be. 22 T~s distinction 
works more broadly and more successf'ully the larceny 
cases than. any reliac,ce on the distinction between t 
and misplaced (since misplaced articles on the 011rner 1 s 
premises wm1ld always indicate the owner and since the 
1finder 1 w~~11 still have a duty - in ~.s. as in English 
law - not to convert t articles i:f' he has reasonable 
21. Statutoried in O.K. Larceny Act, 1916, s.1 (2) (i) (d) (6 & 7 Geo.), c.50). 
grounds for 'believing the owner discoverable). Within the 
area of larceny, this principle has worked successfully, 
obviating the value of any distinction between lost and 
One might, nevertheless, p1°efer to base the 
decis:i.ons reached by the courts in the relevant lar·ceny 
cases on th(; still broader principle, tra.11scend.:i.r1g the 
criminal law, that the occupitir always had possession of 
articles he owns which are found on his p1•emises. 
The concept of abandom1ent does not generally 
play much part in the CorJinon Law; in so far as it causes 
,.~~· lti .,.. ' h i ~-- t• ... u1J:1icu es, :Le. aoes sow en a man s a~vemp ·1ng vO 
abandon, or is claimed t:o have abandoned, an article still 
on his premises. In Williams ~nd Others v. Pll.iJ.ip§ and 
Roberts and Others v. Philips, 23 Lord Goddard, C.J., held 
that articles placed i:i: a dustbin for the municipal 
corporation to take away were not abandoned l:r11t put cut 
for taking by a special authority. If we take the 
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• 
(1957) 41 Cr., App. Rep. '). See also R, v1 Edwards (1877) 13 Cox c.c. 384, where three pigs, bitten by a mad dog, 
we~e shot and buried on the owner•s lana, three feet 
below the surface of the soil.. The Ollm.er had no intent-
ion of digging them up again or of :making use of them 
in any way. The same even:tng, the prisoners dug them 
·.up, carried them away and afterwards sold. therr, for £9/3/9d. 
The jury found that there was no ar..a.no.onment of the 
property in the pigs by the owner and the prj.soners were 
convi.cted of larceny, th€ conviction being upheld on 
appeal. 
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traditional emphasis on abando~ent as "returning to a state 
naturen we might say that while abandonment is renun-
ciation of title ana" occupation or possession; such renun-
ciation is not complet'l cu1less t;he thing abandoned is 
"offered to the world". Things I do not want left lying 
on my le~nd are not abiui.d.oned unle at the same time I 
permit anyone to cC!lle on the land and ta1te them; to offer 
these things to a lin::i.ted class of persons is not to e.ban-
?l;. don them. - An American case 1 Fidel,;l~:-:Pi;liladelnhie,"lr11st 
Cot--YL-L.ehigh YallU~·, 2 5" whillle not affecting these 
general principles, brings out the distincti crn between 
abandoning the possession of and t:!.tle to a thing and mal'l:ing 
the thing its elf an a bi>.ndoned one. In that case, nx C, 
following the custom.i of his predecessors in title, .had. f©'I" 
some 30 years deposited culm, or waste material, from his 
mine on Janel adjoining h:Ls, now owned hy the defendant. 
Some 15 years later, owing to changed conditions, the culm 
had became of great value and the plaintiff, executor of c, 
______________ . __ _._; __ , .... _._ ____ =·---------
2)+. In Jewish Rabbinic Law, 1,.rhere the f.ormal co".:oept of aban-
d·::ined property plays an important role, same of the> Rabbis 
have held that a roan ca.YJnot abandon property to the whole 
world minus one. Seo the interesting article by David 
Dau be, "Derelictio, Occ~upatlo and Tradi tio!! Romans .S4'1d 
Rabbis", (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 382. 
25. (Penn. 1928) 1~3 Atl. 47'+; noted 
(1929). 
27 Mich.L.Rev~ 590, 
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asserted title to it. Ignor:l.ng this claim, the defendant 
separated marketable coal om the culm and sold it. De:ny-
ing the plai.nt:lffls suit for trespass, the Court held that 
C had abandoned the property and therefore could not revive 
h • t•tl ~hi •tu ti • 1 t ~ ld i . :i.s 1 . e. __ s SJ. a on, we m1g.,1 noce, wou.. n no way 
· alter if e. plaintiff weee to have abandoned such culm by 
dumping it directly on to the fendantts land and thus 
rendering it immediately into his possession. The cul.'11 
would not be abandoned material for the purposes of trespass 
against or larc€ny from the defendant, but the plaintiff 
would have abandoned both 
I ~ . 26 case, n re oavarillQ, a 
title and possession. In another 
borderline issue arose, whether 
money ~im:Emm abandoned by a passenger in the back seat 
of a taxi and picked up by a fellow-passenger during the 
trip had in the interval been rendered into the possession 
or the taxi-driver. The facts were as follows: two govern~ 
ment detectives had hired a taxi and were taking to headqu<?.rt-
ers a man suspected of bribery. During the trip, this man 
was seen to drop something on to the floor; when the taxi 
stopped, one of' the detectives xaw that the article drapped 
was a roll of money amd ordered the suspect to pick it up. 
26. (S,D, N,Y, 1932) 1 Fii Supp,. 331; noted in (1932-3j 
1+6 F..arv.I,,Rev.716. 
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• The suspect refused, dhclaj.ming ownership, and the other 
detective then took the money, wh1ch was later used in 
e~idence in the ens~ing trial. The taxi-driver subsequent-
ly brought suirunary proceedings for the return of the money 
to him; the Court held that he was not entitled to it since 
he had neither found it nor reduced it to his possession. 
2o 1 Lost 1 or 1 Mjsplaced 1 in Private Premises of a Stranger: 
In Bowen v. SulJivan, 27 we find what may be 
called the •stnongt American l:L~e on the finding of 1 lost' 
property ll:in pr:lvate premises or what Professor Aigler has 
rightly called the application of the ch:l.ld:i.sh Finders-
28 Keepers rule. Re re, th,, court went to far as to say: 
The primary question is, were the notes lost 
property? If they were 1 t can make no differ-
ence whether they were found u~on the highway, 
in the defendants' paper-mill or in their dwell-
ing-house; the difference be!ween the highway, 
the place of business or the dwelling house (so 
far as this case is concerned), is the difference 
only as to the degree of privacy; the place of 
bilsiness more private than the highway, and 
the dwelling hoi1se is more private than the place 
of business. 
But, if the banknotes were lost property and the 
plaintiff 1 s ward found them, it does not ma~ter 
where she found them; they belong to her as 
against every person but the loser, or real owner., 
27. Supra, footnote 16, the facts are indicated in11the text 
above. 
2s. Oo. cit., p.677n. 
This line is supported, as we have seen, by the decision 
in Danielsop';ir!! Roberts, supra, where the 6ourt goes so 
far as to ignore the pursuasion of the real property 
principle ~icguid olantatur [fi'.'!Caturl solo= cedit solo, 
which gi·ves possession of that which is attached to or 
under the soil to the owner of the soil. In Ferguson V@ 
Ray~9 the Court reached the decision that an English 
court would have reached (barring the special rule relat-
ing to treasure trove) in awarding possession of ~ sack 
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of gold-bearing quartz buried in the ground to the owner-
occupier of the land, but it did so on the groux1d that the 
huried sack had been intentionally deposited, i.e., mislaid, 
and that a bailment to the person in control of the ground 
had thereby been created. 
Not all .l\znerican cases, however, take the heroic 
line. In some cf them, the court does take into consider-
ation the private aat1.lre of the premises aa strengthening 
the presumption i:;hat the person misplacing the article 
created a bailment in favour of the occ~pier; in other 
cases, the court has allowed the private nature of the 
p~emises to override clear evidence that the article had 
(19o4) 77 Pac. (Ore.) 600, following the princiP.le laid 
down in the same terms in Sovern v. 21 Yoran, 1b Ore. 269, 
20 P. 100, 8 Am. St. Rep. 293. 
left its mvner 1 s possession aasually and involuntarily. 
Thus, in Foster v, Pidelity Safe Deoos1.t Cq., supr{!, the 
Co,irt, after holding that a parcel of mor:ey found by a 
customer on a desk L~ a private room reserved for the use 
of vault depositors was nislaid and not lost, went on 
to say: 
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Now, in whose possession was the money when dis-
covered by the plaintiff? It could scarcely 
have been mere in the defendant's poasession7 
u..riless it had been in thto; pocket oil one of' i 'ts 
officers. It was not only in the defend.ant's place 
of business, but was a separate aparmnent, 
from which the public liflS excl11ded9 and more 
than tr.at, it ,was on a desk in a private com-
partment kept under the im.8ediate and constant 
guard and supervision of one of the defendantts 
attendants. A roguish street urchin if by 
possibility he had gained, access to this place 
and discovered the envelope on the desk, would 
have had the san1e rights to it that the plaint-
iff had. Suppose the attendant had observed the 
boy as he fou.~d it; would he have been justified 
in letting him carry it off? Would it not have 
been his d~ty to assert the defendant 1 s right of 
possession and to take it from the boy? 
In Silcott Y• Louisville Trust Coo;o the Court went further 
a.11d awarded the occupier possession of a bond foux1d on the 
flibor of a similarly reserved room (i,e., of a bond that 
would normally be considered 1 lost') on the ground of the 
privacy of the room wht~re this was found. 
30. 205 Ky, 234, 265 S.W. 612. CoJJpare Commercial Banke{, 
,\IJncilli"l.ati v. Pleasant (1841) 6 Whart. 375' (Pa.). 
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Neither have all the relevant U.S. cases awarded 
the occupier possession things found buried in bis 
land solely on the ground that these were 'mis~+aced•. In 
two cases involving aerolites - objects that one can hardly 
treat as 1misplaced~ - the Court awarded possession to the 
Oliners of the land where they fell because they had become 
part of the soi1;31 in a third case,32 the Court reached 
the same decision in reppect of a meteorite which rested 
on top of the la.".ld. - on the grr.m.nd that the difference 
between restlng on top of land and be 
did not matter£ 
buried in land 
It is, of course, open to the !!bl:i: die-hard 
supporter of the 1s ong' line to argue that Silcott Vt 
Louisville Trust Co. was wrongly decided; 33 it seems 
31. 
32. 
'i~w Goddard vv,Winchelf,1,.06 Ia. 71 1 52 N.W. 1124, 17 L.R.A. 788 1 41 Am. St. Rep. 481; Maas v. Amana Soc. (Ill.) 1 16 Alb.L.J. 76 (where the aerolite had fai).len on a h:tgh-
way and was picked UJ2 by a traveller; being awarded to 
the owner of the feeJ. 
Oregon Iron Go. v. Hugh'2.§. 1 47 Ora. 313. 
Roy Moreland, in the liote cited i;upra (footnote 18) 
does treat the case as wrongly deci.ded, but bases hls 
criticism on the ground that the premises were open to 
the public, though admittedly in a limited way. He thus 
alreacty departs from the strict lost-misplaced dichotomy. 
The Court placed some emph .. ?.sis 'lln the high defree of 
trust existing between the users of the room and the 
occupier. 
more reasonable to take the decision as illustra:f.Jing the 
difficulty that American courts have also felt in treat-
ing as 1lost 1 an<l awarding to any finder articles picked 
up in premises over Which the oceupier has a very high de-
gree of control. Indeed, are we being seriously asked to 
head that an article of value dropped by an unknown person 
in a room or corridor of my house goes to the first finder 
whoever he be? Even. if such a request were palatable, 
the distinction between 1 lost 1 and 1misplacedt would not 
in the encl work satisfactorily. Is an article depos:tted 
on the desk by the first customer, inadvertently knocked 
on to the floor by a second, and picked up by a third, 
1 lost 1 or 1misplaced 1 ? Is the situation altered if it 
is the first customer himself who, a1'ter depositing it, 
knocks it on to the floor? Is it any more reasonable to 
suppose that bonds or baxL1motes found on the floor near 
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a counter or desk have been inadvertently dropped than to 
suppose that they have been deposited on the counter or desk 
and at same sta.ge, by now unascertainal:ile means, been knocked 
to the fli!lorr3 4 To recog::ii:ie these difficulties is to 
34. Conversely, do peo:ple not uni11tentionally drop such things 
as piDs or brooches on to c01.u1ters? In White v, Dan::i.eJ,s 
(1904) 30 N.Y.I,.J. 1223, noted in (1903-L.") 17 Harv.L.Rev. 
l+25l the plaintiff founu a jewelled pin on the counter 
of che dEd'endarr~ 1 s shop showed it to the superini!lendent 
who took the pi:1 to examine and tlllm refused. to return j, t, 
saying he Wv'llld keep it for the owner, 1111!lo did not appear,. 
The G ourt made not aptempt to apply the lost-misfi(aced 
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recogn:tse that while there might be satisfactory evidence 
that articles on private prewises have been misplaced, there 
Wl111 hardly ever be satisfactory evidence that they were 
lost by the owner. It is not open to the court to say 
that the articles are lost no matter who reduced them to 
that cor:.(U.tion, since the whole emphasis of the lost-misplaced 
dichotomy centres on the question whether the OJW.9.l'. of the 
articles created a bailment. (The courts have held that 
the owner 1 s subsequent forgetting of an article laid down 
does not react back to destroy the bailment. Why then 
should his subsequent5!:;!1: knockirg it to the floor react back 
to destroy the bai.lment?) 
The same di ff:!. cul ties appl;!i to the Amer lean 
attempt to solve the problem.s aris:l.ng the English 
1 escr:Ltoire 1 or 'bureau casesi35 in terms of the lost-
. " " "' ' t I D f - J 36 A · mispiaceu c1.1cno .omy. n ~.!?e 'if. ones, an merican 
34. (Contd.) 
dichot;omy, but argued frorr, general prirciples of posses-
sion, holding that the p1eJ.ntiff was entitled because 
the pin was founli in a olac8 ooen to the nublic in which 
the defendant could not' be said. to have ar1y intention to 
others. One may well cha11enge this decision and treat 
the superintendent 1 s actions as telling evider:ce of the 
control and ll::t!llli! intention to exclude others maifested 
by the shop-keeper relation to all things his 
shop. But whatever view one tcok 1 the criteria. for dis-ti::1guishirg the 11ost 1 from the misplaceci.1 would have 
ttle reality in this case. 
35. Merry v, Green (1841) 7 M. & w. 623, 151 E.R. 916; Calt-
wright v. GrAen (1802) 8 Ves. Jun. 405, 32 E.R. 412. 
36. (1877) 11 R.I. 588, 23 Am. St. Rep. 528. 
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court awarded the bailee of an old safe possession of a 
roll of ba:riJmotes found in the lining of the safe against 
the cla:Lm of the bailer on the g:rountl that the notes hacl 
not been placed there designedly and were therefore 2 lost'. 
But is it not reasonable to argue that at some stage the 
owner of the notes nro.st have deposited them :t.n the safe 
and that his subsequent faJ.lure to remove them (even if 
due to their change ii:::. position) in no way :XWlnlD affected 
the character of the notes as 1misplaced 1 thir:gs? In most 
cases of this type, is it not even ~~ite likely that the 
articles may hr.tve been intentionally secreted in the place, 
though later forgotten? True, there w:l.11 be a problem 
concern:l.r::.e precisely wh°"'ll such deposited articles were 
bailed to 1 whether one can - for the first time ~ create 
a bailment by pass on the safe to someone else's pos-
session and if one can, how this possessi::m. continues to 
pass. But these are precisely the problems that English 
wirters have emphasised and which the distinction between 
lost and misplaced things (in any case unworkable in th:l.s 
context) in no way resolves. Our real problems in the 
'3scrj_ toire 1 or 1 b1.1reau cases 1 , as in Durfee v, Jgnes, are 
-
such problems as whether a man can have or acquire posses-
sion things he does not knc~,r of through their being 
within or attached to a largftr object pf which he has ibr 
acquires possession, whethdr any bailment passes such 
possession if it exists, and preciSEJ1y wh01.t title :im is 
passed on a sale. These are interesting and diffiitult 
problems, indeed; the distinction between 1 lost 1 and 1mis-
placed1 arti.cles makes no contribution to solving them and 
fails to remove the need for considering them., 
3. 1]&st 1 or 1liisplaced1 in Private ?rem:i.ses One_p to the. 
Public: 
It is with premises of this type - shops, the 
public portion of banks, theatres, amusement parks, street 
cars and railway carriages - that the most straightftlrward 
of the American cases dea1937 it is in th:ts area that the 
drawing of a distinction between 11ost 1 and 1 misplacecP 
articles seems at first sight most successful. It ].s true 
that the straightforwardness E:f with which American courts 
hwe distinguished (misplaced' articles on the counter 
1.27 
37. E.g. 1 McAvo:v v. Medina, K;incaid v. Eaton, Loucks v, Gallogl;y, 
Lawrence Ve Statelf Hamaker v, Blanchard, State v. Courtsol, 
Foulkes v. N, Y. Conso].. Ry. Co.,, a11 cited supra where the 
facts are indicated; Cleveland R • v. Dursc uk (1928) 
31 Ohio App. 248 1 166, N.E. 909 bill on f1oor of~rt:l.i.lway 
carriage 1 lost 1 ); Toledo 'fr.;.st C<;L v. Simmons (19.;1?) ?2 
Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E. (2d) 661 (article on flibor of 
passage to bank vault not 11ost 1 for p.urposes of larceny); 
Roaglii!nd Ve Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co. (1902) 
70 S.W. O<fo.) 878 (pocketbook on grounds in amusement 
park 1 lostl, xll!:l!ld assault by proprietors 1 em:!hloyees to 
gai.r.. ros~:ession of pocket book unlawful); Heddle v 1 . Bank 
of Hamilton (1912} 17 B.C. i:. 306, 6 B.R.C. 256, ? D.I,.R. 
11 (wallet on writing desk in bank lobby 'misplaced{). 
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from 1 lost 1 articles on the floor has depended upon the 
fact thllt the courts have not appJJ.ed their minds to two 
important difficulties: (a) the fact, mentioned above, 
that articles may reach the floor in. more ways than falling 
through a hole in the owner's pocket; (b) that there is 
a considerable number of articles (e•P'•, suit-cases) so 
large and bulky that they would normally be deposited on 
the floor and would in any case be incapable of leaving the 
owner's possession casua11y and :biJlzdJul.kax:t:Q:x inaclvert-
ently, i.e. 1 could not be 1lostl by him. The recognition 
of these difficulties again, suggests that the lost-mis-
plaeed dichotomy will not solve the fcL'ldamental problems 
in this area either. We might say that the 'misplaced' 
side of the dichotcmy can be helpful in providing a quick 
solution to those cases whore there seems to hc-~ve been 
an obvious placing "under the protection of the hibuset• 1 
~-, a purse left on the counter of the corner grocer 
shop or a coat ft hanging on the peg on the fitting-room 
of a dress shop. But if I drop my wallit in the fitting-
room, it :tt any ss in the custod.y of the shpp? And if 
I place my purse on the counter of a department store 
which is covered with boxes whjch customers are rum-
maging during a bargain sale, have I really placed it 
•tlLr:tder the protection of the house"? The crucial question 1 
then, is not the distinction between my depositing anc 
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my dropping. The question is the control exercised by the 
oc,~upier over thicl area where my article is found; if that 
control be sufficient the occupier has possession prior 
to the finder. Whether the. control is sufficient for 
possession depends upon the specia1 nat11re of each set of 
premises, the supervj,sion exercised by the occupier and 
his servants, the sort of se:·vices provided 1 the size of 
the prem:tses and business, etc. Intention to control 
does not establish possession -without sooie degree of · 
effective control; to award possession to the trustees 
of a museum of a purse found in its public c::irridors is not 
the same as awarding possession to the proprietors of 
Luna Park of a purse trodden lli"lderfoo'I:; in its grounds. 
L'n the other hand, where control is effedtive, ini;ention 
presumed: in a high class restaurant >.<here waiters 
hover everywhere a,rticles left on the floor are in the 
possession of the restaurant, even if displayed no 
interest in controlling. (Customers who have forgotten 
articles there wi11 reason&,bly presume they are safe.) 
4, 'Lost 1 or 1 Misplaced 1 in Public Places: 
Since depositing in a place that is tru1v nublic 
-.. 
(i,e. 1 has no 011mer or occup:'.ier) cannot create a bailrnent 
~h d. ' , o.. ha 
v e l.S'tJ...YlC • ... 1on ,S no application to finding on such 
premises. All a~ticles fou11d are 1 lost 1 1 the 1ega1 
problem lies rather in ciding what em:Ls es are truly 
~· . t or 110 auvnorJ_ Y: it is sublljlitted 
that certain places by their nature can never cease' to be 
public 1 !:IO ma;i.Jter how strictly controlJ .. ed and wherever 
the m·tnership of the soil may be vested (e.g. 1 hj.ghways 1 
streets and bridges, public forming an area of 
bord.erline U!':c>'n:-tainty) itnd that other places often call-
ed. 1publ:tc 1 (court houses, rer;istry oJ:f:tces, libraries 
upon the amount of n vigilance; the stence of penal 
se.nctions, etc. 
T.he Cornmon L;"w, ou.tside the bi United States , 
suffers from a paucity of authorities in the matter of 
f' ' "' . ~ :1.nc1:1.ng; American courts had ircore opportunities 
oblem. It often said that 
the American developments shpu.ld be ~"lderstood as ref:ilect-
ions of a national and 
130 
fL"1der. True as this be to scme extent, American courts 
have understood that the fu.ndamental probJ.em the dispute 
between 1finder 1 anrl occupier is not to be reso1ved i.n terms 
of general principles concerning the rights of a fi1:lder, 
but raises the question whether the person picking up j,§, 
a finde1· 1 or whether he is tah:ing f'rom the possession of 
the occupier. The criteria of posses::do:o thus become a 
central issue and the AmBrican courts recognise, as readily 
as the English, that possession is not confined to mere 
detent1on and not acquired only by physical takjng. But 
j.n asking whether possession has passed to the occupier, 
American courts are clearly tLnd.er the influeri.ce of the 
lawful 
formal view that/possession passes by intentional delivery. 
This formal view is linked with the traditional doctrines 
of bailment and American decisions, when awardine possession 
to the occupier, cons:1.stently speal{ of him as a (gratuitous 
or invohmtary) bail~e. 38 On the one hand, this approach 
!:1as the i;ii~J;it of recognj_sing that bailment need not be 
founded on contract or agreement, but can rest on mere 
possession accompanied by the baileo 1 s recognition of the 
~C) 
rights of a previous possessor or of an owne:i: • .:i, On the 
38. Thus in Foulkes 'lP.....!'I• Y,.... Consolidated Ry. Co. (supra, 
footnote 1 ')), where a passenger had left a parcel in 
a subway tre.in car operated by the defendant$', the Conrt 
said that the defendant had a rie;ht and a duty to become 
as to the parcel and its owner a gratuitous bailee. 
39. Thus, in the case just cited (note 38), the Court went on 
to say: 11Bailment does not necessarily and always, thortgh 
generally, depend upon a contractual relation. It is the 
element of lawful possession1 however created, and duty to account for the thing as ~he property of another, that 
creates the bailment, regardless of whether such possession 
is based on contract in the ordinary sense or not ••• ": 
pe. r Co,li~' J. if- e"t <UjjvJt. s\.-c11\ Se~, (sech<.1'<-. li'/ \ "lulto.fe,. [llM~ ~Ii-'. Hf<\.~ ~·~~LL\ of' O.v.a\Wl.t'i. 9ooli'- b,_'f lhlnll.. DY O.CL1iltlill--1 Ylo b.o.Jlwi ~"' t"_1;<1oll •o\'>_ C!\I • oii ,~ \\. tm 11-u . h f::"\:,tl£M" r., &..iClr.L .. p, .. d: 1.11...§ lo1o••lli-"1'.(l.i.... of -it-.11.- · r ~r 90011.S 1n;i.-i,2.. to""~ 11-:rt. \.:.,{.. t>O!.llt-SS.1.01-. \l\lli\1e,\... l,;,~J..,11.~~ "\b lh\o~"" ."' ~ f.;_,o_;u~ko.<Jl,,,., :;;::.) ''" \:'..(ui'r.::'..K\$ 'i· I ;111/<,,t:{ lt'\o,)...) \-I.I.\. ~"'1>\'· 1 \ll)- ().\ ~.ton 
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other hand, it has the defect of distracting attent:ton from 
the presence or absence of the occupier's effec;il:tve control 
and focusing it on the (presumed) intent:Lon of the previous 
possessor, on whether he was makin.g a deposit or not. In 
other words, while American courts have emancipated themselves 
specific 
from the view that bailment requ:l.res the/consent of the bailee 
they have not emancipated themselves 
requires the consent or intention of 
from the view that it 
40 
the bailer. The dis-
tinction between 'lost' and 'misplaced' articles is meant 
to resolve the problem whether possession has passed to the 
occupier precisely by asking whether there has been a(n im-
plied) deposit or not~ This distinction, we have striven 
to show, breaks down the moment careful attention is paid 
to thA ·et of · · ·ch .,.,. · 1 ch the ,, va:ri . y ways in wni an a_ v.1.c~e may rea .. •
is found. Aside from this practical in-
adequacy, American courts have had to recognise the theoretical 
the distinction 
inadequacy and to depart from tt in a number of significant 
instances in which they have allowed the high degree of 
control exercised by the occupier over the prerr,ises where 
the th5_ng was founcl, or over the person finding, to overrid.e 
the lost-misplaced dichotomy. In even more cases where 
they have not done so, the results seem quite unsa:t;isfactory 
to anyone who is not prepared to regard life as a lucky-dip. 
40. What I take to be the correct view of bailment, and ~Y 
grounds for doing so, are developed in section 6 1 below. 
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l• POSSESSION AND THE MODERN LAW OF FINDING 
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"The finder's right," as Sir Frederick Pollock 
, 
remarks,' "starts from the absence of' any de f'agto control 
at the moment of finding." It is the failure to consider 
possession fram the point of view of de facto control, 
which may exist whe~e there has not been an intentional 
delivery of possession, that sharply distinguished the 
decision in Bridges y, Hawkesworth from the subsequent 
English and COl!llllon.wealth cases on finding. For in all 
these subsequent cases, possession is consciously consider-
ed as an issue of fact, fundamentally important and capable 
of coming into being independently of intentional bailment, 
consent or previaas right. The abolition of the forms of 
action, coupled with the influence of the 19th century 
flowering of jurisprudence in Germany, finally produced 
in the 1880s the first writings on possession L~ the Com-
mon Law world. These writings drew unequ.ivooal attention 
to the factual basis of possession and to component factors 
of such possession that were not reducible to, or tied to, 
formal or procedural p:x.!i! requirements. 2 It is these writings 
1. Pollock and Wright, Possession in the Common Law, p.4o. 
2. The inriuence of the movement that culminated in the 
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 in releasing legal think-
ing from the limitations of rigid formal pleadings and 
enabling the law to be expressed in terms of genera1 
principles was felt in the whole law of torts, but most 
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and the climate they created that account for the conceptual 
leap between Bridges Vm Hawkesworth on the one hand and 
Elwes v, Briga. Gas Cgo3 and SouVh Staffordshire Waterworks 
Co. v, Sharman4 on the othero 'Where Patteson, J,, in his 
judgment simply brushed aside %m'lll.Nll!ll:ii:t counsel 1 s attempt 
to get some conceptual argument from Puffendorf and 
Savigny5, Lord Russell of Killowen in Shal'man's Case cites 
frooi Pollock and Wright 11 the principle on which this case 
/ 
must be decided, u0 
2, (Contd.) 
sensat:i.anally in the field of negligence, where the courts 
and writers made a sustained {if not wholly consistent), 
attempt to develop and to axplain the law in terms of the 
pr:troary concept of fault and a resultant duty to take care 
in condi tipns of foreseeable harm.. Among the wri tars l. 
Pollock in the first edition of his Law v_:t Tqrts 1 188y, 
and Ames in his Leginres m;i Legal liistgry were the lead-
ing fepresentatives of this spirit, as Hoimes and Roscoe 
Pound were to become its leading historia.'l'J.. Mr Fifoot 
has briefly sketched and criticised the t:flena1. ~a.¥! espec-ially its moral presuppositions when used""{ .if~ his-
torical explanation1 :L'1 his Selden Societ;y lecture "Law and History in the Nineteenth Century" (1956). 
3. (1886) 33 Ch. Div. 562. 
4. [1896] 2 Q.B. 44. 
5. 11We were referredi :In the course of the argument, to the 
learned works of Von Savigny edited by Chief Justice 
Perry; but even this work, lu.11 as it is o:f subtle dis-
tinctions and nice reasonings, does not afford a solutbn 
to the present question": 15' Jur. 1079, at p,10820 
6. SuRra, at p.46. 
In Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., the plaintiff had 
leased to the defendants certain land for 99 years, re-
serving to himself all ~inerals, but authorising the de-
fendants to erect a gasholder on the land. In the course 
of excavations for the founclations of this gasholder, the 
defendants discovered a prehistoric boat embedded in the 
soil for to six feet below the surface, and duly contested 
the plaintiff1 s claim to the boat. The facts of the ease, 
in short, were such as to encourage a technical treatment 
of the problem. This, indeed, was the line taken at the 
Bar, counsel f'or the plaL'l.:t:tf'f arguing that the boat 
should be treated either "as something in the nature of 
a mineraln or as a thing "annexed to the land1' to which 
the real property principle ~cquid plantatur solo, solo 
cedit applies. The defence saw the boat as being more like 
a 1 dotard 1 , but essentially argued it to be simply part of 
the "spoil arising f'rom the excavations"., .Chitty, J'., 
however, insisted on treating the issue generally, nThe 
first question which does actually arise in this case is 
whether the boat belonged to the plaintiff at the time of 
the granting of the lease."7 If it were a mineral or at-
tached to the land, it would have belonged to the plaintiff 
at that time by virtue of his tit1e to the landc But if 
it were a vhattel, the plaintiff would have to base his 
claim that the boat belonged to him when the lease was 
granted on his having actual possession and the absence of 
any other owner. Chitty, J., though prepared to hold that 
the boat was not a mineral, felt no need to decide what it 
was since he was able to find for the plaintiff even on 
tbe weakast of the three claims: 
But if ought to be regarded as a chattel, 
I hold the property in the chattel was vested 
in the plaintiff for the follibwing reasons. 
Being entitled to the inheritance under the 
settlement of 1856 and in lawful possession, 
he was in possession of the ground£ not merely 
of the surface, but of everything ~hat lay be-
neath the surface down to the centre of the 
earth, and consequently in possession of the 
boat ••• The zluliw:Q: plaintiff, then, being 
thus in possession of the chattel, it follm1s 
that the property in the chattel vested in 
him. Obviously the right of the original 
ovmer could not be es ta.blished; it had ,for 
centuries been lost or barred, even .supposing 
that the ,property had not been abandoned when 
the boat was first left on the spot where it 
was found. The plaintiff~~~i!i~ad a lawful 
possession, good against all the 
world, and therefore the property in the boat. 
In my opinion it makes no difference, in these 
circumstances, that the plaint3tr was not aware 
of the existence of the boat.U J 
8~ Supra, at pp.568-9. 
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In support of his view, Chi tty, J. 1 cited ;a. v. Rowe9 
(where a canal C<Epany was held to have sufficient posses-
sion, for an indictment for larceny, of iron dropped by 
unknown persons and lying at the bottom of its canal) 
and - significantly - Holmes 1 lecture on Possession in 
The Common Law. The question that remained, if the boat 
were a chattel, was whether the lease passed the rights 
to it, and Chitty, J., held that an implied permission in 
the lease to cart away spoil from the excavation~hould 
not be interpreted to cover what was unknown and not con-
templated by the parties. 
The rule which The Jurist found im Bridges Vo 
Hawkesworth - "The place in which a lost article is fou ... "1d 
does not constitute an exception to the general rule of 
law, that a finder is entitled to it as against all 
persons except the owner" - fortunately had no influence 
on Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co2 Chitty, J., had no hesitation 
in seeing that the fundamental issue w~s whether the 
'found' object had been in the possession of the lessor 
before 1finding 1 by the lessees. The facts of the case, 
it is true, encourage one to think of the boat as being 
like an attachment or accretion to land and not like an 
9. (1859) 28 L.J.M.C. 128, Bell, C.C. 93, 169 E.R. 11809 
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article dropped on the highway; Chitty, J., makes no refer-
ence to finding or to the rights of the finder anywhere in 
the case9 But Chitty, J., as we have seen, specifically 
considered the situation that would arise if the boat were 
a chattel, ioe., if it were a lost or abandoned object 
found in the land. 
It is impossible to read Chitty, J. 1s judgment 
without feeling that the learned judge has approached 
the issue before him in terms of a general theory of pos-
session •• This does not mean that the theory is embodied 
in the judgment. Chitty, J., decided that the plaintiff 
was in possession of the boat jlmlj!JillX because he was in pos-
session of the land within which the boat was contained. 
In possessing land, Chitty, J., held, a man possesses not 
merely the surface of the land but everything beneath it 
d01'1Il to the centre of the earth. Chitty, J.'s reasoning 
rests on the proposition that in possessing a volume a 
man possesses eve~hing within that volume, whether he 
knaws of its particular existence or not. In support of 
this (tacit) proposition, he noted that any interference 
with the boat (1,e., with the thing contained in the volume) 
would necessarily be an interference with the possession Of 
the land (i.e., of the volume as a whole). 
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The proposition about volumes is limited in 
Elwes 1 Case in one very important wayo Chitty, Jo, had 
occasion to consider only the volume which extends down-
ward from the surface of the la...~d; he says nothing of 
things resting on top of the land or contained in the 
volume extending upward. Some or his supporting argument -
the necessary spoil and. waste .. of the land in attempting 
to reach the boat - would not ~ apply to the volume 
above. 10 
In South Staff'ordshire Watervork Co. v. Sharman 
this limitation is overcome and the issue of possession 
is put on a still broader conceptual basis. The defend-
ant-reppondent, under the orders of the plaintiffs-appel-
lants, cleaned out a pool of water on their land and found 
two rings Which he re:f'used to surrender. When the true 
owner failed to come forward, the plaintif.:ll:! brought an 
unsuccess:f'ul action in detinue claiming the rings. Revers-
ing the judgment on appeal, Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., 
said: 
10. Chitty, J.ls method of dealing With the case, in his 
tacit reliance on the proposition about volumes, strong-
ly suggests that he was arguing on the analogy of the 
maxim relating to rights of owners of land: Cuius est 
solum eius est uscrue ad coelum usgue ad inferos. But if 
so, he did not press the analogy the :f'ull way, and it 
is perhaps even more interesting to note that he made 
no attempt to apply the maxim directly as a way of find-
ing simply that ownership of the boat la~ in the owner ot 
the land; on. the contrary, he specifica~ly brought tl!lle l!iS!ii<. 
on to possess1ono 
The plaintiffs are the freeholders of the 
locus in quo, and as such they have the right 
to forbid anybody coming on the land or in 
any way L~terfering with it. They had the 
right to say that their pool should be clean-
ed out in any way that they thought fit, and 
to direct what should be done with anything 
found in the pool in the course of such 
cleaning aut. It is no doubt right, as the 
counsel for the defenda.nt contended, to say 
that the plaintiffs must shew that they had 
actual control over the locus in quo and the 
thi~gs in it; but under the circumstances, 
can it be said that the Minster Pool and what-
ever might be in that pool were not under the 
control of the plaintift"s? L"l my opinion, 
they were. The case is like the case of 
which several illustrations were put in the 
course of argument, where an article is found 
on private property, although the owners of 
~he property are ignorant that it is there ••• 
LT]he general principle seems to me to be 
that where a person has possession of house or 
land, with a manifest intention to exercise 
control over it and the things which may be 
upon or in it, then, if something is found on 
that land1 whether by an employee or the owner or by a Svranger, the presumption is that the 
possession of that thing is in the owner of 
the locus in quo0 11 
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In the process of reaching this principle, it is 
true, Lord Russell, C.J., gave himself some curlous direct-
ions. He distinguished BriaJ!es v, Hawkesworth, claiming 
that it rested on the grou.~d that the motes had been dropped 
in a public part of the shop - a ground to which Patteson, 
J., madeno reference whatever and which the principles on 
11. Supra, at pp,46, 47. 
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·which he did reach his decision repudiatet as irrelevant .. 
Lord Russell, C.J., also quoted, as authority for the 
principle on which he decided 3ha,;r;m?Jl's Case, a passage 
from Pollock and Wright which spa f'ically limits this 
principle to things attached to or under land. 12 Neverthe-
less, the decision he reached is a fortunate one: it pro-
vides a coherent basis for possession in the concept of 
control and thus gives us a general principle on which 
disputes in the finding cases ca.~ be resolved,, 13 
t2. Pollock and Wright, op, cit., p.41. 
13. The movement, even in Elwes 1 Case 1 away from a technical 
use of 'attachment' toward the general question of con-
trol is recognised and daveloped in an interesting 
American case on trespass: MgKee v. Gra,tz (1922) 67 L. Ed. 
167, 23 A.L.R. 1393i2170 Fed. 713, 260 U.S. 127, 43 Sup,. 
Ct. Rep"' 16. The p aintiff'-:respondent was owner of' land 
on both. sides of non-navigable water in w~tch lllU.Ssels 
are found; trespassers had collected mussels, piled them 
up in a large heap on his land and later carted them 
away. The plaintiff, suing in trespass for the value of 
the 300 tons of mussels involved, had judgment against 
him in the court of first instance; the judgment was 
reversed on appeal and the reversal was upheld in the 
Supreme Court. Delivering the opinion of the Courti 
Mr Justice Holmes said: "As to the plaintiff's tit e, 
it is not necessary to say that ihe mussels were part of 
the realty within the meaning of the MisS1J'!Jri Statutess 
or in such sense as to make the plaintiff an absolute 
owner. It is enough that there is a plain distinction 
between such creatures and game birds or freely moving 
fish, that may shift to another jurisdiction without 
regard to the will of landowner or statee Such birds 
and fishes are not even in the possession of man ••• 
On the other hand it seems not u..~reasonable to say 
that mussels, havlng a practically fixed habitat and 
little abiltty to move, are as truly in the possession 
of' the owner of the land in which they are suJ1k as would 
be a prehistoric boat discovered undergr01.:md, or unknow 
It should be noted that Sharman1 s !Jase does not 
provide direct warra.'1t for the concept of 1mediatet pos-
session in terms of which Sir John Salmond preferred to 
justify the decision. 14 Lord Russell, C.J., treated the 
fact that the defendant-respondent was cleaning out the 
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pool under the orders of the plaintiffs-appellants as evid-
ence that the latter both intended to control the pool and 
actually controlled it through the defendant; this evidence 
seems to go toward refuting Salmond 1 s claim that "the rings 
13. (Contd.) 
property at the bottom of a canal ••• This is even more 
obvious at to the shells, when left piled upon the bank, 
as they were, to await transportaj;ion11 (pp.169-70). 
At first sight, the last sentence seems somewhat curious: 
one might have thought that the learned judge found pee-
sessian of the mussels to be in the plaintiff because 
they were 1 s:w:IB:' or vibtually sunk (like rings in mud) in 
his land and ...... ould then seem odd to think that a heap 
piled on top of land j_s even more obviously in his pos-
session. ii The oddity disappears however, if we take 
the learned judge to be concentra!ing - like Lord Russell, 
C.J., im Shal'!!lan's Case - on the control over an area 
that a man exercises by possessing and controlling land. 
Such a man does not merely control the land and its 1 at-
tachments' in the technical sense; failing evidebev to 
the contrary, he controls everything within that area 
save for such things as are by their nature not amenable 
to such control, as can pass in and out of the area at 
their will. 
1~. Sa1nond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p.307. SaJ~ond's treat-
ment of the case is also criticised in Goodhart, "Three 
Cases on Fossession11 , vo~ cit. 1 p.87. 
found at the bottom of the pond were not in the company 1 s 
possession in fact; and [that] it seems contrary to other 
cases to hold that they were so in law." (The only direct 
case this would be contrary to is Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 
while Salmond is driven to reject the reasoning of both 
Eawes 1 and Sharman1 s Case by his narrow insistence on 
specific animus baselil: on knowledge of the thing as a neces-
sary element for ordinary possession.) This is not to say, 
hmvever, that Shfirman 1 s Case could not also have been de-
cided for the plaintifZs-appellants on the ground of 
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1mediate 1 possessi.on, that is, on the ground that the 
servant, in picking up the rings in the course of his duties 
of cleaning the pool, picked them up for the p1aintiffs 
and rendered. them into their possess:i.on. This, indeed, 
was the view taken some years later in an Irish case, 
McDowell v. Ulster Bank 115 in which the Court awarded the 
Bank possession of a parcel of banknotes picked up by the 
plaintiff, a porter, on the floor under a table used by 
customers when writine cheques, after business hours when 
he was sweeping but the Bank. In this case, Pal1es, C.B. , 
specifically said: 
15. ( 1899) 33 Ir.L. Times 225. 
I do :r::ot decide this case on the ground laid 
dow'!l by Lgrd Russell in Sharrnan1 s Ca.§.!il. I 
decide it on the ground of the relation of 
master and servant, and tr.at it was by reason 
of the existence of that relat:i.onship and in 
the performance of the duties of that service 
that the plaintiff acquired possessj.on of 
this property. l 1o1 
In an li.ustralian case, Willey v. S!na1;i, 17 one of the many 
issues involved was whether a bag of coins discovered in 
a ship by the boatswain during a search for stowaways 
ordered by the captain came into the possession of,the 
boatswaino Dixon, :r., (as he then was), referring with 
approval to the Irish decision, held it did not, sayj_ng: 
When the plaintiff, as the ship's boatswain, 
discovered the coins and handed them to the 
master t he was the instrtunent by which this 
opportu.n:lty for control and disposal was d.is-
placed [fror.1 the owner or agent who had hidden 
the coins] in favour of the master. It does 
not appear what ]1110?t:rlil passed between the 
boatswain and the master when the latter tool!: 
the coins into his keeping# But it is not to 
be supposed that the plaintiff asserted any 
independent possession of his own. The con-
cealment of goods on a ship for the purpose of 
clandestine carriage is a matter that concerns 
the master and ttK owners. It would be incon-
sistent with the duties of a n;ember of the 
ship 1 s ccmpany to deal with goods so concealed 
on his own accou..nt. Al though it may be taken 
that he found the coins it does not appear 
that he took e-ven manuai custoiy of the bag 
of maney. But if he did, it could amount only 
16. The teri:ninology here, alas, is slovenly again.. ·\'!hat 
Palles, C.B. 1 was really deciding is that by reason of 
serv:i.ce etc. the plaintiff did not acquire possession, 
but only a custody~ 
17. (1937) 57 C.L.R. 200. 
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18. 
to custody and not to possession. The pos-
session taken was that of the 011n:1ers, unless 
it be still true that the :'1hip is in the 
possession of the master¢1b 
·146 
At pp.216-79 In a very recent English case, Corrorati~ 
of London v, Appleyard [1963] 2 A.E.R. 834, 1 w.,.R. 92, 
to be discussed in:fra, one issue, which proved not ger-
mane to the decision, was whether the fj_nders of money 
in a safe who were servants of W, an independent contract-
or hired by Y, found for themselves, for W or for Y. 
McNo.ir, J. 1 referrj_ng with approval to McDowell v. Ulster Bank, supra, and wi11ey y. Synan, supra, says that if 
ca1led upon he wou.1.d have held that they had found for w. 
Unfortunately, he expresses the principle upon which he 
bases this view as the servants' 11 legal obligation to 
hand lil1!'j!!'X the notes over to --- as being their principals11 
(A.E.R. at p.838) and in the cases cited as authority 
confuses the servant :receiving into the master's possession 
with the servant having to recognise the master's title. 
The principles involved in finding by servants were 
grasped somewhat more accur&,tely in an earlier Canadian 
case, Haynen Va Mundle (1902) 22 Can.L.T. 152 (Ont.). 
The Court awarcled possession of a..11 i.mclaimecl :!loll of' bank-
notes lying on the floor of a shop tc the shop 1 s salesman 
who picked i.t up against the shopkeeper and distinguished 
McDowell v, Ulster B~ on the ground that picking up 
things from the floor was part of the bank pOli'terfs duties 
and not part of the salesman's. The test seems to me 
sound, though the Court perhaps failed to apply its mind 
to the question whether the salesman's duty was not gener-
ally that of lookilhg after the shop and everything in it 
and not merely that of selling goods. At the same time, 
:im:2g:md: recognisin.g tt>.at Br:tdges v. Hawkesworth should not 
be treated as creating a sound general rule for finding in 
sbops 1 the Court might have asked whether the notes were 
not aJ.ready in the shopkeeper's possession through his 
being an occupier in effective control of the premises~ in 
which case~ any finder - servant or not - has a duty to 
surrender to him. 
The principle on which Sharman 1 'l. Case was de-
cided represents the final freeing of the concept of pos-
session and the law of finding from the fragmented, tech-
nical considerations of the past. In accepting the em-
phasis on control as primary, we do not need to pretend 
that control-situations can be exhaustively enumerated or 
rigidly defined. Control is a self-conscious relation: 
it reauires both a certain amount of exercised physical 
power and a manifest intention to exercise this power, 
which may often be presU!lled from the exercise itself. 
Possession, thus, is not mere physical detention; it is 
the present physical power and the present manifest in-
tention to use, enjoy or deal with land, premises or 
things on one 1 s own behalf and to the exclusicin of all 
others. I exercise such physical power and at the same 
time manifest my intention to control when I inspect my 
land, lock my front door, tell my servant where to put 
various things, arrange things in a pile or cover them 
with leaves for safe-keei\ing. Where there are gaps in 
my actual physical control Cfor no man can be in all 
places at once or turn his attention to everything it} his 
house) iny intention to control 111111 bridge them. Thus I 
control some parts of my land; in doing so, I am presumed 
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- unless there be evidence to the contrary - to intend to 
control all of it; my possession thms comes to pervade 
the whole of the land, extending tc things in the area 
of my possession tr.at I may not even know to exist. It 
is the force of this presumption which the principle 
enunciated by Lora. Russell recognises; in setting aside 
the relevar1ce of the claimant's specific knowledge of the 
thing on his land, Lord Russell cuts through the concept-
ion of a special 1 law of findingt governing the conflict 
between the claims of the 1 finder 1 and occupier and 
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brings this conflict within the general la~ relating to 
possession. The setting aside of the relevance of knowledge 
at the same time helps to f'Urther the development of a 
subtler concept of possession out of the excessively con-
crete, visual notion of control found in the early his-
tory of seisin. In an unsettled society, it was import-
ant fo= a man to be there; in modern conditions, with 
an organised police force, registered titles amd a much 
greater acceptance of legal rights, the actual exercise 
" of bodily power plays less and less role as a means of 
control. 
The value of the principle in Sharma.n's Case 
and of Pollock's definition of de facto possession in 
--
enabling courts to cut through the tangled conception of 
a special 1 law of finding• comes out clearly in a recent 
19 Canadian case 1 Grafstein _v. Holme and F;i;:eeman. ' There, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal had before it the following 
facts: the respondent-plaintiff was the owner and occup-
ier of certain premises and the employer of the two appel-
lants-defendants, who worked for him in the capacity of 
general cleaners. In the ory~rse of clearing out a base-
ment on the premises, Holme discovered a locked metal box 
among the rubbish and brought the box to h:!.s employer who 
told him to put it on a shelf, admitting that it was not 
his and saying it might be a ca.rpenter{s box of tools. 
The box lay on the shelf for two years during which the 
employer see~ed to have forgotten all about it. Fin~lly, 
Holme and Freema...1'1, through curiosity, broke the loclc and 
opene(l the box, whereupon they found rolls of' ban_lmotes 
1".mounting to about (138,ooo. They showed. the money to the 
employer who handed it to the police, but no owner crone 
forward. In an action brought by the employer to determine 
the right to the banknotes, the trial judge held in his 
favOU1'. Upholding the original decision, LeBel, J.A., 
said: 
19,, (195'8) 12 D.I .• R. (2d Series) 727. 
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But it does not follow that because the money 
was lost that the appellants are the 1 true finders', 
even though they first discovered that the box 
contained the small fortune it did. To be true 
finders it must be held that they c~~e into ~ 
facto possession of the money at,a time when no 
one else had possession of it. OThe finder's 
right, 11 as Sir Frederick Pollock put it, in 
Pollock and Wright's Possessi..Q!L.in the Coromon 
~' p.11-0 "starts from the absence of any ~ 
facto control at the moment of finding." At 
p.12 he says, 11De facto possession, or Detention 
as it currently named in Continental writings, 
may be paraphrased as effedtive occupation or 
control. 11 He continued a little further on to 
say at p.13: 11hTe may say then that, in common 
ur1derstand1.ng, tt...at occupation at any rate is 
effective which is suf.ficient as a rule and for 
practical purposes to exclude strangers from in-
terfering with the occupier 1 s use and enjoyment. 
~fuch less than this will often amount to posses-
sion in the absence of any more effectual act in 
an adverse interest. Indeed it seems correct to 
say that 1 a11y power to use and exclude others, 
however small, will suffice, accompanied by an 
animus possidendi, provided that no one else has 
the animus possidendi and an equal or greater 
power.I To determine what acts will be suffic-
ient ia a particular case we must attend to the 
circumstances, and especially to the nature of 
the t~ing deal~ with, and the ma,.~ner in which 
things of the same kind are habitually used and 
enjoyed ••• Further, we must attend to the ap-
parent intent with which the acts in question are 
done. i!w."l. act which is not done ur believed to be 
done in the exercise or assertion of C!or.:iinion 
will not cause the person doing it to be regarded 
as the de fact.o exerciser of the powers o:r use 
and enjoyment.il2Q 
In considering whether the plaintiff-respondent !:tad such 
de facto possession, J,eBe1 1 J.A. 1 relied on the rule in 
20 At 7~2 • p.,.::>~· 
Sharman1s Case as supporting the 'natural' presumption in 
favour of the occupier, noted that the occupier had in 
fact taken specific possession of the box and assumed con-
trol over it when Holme brought it to him and held that 
in taking possession of the box the occupier also took 
possession of the contents, since he assumed control of, 
and responsibility fo~ botho 
Thespplication of Pollock's criteria of de facto 
possession has worked equally well in a very recent 
21 English case, Corporation of London v. Appleyard. The 
somewhat involved facts were as follows: Two workmen 
employed by w. Ltd., building contractors, on a building 
operation on the site of a building being demolished, 
found in their course of their work an old wall safe 
built into the wall of the cellar; inside was a wooden 
box containing banknotes to the value of £?1728 1 the owner 
of which did not come forward. The freeholders of the site 
of the building were the Corporatu~n of London; but before 
the building operation began ::!dm v. Ltd. had purchased the 
residue of the lease with Y. Ltd. financing the purchase. 
v. Ltd. (as leaseholders) and Y. Ltd. ~s contractors) then 
entered into an agreement with the Corporation (as free-
151 
152 
holders) under which Y. Ltd. undertook to erect a new 
building on the site and the Corporation to grant a new 
lease. A clause of the agreement, immediately operative, 
provided tha~ 11Every relic or article of antiquity rarity 
or value which may be found in or under any part of the 
site" shall belong to the Corporation. Y,, Ltdc then enter-
ed into a building conj;ract with w. Ltd., who were in law 
irfflependent contractors. The question before the Court, 
as it recognised, was whether the bariJmo·l;;es were in the 
possession of any of the parties before the finding and 
whether the Corporation, if not the party in possession, 
had any derivative right under the agreement in respect of 
• 
such possession. / The learned judge, McNair, J., held: 
On the facts here, the notes were found in 
a wooden box within a safe built into the wall 
of the old buildingo It seems to me to be 
cle~r th!:l.t the safe in those circuwstancest 
formed part of the Jemiaed premises~ If so, 
Y. or V. , being in lawful possession of the 
premises, were in de facto possession of the 
sa~e 1 even though they were ignorant of its 
ex1s'tence 0 
It was argued? though I think rather faint-
ly, that possession of the safe did not involve 
possession of the ~~ wooden box inside it, 
still less :lf:i::t:IU:H of the notes within the bo.~. 
To accept this argument would be to introduce a 
wholly unnecessary and unreasonable refinement. 
If•. the prehistoric boat in Elwes y. Brigg Q~ Q.Q., thoug~ its existence were u:nknown was in 
the possession of the person who as owner was 
in possession of the land undar which the boat 
was found, so too would be the contents of a 
locker in the boat. If the rings embedded in 
the mud at the bottom of the Minster noel in 
the South Staffordshire case were in the pos-
session of the" person who as 011mer was in- pos-
session of the land on which the pool was sit-
lllX:k:i:mi: uated, the result would, in my judgment, 
have been the same if the rings had been found 
in a purse or other container found in the mud • 
• • • In ~y judgment, the notes hav:ing been fOLU"l.d 
within the safe , which its elf formed part of 
the demised premises, the party in possession 
of the premises, whether it be v. or Y., had, 
in the absence of any evidence mx:!dr! as to the 
true ownership of the not~~' a better title 
thereto than the finders.-
Since the learned judge found that possession of the notes 
lay in v. Ltd. or Y. Ltd., and since both of these had a 
duty under their agreement to surrender such motes, as 
valuable articles fotL'1d on the site, to :lzhe Corporation, 
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it was unnecessary for the learned judge to go any further. 
He did, as we have seen above, say that if it had been 
necessary for him to consider the situation as one in whib.11 
there was a true finding, he would have regarded the work-
men discovering the banknotes in the course of their Gmplcy-
ment as taking the barJtnotes into the possession of their 
master w. Ltd. 
The clear line developed in the mcxlern cases on 
possession that we have so far discussed has been somewhat 
22. At p.838. 
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obscured by some of the Court1 s argument in Hannah v. 
?3 Peel.- In that case, the plaintiff, a soldier billeted 
in a house owned by the defendant and requisitioned u,~der 
Defence Regulations, found in a cfevice on top of a bedroom 
llDlll'. window frame a brooch, the 01 .. mer of which was not 
known. The defendant had neve1· occupied the house himself 
and had no kn.ow·ledge of the existence of the brooch before 
it was found. The plaintiff passed the brooch to the 
police for them to ascertain its owner; later, the defend-
ant claimed and received the brooch from the police as 
o\mer of the premises on which it was found. 
Holding for the plain tiff, Birketl.t, J. , purported 
to follow the rule in B:t:tdges y. Hawkesworth that the 
finder is entitled to a lost article as against all persons 
except the true owner no matter where the article is found~ 
he distinguished Elwesr Case and 6harmar;.'s Cas§ on what we 
have argued to be a.'l'J. inadequate view of the decisions, to 
wit, that they dealt with things attached to or tL'lder land 
as such. But in the crux of the judgment, Birkett, J., 
does come down on the essential point that is consonant 
with the position a:rgu.ed in this section: "The defendant," 
he said, "was never ph1sically in possession of these 
--~' 
premises at any time. It is clear that the brooch was 
never his, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, in 
that he had prior :possession."24 True, the learned judge 
again went on to obscure the issue by referring to the 
defendant 1 s lack of knowledge of the brooch 1 but this is 
irrelevant and unnecessary. The defendant must fail be-
cause he cannot shew any basis for the claim that he had 
prior nossession of the brooch, a claim that must be based 
on possession, even if on possessic;n of a wider nxH area 
which the thing was found, but which capnot be based on 
~ <=: title.~,, Bridges y,,,_Iim;r};:§'llJ!::'.Qrth was not needed here 1 and 
Elwes 1 and Sharman' s Casq, which provide the clearest bas 
for the principle that tbe claimant must have possess:ton, 
shoul(l not have been distinguished. As 1•1cNair 1 J. 1 put it 
24. Supra, at p.521. 
25q In advanced commercial societies w:tth a strong concept 
of property~ there may be a tendEmcy to feel that the 
ownership 01 the premises should confer a right to the 
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1 forttme f of anything fou.,11d on the premises. But so 
far, there is, at Common Law~ simply no such thing as a 
'right to find' vested in ana going V.'ith title to pre-
udses. Barr:!ng the creation ot spec:lf.ic 'right to find-
ings' by contract or agreement, the claim of the finder 
or that of the occupier who claims prior possession must 
be based on possession. As Winf:teJd argued his Note 
supporting the decision in !~nl}QP_XLJc!'l§l, the rebuttable 
presumption b at law is that the possessor of land pos-
sesses goods on, or under that land, but 11 the cases 
irn.lic<:tte that this p;:-esumption is founded upon pos,ses-_ 
sion of the land itself": (191~5) 61 L.Q.R. 333 at I'•334 
(by P.H.IJ. ). 
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in Corpor.;i.tiog of London v. Appleyard, " ••• in Hannah :t.• 
Pee1 the contest was between the owner in fee simple of 
the premlses and the finder, and this contest was decided 
i f f kh f'" ' t' n avour o ~ue ~lll,o.er on .ne basis that the o;mer had 
never been in possession. 1126 
It the custom in genel'al text-books to regard 
two cases decided in the first half of the 19th century -
Cartwright v. Green27 and Merr.z v. Green28 
- as havi,ng im-
portant bearing on one of the chief problems raised in ~ir 
discussion here, to wit, whether a man in possessing a 
·whole has possession of all its contents even of' those he 
may not know to there. In Cartwright v. Green, a bureau 
was delivered, for the purpose of repaix·s, to a person who 
discovered money in a secret drawer and converted the money 
to his own use. 0-n an issue arising in the civil action 
for recovery of the money whether his taking and conversion 
would amount to felony, the Court held that it w011ld and 
upon that ground allowed ::< a demurrer to a bi11 of discovery. 
At p 0 838. 
(1802 ) 8 Ves. Jun. 405, 32 E.R. 412. 
28. (1841) 7 M. & W. 623, 151 E.R. 916. 
In deliveri.ng judgment, Lord Eldon said: 
To constit;ute felony there must of necessity 
be a felonious taking. Breach of trust will 
not doc But from all the cases in Hawkins, 
there is no doubt.i this bureau bej.ng delivered 
to the d efendant J. or DO other purpose than re-
pair 1 if he broke open any part which it was 
not necessary to touch for the pu1>pose of re-
pai1·1 but with an intentitxo to take and appro-
pria~e to his own use what he should find 1 
trw.t is a felonious taking, within the princ-
iple of all the modern cases, as not being 
r~.;.~~~~=~9by the purpose for which it was de-
The pr:l.nciple being appl'i.ed here is the principle that a 
bailee cor.m:its felony in 1break:ing bulk'. The prec:i.se con-
ceptual basis of that ancient doctrine has never l1een 
exatJJ.ined by the courts. It is possible to take two views 
of itt One view is that a bailee who is given possession 
of a package or a bureau or other volUJne is not given pos-
session of the contents of such package, bureau or voltune 
unless this mtj.st have been the intention of the bailer 
and that the bailee therefore comm:tts trespass in touching 
the contents and larceny in appropriating them. It is 
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only this interpretation of breaking bulk which has any 
bearing on the question whether the possession of e, volume 
carries with it the possession of its contents. The second 
view of the doctrine of' breaking bulk is that the doctrine 
29Q Suora, at p.Jtoq, E.R. at p.'tl3. 
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does not imply that the contents were not in the posses-
sion of the bailee, but that his dealing with the contents 
in a certain way constitutes a breach of the express or 
implied. conditions of the bailment and thereby terrninates 
that bailment. Such termination converts his law:f'Ul pos• 
session of the contents into an unlaw:f'Ul possession and 
the action that brings t.his about is regarded, for the 
purposes of larceny, as a ttaking 1 • It is true that until 
the second half of the 19th century, the bailee dealing 
with the entire volume in a way insonsistent with the con-
ditions of the bailment did not corrllTl:l t larceny and this, 
together with a rather cl::mcrete emphasis on actual breakil1g 
to be found in the earlier eases lends some colour to the 
first of the two interpretations. But the emphasis on 
breaking has become less concrete and the distinction 
between converting the whole volume and converting the 
contents, long regarded with some unhappiness, has finally 
been swept away. While the earlier decisions certainly 
did not make explicit the view that the contents were not 
in the possession of the bailee, the latbr decisions have 
moved more and more consciously to the view that brea.king 
bulk is violating the conditions of bailment. This1 in-
deed, is the View StEongly suggested by the language Of 
Lord Eldon with its emphasis on the purpose of the bailment. 
On this view, Cartwright v, Green reinforces the line of 
decisions establishing that dealing with the contents of 
a thing bailed in a way inconsistent with the conditions 
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of bailment constitutes a 1 taking' for the purposes of 
larceny, but the case bas no bearing whatever on the quest-
ion whether a man can or cannot possess things of which 
he does not know through their being contained in a volume 
he knows of and controls. 
l'[erry v. Green is somewhat more involved. 8illlill!!!!!!5 
A person had purchased at a public auction a 
bureau in which he later disc0"1ered a sBcret drawer with 
a purse containing money and he appropriated this money 
to his own use. The defendant, the previm1s owner of the 
b-ureau 1 had unsuccessfully prosecuted the buyer for larceny 
and the buyer now appeared as p1aintiff in an action for 
assault and false imprisonment. The Chief Justice at the 
trial of the action having said in his summing up to the 
jury that he thought there was no felonious taking, the 
defendant obtained a rule to show cause. The Court was 
therefore now considering whether the facts could not in 
law support the charge of a felonious taking. It held 
that the buyer did not ~~ acquire possession of the 
purse at the time of the sale because the purse being 
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unknovm to both parties there was no delivery and no accept-
ance. The purse wa$ a lost object which came into the 
buyer's possession by finding when he discovered the drawer. 
Buch a finder could commit larceny by convartj.ng to his 
own use; whether he did so or not depended on whether he 
had reasonable to believe that there was a traceable 011me:r. 
The question therefore became whether the buyer believed 
that title to the purse had been passed to him at the sale. 
Evidence at the trial conflicted on th:ts point and the 
Court therefore directed a new trial in which the jury 
should be asked to consider as a matter of fact whether 
the auctioneer was selling the bureau or the bureau and 
its conten!is. 
The language of the decision is surprisingly 
reminiscent of Brigges v. Hawkeswort!;l and strikingly in 
contrast with the more modern cases that we have been 
considering., Possession is seen as passing by specific 
intentional delivery; since there was no such delivery 
the purse is a lost object and comes into the buyer's pos-
session only by his finding. The possessor of a volume 
therefore is not held to possess those of its contents that 
he does not know to exist. But the decision contairi.s a 
contradiction that destroys the whole vase. The Court 
assumes that the seller had title to the purse which he 
may or may not have passed on sale; it neglects to notice 
that the seller 1 s title ca.'1not have any basis on the facts 
given but his previous possession of the purse. Since he 
did not know of the purse, his whole claim is valid only 
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if in :possessing the bureau he possessed all its contents, 
known and unknown. What is sauce for the goose, is sauce 
for the gander. Either the seller has no claim, or the 
buyer comes into possession of the purse when he comes in-
to possession of the bureau and therefore ca'1not commit 
larceny thollgh he can be sued for ret-Ul"n of the purse if 
the sale did not pass title to it. The latter, I submit, 
woijld be the better approach to the issue~ ~ry v. Green, 
I should argue; was wrongly decided in so far as it held 
that felony was in principle possible and Tindal, C,J. 1 
had been right in holdL"lg the contrary v:law at the trial. 
The parties should have joined issue on the question of 
title, where there was a gen:Ul.ne doubt and the Court was 
right in holding that this doubt might he resolved by 
looking at the conditions of the sale. If these shortld 
prove not to be e:xplicit, we might argue that the seller 
in passing title to the volume passes title to all things 
that are norma11y part of the volume and to those things 
contapiea. with:tn it to which he has no other title or 
claim apart from his previous possession of the volUllle. 
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In selling a car, a man does not sell the dia:mond.;ring 
which his wife dropped under the seat; on our view he 
does sell the roll of banknotes that some previous person 
who has not come forward bad lost or hidden in the car 
and of which he had no knowledge whatever and to which he 
had no claim whatever save as long as the car was in his 
possession. 30 Belling in this respect is different from 
bailment; in bailing my car to someone I do not lose or 
pass all my rights stal!l!lling from the possession I had and 
intend to resume. 
30. Thus c:Ja!ely paralleling the situation with regard to a 
finder generally: his right depends on his actual 
possession and he has no rights against one who acquires 
possession of the object from or after him without ~mn:f 
wrong. Thus, in Bu.\tldey v,. Gross ( 1863 ) 3 B. & S. 566, 
122 E.R. 213, 32 L.J.Q.B. 129, the plaintiff got possession 
of tallow which had melted and run from warehouses during 
a fire and was acquitted of larceny and of having in his 
possession goods recently stolen. But the l!DJl,itrt police 
had confiscated and sold the tallow to the defendants, 
in accordance with statutory powers conferred upon them. 
When the plaintiff brought trover against the defendants, 
1; was held that the plaintiff could not recover~ because 
his possession had been lawfully divested from hlm. His 
actual possession had not been wrongfully violated, and 
he had not any right to possession on which to base a 
suit. In an American case, Parman v. Cockcroft, Case Noo 
110-223 of 1963, Wisconsin Circuit Court for Dane County 
(here cited from a certified transcrint dated &pril 26, 
1963), the plaintiff, daughter and heir at law of a 
furniture store proprietor, sued the defendant as owner 
end possessor of a house once owned and possessed by her 
father for money found in the house after the defendant 
3o. ( Con:t;d.) 
had moved in. The Court had before it very full 
evidence that the money was money secreted by the father 
before his death; it found for the plaintiff and held 
:!i:imi;: as a matter of law thattthe the heirs, by selling 
the house after the father's death, did not abandon 
their claim to the money, citing from 1 Am. Jur. s.13, 
pp.9-10; itto justify the conclusion that there had 
been an abandonment there must be some clear and 
unmistakeable affirmative act or series of acts indicating 
a purpose to repudiate ownership." But the plaintiff 
succeeded, it should be noted, on the basis of her 
inheritance of her father's estate, including the money 
he hid, and not on the basis of any right stemming solely 
from an earlier possession of the house. 
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6., BAILME~"'.r 1 CHARGE A!li'D LICENCE 
11Bailment, from the French Jci,iller, to deliver," 
says Blackstone, 1 ttis a delivery of goods in trust, upon 
a contract e:x:press or impiiad, that the trust shall be 
faith.fully executed on the part of the bailee." The 
emphasis on contract, it is true, is the subject of dis-
pute. "The essence of' bailment," Mr. T. Cyprian Williams 
writes 1
2
n1s no; the contract which accompanies it, but it 
is the delivery of the goods upon a condition agreed for 
as to their redelivery; in other words, the transaction 
is essentially one of conveyance, not of contract." On 
both views, there is no bailment unless there is a pass-
ing of possession. As Winfield puts it:3 
1. 2 Bl. QO!l!I!l•i p.451. 
2. "The Nature of the Pawnee• s Interest in Goods Pawnedn, (1915) 31 L.Q.R. 75, at p.80. 
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3. The Province of the Law of Tort pp.101-2. Cf. Thomas 
Atkin Street, 2 Foundations of Legal LiabilitY, p.252; 
o.w. Holmes 1 The Common Law, p.172~ Pollock and Wright, Po:>session 1..-1 the Common Law, p.16.); George Whitecross 
Paton, Bailment in the Common Law1 p.30; D.R. Harris, writing the chapter on Bailment, in Chitt? on Contracta, 
vol.II (22nd ed., 1961), p.72. The way in which an em-
phasis on contract (especially evident in some of the 
cases) has been allowed to overlay and confuse the is11ue 
of possession and its passing is discussed in William 
King Laidlaw, 11 Principles of Bailment", (1930-1) 16 Cornell 
L.Q. 286; we shall be raising this issue separately 
below (section 8). 
The salient feature of bail.ment is ••• the 
element of possession. Baillnent is not only 
one of the modes of transferring possession, 
but while the bail.ment lasts it connotes 
possession. As between bailer and bailee 
that was recognised very early in our law. 
Legal writers and judges having to determine 
liability have generally put the weight of their discuss-
ion on the agreements surrounding a bail.ment and on the 
distinctions between one kind of baillnent and another, 
with the accompanying differenees in the care expected 
a.nd the responsibility imposed. But the very existence 
of any baillnent whatever ca.n and does become a.n issue in 
court. The law, as we have seen (section 2, supra), has 
long held that when a master passes a chattel to his 
servant to deal with for the lll£\Ster in the course of the 
servant's employment he does not pass possession of the 
chattel to the servant; he creates no bailment but only 
a •custody' or charge# It has also held that the inn-
keeper who 'serves a man with a piece' does not pass pos-
session to the man but gives him mere authority or licence 
to use. The distinction between giving a chattel into a 
personts 1 charget or giving that person a licence to use 
the chattel and bailing that chattel to hL'll cannot be 
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established merely by inspecting the physical act of 
passing - the chattel may pass from hand to hand in much 
the same way in each caseo Neither does the law of 
bailment provide us with a formalistic criterion for re-
solving the problem, with a rule such as •there shall 
be no bailment u_~less the bailor states that he is hand-
ing into the possession of the bailee.t~ 
In R. v. Smith,? the prisoner, having led the 
prosecutor to believe that he was about to pay him a 
certain sum due to him frpm a third person, took out of 
his pocket a piece of paper with a sixpenny stamp affix-
ed. When the prosecutor had written upon this paper a 
receipt for the sum owing, the prisoner took up the 
receipt and left the prosecutor without paying him. Re 
was indicted for larceny of the stamped receipt and con-
viuted, but on a case stated for the opinion of the 
Judges, there was unanimous opinion that the conviction 
should be quashed. As Parke, B., said: 
The stamped paper never was in the prosecutor•s 
possession1 and the prisoner cannot be convict-
ed of stealing it unless the prosecutor had 
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4. The rules relating to the transfer of things (res mancioi) 
in Roman Law and the requirement of sala and gewerida in 
early Germanic law did create such formalistic criteria, 
which have survived in Common Law conveyance of title to 
land; they no longer apply to the passing of possession 
of land or chattelso 
5. (1852) 2 Den. C.C. 449, 169 E.R. 576. 
such a possession of it as would ehable him 
to maintain trespass. It was merel1 handed 
over to him to write upon it ••• there was 
never any property in the stamped paper in 
the prosecutgr. It was never delivered to 
him to keep. 
In an earlier, substantially similar case relied upon by 
Parke, B., the case Of a. Vo Hart,? Littledale, J., had 
made the same point in greater detail: 
If a person by false representation obtains 
the possession of the property of another, 
intending to convert it to his own use, this 
is felony; but the property must have been 
previously in the possession of the person 
from whoo; it is charged to have been stolen. 
Now, I think that these papers, in the state 
in which they were, were the property of the 
prisoner. He took them from his pocket, and 
the prosecutor never had them except as lQtl[ 
for the purpose of writing upon them; they 
were never out of the prisoner•s sight; the 
prosecutor writes upon;:; them as was intended, 
and the prisoner immediately has them again.. 
I think that the prisoner cannot be considered 
6. At pp.451, 452-3, E.R. at PPo577, 578. 
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7. (1833) 6 c. & P. 106, 172 E.R. 1166. The prisoner had 
produced from his pocket book ten blank 1stamps1 and tbs 
prosecutor had written on each of them the words "Payable 
at Messrs Fraed & Co., 189, Fleet Street, London.H The 
prisoner took them away, but several days later met the 
prosecutor and told him he had forgotten to sign them. 
The prisoner once more produced the paRers, the prosecut-
or signed and wrote the word "Acceptedt,on each and gave 
them back to the prisoner, who L"'l. turn promised to mail 
the money in a few days but failed to do so., He was in-
dicted for larceny or the notes; the question whether 
the imperfect bills of exchange handed to him the first 
time could be the subject of larceny w~ one other 1~­port~nt issue at the tr;!.al. ~wir,a.<L Vtoplt
1 
v1 lnl! l I «trS') 1, , I Jle.\'\iD [N.~.) l'.lD, lf-3 Awi ilu...b£"S, ~11~uzh, a~!~z&ratp1tltt£t;;;1,.1 Jim ~ -~· ~ llll!il ~ '1 t e o er o~ a o e ff tfe ~:It £4 ! ml..Mi/~ ai'f Se'fit\16rsement f' or payment and 
the maker refused to return it: held, there was larceny. 
as having cominitted a trespass in the ta.king, 
as tgey were never out of his possession at 
all. 
Still earlier, in R. v. Chissers,9 where the prisoner had 
come into a shop, asked to see some linen end had run 
away with the material after being handed it to look at, 
he was convicted of felonY because there was no change 
of possession until he ran away: 
Although these goods were delivered to Chissers 
by the owner, yet they were not out of her pos-
session by such delivery, till the property 
should be altered by the perfection of the con-
tract, which was but LJ.choate and never perfected 
between the parties; and when Chissers ran awa1 
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8. At pp.118'"9, E.R. at p.1171. The same conclusion was 
reached 2 on grounds not so well stated• in R, v. Phipoe (1785) 2 Leach 673, 168 E.R. ~38 and R, v. Frampton (1846) 2 c. & K. 47, 1?5 E.R. 20 7 where the Court said: 
'•the receipt stamp was given by the creditor to the 
debtor for a special purpose, namely to prepare the 
receipt: and it was never in the prosecutorts posses-
sion after the receipt was in a completed state" (:p. 50 9 
E.R. at p.21). In R. v. Rodway (1841) 9 C. & P, 7841 173 E.R. 1092 1 where a landlord had given a ccmpletea 
receipt to a ~en.ant believing that ~certain sum was to 
be paid and the tenant paid only «81r of the sum but 
refused to return the receipt, it was held to be larceny1 
the case is to be distinguished on the ground that the 
receipt J.@4 been in the possession of the landlord. 
9. :t:ti21ii: (1678) T. Raym. 275, 83 E.R. 142, 3 Salk. 194, 
91 E.R. 772 (cited in .RL v. Summer:s:). 
with the goods it was as if he had taken them10 up, lying in the shop and ran away with them.· 
The principle on which these cases were decided was grasped 
and reaffirmed in R. v, Thompson~ 1 where a woman wishing 
to buy a railway ticket had handed a sovereign to the 
prisoner, who was nearer in the queue, to purchase the 
ticket for her. The prisoner made off with the money and 
was subs;.t'equently indicted for larceny. Affirming his 
conviction in the lower court, Wightman, Jo, said: 
The true doctrine is that, if the owner delivers 
a chattel to another for a temporary purpose, 
and himself continues present the whole time, 
that other has only the custody of the chattel, 
and not the possession of it, and, if he con-
verts it to his own usl~ may be convicted of 
larceny at common law. 
10. ~~At p.276 (T. Ra.iml.), 83 E.R. at pp.142-3. 
110 (1862) L. & c. 225, 169 E.R. 1373. 
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12. At p.23o, E.R. at p.i375. Although the final phrase 
may suggest that Wightman1 J., is laying down a principle 
of the ~ law pf larceny it should be noted that 
here as in the preceding criminal cases cited the princ-
iple being laid down is a general principle of possession 
in no way affected by its criminal context. The submis-
sion by counsel for the prisoner that the only.possible 
case against his client would have to rest on the allegat-
ion of larceny b~ a trick or obtaining by false pretence, 
while str:!.ving to bring the issue down to specifically 
criminal principles, was significantly rejected by the 
Court. In another case R. v~Sharpless and Greatrix (1772) 1 Leach 92, 168 t.R. 1 1 the Court did deal with the matter in specifically criminal terms. s. acting 
in concert with G. and according to a plan, go! a trades-
man to bring to his house various goods to look at; s. 
One of Wightman, J. ts brother judges 1 Williams 1 J. 1 agree-
ing that there was larceny because the prisoner had only 
a custody 1 treated Wightman, J. •s principle somewhat more 
broadly: 
I do not, however, think that, under the circum-
stances of this case, the actual presence of the 
prosecutrix during the whole time was necessary. 
I am of opinion that it would have made no dif-
ference in this case if she had wi thdra'm for a 
short time. 13 
This opinion, we have seen, was shared by the editor of 
the report of R. v. Sharpless and Greatrix; it was 
stretched to the maximum, perhaps, in R. v1 Aickles. 1 ~ 
The owner of a bill of exchange had passed to the prisoner 
the bilJ., originally for the purpose of having him ascert-
ain that it was good., but then allowed the prisoner to 
leave with it in order to have it discounted. Distr~sting 
12. (Contd.). 
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separated a n~ber of these and asked to be brought more; 
the tradesman thereupon left to fetch more and s. and G. 
decamped with the goods. The prisoners were indicted 
before G<1111-ld, J. for larceny and convicted; the con-
viction was upheid by the Judges to whom the case was re-
ferred on the ground that "the whole of the prisoners 1 
conduct manifested an original and preconcerted design 
to obtain a tortious possession of the property" (1,e., 
that it constituted what was soon to be called •larceny 
by a trick'),. But subsequently, the editor of the report 
added this note: "The verdict of the Judges imports, 
That in their belief the evil intention preceded the 
leaving of the good.s; but, independent of their verdict, 
there does not appear a sufficient delivery to change 
the possession of the propertyn (at p,.93, E.R .. at p.149, 
2 East, P.c., 675 makes the same point). Here is a timely 
reminder, in a comparatively adverse context, that the 
study of possession cannot proceed by sharply distinguishing 
civil from criminal cases. 
the prisoner, however, the owner instructed his clerk to 
follow the prisoner to the place of payment and not to let 
him out of sight until the rr.oney had been received and 
paid to the clerk. The Court held that the delivery of 
the bill to the prisoner had not passed possession or it 
to him., 
In the cases we have been citing, then, the 
physical passing of a chattel from one hand to another 
has been held not to constitute a passing of possession, 
but to cseate a charge or licence to use. 15 In most of 
the cases the Court placed considerable emphasis on the 
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fact that the chattel in question had no~ left the presence 
or sight of the deliveror; to this extent the courts were 
clearly applying the general criteria of control and pos-
session that have emerged from our preceding sections. How-
ever, a great deal of welhght was also placed - particularly 
in R, v. Aickles - on the purpose of the delivering, on 
13. At p.23o, E.R. at pp.1375-6. 
14. (1784) 2 East, P.c. 675-7· 
15. It is precisely this fact that possession does not pass 
because of the continued control or supervision of the 
licensor that distinguishes the licence to use (wh:l.ch 
is not a bailment) from the ~Q!1!!11cdatum (which is). 
the fact that the transaction did not require the passing 
of possession to the recipient and that therefore, in the 
circumstances, there was .no reason for supposing that pos-
session did pass. 
Professor John Scurlock16 relying on the view 
that bailment is a delivery on trust, has sought a more 
fundamental rationale of the cases so far discussed by 
arguing that both the deliveror•s continued supervision 
and the purpose of the delivery are to be treat ed not 
as direct evidence of possession and control but as lld:J<: 
eii:l.dence of the absence of trust: 
Where the thing was delivered for a special 
purpose and was intended to remain in the owner's 
presence, it would not be said that he had re-
posed any confidence in the party in whose 
hands it was placed. Since the owner could re-
claim the goods a~ any time, his dominion over 
them was nearly the same as before. It was not 
like a delivery on bailment: the contract of 
baillr,ent17ave an interest to the bailee beyond custodyo 
The first sentence, no ~oubt, presents Professor 
Scurlock1 s point more successfully than the material 
which follows, in which the distinction between bailment 
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16. Scurlock, •tThe Element of Trespass in Larceny at Common 
Law", (1948-9) 22 Temple L.Q. 120 
17. On. cit., at p.18. 
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and a licence to use is not brought out clearly or accurate-
ly enough. The bailor-at--will, after all, can also reclaim 
the goods at any time and the man looking at materials in 
a shop in order 'to cheapen' them has an interest beyond 
that of custody. But cert~nly the a~sence of any trust, 
the continued supervision of the goods by the 1 deliveror1 
or his agent and the fact that the purpose of the delivery 
would not req~ire the deliveree to have possession do all 
constitute evidence against the passing of possession and 
the creation of a bailrnent. Professor Scurlock, relying 
on a contractual view of bailrnent, singles out lack of 
trust as the f'u:iil.amental grpund and treats the remaining 
grounds as evidence of such lack of trust~ If we reject, 
for wider reasons to be given beJ.ow (section 8), this 
view of bailrnent as requiring a delivery upon contract or 
trust, we can put the matter in a different way that is 
equally faithful to the decisions and the reasoning/ en-
shrined in the cases. We can single out as the fundamental 
ground for denying that possession has passed the deliver-
er's continued control and supervision and regard the pur-
pose of the delivery and the absence of trust as corroba:b-
ative evidence that the deliveror has not relinquished 
control. Treated in this way, the cases we have been dis-
cussing once again focus attention an control as the content 
of 'possessiont. 
It is true, however, that the purpose of the 
delivery, the accompanying distrust or the failure to 
consummate a formal passing of possession by sale might 
be interpreted as having importance not so much as evid-
ence of continued control, but rather as evidence that 
the deliveror did not intend to pass possession. The 
relative importance of animus and cortru,~ in the deter-
mination of possession has been the subject of much de-
bate. In general terms, there is no doubt that the mere 
intention to control 1maccompanied by any present and 
manifest power of control is not sufficient to establish 
possession~ 18 It may, howeyer, :tor a )2eriod ,can:t.:i,nue it,. 
Thus the intention to control acquires special importance 
where the facts of control are ambiguous and in dispute 
and where one claimant has to rely on a non-consensual 
acquisition of possession. From the real property doct-
rine of 'continual claim• 19 onward, the law - in the 
interests of maintaining order and 6.iscouraging violence 
and wrong - has been slmr to recognise the non-consensual 
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18. Thus Holmes 1 powerful ruffian moving in to wrest a 
pocket-book from a child has not possession of it till 
the actual wresting has taken place: ~Cg:nmon Law, p.23;;. 
19. Littleton 1 Tenures, ss.414-5; Coke on Littleton, 2:2j 25'0.a 1 b 1 251.ao 
passing of possession. For the limited period that the 
facts of control re,11ain ambiguous, the law will recognise 
the rightful possessor's continued intention to control 
as successfully making up for any temporary absence of, 
or deficiency in, actual, exclusive contro1. 20 The pos-
session of the thief who has successfully carried away 
the loot is beyond question; the fact that I do not 
pass possession merely by handing my ring to a jeweller 
to value while I wait in his hop or by lending my guest 
a racquet with which to play tennis on my court is also 
beyond question. It is in cases where neither party 
has exclusive or manifest control, as in R. v. Aickles, 
that the rightful possessor's continued intention to 
control (indicated in this case by sending ~he servant 
to watch) is of crucial importance. Even if the court 
car.not go solely upon my uncorroborated account of my 
intention, it will not presume intention beyond that 
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20. This is dearly the view taken by the editor of the 
report of R. v. S~rpless and Gre~~rixt supr9, and 
Mr. Justice East, in allowing the possession of a 
tradesman who has left goods at a house while return-
ing to his shop to fetch more to continue. 
reasonable in the entire circumstances of the physical 
deliveryo 21 If I hand my guest a book to examine, if I 
give my servant my shirt to wash, the circU!!lstances sug-
gest that I am giving no more than a licence to use in 
the first place and no more than a charge in the second. 
It is not impossible for me to bail something to my 
guest or my servant in similar circumstances, but very 
clear evidence will be required to show that I have 
manifested my intention in such a way as to make them 
b ·1 22 a:i. ees. 
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21. As Pollock puts it: 11It must then depend on the true 
intent of the transaction, as ascertained from all the 
circumstancesi whether there is a baiLment or a mere 
authority or icemce to deal with the thing in a 
certain way": Pollock and Wright, Possession in the 
Common Law, p. 5'8. 
22. See the citation from Pollock, op. cit. 1 section 2, footnote 21 , SUPt.liJ.• 
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z. POSSESSION IN TEE DEPOSIT FOR SAFE-KEEPING 
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The deposit for safe-keeping normally confronts 
the law witb a situation that seems at first sight part-
icularly favourable for applying the traditional contract-
ual concept of bailment. There is, generally, a contract 
or agreement, an actual and intentional handing over of 
the goods to be kept and managed by another and an agree-
ment for the redelivery of these goods at a certain time& 
In such widespread arrangements as the storage of goods 
with a warehillllseinan or the leaving of a car at a garage 
for repairs there is no:rmally no doubt of the existence 
of a bailment. The warehouseman or the garage proprietor 
has the right to exercise such power and control over the 
chattels left as he regards suitable or deems necessary 
for his own convenience and the protection of h:l.s own 
interests provided he acts within the terms of h:l.s con-
tract; 1 he will stack or place the goods where and how 
1. The terms or the contract, of course, may severely limit 
the bailee's freedom of. action without destroying the 
bailment as long as he is left a genuiline area of control 
in his own interest frOl'!l which he can exclude even the 
bailor until the bailment has been determined. Restrict-
ions on his freedom of action that do not destroy such 
area may limit his liability under the bailment. Thus in 
Harner v._ Jones (1879) l+ V.L.R. (L.) 536, where the depos-
itor insisted that the warehouseman stack the depo.qitor 1s 
rice on the floor and not on the platfoI'lll. 1 the Court up-held the existence of a bailment but relieved the bailee 
of liability for damage caused by an unusual flood which 
reached the rice on the floor but did not reach the plat-
form. 
he wishes, make his own arrangements for their protect-
ion and remove them from one place to another according 
to his convenience. His control is limited only by the 
depositor 1s title, the general provisions thet may be 
implied by the nature of the bailment and the specific 
provisions of the contract or agreement accompanying 
the particular baiL'!lent. But in other cases doubts do 
arise. In AshbY v, Tolhurst2 the owner of a motor-car 
hed left it at a car-park, paid 1/- for a ticket for 
being able to do so and hed received a printed ticket 
stating thet all cars were left in all respects at the 
owners' risks. The plaintiff's car was ta.~en :IE:t from 
the park by a thief who had neither ticket nor key. On 
an action for d!iillages for negligence (in which negligence 
was admitted bu't liability denied) the Court of Appeal 
held that there was no contract for safe-keeping and that 
the relationship between the proprietors of the car-park 
and the owner of the vehicle was that of licensors and 
licensee? thet there was therefore no liability at all 
on the part of the proprietors; that what was done by 
the attendant (who had allowed the car to pass out of the 
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2. [1937] 2 K.B. 2~2 (C.A.), [1937] 2 A.E.R. 837 (a less 
detailed report); noted in (1937) 53 L.Q.R. 301 by P.F ... W. 
ibu 
park) did not amount to misdelive:ry; that the conditions 
on the ticket completely relieved the proprietors or 
liability even if there had been both bailment and 
negligence; and, finally, that no term could be implied 
in the contract, if an:y, that no car should be allowed 
to pass without a ticket having been presented. Part 
of the Court's reason;"; for holding that there was no 
contract for safe-keeping was that the facts did not lead 
one to suppose that the car halll been placed in the posses-
sion of the proprietors: "parking you.r car means, I should 
have thought, leaving your car in the place [described as 
< 
a car-park] ~·· and nothing else."~ 
The Court thus focused some attention on the 
question or possession, even if it did not regard this 
question as having any more than subsidiary importance 
in this case. l+ "In order that there shall be a bailment," 
Romer, L.J. said, nthere must be a delivery by the bailor, 
that is to say, he must part with the possession of the 
cha~tel in qtlestion. 11 5' The essence of delivery was thus 
3. ~Sir Wilfred Greene, M.R., at p.2l+9. 
l+. See pp.2l+8-9. 
;?. At pp.25'4-;i,, 
taken non-technically as lying in parting with possessi.on 
to another rather than in the accompanying intention or 
agreement. 6 The Court did not go on to consider the 
criteria. for deciding whether the plaintiff had par·!;ed 
with possession of the car systematically, but it did 
appear to be conscious of the facts bearing on the quest-
ion of control. The ground on which the car was parked 
belonged to the defendantst but it was perfectly bare and 
opem on two sides; There was 110 evidence that the defend-
ants sought to exercise any control over persons entering 
or leaving the ground or that they proffered supervision 
as an inducement for parking at a ~ee. The Court was 
prepared to hold from the facts that no term could be 
implied into the contract to the effect that a car should 
not be handed over withput production of the ticket: it 
accepted that the attendant was not there to guard the 
cars or to take them into his safe-keeping, or even to 
supervise the piece of land generally, but that he was 
there only to prevent people from parking their cars 
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6. Cf. Theobald v, Satte;thwaite (1948) 30 W~shi 2~2190 
P2d 714, 1 A. i... R. za '/99, notea in ( 194(:)-9; 47 Mich. 
L.Ren;. 268, where the Court said: "While we are not 
inclined to view the element of delivery in any technical 
senae, still we th.ink there can be no delivery unless 
there is a change of possession of an article from one 
person to anothern (per ¥,allery, c.J.). 
on this private land without paying the fee. It is on 
this basis that Sir Wilfred Greene could say: 
It would be rather a surprising result if, when 
a man left his car on land like this and. paid 1/-
for the privilege of doing so, possession passed 
in a way in which it certainly would not pass 
if he left it in a public park in a square in 
London and paid the attendant 6d for the ticket ••• 
It is not like articles in a railway cloaikroom 
which have to be handed out by the cloakroom 
attendant before the person claiming them can 
get them. This is a case where anyone can walk 
on to the land and get into a car ••• 7 
7. At pp.250 251. In a substantially similar case, Ex 
parte Mobile Light & R. Co. (193~) 211 Ala. 525, 101 SoQ 
177, 31+ A.L.R. 921, 24 N.i.c.A. 223, 131 A.L.R .. 1180, 
an American court said: "A fee charged for a parking 
privilege in the place may be regarded as carrying 
the right to parking space with rights of ingress and 
egress. We find nothing in the complaint indicating 
that possessionrrand control, actual or const:t"Uctive, 
was surrendered to or assumed by the defendant. Tha 
complaint defines the duty of the gate-keeper to be 
at the entrance to collect the fee or charge for park· 
ingo He is alleged to have remained there a portion 
of the time, - the time for collecting entrance fees, -
but not, so far as appears, when the cars were removed. 
He had a duty to see that a car go in only on payment 
of the charge, but no duty to see when or by whom the 
car was taken out. There was another employee twhose 
duty it was to generally watch after said autooiobiles 
so parked. t This duty is con:tistent with either a 
bailmant or a general oversight of the car while parked 
on the space leased by the owner and still under his 
control." The second employee with his ambiguous 
duty was not present in Ashby v. Tolbur'.,S'l.:!;i in the 
American case it was heid that the ambj_guity must be 
construed agafnst the pleader as not implying bail:ment. 
The reluctance to see any passing of possession 
here would be somewhat reinforced by cons:id.eration of 
the special nature of motor cars and the normal modes of 
possessing them. A motor car, by its nature, ca-'111ot be 
kept constantly under the eyes or in the physical grasp 
of its possessor; he parks it before his office, in the 
street before .bis house, on vaca.~t land near the beach. 
While he leaves it, his intention to retain control 
(possibly but not necessarily reinforced by locking his 
car8) is sufficient to bridge the gap in actual, physic-
al control, if no one else succeeds in assuming exclus-
ive control over it. In Ashby v. Tolhurst the ev:l.dence 
strongly suggested that no one else (before the thief's 
a departure with the car) had assu.med such control;' it is 
8. In Ashby v. Tolhurst the plaintiff had in fact locked 
his caro 
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9o Here, as in the cases cited in the preceding section, 
the purpose of the transaction may also help to resolve 
doubt. Thus Romer, L.J., said: •trt is true that, if 
the car had been left there for an$'1 particular purpose 
that required that the defendants should have posses-
sion of the car a delivery would rightly be inferred. 
If, for instance, the car had been left at the car 
park for the purpose of being sold or by way of pledge 
or for the purposes of being driven to some other 
place or indeed for the purposes of safe;;.custody, the 
delivery of the car, although not actually made, would 
be readily inferred. But it is perfectly plain in 
this case that the car was not delivered to the defend-
ants for safe-custody ••• It is also plain that the car 
was not left there for any other 1lUrpose 11 (at pp.255', 256 ). , 
for this reason that the Court could convincingly hold 
iO that there w~s no delivery to the attendant. 
In Tins1ey vi D1idleJ! 11 - where the plaintiff 
brought an action for dcunages against the keeper of a 
public-house after the motor-cycle he had park.ad in a 
closed yard adj oinine; the public-house had been stolen -
Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R. 1 immediately brought the sue 
to the question :c"iwhether the public-hm1se keeper had 
possession. 12 The Master of the Rolls rejected the view 
taken by the learned judge in the lower court that :l.f the 
plaintiff was aJJ. invitee and not a licensee then posses-
sion passed to the invitor - the distinction between 
invitees and licensees, he held, has reference only in 
18{! 
10w We have discussed Ashbv v. Tolhurst at this length 
because of the remarkably m:i.sleading treatment it is 
eiven in the text-books. Thus in Winfiild on Tor~ 
(6th ed. 195"+, ed. by T. Ellis Lewis), in this respect representative~ it is presented as a case of no convers-
ion because ( 1; merely to a.11ow a stranger to take away 
the car is mere omission and not suffj.cient for convers-
ion (p,.418) and (2) in doing so, the defendants were 
not denying the title of the plaintiff or asserting a 
right inconsistent with it (p.426)~ But these proposit-
:i.ons are very much obiter j.icta; the crux of the case 
lay in two other propmsitions: (1) the point, which we 
have discussed at length, that there was ho bailment o..~ 
which to found liability (2) that even if there had been 
bailment, there was no contractual term requiring the 
defendants to surrender only against a ticket and there 
was a contractual term exempting them frcm 1iabil;ity 
for a11 such negligence. 
11. (1951) 1 A.E.R. 252 (C.A.). 
12. "The decision lllll.St depend on discoverj:ng in whose hands W!iS 
the. CUliltody [1a..it., possession] of the article in question (p.,25')J .. 
actions for pe.rsonal injuries and incidental damage to 
property and has no bearing on the issues of bailment. 13 
Instead, dismissing any legal signification following 
from the fact that the; yard was described in a notice 
as a ncovered yard and garage,., the Master of the Rolls 
held that the facts indicated it to be a car-park to 
which the decision in Ashby v, Tolh:u~ applied: 
If, therefore t on the true view o:f' the facts 
in the case now before us, th:ls yard • • • was 
really no more than a car park, the case is 
governed by Ashby v..._,.Tolhur§t. On the other 
hand, it is conceded, if I take my motor car 
to a garage, in the ordinary acceptation of 
that term, and leave it in the garage, pr:L'llfl, 
facie there would be a delivery over of pos- 14 session or ,custody to the gar1l,ge proprietor ••• 
The distinction between a car-park and a garage 
is to be made, as we have suggested, in terms of general 
criteria of possession and control, esp~cially in terms 
of the absence or presence of the proprietor 1 s ability 
to control the car by exercising physical power over it 
in his own interest and according to his own convenience 
13. At pp.255-6. Th:Ls important point, that liabilities 
vis-a-vis licensees upon premises have no connexion 
with liabil:lties under bailment, lnust not be fagpttens 
neither must the licence to enter premises be conf'lised 
with the licence to use. 
14. At p.257. 
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wt.ct.ch implies hi.s power to exclude others, including even 
the depositor, as long as he has this control. The im-
portance of this latter test was recognised by the Court 
in HalbaJ!.er v. Brighton Corpora:ct2n. 15' The Corporation 
during the sUllllller months allowed campers to park their 
caravans on its caravan site, charging them 2'5/- a week 
:for use of the site and its facilities. Each camper re-
mained in control of his own caravan and vehicles end 
visitors passed in and out of the gates day and night 
without let or hindrance. During the winter mo..nths the 
camp was closed and the road gates were locked, all car-
avans left by customers were kept on a hard tarmac, no 
one, including such customers, was permitted to enter the 
camp, and a 1storage charge 1 of 12/6 a week was levlad in 
respect of these caravans. The Court held that there was 
ba1lment to the 6orporation in the winter but not in the 
SUJJ!lner. !n winter the Corporation had the.liability of a 
bailee safe-keeping for reward, having to exercise the care 
of an ordinarily prudent man in safeguarding the caravans; 
in summer, w2en the users of the site would be mere licensees 
tow1'!.rd whom the Corpo:tation assumes no duty to safe@l'uard 
property, the Corporation would have no liability for theft, 
loss or damage save in so far as these resulted from 
"negligence within its sphere of operations. 11 
15. [19;)4] 2 A.E.R. 7070 
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The Court therefore held that the plaintiff could not 
recover for theft of a caravan stored in winter but stolen 
during the summer, since she was aware that the winter 
arrangements had c0I:1e to an end and had. failed to move 
the caravan from the hard tarmac for her own convenience. 
The same criteria, with their emphasis on the 
bailee's assu.mption of control aver the chattel and his 
power to exclude even the bailor, have 
line of u.s. decisions on parking. 16 
been used in a long 
The parklng a 
car on a parking lot, the courts have held, is based at 
the least on a licence to use the parking space or a rental 
of it, but it may be a bailment. Whether or not there is 
a bailment depends on whether possession and control of 
the car has been passed to the q'erator of the lot or his 
agent and this in turn "depends on the place, the condi t-
i ons, and the nature of the transaction. 1r 17 Generally, 
the courts have held that where cars may be parked and 
removed by their owners a:I: will there is no bailment, 
even if there are attendants who collect fees and exercise 
16. For a general discussion of the U.S. principles in 
this a:fiea see: 21+ Am. Jur. 493 , Garages, Parking 
Stations ana_ Liveries"1 s.29.,~ 3 Brashfield, Cyclopedia of Aut~obiJ.e Law (1927) pn~24o6-7a and Laurence 
M. Jones, "The Paring Lot Cases0 , (1t./.:>8-9) 27 Georgetown L. 
Osborn v. Cline(1934) 263 N.Y. 434, 189 Ii.E. 483, 131 ~
A. L.R. 1202. 
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a general superv"'ision over the lot and the cars within 
• t 18 
.J.. • Where the operator of the parking lot exercises 
and intends to exercise such control over the car that 
he could exclude even the owner from possession, at least 
unt~l certain steps have been taken, then the courts hold 
that there is bailment.19 Thus, if the driver is required 
t d 1 . t' . - th t th ~ 20 i~ o e iver ne Keys or e car o e opera or, or ~ 
18. 
20. 
Porter v. !,os Anf eles Turf Cluilll ( 1940) l+o Cal. App. Supp. 
(2d) 840? 105' P.2d) 95'6; Ex parte Mobile J"igbt &: Ra Co. 
(1924) 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177, 34 A,L.R. 921, 24 N.c. 
c.A. 223. The principle has been applied just as 
firmly where the parking lots are wit.bin enclosed amuse-
ment parks or fair grounds and where attendants direct 
the driver to a desi~nate(l spot: Suits v~ Electric 
Park A1m1sement (1 23; 213 Mo. App. 2751~2 9 S.1:11. 65~ Lord v Oklah e F··· · r soc. ( 194J) 95 Okla. 
29 219 P. 71 ; ndle S uth Plains Fair Asso~. 
Y• Chappell (191+0) 1 2 s.w. 2d 9 ' 1.Tex. ()iv. App.). 
in (1931) 30 
ce Cor 
Mich. l, 2 
on General Ex-
e Grounds I n 0 
Beets on v. Holl vwood A thJ etic Club ( 1930) 109 Cal. App. 
715~293P.821; l\eeev Lumbern1en 1sMt In Co. 
(19.:>9) 60 Ga. Ar;p. 1. ,, S.E.(2d 79; KeenarHotel 
Co. v. Funk (19.;;1) 93 lnd. App. 677~ 1'77 N.E. t.4; 
Kaisex• v. Poche (194·0) 194 So. 464 lLa. Apu.); Doherty 
v,. Ernst (19331)) 282 1JJ:e,ss. 341 1 187 N.E. ~20i Sandler v9 Commonwe{%lth Station, Co. (1940) 30 N".E.(2d) 
389, 131 A.L.R. 1170; Geners,ll!:xchaage Ins. Corn, Y• 
Par . Service Grounds Inc su.nra; Baione v. Heavey 
\19~2 10 Pa. er. C. 291 1 A. 181; Leanard 
v St nd fer (1933) 65 ~.W.(2d) 1112 (Tex. C~v. 
App. l Snooner v. Starkman [1937] Ont. Rep. '~2, 
[1937J 2 D.L.R. 5'82 - a Canadian decided on the same 
principle ~ and many others. In Fire Assoc. of Ph!la. 
he cannot take his cm: until he has surrendered a ticket 
acquired from the operator, 21 there is bai1ment. The 
asse;:ytion of a bailment in such parking cases in general, 
then, depends on evidence that the alleged bailee has 
direct control over the car, being able to deal with it 
in terms of his own interest or convenience (~.,not 
solely on behalf of the customer but also according to 
the general requirements of hj~s business and his obligat-
ions to other customers), or that he has power to exclude 
from it all others, inclu.d1ng even the owner, u ntil the 
relationship r~.s been terminated. Whether a fee is ~ 
20. (Contd.) 
v. Fabian (1938) 170 Misc. 665 1 9 r,:.Y.S.(2d) 1018, it was the plaintiff's custom -co leave his car for a 
fee in the parkj.ng yard behin(1 a garage and 1 to leave his keys in the car to enable the defendar,t s servam:ts 
move the car to facilitate passage for other cars. 
The Court held that the servants when driving the car 
would have lment for the defendant, and since they 
had pO'..rer to drive it at ar1y time accord1ng to the 
convenience 11nd needs of the business, they were 
gener~clly baileos for the lie:tendant. In principle, 
this ground for bailment does not strictly require 
access to the lteys; if the depositor were required 
to leave his car unlocked or even locked but with 
the brakes off so that it can be pushed abc1ut by the 
servants of the business for the convenience of the 
business, a bailment w·ould sim#llarly be established. 
(Qt. the obiJ-0.r. dictum in Parter .J!:L.~9.:?. i\ngeles Turi: 
Club, sunra1' "The mere fact that an auvoi!::lobile was 
locked and the kEJys retained by the owner would not 
necessarily precu1de a findj.ng that a ••• bailment 
eJcisted. ••) 
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21. Galowttz V:s Magner (1921+) £;.08 App. Div. 6, 1o3 !~. Y.S. 421; 
:Hartfo:i;:sL . E~ Ins. Co. v, Do11 (1926) 5 La. App. 226. The 
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charged or not is in principle irrelevant to the existence 
of a bailment, though Amer:tcan courts have also used the 
argument in Ashby '11. Tolhurst that the lowness of the 
fee may be taken as additional evidence that the propriet-
or had no intention of assu1ning the duties and liabilities 
of a bailee. 22 
The difficulties arise where there is a deg:l'ee 
of supervision over the car-park and the cars in it suffic-
ient to enable the operator to hinder persons from approach-
ing the cars; at will, but where it is not clear that he 
either uses or intends to use the supervision for this 
purpose. The diffic~lties here are both those of inter-
prating the evidence in a given case and these of defin-
ing the necessarily fuzzy borderline of possession and 
control. The general principle is that the more closely 
21. (Contd,) 
mere existence of a ticket given after receiving a fee 
for parking is not enough; the question is whether 
it is only a receipt for the fee or also a means of 
controlling the redelivery of the car. 
22. Tlras in Ex parte Mobile Light~ R. Co., supra, the 
~ourt said: "To write into the transaction a duty 
to look out for theft is to add to the special limj.ted 
service the parties had in mind 1 and to impose a liab-ility properly covered by the field of insurance.~t 
would defeat the purpose to furnish a mere parking 
convenience for a nominal charge." Generally speakj.ng 7 
there has also been a marked shift in social expectations 
as the pressure on parkj.ng space has increased and as park-
ing meters on public streets beca~e increasingly comroon: 
people are now far less prone to assume that where a small 
charge fo:r parking is made this also covers the duty of 
sAfe,:-uardin,:- the cRr. 
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the supervision approaches the point where the attendants 
seelt to satisfy themselves that persons removing cars 
have the right to do so before allowing them to leave, 
and the drivers leave their cars in the expectation that 
this will be so; the more closely the situation approaches 
that of bailment. 23 In other words, where the circum-
stances attendant upon the initial leaving of the car 
do not in41cate at all clearly whether there was delivery 
(i.e., passing of possession) o~ not, then we may look to 
the circumstances surrounding the collection of cars to 
see whether the attendants behave as though they were 
redelivering and anxi~~s to avoid misdeliveryv Thus, 
there may be bailment even if the person leaving the car 
is not told at the time that he will be required to go 
throt:1gh cer~ain steps before beinc; allowed to recover his 
23~ Galowitz v. 1".iagner, supra:. '1It seems to me obvious 
that the plaintiff had the right to beli.eve, from the 
fact that the d.efendant maintained an inclosed space 
for parking cars, with an entrance and :s:x:bd!; exit and 
attendants, that he was paying the parkj.ng fee i:lmml: 
in consideration of care .md watchfulness to prevent 
injury or loss~ ••• It equ.ally clear that the de-
fendant had a like understanding of his obligation, 
because ~s he testified, he maintained this fenced: 
parking space and three attendan:es 1 looking after, 
taking care of' the cars as they came in and went out. 1 n 
The Court therefore held there ms bailment. Our point 
about the change in social expectations is confirmed 
by the fact that this Court in 1924 thought it ob-vious 
that if the customer had not expected safeguarding he 
wa~ld have parked in the street and saved the feae 
car, but has good ree.son to ~u:t believe that the 
attendants were there, in part, in order to cl'Ktllenge 
anyone who did not appear to be the depositor of the car. 
h~f't., 
There may be bailment~because the pperator's control 
over his premises and the cars within tl1em may be such 
as to indicate that he has and in·tends to have the power 
to exclude anyone, even the owner, until he is satisfied 
that he :Is correctly redelivering; it is not necessary 
for him snecificallY to mani~est this power by demanding 
tickets or warning drivers that they will be challene;ed. 
What kind of supervision is sufficient to suggest to the 
court that such control and power is present depends upon 
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the nature and situation o:t" the parking place; in a small 
parlcing lot with a single entrance-exit, the presence oft only 
one attendant who appears solely to rely on his meraory 
in allowing cars to leave does not refute the ~ operator's 
assumption of such control; in a very large parking area 
with many exits and entrances the absence of any device 
for iden-!::ification on collecting the car would go toward 
refuting a claim that the operator had assumed control. 
The main point is that the supervision must; be for the 
purpose of preventing misdelivery - the presence of attend-
ants who merely help to locate cars {without using this 
help as an unobtrusive check) and direct drivers to the 
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exit is no more evidence of a bailment than was the 
presence of attendants who direct cars ±ti available spots. 23a 
The difficulty for the court, of course, will often be 
to decide just what the attendants were doing. The acr:om-
panying d:i.fficulties of defining a baj.lment in this area, 
which we have been trying to J!ml:m:Uq: !'£solve, cannot be 
entirely removed: the source of these difficulties, I 
should argue, lies in the fact tlli'>t a locked car is some-
where half-way between a locked trunk, possession of 
which is passed on deposit in another's premises, and a 
locked :room rented for storage, cf which the renter has 
plilssession as long as he keeps the key. Although the 
car, like the tru...'11:!:, is a chattel, like the room it 
normally cannot be mbved. 
The difficu.lty of defining a bailro.ent in these 
conditions, however, is not always crucial in those 
car parking cases where a certain degree of supervision 
is admitted and a fee has bee11 charged. Where the courts 
23a • .fanhli\;".l.ille South Plains Fair Assoc. v. Chappell, supra: 
"The mearest the testimony comes to establishing this 
essential element [earlier define by the Court as 
•possession, control, or authority of the plaintiff's 
car 1 ] is thi:tt scmeone who appeared to be directing 
the location and parking of cars generally indicated 
• • • the direction ax1d lane where a suitable parklng 
space was available, this cannot be said to con-
stitute an acceptance of the custody of the car." 
h'lve accepted evidence that the car was left and the 
~ 
fee paid on the express or implied understanding that 
a watch would be maintained over the car, they have been 
prepared to hold the operators lj.able for negligence in 
maintaining such watch,. Generally, this J:t.s been done 
by treating the undertaking to watch as evidence of a 
bailment for safe-keeping, but the liability may equally 
be imposed without imputing bailment as following from 
an undertaking upon contract. In fact, since in each 
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case the liability would normally be the same, it is not 
necessary for the court to decide whether there be bailment 
or not; whether there is bi:dlment or not :l.t is to the 
express or implied terms of th:!s undertaking that the 
court must look in deciding whether there has been 
negligence. 2:3b What is negligence and what is reasonable 
23b. Thus in Pennyroyal Fa.~r Assoc, v. Rite (1922) 195' Ky. 
732, 243 s.w. 104-6, where the plaintiff parked his 
car on a park1.ng lot under circurnstarms that would 
normally indi.cate no bailment 1 but where he first 
received an assurance that his car would be safely 
lool{ed after and kept, the Court held that there was 
same kind of bailment but that this bailment was irre-
levant to the specific liability alleged, which was 
under the 'special contract' establisbeN by this 
assurance. In Chattanooga Interstate Fair Assoc., Y:• 
Benton (1927) 5 Ten,~. App. 480, the Court !Q?t.'hl:X of 
Appeal refused, on similar facts, to upset the lower•s 
court's d~rection that there was bailment for mutual 
benefit. The pla:i.J!J.tiff-respondent had been told by 
a gatekeeper "Your car will be safe here" and by an 
attendari.t before the parking "We are responsible for 
care will depend on the undertal::ing ana the surrour1ding 
circumstances in ea.ch case: in the absence of specific 
definition of the kind or degree of care to be exercised, 
what wi constitute negligence in a highly organised 
parking station normally known to demand identification 
from owners will not necessarily constitute negligence in 
a temporary parkin.g lot opere.ted on a roped-off piece of 
land. While such known coud.itions may impose added 
liabilities on the operator, they may on the other hand 
help to relieve him tf liability. Thus in Fire AsrQS• 
wli<.'"11!. 
of Phila, v. Fabian, discussed in footnote 20,A,the Court 
held that there was bailment of the car left in the 
parking lot at the back of garage and gasoline station, 
it held that there was no liability for theft because 
the plaintiff knew that the garage was too busy to super-
vise the lot effectively and therefore had acquiesced :tn 
23 b, (Contd.) 
your , and this in fact was the sole ~ ground 
for findir.g bailment. It should be noted that the 
statement "Your car will be safe here" coul1, in 
principle at law, be treated as an ill-considered 
statement of opinion which the person park:ing the 
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car had, on the basis of his own observation, no 
business to rely upon; but 1"0~e are responsible", 
uttered in conjunction w:tth the taking of a fee for 
lec.ving a car, is what :D:i,-x~ J.L. Aust:L.'1 called 
a performatory utterance - to say that you are re ons-
ible, in these circumste.nces, :l.s to make Jo!l!rself 
responsible. What is not clear j s that these words 
are sufficient to imply acceptarwe of possession of' 
the car; in both the cases cited here the existence 
of a ba:i.lrnent is at least questiona.ble while contr1:tctual 
llebiltty seems clear. 
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th 1 . ·' • · i r :It 2.3c e . iwi ,;en supervis on o. . • 
* * * 
23c. The courts have shown little reluctance to der:\.ve 
acquiescence in liwited supervis:ion from what a 
reasonable man would have known and observedi but 
they have sh01,>Jn reluctance to allow parking ot 
operators to escape 11abilities by printing waivers 
on tickets given to customers which they would not 
normally read. The trend has been to resist the view 
that the cust<xae1· has waivelli his rights unless there 
is evidence that he has reac. the ticki!lt or had its 
provisions drawn to his attention and was not allowed 
to continue ir' a reasonable belief' that the tj.cket 
was merely a receipt or means of identification -
Sandler v. Comrrionwealth Station Co1 i supra, - or un-less there was evidence that from his general observat-
ion of the place he should have suspected the substance 
of the waiver printed on the unread tic1cet - 1J DriJ:e 
& Tou;i;: v 11 System A.JI;:? Parks ( 1937) 28 Cal. App. Supp. (2d) 782, 71 P.(2d j54~ 
The issues relating to possession and control 
are just as fundamental in a lcng line of American 
decisions concerning valuables placed in safety-deposit 
boxes in banks and similar institutions. Here the con-
ditions and possibilities of control by either party are 
normally rigidly determined by terms of the agreement 
the physical circumstances under which it has to be 
carried out4 The question before the court thus is norm-
ally not the factual problem of determining what powers 
are being exercised by whom, but the problem of deciding 
whether the powers clearly indicated by the facts amount 
to possession or not. 
In the car-park cases, we have seen the courts 
having to decide between the two possibili·ties of bailment 
on the one hand and rental of space or licence:. to enter 
and park on the other. In the deposit of valuables for 
safe-keeping we are confronted with the same twin possib-
ilities: it bailment or is it rental of space? That 
the drawing of this distinction is to be done in terms 
or the criteria of possession that we have striven to 
bring out above, is confirmed by the words of the Co1.1rt 
in Zweere v. Thibault~4 whore Sherburne, J,, is concernod 
24-. (191+2) 112 Vt.261+, 23 A. (2d) 5'29, 138 A.I.R. 1131., 
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to bring out the paradigm case on each side: 
In this case it is necessary to distinguish 
a bailment from a lease. When personal 
property is left upon another• s premises 
under circumstances from which either relat-
ion might possibly be predicated, the test 
is whether at> not the person leaving the 
property has made such a delivery as to 
amount to a relinquishment, for the duration 
of the relation, of his exclusive possession, 
control, and dominion over the property1 so tr.at the person upon whose premises it is 
left can exclude, within the limits of the 
agreement, the possession of all others. If 
he has, the general rule is that the trans-
action is a bailment. On the other ha:nd, :tf' 
there is no,such delivery and relinqui§hment 
of' exclusive possession, and his control and 
dominion over the goods is dependent in no 
degree upon the co-operation of the owner of 
the premises, and his access thereto is in no 
wise subject to the latter 1 s control, it is 
generally held that he is a tenant or lessee 
of the space upon the premises where the goods ::FLJ:. 
are kept. Considered frcm the opposite view-
poi.nt, a tenant, but not a bailor, has the 
exclusive possess ion and control of, and 
dominion over, the portion of the other party's 
premises where the goods are kept, for the 
dura~ion of the term of his lease. 
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Thus, und.er the old-fashioned condi tiom, where the customer 
or client normally handed valuables that he wanted kept 
especially safely to the manager of his bank or to his 
solicitor, who then locked them into the bank or office 
safe and handed the depositor a receipt, there was no 
;;.-
doubt tr..at a. bailment had been created._, On the other 
25. Thus in U S et Cie an 
of England 19 2 A.C. 27 where many other issues 
arosei there was no doubt that the Bank had bailmen.t 
of go d bars sent to be kept in its vaults; but it 
should be noted that in the more usual arrangement 
under which the Bank does not undertake to return the 
same barsp but merely c~edits their value in goldz 
the relat1on created is not that of bailment but vhat 
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of creditor and debtor. The same applies to more com-
mon deposits of runas, drafts, notes, cheques and other 
negotiable instruments. But in Bernstein v. Northwest-
ern National B t in P iladel hi'i"l1945) ~1 A. (2d) 440, 
(Pa. Super*) (noted in 19ro-7 ·5 Mich.L.Rev~ 908), 
the plaintiff had put funds into a canvas bag supplied 
by the Bank and dropped the bag into a night deposit 
box at the Bank that he was entitled to use as a result 
of paying a nominal fee; after the Bank failed to 
credit or find the fUnds, the Court held that although 
they were intended for crediting, the placing of them 
into the night deposit initially cl!eated a bailment for 
mutu.a.1 benefit with consequent duty of reasonable care 
upon the bailee. Specific deposits of money, chattels 
or paper, with: instructions to keep separate and return 
in specie or deal with according to the nature of the 
paper (present for payment at the appropriate time, 
etc.) similarly create a bailment, even if the accom-
panying instructions amount to provisions for terminat-
ing the bailment at a certain time and then converting 
the relation into that or creditor and debtor. For a 
thorough treatment of such complex relations between a 
Bank, :i.ts customer-depositor, and third parties see: 
Ralph J. Baker, "Babk Deposits and Collections", (1912-3) 
11 Mich.L.Rev. 122 and 210., 
Similar difficulties arise in connexlon with the de-
posit of grain in elevators, where it is customaty to 
mingle such grain wi'tlh a common r:i.ass of other deposited 
grain and of grain bought by the warehouseman, and where 
the latter normally has authority to sell from the com-
mon stock and to replace that which has been sold with 
other sirrcilar grain. These arrangements do not fall 
plausibily into such exclusive compartments as bailment, 
lease or sale. The courts have held that the transactions 
create a tenancy in common of the conm1lbn.gled grain with a 
. special bailment to keep to the warehouseman, this special 
bq, ln,~1tt'bei!lg accompanied by a power to dissolve the tenancy in 
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hand, there equally no doubt that where persons are 
able to gain access to a locker by dropping a coin into 
the lock and then take away the key, the relation created 
is that of rental, with the possession of the articles 
deposited remaining in the depositor. 26 In the same way, 
there is no bailment where a man pays for the right to 
put his car into a private garage, to which he is g:!mn 
the key and sole right of use; 27 just as there is no 
26. 
27. 
(Contdo) 
COilllllon into its constitui!>nt tenancies in severalty and 
~ contL~uous power of sale, substitution and resale: 
see Street, 2 Fou:g,d~tions of Legal Liability, pp.290-1. 
r•;arsh v. Americ~ Locker Co.fllis~9 A.L.R. (2d) 326 7 7 N.J. Super. 81, 72 A. 2d) 3li'J; the fact that the rent;al was 
for 24 hours only and that an atcendant had a master 
key to enable him to take possession of articles depos-
ited which had not been removed on expiry of the rental 
period was held not to affect the initial absence of 
bailment,. Heither is there any hailment if the depositor 
receives the key from an attendant and not by an aut~~at­
ic device; the point in each case is "that the owner of 
the locker exercises no control over the contents thereof, 
furnishing only such secui'ity as is provided by the 
system of locks and his general supervision of the lock-
ers and of their Dl!l: use 1 and, unlLk:e one operating a 
checkroom, usually does not control access to them": 
19 A.L.R. 331. 
Lessor v. Jones (1920) 47 W.B. 318, 52 D.L.R. 223. As 
long as there is exclusive control, it makes no differ-
ence if the garage is own.ad by a company, even by one 
in the haulage business that may be using other garages 
adjacent thereto: Ztlck~r v. Kenworthy Bnos, Inc. (1943) 
130 N.J.1, 385, 33 A. (2c1) 34'.9 {Sup. ct.' 
r 
bailment where a person deposits in a room of which he or 
she has exclusive use and the only key t whether such !'OQll 
be in a private house or a warehousee28 
The more modern practice followed by an increas-
ingly large number of ba!'Jts and safety-deposit companies 
in offar:lne .safe-keeping fac.ili ties to the pub1:1.c does 
not fall within any of these paradigm cases. Such banks 
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or companies keep in their vaults numbered tiers of safety-
deposit boxes, each of which can be opened only by the use 
of two keys. One of these (the master key) is retained 
by the vault proprietors, the other key is delivered to 
the depositor. Normally the parties enter into a contract 
28. Peers v. Sampson (1824) 4 Dowl. & R. 636 (room rented in 
private house and door fastened with padlock of which 
depositor had the only key - no baill!lent to owner of 
house); Ancona V:• Ro;yers (1876) L.R. 1 Ex. Div. 285 
(where Mrs H,, tril:'ough an agent, had sent goods for 
safe-keeping to the house of x, whose wife placed the 
goods iri two roams, locked them and gave the keys to 
the agent 1 who delivered them to :til's H~ - held that 
the goods were in the possession o:r Mrs R. to whom 
possession of the rooms had been delivered); Bash v. 
Reacling Cgld Storage & Ice Co~ ( 1930) 100 Pa. Super~ Ct. 
359 ~where the plaintiff had exclusive use of and the 
key to a rocm in a warehouse where he kept goods - no 
bailment); Gruber v. Pacific States Sav1 & Lt Co. (1939) 13 Cai.(2d) 11+4, BS P.(2d~ 137 {locked rooms in 
warehouse with depositor keeping only keys - no bail-
ment). Possession of the only key is the most convenient, 
but not sole or indispensable, evidence of exclusive con-
:!:rol of such rooms. On the other hand, in Zweere v, 
Thibault, from which we have cited above, the defendantts 
claim that he had r:ierely let out a ro~ in his warehouse 
to the plaintiff failed, the Cpurt holding that the goods 
had been placed in his careand that his moving them to a.noth· 
by which the proprietors undertake to allow no one but 
the renter or his authorised agent access to the box and 
to safeguard whatever property may be deposited in the 
box. The renter has the right to demand access at c~rtain 
times and has no duty to 1nfo!'tll the company of what is 
placed into the box; the company, on the other hand, 
reserves the right to revoke his power to use the box 
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at any time upon notice and imposes ru1es relating genere.1-
ly to the use of the box and to the access to it. In 
the typical case 1 the renter has the right to demand the 
company 1 s n:.aster key, but the company has no power to 
demand the renter's for the purpose of opening the safety-
deppsit box. 
There is a surprising amount of authority in 
American case law for the proposition tlla.t depositing 
in a box UI\der these conditions still creates a bailment 
to the bank; indeed, one might say that this :ts the 
------------·~·-------------------
28. (6ontd,,) 
er room without the owner's prior permission but with 
her subsequent acquiescence by meeting his bill for 
the labour involved was evidence that the goods were 
in fact in ti.is care and possession. 
dominant view. 29 The argtment for th:ts proposition was 
put most emphatically in National Safe jlenosit C.o. Y• 
Ste~30 where the Court said: 
29. amer v Gr of St Lo• ~ (1935') 81 
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\2d; 9 1 in \ 19 ;:-o 21 Cornell L.Q. 
325; Moon v Balk of Bens n (1926) 135 
Atl. ii Pa. 1 7 Pa. 9 ; Rosend v Lemh" Va •e 
B51nk ( 192 ) 25'1 Pac. 293 (Idaho , Idaho 27 ; Morgan 
v. Citizens' Bank of S rin Ho e (1929) 2j:t 190 N.C. 
209i 129 s.E. ? 1 2 A.,,.R. 1299 and note; McDonald 
vi ~erkins (1925) 133 Wash. 622$ 234 Fae. 456, 40 A.L.R. 
8 8 and note; Webber ~ ~ank o7 Tracy (1924) ?6 Cal. App. 29, 225 Pac. 41, r;.C.C,A. 184 and note, bmr 
Sec r t Stora e & Trust Co v ~lart1n (1924) 144 Md • 
.Jo,1 12~ At;t. <++9; Tra1ne: ¥• Sagnders (1921 f 21~0 Pa, St. +51 1 1iJ Atl. 681, 19 a.L.R. 61 and note, west Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrtckson (1920) 56 Utah 32?, 
190 Pac. 94-6 1 11 A.L.R, 215 and note; Schaefer v. Wash-ington Safety Deposit Co, (1917) 281 Ill. 43, 117 !'I.E. 
11$1, Ann. Cas. '.1918c 906; In re Ackerman's Estate 
£1918) 1?3 Misc. 175, 169 N.Y.S~ 1073l Reading T~~:!; 
vo. v. Tnompson (1910) 2;:,1t Ba. b>t. 335, 98 Atl. 9:; 7 
S_ oem n Teumle Safet De osit Vaults & Nort' "de 
a,vings Bank \ 191 1 9 Ill. App. 1 ); Natio afe 
Deposit co. v. Steed (1911) 250 111. 584, 9 N •• 977, 
Ann. Cas. 1912B 43 , aff 1d as to constitutionality of 
the statute involved), (1914) 232 u.s. 58, 34 SJtP• Ct,, 
209 1 58 L.Ed. 5~; " ssen v S~t ern c. l S, ~ari' tti~9i ( 1901 ) 133 Cal. , .t"'ac. 1099, ;l.lll., o t. 
Rep. 221; · er v Brensir:tne t - s::t:t 
m (1899) 1 0 110 1 1~.E. 1 9 1 72 &'11. St_t Rep. 
196 and note1 :Bock.wood v •. Manhattan ~.tora e & Ware-
house co. ( 1 t>98 2 App. Div. o 1 50 Tu. Y .s. 97 1-; 
Roberts v. St,vves nt Safe De osit Co., (1~90) 123 tf.Y~ 
77, 2 N.E. 29 1 9 L.R.A. · • 20 Am. St. Rep. 718; 
see also 3~ Y.L.J. 795; Y~J.:n~ v. First National Ba,nk 
of Oneida (1924) 40 A.L.R:-lr6 , 15'0.Tenn. 451, 265 s.w. 
681; and see 133 ii., L. R. 280 et sea. for other cases. 
30. Supra, preceding footnote. 
Certainly the person who rented the box was not 
in actual possession of its contents. For the 
valuables were in a safe built into the com-
pany1 s vault, and therefore in a sense 'under 
the protection of the house'. The owner could 
not obtain access to the box withaut being admit-
tad ~o the vault nor could be open the box with-
out the use of the company's master-key. Both 
in law, and by the ~:x;press provisions of the 
contract, the company stood in such relation to 
the property as to make it liable if, during 
the lifetime of the owner, it negligently per-
mitted unauthorised persons to remove the con-
tents, even though it might be under colour of 
legal process • 
• • • the fact that the sai'ety-deposit company 
does not know and that it is not expected it shall 
know, the character or description of' the property 
which is deposited in such deposit box or safe 
does not change the relation any mere than the 
:relation of a bailee who should receive for safe-
keeping a trunk from the bai1or would be changed 
by reason of the fact that the trunk was locked 
and the key retained by the bailer. 
Counsel, it is true, have argued, and some c01.lrts indeed 
have held,31 that the relationship between the renter 
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and the COl!lpany is that of ssee-lessor and not that of 
bailment. This view was criticised and rejected in 
Morgan v. Ci tizen,:i 1 Bank~2 where the Court placed weight 
on the !l\I'gument that this cou1d not be so because a land-
lo:ra or lessor had no rights or duties comparable to 
those character:t::;:ing the uJ1dertaking for safe-keeping. 
There is not, I should argue, any force in this 
suggestion that tho relationship between the renter of a 
box and the company cannot be that of lessee and lessor 
because the supplementary undertakings enterecl. :tnto by 
the company have no natur1;1.l counterryart the lease of 
premises. The point :l.s that there is nei 1;her inconven-
ience nor implausibility in treating the company 1 s under-
205 
takings as sunnlementarv, as not entering into the essence 
of the relationship of either party to the box and of 
their consequent relationship to each other, even if 
these undertakings constitute an intiucement for renting. 
There is no reason, in logic, in practice, or in law, 
why the ~m:d:s: lessors of office space in a building 
shou1c. not offer special undertakings to provide a very 
11igh degree of securi i;y as an inducement for rentirn:;, 
much as landlords alread.y offer special features, 
32. (1925) 190 N.C. 209, 129 S.E. 5'85 1 l+2 A.L.R. 1299. 
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dif.criminatory po1iciEs in selecting tenants and restrict-
ive covenants relat1ng to the neighbourhood as such in-
ducement. 
!·:either is there any force in another important 
argument used by the aourt in National Sa;t:e Denosit Co~ 
Vg Ste11id. It is not correct to say that "both in law, 
and by the e:i«press pDovisions of the contract, the com-
pany sto_od in such relati.Q!L....tO the prope;rty as to i:1ake 
it liable" (itt?lics addtlrl); the true position is that the 
company stood in such relation to the renter as to make 
it liable. Its liability rests on the express or ir:plied 
terms of' a specific contract with the renter 1 on the 
fact that the CO!ll]j)any holds itself out as providing a 
very high degree of protection, such as is normally 
associated with vaults, safes and banks. Its liabilities 
under such undertakings (where there has been consider-
ation) are at least as high as those of a bailee for 
safe-keepir1g, but this does not mean that the company 
thereby accepts bailnent. Such bailment would be deduced 
if the companyt s duties require it to have possession; 
the facts the typica.1 situation, on the c~rary, show 
that the ·two-key system actually prevents the company 
from te.kin.g physical control of the articles deposited 
and, for example, misdelivering them. 
The liabilities of the company created by its 
offer to let space for the safe deposit of valuables and 
by its general character as a presu.'llably prudent instit-
ution hab:i.tually keeping mid having valuables on its 
premises are then quite as high in respect of the con-
tents of the boxes as they would be if the ccrnpany had 
bailment of them. As the Court said in Security Storage 
and Trust Co. v. Martin33 : "whether the relation was that 
of bailor and bailee or lessor and lessee its duty and 
liabilj.ty were the same. 1134 The same point, after some 
vacillation, was made in McDonald. v. Perkins, supra: 
It is not absolutely essential to determine 
whether the contract between the plaintiff 
33. (1924) 144 Md. 536, 125 Atl. 411-9i ef. Safe Deposit 
Co. of Pittsburgh v. Po:block (1877)85 Ba, St. 391, 
27 AniJRe:i)o 660 and YJils~on v. Citizens Cent. Bank 
(~936) 56 Ohio App, 1+78, 11 N.:Bi, (2d) 118. 
34. A number of cases define this duty as the duty to 
safeguard the property deposited by taking measures 
such as are used in the community by an ordinarj:ly 
careful ins ti tut ion fairly ccrnparable in size and 
other concj_j.tions to safeguard property presu.med to 
be valuable; most of the cases note that this duty 
is identical with the duty of a bailee for hire 
where the bailee accepts bailment as a bank.ar or 
ccrnpany offering security. See Sclo...mid.t v) Twin City 
State Bar.Lk (1940) 151 Kan. 667, 100 P.(2d 6521 
Bohmont v, Moo~ 295 N,W. 419 7 297 N.W. 559, 1j3 A.I,.R. 270; Yo1mfc v. F~rs~ :.~atjon~l, Barili; of OJ;:leida (1924) 
150 Tenn. f51 , 2o5 o, vJ. 682, 'l-0 A. L.R. 868. 
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and the def'ende.nt was one of bai1ment of the 
goods or of hirine the room in which t11ey 
were stored, because whichever it was, the 
defendan.§ was bound to exercise ordinary 
care and prv.clence in guarding thera.55 
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In the vast majority of safety-deposit box cases, then, 
as in some of the car parkine cases discussed earlier, 
it is not necessary to hold that there is bai:Lment in, 
order to impose liability. This is especially so in 
these cases, because even the offer of free safety-
deposi t box facilj.ties would be n.egarded at law as a 
service and un.dertakj.ng upon consideration. 36 
To hold that there is in these cases no bailment, 
then, is not to impose a.viy hardship on the depositor 
whose clatm for damages for negligence does not requi.re 
the bank to heve :possession of the articles deposited. 
36. 
Nf ... 1 "·+· c t B n1 "R ·1 1:-• wi son v, vi.izens en~.m a ;:, supr~;: egarc: .. ess 
of how the relationship is regarded ••• the rule govern-
ing the li.abili ty of the party is the same. 11 
MgDrrnald v. Leonard Ross (1939) (rex. Civ. App.,) 134 s.w. 
T2d) 4·60, f31 A.L.R. 1179 1 where free parking maintained by a department store was held to create a ba:!.l:ment of 
the car that was not gratuitous. Two contradictory dec-
isions on gratuitous or non-gratui.tous bailment of arti-
cles deposited with bankers by custcmers without charge -
Giblin v. McMullen (1868) L.R. 2 P.c. 317 (gratuitouus) 
and Re Unite Service Co Johnston ts Claim ( 1870) 6 Ch. 
App. 212 (non-gratuitous - are not strictly relevant, 
since the banks were not offering a service b'~t acceding 
~o a customer's request, which is less obviously an 
inducement to trade. 
To hold that there is bail:men·~, on the other hand, forces 
the depositor to pass certain rights to the bank or com-
pany - e,g,,, the power to garnish upon the deposit; we 
wil1 thus have the situation in which a man seeking to 
safeguard his valuables, who has no interest in passing 
possession of them unless ·this :ls a way of obta:!.r.ing gre 
er secul'ity for them 1 gains no greater security by being 
able to rely on the liab:111ty of a bai e, but a.oos 
pose his property to an additional insecurity.37 
The fundamental question, however, cannot be 
resolved simply accprding to such convenience: we must 
consider what the general principles of possession require 
us to hold in these situations. is true, as the 
Court said in National Safe Deposit Co, v. Stea)l., suPr£, 
that the company 1 s lack of knowledge concerning the 
contents of the box is not in 1 tsel:f• a bar to bail!!lent, 38 
and that a man can have bailment of the contents of a 
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37. The question whether the contents of the box were bailed 
to the bank ca~e befofe the court as result o~ proceed-
ings to a.etermine whether the contents were the subject 
of garnishment or attachment execution in Kramei;: 
v9 Grand National Be;nk of SJis Lo1tis 1 supra, and CarpJ.es 
v, Cun1berland Goal & Iron Co., sypra. It should be 
noted that the power to garnish follow:imechanically 
from the baiL>nent and therefore cax1.not be used as a 
test whether such bailment exists. 
38, 'rhe same argument was used in Tennesse~Hermi tage Nat,, 
Bank.v.!l Hin<ls (1925') 1 Tenx1. Anp. 508. See also t33 
A.L.R. 281. , 
locked trunk given to him to keep,, But such bailment 
(a.nd after all it has been the subject of centuries of 
dispute39) :ts dependent on the recipient•s having bail-
ment of the trunk; he must be given power to deal with 
the trunk in hls !bwn interest and convenience, to move 
it away from danger, lteep it convenient places consistent 
with hi.s contract, ~. The safety-deposit box, though 
owned by the c ornpany, is not like a trunlq it is by its 
nature fixd, caP.i1ot be moved about and is much oore 
plausibly to be treated as like a locked room let for 
storage than like an object deposited w:t th the company. 
The true parallel to the trunk would be detachable 
boxes which the company removes to suitable places of 
safe-keeping at will, bringing them out when reqaested 
by customers. In such case, we would hold that the con-
tents of these boxes are bailed to the company. 
Superficially, the strongest ground for treating 
the company as a bailel'l is the absence of untrammelled 
control on the part of the :mdhlz depositor; his extreme 
clependence on the company for the physical means of acce 
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39. Harton v. Hoare (1743) 3 Atk. 44,.lhE.2.~2$and author-
ities cited therein. 
to the articles deposited in the box. A number of courts 
have found this a very convinc:tng argument against bail-
40 
ment. But the man who deposits articles in a locked 
room in a private house or warehouse and is allowed to 
take away the key is not riorma1ly given the key to the 
front door '·e' l• w .,.L :: the fact that he is thus completely 
(lependent on the occupier for access to th0 locked room 
has not been held to destroy his possession of the room 
and its contents. The master key helrl by the bank or 
company, it should be noted, is not a means of allowing 
the bank or company access to the box; it is merely a 
precautionary device, conceptu<\lly and practically nothing 
but an extension of its rrteaJ1s of guardine agairist wrong-
ful intruders. 
4o. 
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E.g., Locjytrood v. Mar1hattan Storage & Warehouse Co., 
supr~: 0It is urged upon the part of the defendant 
that it was not the bailee, because it was not in pos-
session of the plaintLf'fts property. If j.t was not? 
it i.s difficult to Jr..nww who was. Certainly the plaint-
iff was not, because she could not obtain access to the 
property without the consent and active particlipa,tion 
of the defendant. She could not go into her safe unless 
the defendant used its key first and then allowed her to 
open her box with her 01vn key, - thus absolutely control-
ling the access of the plaintiff to that which she had 
deposited within the safe. The vault was the defend1:nt 1 s 
and was in its cust<X'!y, and its contents were under the 
same conditions. As well it might be said that a ware-
houseman was not in possession of silks in boxes deposit-
ed with hiru as warehouseman, because the boxes were nail-
ed up and he had not access to them." 
In our discussion of the car parking cases, we 
have emphasised the power or lack of power of the ru:til: 
recipient to exclude the depositor from the articles 
deposited until the deposit is terminated as a cruc:tal 
test of the existence of' bailment. But the c!'l!l.cial 
qu1.,lity of this test arises :f'r·Oin the fact that the power 
to exclude even the owner is logically required by that 
complete control over the property which the recipient 
must have in orde:e to 11£1,ve possession. The exclusion 
of the owner counts only if :i.t is part of the exercise of 
such control. The power a la.'1dlord to exclude his 
tenant from the bu:i.lding until the tenant checked in or 
satis d the caretaker does not count as evidence tha.t 
the landlord has possession articles in the tenant's 
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roorr1 ror of the roOlJJ its elf, because this power of exclusion 
is not eXErcised as part of the landlord 1 s control over 
the room. 41 Similarly, the bank or company 1 s power to 
exclude the renter of the safety-deposit box does not 
cou:nt as evidence for its possession of the internal volume 
41. The fact that u 1&'1dlor<1 may control the access of a 
tenant just as the bank or crnnpany controls the access 
of the renter without acquiring possession of the 
tenant 1 s rogr::. is emphflsised in People ex rel4 Gl:nm v. 
Mercantile afe Deoosit, sUnJ;ll 1 and in Wells v. Cole, 
supr!l- 1 where the courts founct no bailment, though the 
courts did not go on to consider why. 
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of the box and its contents because it is not exerc 
as part of a direct control over thesa. The power is 
exercised regardless of whether any articles are deposited 
in the renter's box or not - a matter of which the company 
has and seeks no knowledge; it is part of general arrange-
ment for safeguarcU.ng the pr<amises, the Va.ult and the 
boxes "'""t' I dt'' "'d ·r as parv o~ ne company s un er ax:ing .,o eposi.ors 
and the normel · ... : vigilance associated with its 
business. The mere fact that this extremely close 
vision and guard car< be carried out without the company• s 
in any way requiring to have direct control over the con-
tents of the boxes :l.s further reason for supposing that 
vigtlance is not evidence of a possession it neither 
requires nor stJeks. In other words, the company's power 
to exclude the depositor is not the power tr> exclude hj.m 
fl'om actual contr<)l of the articles deposi'tGd, as quired 
for bailment, but the power to exclude him frol:l reaching 
these articles. 
The same d:Lstinction, it seems to me, should be 
cases where, in placci of dropping 
a coin the locker and recei v:tng a key, the d:ep osi tor 
has the 1ocker opened for him by an attenda"lt with ll:eys. 
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There may be no baiL'lient even when the att":indant keeps 
the key~ Thus, in Greenwood v. Council of tJl~ l.fu.ri:tcirni,lity 
of Waver1°11.42 t' l i t· ~r hi d l 1 i th ~v" , ,ne p a n ::u: re, a oc <:er _n e 
defendants 1 bathi.ng shed to leave his clothes end valuables 
while bathlng; the locker was unlocked for him by an 
attendant, who gave him an identific11tion dj.sc but kept 
the key. The locker room contained a bell enabline; 
bathers to SU!!Lrnon the attendant to open the locke.i:'s when 
they returned; after the plaintif.f had done so, it was 
fotmd that h:ts clothes and valuables were missing. The 
District Court held there was liability under a coni~ract 
of bailment. The view that there is ba1lment here, I 
should argue, is mistaken. The attendant acts as the 
bather Is instrurnent in opening th13 locker; his retention 
of the key does not carry wi.th it a r1ght to open the 
locker except on the bather's instruction. In so far as 
the bather is excluded until he has suro1r1oned the attendant 1 
he is excluded. from reaching the thjngs and not from his 
control over them. The attendant's having the key, on 
the other hand, t.hortgh :t t gives him physical power to 
reach the things, does not give him control of th,:;se 
1+2. [1928] s.R. (N.s.w.) 219. 
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thi?lgs because he manj.fests no intent:ton of assum:Lng 
such control and, in fact 1 makes no attempt to reach 
43 them~ On appeal, Ferguson, J., held that the fjrst 
question was whether there was bailment or mere lettine 
of a locker; though he did not decide this q_uest:tcrn, 
he held that the e:qiress finding of the lawe:r. court 
that there was negligence in thf3 defendants' failure to 
!ilB.i.ntain continuous watch in the locker room was not 
supported by any facts show:!.ng a du·l;y to do so ;111d there E'ore 
sent the case hack for retrial to determine as a matter 
the duties imnosed on the defendants by the contract, 
whether that contract be one of baiL"llent, simple letting, 
or letting ~here the defendants "undertook a large1• 
measure of resp onsi bili ty". ( , indeed, one w<n·e to 
look a,t the backgrou."ld si tua ti on again, one wouJ/i find 
an ad di ti onal argument against baiL11ent: the retenl: 
or the key by i;;he attendant is virtually required by 
the conditions of hathing, where bathers could easily 
43. It he d.id make such an atter.Jpt, he would comroi t trespas:;i 
and where uossession is claimed on the basis of a ' ' ' '} 
unilateral" ac·c attetapting to gain co:r:trol without 5 
delivery or consent, the law will require especially 
clear evidence the.t such control has been attained. 
lose keys in the water ar.d have nowhere else to keep 
them; this is further ground, then, for supposing tha:t 
the retent:ion of the key by the attendant is not designed 
to ,sive him control of articles deposited but is a 
convenience for bathers and an attempt to preserve the 
keys the;~selves from loss.) 
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80 TEE FUNDA?-:ENTAL ELEMENT OF BA.ILMENT; POSSESSION, 
CONTRACT OR CONSENT? 
"In all bailments, 1' T.A. Street wrote in his 
Foundations of Legal Liability,1 
f11 possession is severed from ownership.• J 
Under the theory of the common law 1 every bailee has true possession as distinguished 
from mere custody. The nature of the 
ownership inhering in the bailer may some-
times, especially in early law, becane a 
matter of inquiry and may sometimes 
appear to be almost nan-existent; but 
there can never be a:ny doubt that the 
bailee has true legal possession. 
It should further be observed that in all 
true bailments delivery is made with the 
consent of the owner, a circumstance which 
supplies one of the requisites of a 
contractual relation. It is doubtless 
this circumstance which makes the physical 
custody of the bailee an ll:ns:l:ance of true 
legal possession. 
The material in the first paragraph of the 
above citation - save for the clarification or emendation 
in the footnote added - is not the subject of dispute: 
that the passing of possession is a necessary element in 
1. vo1.2, p~2?2; the divisiom into.paragraphs is mine. 
21s 
2. Severed, Street no doubt meant, conceptually but not 
necessarily practically, since an owner of a chattel may 
also become the bailee of that chattel. A hirer or other 
bailee for a term may in turn bail the chattel to its 
o1fmer and impose on that owner a duty to redeliver1 It 
might thus be better to say that in all bailments the 
bailee 1s right of possession is not based on a claim 
of ownership~ 
bailment no one has denied. Neither has anyone denied 
that bailment requires the bailee to have •true legal 1 
(i.e., rightful or lawful) possessiQn which must be 
distinguished from the possession of the owner and that 
of the thief by the fact that there is no accompanying 
claim to or assertion of dominium and by the fact that 
there is an ac~eptance of the continuing interest of a 
previous owner or possessor and of a duty to redeliver ~o 
him. But is it correct to insist, as Street did in the 
second paragraph of the citation given, that a 'true' 
bailment also requires a delivery made with the consent 
of the owner? Is it correct to go even further, 
3 l+ ,., 
Blackstone, Jones and Story7 did, and insist that a 
bailment must be based on a contract, express or implied? 
3. 2 Bl. Comm., p.45'1, quoted in sectj"on 6 above. 
4. Sir William Jones, An Essay on );h!?-1.~ of~_Bai~gts: 
"that contract which lawyers call bailment, or a delivery 
of goods on condition~ express or implied, that they 
shall be restored by the bailee to the bailor, or 
21£ 
according to his directions as soon as the purpose for 
which they were bailed shali be answered" (p.1, also p.117). 
5. Joseph Stpry, Law_gf Bai~~ (3rd ed., 1843): n ••• a 
bailment is ~ delivery of a thing in trust for some special 
object or purpose, and upon a contract, express or implied, 
to conform to the object or purpose of the trust" (p,,l+ ). 
At first sight, the origin and early historj 
of the technical use of the word 1 bailment 1 do' support 
the view that bailment requires, at the least, consent 
to the passing of possession by the bailor (i.e., a 
1delivery 1 in the narrow sense) and an express or implied 
agreement between the parties for the redelivery of' the 
chattel in question to the bailor or another person at a 
time or in circmnstances specified. These we:ee the two 
elements that had to be alleged and proved in an action 
on detinue sur bai'.lment; the allegation and proof of 
these elements distinguished detinue sur bailment from 
other types of detinue in which such formal 'bailment' 
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was not alleged, such as detinue on a devenerunt ad manus 
and detinue sur trover. But these latter types of detinue, 
as we have seen 1 conceptually were soon absorbed in the 
new and separate action of trover, which soon, once more, 
ceased to focus attention on the duty to redeliver as such 
and became a general way of testing the strength of 
competing cla:!mS to a chattel, The duty to redeliver thus 
, 
became identified with what remained of the older action 
of detinue, and what remained of detinue became identified 
with the traditional conception of bailment as requiring 
consensual delivery and an agreement, express or implied, 
between the par·cies. 
As th e !"all-fledged law of contract grew out of 
the assumps;!,.:it that began as a preliminary declaration 
within the writ in an action on the case, there was a 
shiEt from viewing this segment of the law as being the 
law of certain kinds of enforceable promises to seeing it 
as being the law of all kinds of enfoDceabla bargains. 
In the early history, promises became enforceable by having 
been made as part of a situation analogous to situations 
recognised by the earliest forms of action as imposing 
legal duties. 6 Generally speaking, this meant that there 
had been either the passing of possession in a chattel on 
a certain understanding or an undertaking to do something 
which had then been done badly. Looking at the situation 
from the Roman point of view,? we might say that English 
law {excltj.ding the action of covenant) began with the 
contract .I.!:l,, of which the bailment upon delivery and 
agreement is in many ways a special but exceedingly common 
case. It was for this reason that the declaration of 
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6. The relation of the action on the case to the old actions 
of debt detinue, covenant and deceit has been t:::-;:iced 
carefuliy in s.c.F. Milsom1.. ".Not Doing Is Ne Trespass: 
A View of the Boundaries or Casen, (195'1+) 12 Cambr. L.J.105. 
7. As Dr S.J. Stoljar has done in "The Conception of Bailment", (19,5) ? Res Judicatae (since re-named Univ. Melb. L, Rev.), 
112 160. The article makes some interesting connexions 
between certain types of bailment and certain questions in 
contract, but I am u..Dable to accept Dr Stoljar 1 s general 
view of bailment and its relation to possession.: c, ' 
assu.mps~t in the action on the case was able to bring 
situations in detinue (sur ]?ailment) within case and for 
a period (as a result of practical considerations 
determining the choice by litigants) practically brought 
detinue into disuse. 
The tendency to see bailment as a form of contract 
was strengthened in the early law by the typical cases 
coming before the courts: cases involving loans for use, 
hire or safe~keeping or deposits as pledges, of cattle, 
plolhghs and other farming implements, of jewels, clothes 
and charters. In such cases there was almost invariably 
a fairly specific agreement, though there was always also 
the (usually simultaneous) passing of possession. As the 
English law of contract moved with the realities of 
English economic life to seeing the essence or contract 
in an economic bargain rather than_ in the passing of a 
chattel or the doing of a task, the contract consensu 
came to replace the contract J:!i! as the paradigm. By this 
time, it was not at all obvious that bailment, even when 
accompanied by an express agreement, fell necessarily 
under the contract model; a historical development, 
partly influenced no doubt by the older and more plausj_ble 
connexion between bailment and the c011tract J:li!i put it 
there. The development has been sketched for us by Beale: 8 
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8. Joseph H. Beale1 Jrf, "Gratuitous Undertakings", (1891-2) 5 Harv.L.Rev. 222 a~ p.22). 
There seems at one time to !'.ave been a threefold 
division of personal actions into (1) trespass 
and trespass on the case; (2) case induced by 
assumusitj (3) covena.ntq Actions on the case 
induced by assumpsit included not only breaches 
of simwle contracts, but also breaches of 
gratuitous undertakings, which therefore in 
their origin are more nearly allied to simple 
contracts tr..an to torts. When those actions in 
which the assµmusit was merely an inducement 
were differentiated from those which it was the 
gist of the action, the former would properly 
have ur1i ted with the old action of detinue, 
founded on bailrnent, to make the grand division 
of undertakings; just as the latter united with 
actions of debt and covenant to form the grand 
division of contracts. Bailments, however, were 
after a st:rug~le drawn off into the division of 
contracts; and the few other cases of undertaking 
then known, not being of sufficient importance 
to form a seuarate division either followed 
bailments' or with other actj,ons on the case 
sank back into the division of torts. This fact, 
singular as it is, may be accounted for by the 
well-k..~own early neglect of all rights that did 
not concern tangible property. Injuries to 
intangible property might it is true, be 
redressed after the Statuie of Westminster II 
by an action on the case. But the recognition 
of such injuries was a gradual process; and 
before such as were in the nature of breaches 
of undertaking were recognised, the twofold 
d:lvision of actions was fully established. 
It is in the light of this historical 
development that courts and 19th century legal writers 
emphasised the element of consensual delivery, "o..ri.e of 
the requisites, 11 as Street put it, "of a contractual 
relation.'~ Bailments, indeed, might have been put 
even more firmly within the class of contracts if the 
16th century ir1troduction of consideration as a 
requirement of contract, and the 17th century refinement 
of it, had not raised very great difficulties in treating 
such gratuitous bailments as ma.~dates and deposits as 
Q 
establishing a contractual relation. Coggs v,_~Berr,.ard;/ 
in which the Court unanimously rejected counsel's plea 
that no action lay against a bailee undertaking to carry 
because there has been no reward, did net display unanimity 
in its treatment of the reasons. Gould and Powell, Jjo, 
brought the reatter back to its old foundations in detinue 
and earlier assumpsJ"l; in case: Powell, J., areued that 
the bailee's undertaking was enforceable because was 
given in conjunction with, and as the foundation for, the 
bailor 1 s entrusting him with the gocxl.s and this seemed to 
him just since, 11 if the bailee will take the goods into 
his custody, he shall be answerable for his own act."10 
Gould, J., returning to the old cause that the defendant 
had undertaken to do and had done badly (in wh:lch 1 too, 
no •consideration' had been required), argued that the 
bailee, "by his assumption" of the goods, has concurred 
.!::i::H in "the particular trust ••• in the executing which 
9~ (1703) 2 Ld Raym. 909, 92 E.R. 107. 
10. At p.911, E.a. at p.108. 
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he has miscarried by his neglect." 11 Both judges did not 
hold that there was consideration and therefore made no 
attempt to force gratuitous bailments within the realm 
of contract; they seemed, rather, to regard them as 
enforceable undertakings that need not be contracts. 
The reasons they gave are perfectly consonant with the 
view of undertaki.ngs ( indluding the undertaking in a 
gratuitous bailment) given by Beale: 
An tLr1dertal!:ing is the entrance of two parties 
into such relationshi.p as that one party, on 
account of the bare relationship unaided by 
a.riy agreement, has a new duty to perform 12 toward the other; he undertakes a new duty. 
The emphasis laid by the two judges upon warranty may 
then be seen as necessary :Lor determining the precise 
extent of the duty rather than for bringing it into 
existence, though there is no doubt that the judges have 
been sufficiently influenced by contractual notions to 
191y greater weight on it than this. The older view of 
bailment as an undertaking - very much in the sense 
defined by Beale - within the action on the case also 
played its part in the judgment given by Holt, C.J., 
11. At p.909, E.R. at p.107. 
12. Beale 1 op. c~t., p.223. 
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but in a crucial sentence Holt, C.J., went beyond the old 
law: "But to this [that there is no consideration to 
ground this promise upon] I answer, that the owner's 
trusting him with the goods is a sufficient consideration 
to oblige him to a careful management.••13 In substance, 
Holt, G.J., said no more than and Gould, JJ., that 
the passing of these goods in these circumstances was 
sufficient to create an enforeeable duty, but by adding 
the word iconsideration1 after 'sufficient' he brought 
the duty and the whole concept of bailment (on his view) 
within the law of contract. He went on, indeed, to 
discuss the bailment before him from the po:Lnt of view of 
executory agreements. 
These words bore full fruit only a centiJry later. 
The economic developments that produced the treatment of 
contract as the law of bargains had wider political-
ideological effects: the men of the 19th century strove 
to fi;.'l.d contract everywhere~ Story, in his classic work 
on Bailments, argued that in mandates and deposits there 
was sufficient consideration by "the b<1ilor yielding up his 
present possession, custody and care of the thing to the 
13. At p.919, E.R. at p~113. 
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bailee, upon the faith of his agreement, or promise to 
redeliver it •••• A detriment, or parting with a present 
right, or delaying the present use of a right on the 
part of the pron:isee, is a sufficient consideration to 
support a contract by the prisoner, although the 
promiser derives no benefit whatever from it~" 14 Others 
have emphasised "the confidence rep osea 
who undertakes. the duty" 15 as p:!:'oviding 
consideration. 
the element of 
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In recent times, these views have been increasingly 
cl1'-'lllenged. 16 Pollock 17 thought that in the contractual 
14. ~· cit., p.4, n.t. In Bainbridge v, Firmstop,e (1838) ~A. & E. 743 7 112 .R. 1019, another case of gratuitous bailment, the Court held that there was suff1cient 
consiCJ.eration in the plaintiff's permj_tting the defendant 
to take and weigh certain bei1ers: 11 I suppose the 
defendant thought he had some benefit; at any rate, 
there is a detriment to the plaintiff from his pal'"ting 
with the possession _for even so short a -~ime": 
Patteson, J., at p.71+1+, E.R. at p_.1020. See also 
Hart v. Miles (t '8f?8) Y. c.n.n.s. 371, 110E.R. uig, 
15. Fer L~rd Finlay, L.c., in Banbury v. Bank of Montreal 
Tf9181 .4..C. 626 at p.b57• 
16. E.g. 1 by C.V. Davidge, "Bailment" 1 (19~5) 41 L.Q.R. 1+33; Will_Lam King Laidlaw, "Principles of Bailment" -1 ( 1930-1) 
16 Cornell t. Q. 286; 1,\filliston Qn Contracts (.:H:·i ed.,, 
1936); Paton, Ba:Lllnf,nt_j,p_the Common Law {195'2), 
che.pter 1. 
17. (1886) 2 L.Q.R. 37, in an editorial note to Erwin 
Grueber, "A Difficulty in the ::ioctrine of Consideration" 1 
vol. cit. 33, where Grueber puts very ·~learly the 
argmner1t we shaJ.1~ be 1.1sing shor·tly: t1Jat 1ft!1€ fact 
of leaving things with another rson in order to have 
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treatment of gratuitous iJ.ment, the theory o:L consicleration 
was being stretched to :1.ts utmost !.:i.ntits t but did ::lot 
other writers have thou.ght it clearly breaks. 
Story is no doubt correct in stressing that the cons ration 
need not be a benefit to him who receives it 1 but he is 
far too cava11er in the question of detriment. To treat 
the passing any chattel, or the most temporary 
surrender of any present right, as its elf necessar:t1y 
irivolving a detriment is to rob the criterion of detriment 
. ~ + • • ht. ·~ t• f "" in ci.e uermining w."u is cons:u.era ion o · any .1. <Jrce 01~ 
cance "t!h:1teve:r. Wh0n I pass on to another the 
troubl·e of ca.ring for a th:i.ng from which I extract no 
immediate benef:i.t or enjoyment w.ha tever, and yet keep 
my rights to all future benefit or enjoyment, I cannot 
meaningfully be said to suffer detriment, pr'"j11dice o:r 
trouble. 
If one were to abandon, as many modern writers 
do 1
18 the insistence that there 5.s technical considerat:Lon 
(C CYfftd.) 
them or their value preserved11 need not be a benefit 
t t . . . ..., . ,.. . . . ' o ·ne person receiving, anu, in ~ne_ g1yen cJ.rC.!2;"!si:;mce.s, 
mll.y be an advantage to the person parting with them: 
see esp. p.35. 
E.g., Ral'ih Sutton in 2 Halsbury 1 s Laws of Englan~ (3rd. 
erI., 1953) p.93!. and D.R. Harris i.n Ghittv on Contracr~s, 
vol.II (22nd ed., 1961 )1:J... Both writers consequently 
divide bailments :1.nto gratuitous bailments and bailments 
for reward, a ·Jision whose significance lies, for them, 
in el1 1 true' baiL'llents, it would st:lll be possible to 
pass, as some writers do, from the contractual to the 
consensu<'.1 view of bail:ment as founded on agreemiint 
between the parties. But this vie·,, is as i'Tplau.sible as 
the contractual view in its treatment of bailment by 
ancl of 1 involuntary' baiJ1nen,ts; i.f agreements 
are not to become the baldest of ficl~ions, these 
j_mp ortant parts of the law of b!:dlment have to be 
disting·uJ.shed from it ancl treated as not 'true 1 or as 
1 quasi- 1 bailments. But in respect of the essential 
foundation of legal liability, sum alleged f quasi-
bailments 1 differ in no respect ilhatever from the 
allegedly ltrue 1 bailments. It is the recognition of 
this poj.nt that has led some modern writers to insist on 
the unity of the law of all bailments as a subject sui 
generis, that m.ay have both contractual and tortious 
features but has its own character precisely because it 
1B. (Contd.) 
in its effect on lif,bility. Charles E. Cullen, "The 
Definition of a Ba:llment", (1926) 11 st. Louis L.Rev. 
2'57, had earlier atter11pted to argue that bailme!lts 
were contracts, but dispensed with both consideration 
and agreement and found the conc·ractual essence in 
r.ro:tual obligations that might be created by the 
operation of law and not only by agreement of the 
parties. 
229' 
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longs to neither contract nor tort, 19 In what follows, 
I should lik0 to suggest yet another alternative: tr.at 
the foundation of the baileets d.uty, as distinct from 
its nature ax1d extent, is :In no way rooted in agreement 
and the law of bailment, therefore, properly speak:tng, 
belomgs within the realm of torts. 
* 
19. This is the view taken by Paton, .9JL<L.SJJ:::o, leaning on 
Winfield's simtlar view (T}le Province of tti.e Law of 
Tort, 1931 p.100f.).·that bailment is a 'contract 
conveyance? and is therefore best treated as belonging 
to neither contract nor to tort but as forming a distinct 
branch of the law of property. 
20 In 1312, in the case of Lyndesey v, Suth, the 
plaintiff, as heiress to her grandfather, claimed in 
detinue a charter from the defendant, declaring that 
after her grandfather's death, the charter had tcome into 
the seisin1 (devenit in seisinam) of the grandfather 1 s 
second wife who had in turn delivered it to the defendant. 
The defendant pleaded that the charter had been given 
her directly by the grandfather when he enfeoffed her of' 
the estate in questiono The plaintiff 1s reply was to 
traverse the feoffment and to repeat that the charter 
had come into the hands (devenit all manus) of the second 
wife~ In argument, Toudeby (for the daf'endant) objected 
that the plaintiff's count die'! not show that the 
plaintiff or any of her a..~cestors had bailed the charter 
to the defendant, and Scrape (for the plaintiff') replied: 
If yoo disseise :me and carry off my ch3rters, 
and I bring my writ and demand these same 
charters, it is then no answer to my writ to 
say that I did not bail you any charter. 
J,ikewise if ycr<I should lf!ind my charters, you 
would answer for the detinueo 
23j 
20. Y.B. 6 Edw.2 (s.s. vol.3~, pp.166-8), trans. in Fifoott 
History and S911rces of the Common Law, pp.37-9· Mr F11·oot 
has converdent.1.y brought together a number of cases that 
reveal aspects of the early detinue on a deyenerunt all 
manus which I seek to develop as a general basis for 
detinue and for the modern law of bailment. Apa!lt;:' from 
the two cases cited here, see also, s.s. vol.3, ;:ileas 8 
137, B. B. pleas 191+, 936, 8)2 Pi,Ud 1366, all aJscussed 
in F:t-_fol)t, SlP• ci~e, 025-6?! 
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The count was allowed and the case sent to the jury for 
a decision how the charter came into the defendant's ,, 
possession; and the action of detinue was thus bifurcated 
into detinue sur bailment and detinue on a devene:;:,Y.Jl.t,ad 
manus. In detinue sur Q,a:L1ment the pla:l.ntiff had to 
prove the bailment and that the defendant was party or 
privy to it, but if he declared on a devenerunt ad manus 
the process whereby the chattel had reached the defend~'lt 
became irrelevant. As Green put it when arguing in 
Thornhill 1 s Case ( 13lt4) up on a deve~~rp,nt: 21 
In this action of Detinue you are put to 
answer as to your own act, which is the 
detinue and net as to your testator's 
contract; for here you '"fill not have a 
traverse as to his receipt nor as to the 
manner how [he received it], but only e.s to 
your detinue • 
••• In whatever way it came into your possession, 
whether as executors or because you took it 
a~t of the possession of some one else or 
because you fou.nd it, if you tain it, I 
shall have an action; wherefore, inasmuch 
as you do not answer to the detinue, which 
is the principal matter of the action, I 
aslt judgment. 
21. Y.B. 17 & 18 Edw.3, (R.S.) p.150 1 trans. by Fifoot, £lllt. cit., pp.41 & ~2. 
233 
Here, then, we have the non-contracti.ual and non-consensual 
view of a person1s liabilities in detinue. He .1-l>'ia.'.:J £1CU)e.~ 
admittedly legal possession of the chattel, but the 
chattel belongs to another or another has the better 
right to possess it. He has been made aware of the 
continuing right of another bp: a demand for delivery. 
He now has a duty toward the demandant, not because of 
any express or implied undertaking toward the demandant, 
not mfx because of any agreement between them, but 
simply because he accepted the possession of a thing in 
which another haci. a continuing interest. It is only if 
the defendant claims that he has a continued right to 
detain that agree~ents and undertakings become relevant, 
not to the plaintiff 1 s charge but to the defendant 1 s 
reply. It is by entering into a relationship with a 
thing, and not by entering into a relationship with a 
person, that the defendant becomes subject to dut:les. 
It is thus that the finder has the seJUe primary duty as 
the consensual bailee: 
for he which findes goods, ••• i:f he deliver 
them over to any onei ui~less it be unto the 
right owner, he shal be charged for them 1 for at the first i.t is in his election, 
whether he will take them or not into his 
custody, but when he hath them, one onely 
kw.th then right unto them, an~2 therefore he ought to keep them safely. 
Or, as an American court put it, even more generally: 
No person can be compelled to become a 
depositary without his own consent; but 
there are cases where a perso.n. may be subject 
to the duties and liabilit s of a depositary 
without any intention on part to enter 
into any contract, or to assume P.ny liability 
in regard to the property in question. The 
finder of property of a person unknown is not 
bound to interfere with it. He may pass by, 
if he please, and has then no responsibility 
in relation to it; but if he takes it into 
his possession he becomes at once bound, 
without any actual contract and perhaps 
without any actual intention to bind himself 
to the 011mer of' the2groperty for its safe-keeping and return. " 
The forms of action arise as remedies for specific 
types of recurring sltuations. The situe.tional bas:ts of 
the action of detinue genero.lly, I have striven to show 1 
is that the defendant has accepted into possession 
23. 
v Clar' (1615) 2 Bulstr. 30$' 
p.11'+. 
Costello v. 'f:en E;1ck; (189i) 86 ,Mich. 348 49 l'J.W. 152, 
24 Am.St.Hep. 128. Thus 1 courts have held that persons 
legally ~;ca~able o~ en~ering into bindi.ng contracts or 
legally o,.nding obl:q~ations with persons (such as 
infants and - at the relevant time - married women) 
were bound by the legal obligations of a bailee: R. v. 
Robson (1861) 31 L.J.1'1.c. 22 (married wo11ian indictable 
as converting bailee); Ik.Js McDonal,sl (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 
323 (C.C.R.) (infant indictable for larceny as ba:i.lee), 
esp,, the argument of Coleridge, c. J~ a·t pp.326-?; 
Burt<";!n v. Leve;z (1890) 7 T.L.H. l/fS i.fnfant llable on 
det:tnue). 
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a chattel or continues to hold in his possession a chattel 
in which he recognises the continuing interest of another. 
Detinue sur bai 1ment is no more than a special case of 
this situation: a case in whj.ch the acceptance of 
possession is by consent of the deliverer and with agreement 
between the parties. But here, as in other types of 
detinue, the primary duty arises from the acceptance of 
possession. 
We have seen that in the early law the term 
1 bailment 1 was used to make a distinction within detinue. 
But this distinction, we have argued, has no fundamental 
importance in the law: consent and agreement between 
the parties help only to define the extent of the duty, 
they do not create it. The primary duty of a man who 
takes into hi.s possession the chattel of another without 
challenging the other 1 s title is the saIMl whether he be 
a hirer, a borrower, a finder or an 1 involuntary' bailee; 
he has a duty to safeguard and redeliver. It is for 
this reason that the term 'bailment 1 is most conveniently 
used not to cover delivery upon agreement, but to refer 
to that general situation in which a man has duties 
arising from his temporary possession of another's chattel. 
The law, indeed, has recognlsed this and has gradually 
come to use the word bailment (often w:i.thout the hesitant 
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'q_uasi- 1 ) for all the situations to which we have referred. 
E.s Williston put it: 
A bailment may be defined as the r:l.ghtful 
possession of goods by one who is not the 
OW!1er • •. 
It is usual to add as part of the def:i.nit1on 
of bail:ment that the bailee must be under 
a duty to redeliver the goods, but all that 
is esiH.1ntial j.s contained in the definition 
• • • [above], for one who has the right to 
perma:n.ant possession is necessarily the 
ow:r:.er; and since one entitled to tempora1•y 
possession only is under a duty, either 
present or future, to surrender the goods 
or their proceeds on demand or to seek the 
mmer an.,i deliver them to him, he is a 
bailee~'='.'+ 
The customary distinction between the tgrand divisions 1 
of co.11tract and of tort is made in these terms: a 
contractual duty :i.s one which is owed to a specific !:Jerson 
in consequence of an agreement entered to with that 
person; a tortious duty is one owed impartially to the 
whole world in consequence of entering into a specific 
situation, though it can be claimed upon only by those who 
have become linked with the duty-bearer through that 
situation. On this view, the primary duty of the bai1ee 
as set forth in these ps,ges is a tortious duty: the duty 
of the bailee requires neither his agreement with, nor his 
l~'10'#ledge of 1 tht-; ballor. 
24 W·11· t • lLd.s on, op. cjj;., ss.1032 (at p.2888) & 1035 (at 
p,.2891 ). 
The precise nature and extent of the bailee's 
duty, howev(3r, is 
?) 26 Hames,"- Street 
another matter. Whether it be 
and Holdsworth27 thought 1 that 
true, as 
th.e 
liability of the bailee in early law was always strict, 
has becon:.e the subject of some dispute. 28 In modern law, 
there is no doubt that the degree of liability imposed 
upon a bailee may vary accord:ing to the type of bailment 
and may be affected by the agreement existing between the 
pa ies. Southcote•s Case~9 what Coke, .C.J., took to be 
the strict liability of earlier law - 11 To be kept and to 
be kept safely is all onen - was initially reaffirmed, 
but the bailee was allowed to escape liability for theft 
if he has specifically undertaken to keep only he keeps 
his own goods, Coke, indeed, recomnmn:iing this device to 
any reader of the report inclined to become a bailee, 
26. Street, 2 FounCiat;iqns of Legal Liabilit.Y, p.253. 
27. Holi3worth 1 Historz o( English Law, vol.iii, pp.337-8., 
28. Beale 1 11The Cai'rier 1 s Liability" l ( 1897-8) 11 Harv. I .• Rev. 158; Hugh Evander Willis, 'The Rj.ght of Bailees 
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to Contract Against Liability for Neglt;ence 11 ~ ( 1906-7) 
20 Harv.L.Rev .. 297; Bordwell 1 "Property vhattels", 
(1915-6) 29 Harv.L.Rev. 501, '(31; and Fletcher, The 
Carrierts Liab11;iJ;:;L (1932) pp.1 6 and passim. S.J. 
Stoljar, "The Early History of BaiJ.ment", {1957) 1 .ll.m. 
J. Legal Hist. 5 has recently re-examined the question, 
arguing that the courts were aware that a bailee could 
come to lose things while yet applying proper diligence 
and that there were separate lines of ri!:evelopment in 
formulating principles of exoneration which later became 
s~erzed. (1o01 J 4 Co. 83b, 76 .R. 1061. 
Holt, c.J., in Coggl'LJ!:~ 3erl1§'rd, supra, went further to 
'chrow the mnpha.sis on various types of bailra<Jnt, classifiet'l 
by him (again ·with support from e lier law) into ~positµm, 
.9.orrunodatµm, locatio et conductio, vaditim, bailment for 
carriage or worlt to be done with reward aTld bailment for 
carr:lage or work to be (lone without reward. The 
significance of these, for him, was that any two of them 
d:i.d not necessarily impose the same l bilities upon the 
recipient, and though otha.r authorities have reduced the 
number of relevant types, the link between type of bailment 
and liability has remained. Since the type of bailment is 
normally most easily determined from the agreements that 
surround the passing of possession, and s:i.nce these 
agreements thus often :l\tlom::;n.:rlll:!l:Xli!J!ll.R:ii::lra::irn:il:µ~ become 
crucial in termining liability, courts and writers have 
not ur1naturally been 1ed to emphasise the contractual 
elements surroUcnd·Jng bailn1ent at the expense of the 
tortious element that constituted it. 
It would be mista.l~en 1 however, to treat the 
not different rules concerning negligence for each type 
of bailment: thix becomes evident onc!3 we recognise 
that 1negligence 1 means no more than absence of (the 
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due or appropriate) care. As Montague-Smj.th, J., put it 
'.l "· in Grill_.L_ General It.Qn Screw Collier Co. :-'v "The of 
the term tgross negligence 1 is only one way of stating 
that less car·e is reguired in sorcie cases than L"l otters, 
as in the case of gratuitous bailees, anc it more 
correct and scient to define the degrees of care than 
the degrees of negligence." The degree of care required 
frora the bailee d ends upon the character in which he 
accepts possession of the chattel (as an ord:inary man,31 
as a banker with seci..U'ed vaults,32 as a skilled workrnaH 
exper:ienced in deal:lng with this type of ctiatte133 ); it 
depends upon the purpose for which th8 chattel was bailed 
and upon any agreements or ur,de:!:talcings entered :into by 
the p ies, wh,cther these be express or implied by the 
______ , _______________ .. __ _ 
30. (I €6b) L. 1 ~."'. f'..oO?, a+ p 1 1,... ~ . . ~ ' - . ~ ~  
31. il.s in S,hiells....,.Y. Blackburne ( 1789) 1 FI. Bl. 160 7 126 • R. 94, vhere the dsfendant, who hac undertaken without reward 
to send some dressed ather out the cou.ntry and had 
caused its seizure 1:ly \Vrongly enterlr1g it at C11stc>n1s as 
wrought a ther, was held not to have held himself out as 
having any special skill in exp ting and therefore not 
to be liable. In certain cases, however the courts have 
hel(,1 that a man doing something has a riu!y to exercise 
such sl{ill as he has even if it be not known to th.fl bailor: 
}iil§..QP v~_Brett (1843) 11 M. W. 113, 152 E.R, 737: if 
a man bails me his car to drive in the beJ.ieve that I have 
no more than ordina.ry skill, this does not ,,abslillve me from 
the duty to drive with the care and skill I have in fact 
acquired as a. test-driver. 
32. Giblin v. ?19.!'<fu.llen (1869) L.Ho 2 P.C. 317, at pp.3 -4. 
33. Gi:bli11 ~ l"fcI'fulJ~en, loc. i::;~tt 0 
general circuxnstances of the transaction. 34 The ion 
of bailments into various types is mo more than a 
convenient but rough classifj<ca.tion of varying but recurrent 
bailment-situations according to obvious features bearing 
upon the amount of care expected.3 5The classification is 
not strict because within each type of bailroent the known 
value of the thing deposited the facilities known to 
be avail2.ble to the recipient will affect the degree of 
may bri~1g above the degree of care 
r·equired in other circumstances in a type of bailment that 
nominal.ly sets stricter requirements. The courts havra 
34. ,, R 1 h ~ ' ,. h ' .L 'I~ ' • 1 t t " .ns .. a p bUt-vor1 pu·Gs iv: 'J.t rnay p1;:,:r·r1a!J8 Ji~ s '3. ea 
with equal truth and brevity that the bailee is required 
in every case to take that degree of ca.re which may 
re on.ably he J~ooked for, havir~g 1~ega1*d. t~9 a.11 t11e 
curnsten.ces; for e:x:<::iJitple, i:r you con.fiG.e a casket of 
jewels to the custody of a yok81, you cannot expect him 
to ·take the san1~1 care of it as a barJcer~ would 1~: 2 bu:'"y, 
I~a1,rs gf :Snr;J.and., Pw96. rl'his :Ls not to sa.y that r1otl1J~r1e ·t,!1e 
yokel does fails to do is negligence: i~1 Doorman v...,, 
Jenkins (1 ) 2Ad. 256, 111 E.R. 99, a coffee-
hou.se .keeper was he llable for the loss of money deposited 
1-Ij_th h:t"m i·1t1en i·t '1-Tatj si~ol2J1 thrcn1gh bein& left accessible 
to tl:1fl public 1 even though it was thus left t ther with h:ts O'u'll morcey. 
Beal_xJ~h Devo.q Haj_Jwa,y:_co. (1861~) 3 H. & c. 337, 
i 59 E.R. 5oO: ''What is reasonable varies :ln the case 
a gratu:ltous ba:tlee and that of a bailee for h:tre. From 
the former is reaso;;iably expected such care aYJ.d diligence 
persons ordinarily use in their own affairs, and such 
sl.;:j_JJ as he ha.s. From the tter is reasorn:J:;ly expectis'd 
care and clil:tgence, such as are exercised the ordinary 
proper conduct of similar business for which he 
re;e~ves paymenti" per Crom.pt.on, J., p.343, E.R. 11.t 
p.:;6c:. 
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:i.ncreasingly tended to :cecognise this, as the cases cited 
sh:iw: the general trend to brj.ng the 11abiJ5ty of the 
bailee back to general tortious duty of exercising 
reasonable care appropr5.ate in the circumstances, w:lth 
the type of bailment, agreement between the paldties 
and the social responsibiJ.ities of special callj.ngs, 
such as those or irrnkeeper and carrier, forming the 
i t + ~ ~ . ·~ c reruns ances vO 11:nJ_cn c:ne care :i:::: 
A1J these matters1 in short, do not i:;o to the essence 
the bailment or of the primary duty of' the bailee; they 
are ancillary, surTo-vnding circun1stances determi.ning the 
appropriate degree of ce.re. 
* * 
36. Thus even 1 gross negligence 1 , specifically linked llli:ti!J. 
gratuitous bailments, has been regarded by some courts 
nothing more than n("gligence plus >ta vituperative epithet" 
(ner Rolfe, B. , ;LYJ fill§..fln_V~J;ett, supr·a, supported by 
"'"JJ ~ 1 G"r' G lI •• .~--1,..·~ WJ ... es, "•, ... n <r:c ... L_x, .enera . ron ·.ocrew 'JO.lJ., e~ >wo .• 2 • ~ I · ~ , .• ·r· • ... 1 D"bb" ('PzL ) stwpa, c1. ,ord uenman 1 ,,. v., J.n nin ,:on v~ ' i ;i,n 10 T 2 Q.B. '61+6 p,661, 114 E.R. 253 at p.25 ). Others see 
it as lacl:i~ of the very lowest degree of cax·e 1 an<1 some have enpr,B.sised !;hat the degree of care 1:1ay be so low 
lack of it approaches dolus (for i.:astance ;i Erle t J., 
Cashill v. bJ§'.l\ttt:t Wrivht (1B56) 6 E. & B. 091, 119 
E.R. 1096 at p.1099). Americart courts have been reluctant 
to accept the waivi:ig of liability for gross negJJ.gence 
by agreement, and in doing so have treated it not as lack 
of the lowest degree of care, but as someth:Lng appr caching 
~ w~Jfu1 act '-~e 0 \'"'''is o·o c~t ) ci ~.- .... _, ,,.\,, "' Q \_;;) ,...,_, ',JJ_--'-.._,'" ' fl ....... 
In the preceding, I have attempted to suggest, 
partly only in outline, the coherent basis for a law of 
bailment, a basis that has often been recognised by many 
of the courts. I should not wish to suggest that it has 
been recognmsed by all of them all of the time. The 
contractual view of bailment has had strong support and 
has determined or influenced decisions. It is some of 
these decisions that we shall n~~ turn to examine. 
A bailment, said the Court in Wechs~:t,,,;u_ Pis:;Xarg 
Importing C.Q.,37 "must be predicated upon some contractual 
relation." In that case, a swindler had i.nduced the 
b~p.,g btJ,s,f~\l!f!!~ ~tt..~·\,sl.J. 
plaintiff to deliver goods to the defendant's room,LwHkch 
he shared with two co-tenaflts, in the defenda.~t 1 s nameo 
The defendant being absent at the time of the delivery, one 
of the co-tenants accepted the goods. The second co-tenant, 
before the defendant's return, permitted the swindler to 
take the goods away after being persuaded that the delivery 
had been made in error. The Court held that the defendant 
was not liable because there was no bailment and that tha-re 
no bailment because there was no contractual relation 
between the parties. In an earlier case, ,!);r.urnsky Y.t Loeter,38 
37. (1916) 94 Misc. 15'7, 15"7 N.Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct, 1916). 
38. (1902) 37 Misc. )o4, 7~ N.Y. Supp,, 1012 (Sup~ Ct+ 1902)0 
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the Court took a similar view. A cheat, representing himself 
to be the defendant, had ordered goods to be delivered to 
the de!endant 1 s store. The goods were sent by an expressman 
and received under :IJ:ha mistaken assumption that they had 
been ordered. Before the mistake was discovered, the cheat 
telephoned the store, representing himself to be the 
plaintiff, and explained that the goods had been delivered 
to the defendant by mistake and that a messenger would be 
sent to collect them. A messenger arrived, presented a 
forged order, received the goods from the defendant, and 
goods and messenger were heard of no more. The Court 
dismissed the pla1ntiff 1s claim that the defendant was a 
bailee of the goods liable for negligent misdelivery on the 
grounds that there cauld be no bailment where there was no 
contract-ual relation, express or implied, between the parties. 
In Coor.s v. Fir~t National Bank; of Philmont,39 
this final proposition was taken very far indeed. The 
plaintiff had deposited certain securities in the safe-
deposit box of the defendant's, hired by her father, and 
they had been stolen from the box by burglarsq Though tee 
Cpurt was prepared to regard property put in the box by the 
father as bailed to the Bank, it denied the plaintiff 
39. (1926) 218 App. Div. 283, 218 N.Y. Supp. 189 (3rd Dept.). 
relief on the ground that since she had no contractual 
relationship with the Bank whatever, she could not make 
the Bank a bailee. As the Court put it: 
The relation between a bailor and a bailee is 
fixed by contract, either express or implied, 
and the rights and liabilities of the parties 
must be determined from the terms of the 
contract, if express, or, if implied, under the 
general principles of law and the surrounding 
and attendant circumstances; but always 
liability is grounded in contract; one cannot 
be made the bailee of a~other's property 
without his consent. 4oJ ••• It follows that, 
if there is no contract between the parties to 
the action, there can be no liability resting 
upon the defendant as bailee. 
In C:l:lwen v. Pressprich,41 on the other hand, the 
Court took the non-contractual view of bailment, purporting 
to follow Riort v. Bott. 42 The plaintiff and defendant 
were security brokers, and the latter had ordered from the 
former an X bond. By mistake the plaintiff sent a Y bond 
by one of his runners, who arrived in the defendant's 
office and deposited the bond by dropping it through a 
slpt in a partition in an inner office, the normal arrangement 
4o. Note the confusion of contract and consent, and note 
that the consent spoken of is onlv that of the recipient. 
41. (1922) 192 N.Y. Supp. 242 (Sup. ct,, App. T.); noted in 
(1921-2) 35 Harv.L.Rev. 873 and (1921-2) 7 Cornell L.Q. 
238. 
42. (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 86, to be discussed below. 
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for depcsiting. The defendant promptly noticed that the 
wrong bond had been delivered 1 opened a hole in the partition 
and called for the runner. An imposter stepped forward, 
received the bond and decamped. The Court held that the 
defendant had entered into (an involuntary) bail:ment and 
that he was liable for negligent misdelivery. The same 
concept of involuntary bailmant had been acc~pted by the 
English courts even earlier. In Haugh v, London & North 
Western Rx, Co.,43 the defendants were carriers forwarding 
and delivering goods consigned by tbe plaintiffs, who, 
induced by the fraud of N, had consigned the goods to a 
certain address. The person in charge at the address 
ref'used to take delivery; the defendants brought the goods 
back to the station and notified the plaintiffs by letter. 
The defendants were induced to part with the goods to N 
when he came before them bearing their letter of notification. 
The same circumstances occurred in respect of two f'urther 
similar consignments, except that N, who was now knmm to 
the defendants as having brought the first letter of 
notification, was allowed to take the subsequent consignments 
without the subsequent letters. In the circmnstances, the 
43. (1870) L.R. 5 Ex. ;11. 
plaintiffs were u.~derstandably anxious to rely on the strict 
liability of the carrier~ the Court held that 
the defendants 1 character of carriers had ceased, 
and whatever character they filled it was not 
that. Their p::>sition has not been inaptly 
described as that of involuntary bailees; 
without their own fault they found these goods 
in their hands, under circumstances in which 
the character of carriers4µnder which they received them had ceased. ~ 
In terms of the lower duties of care imposed on an 
involuntary bailee, the Court held, the misdeliveries, 
based on the initial production of a letter of notification, 
were not negligent. 
Generally, then, we may say again, with the Court 
in Foulkes v, New York Consolidated R.R.,45 which held that 
leaving articles in a railway carriage creates a bailment 
to the proprietors, that 
44. 
Bailment does not necessarily and always, though 
generally, depend upon a contractual relation. 
It is the element of lawful possession, however 
created, and duty to account for the thing as 
the piioperty of another that creates the bailment, 
regardless of whether such possession is based 
upon contract in the ordinary sense or not. 
At ]p.56-7 7 per Kelly, C.B.; also see Martin~ B., at p.5tl. In the Note to Cowen v. Pressprich in j) Harv.L. 
Rev. 873, an involuntary bailee is defined as one who 
"when goods are thrust unexpectedly upon one under 
circumstances which make it impossible for him to decide 
whether or not he will take them into his possession." 
45. (1920) 228 N.Y. 269 at p.274, 127 N.E. 237 at p.239. 
-
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The extent to which this is so is illustrated by the decision 
in Davids C/11.}~:. Alask_a B@king Co. 46 where a pars on had sent 
money to a bank to be deposited to his credit and the bank 
bad refused so to deposit it but claimed to hold it for 
another person. The Court held that the bank, in spite of 
its intention to hold for another person and regardless of 
its violation of ~he sender•s instruction, became bailee 
for the sender,47 and therefore had a duty to redeliver or 
ere di t to the sender• s ace ount. 
46. ( 1917) ') Alas kn 683. 
47. The decision is curious because it is a well-established 
principle in modern law that money not to be kept in 
~ie cannot be the subject of bailment: R1 v. Hoa:ee (1c59J 1 F. & F. 647, 175 E.R. 890 R, v, Garrett (1860) 
2 F. & F. 11+, 175 E.R. 938, R. v._j~sall (1861) L. & C. 58, 169 E.R. 1302 (all three being prosecutions as bailees 
under the F:audulent Trustees Act, 20 & 21 Viet •. ~ c.~, 
s.4i and suosequent Act, 24 & 25 Viet., c.96, s.j, which 
fai ed because the obligation on the prisoner was only 
to return the amount of the sum received by him and not 
the identical coins); see also R.~v• De Banks (1884) 
2 Q.B. 29 (where the Court recognised a duty to return 
the same coins) and ltt_-1':s.,,j),;x:en~fili! (1876) 46 L.J.M.C. 125 
(where the bailee of a bill of exchange, entrusted to 
him for the purpose of discounting and banding over the 
proceeds to a.~other, indorsed the bill as his own to a 
creditor in payment of his own debt; held: guilty of 
fraudulent conv<trsion of bill within the meaning o:f 
24 & 25 Viet., c.96, s.3). ~he Court may have been 
influenced by the fact that the bank in Davislll2.IL.Y• 
Alasl;:a Banking Co. did, as it were, 1 :freezet the sum 
and thus appeared to do something more al~in to holding 
than cre~iting. It is also interesting to note that 
deppite the modern position, the language used in describ-
ing the offence of embezzlement is that of cor:version 
and not that of debt or account. 
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We are now in a position to reappraise the decisions 
in the cases of Coons~ Krumsky and Wechser. In Q.QQp.s 1 Case 
the Court passed, as a result of contractual preconceptions, 
from the correct proposition that the bank could not become 
the bailee of X1s property unless it accepted that prooerty 
to the incorrect proposition t®ti it could not become a 
bailee of X1 s property unless it accepted it as X1 s _ _riroperty. 
But if allowing articles to be placed in the safe-deposit 
box constitutes the acceptance of possession by the bank, 
then such articles become bailed to the bank whether it 
knows the owner or not and the initial liability of a bailee 
gua bailee applies. When such liability is modified, as it 
may have been in this case, by ancillary contracts and 
conditions, two questions arise. The first question is 
whether the bailor is privy to these contracts: the sole 
fact that his goods have been accepted inyo bailment need 
not make him so. 48 
1+8. This w2s the question in And~_§ v. Home Flats Ltd. [1945] 
2 A.E.R. 698 (C.A.), where the respondent, the wife of a 
tenant living in a b1ock of flats owned by the appellant 
company, deposited a cabin trunk in a baggage room :;. 
provided for the use of tenants. The trunk was taken to 
the room by servants of the appel1ant company, but no 
specific charge was made for the deposit and no tickets 
or receipt was issued. Two years later the trunk could 
not be found. It was held in the county court and upheld 
in the Court of Appeal that the appellant company were 
baile§oJSf~_,g_ward in respect of the wife's deposit and 7 
on the facts, geg1igent in having no system to prevent 
misdelivery. In response to the arguraent that the rent 
was paid by the husband, and that the company were therefore 
gratuitous bailees in respect of the wife the Ceurt held 
that tenants• families were part of the '&t3.siness arrangement. 
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Ir he is not privy to these special ccntracts and agreements, 
his claim is limited to the general liabilities in an 
ordinary bailment under these circumstances. The second 
question, which might have arisen in Coonst C'l§.£, is whether 
the agreements and cond:ttions specifically exclude certain 
property,~., that of non-customers, from acceutanc~ by 
the bank, so that it becomes no more than property left by 
a trespasser. Such property is bailed and subject to 
liability, however, if the bank - under whatever misappre-
hension - takes it into its contro1.49 
There is little of interest in the decision in 
Krumsky 1 s Csi,se; in so far as it denied the extstence of 
. . 
a bailment it was simply mistakeno The defendant received 
the goods, took them into his control and (mis)delivered 
them; that, sur•ely, is bailmentJ0 Saying this, one could 
still agree with the court that there is no liability 
49. The real difficulty in Coons• Case is that it falls withL~ 
the safety-deposit arrangements discuBsed in section 7 
above, where the more plausible view is to deny that the 
bank has bailL~ent of any such deposit, whether by a hirer 
or a stranger. The bank might, of course, have accepted 
contractual liability toward the hirer and the court 1 
approaching the matter in the way it did, seems not to 
have considered the possibility that the daughter by 
depositing : .: in the box bailed the articles to her father. 
;lo. As Cave, J,, recognised in R. v, McPonald, suprJa, at 
p.3280 
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because the misdelivery was not negligent. The plaintiff 
himself' 1 as the Court noted, ha.d been imposed upon by the 
cheat and had made no checks more rigorous than the 
defendant 1s,51 which might be taken as further support for 
the view that the defendantls conduct was reasonable in 
the circumstances52 and that the plaintiff was simply 
attempting to &ransfer a loss without much reason for 
doing so. 
Wechser v~icXard Imn .. QI,:];.ing_9o., reapp2aised, 
becomes somewhat more difficult. Clearly, there is acceptance 
of possession amounting to bailment; the question is, by 
whom? On the facts, it woul1 seem that the acceptance is 
either by the defendant, with the co-tenants, who have the 
run of the premises, having implied authority to receive 
on his behalf,53 or by the defenda.~t ar.d the co-tenants as 
51. Thi,s point should not be treated as establishing a general 
principle; the situation confronting the plaintiff may 
require less care than that confronting the defendant. 
52. 11 lf I am apprised by another that a certain article 
belonging to him was sent to me by mistake, am I not justified in assurr.ing, from the very fact of such party 
first making me aware of its presence, that he is the 
true owner and entitled to its return? Am I obligated 
or beholden to the real owner 1 if I am deceived, to 
account for the value of the article thus secured from 
me through trick? I think not": 506 1 75 N. Y. Supp. at p.1014. 
;)J. Being in this respect like a lodger or house-guest who 
opens the door and acc~pts goods on the occupier's behalf. 
Such a person, for these purposes, makes himself a 'casual .~ 
servant' receiving into the mast"r's possessio nJ. unl~s .· · 
there be evidence that he takes Into his own concrol. i:.c.~1<\h:l: 1. · A-N.t'\1~..:f. 
joint possessors of the premises into which the article is 
accepted. On either position, the defendant is liable if 
the second co-tenant was negligent in redelivering. The 
defendant w01Jld not be liable on a third position: if the 
first co-tenant had received into his own possession, 
making himself' a bailee for the defendaa:.ll:l. The facts of 
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the case, however, do not indicate a separation of spheres 
of control within the premises that would suppor·I.; this third 
view. The real difficulty in the case is whether the 
second co-tenant 1 s action amounted to negligent misdeli very 
at the low level of care required from the defend~nt as an 
involuntary bailee who had not ordered the goods: this is 
a (borderline) question of fact. 
It would be unusual to conduct a discussion of 
involuntary bailment without mentioning the well-known 
54 case of Hiort v. B9_ll. The custom, nonetheless 1 is a 
curious one. The facts showed th.at the defendant did not 
actually have possession of the goods alleged to have been 
converted, and the ~ourt at no stage imputed such possession 
to him. The situation before the Court was this: G, a 
former broker for A, had ordered frOl!l A a consignment of 
gocds to be sent to B, a reliable purchasing house which 
had had no previous dealings with G or A. The goods (barley) 
were forwarded to a railway station to be held till called 
for and A sent to B an invoice which stated that the barley 
was "sold by Mr G. as broker between buyer and seller" 
a de'ivery order which made the barley deliverable to "the 
order of consignor or consignee". G called on B before any 
further steps hati!: been taken, admi:l:ted a mistake and asked 
B to indorse the delivery order to G so that the expense 
of obtaining a fresh order might be savedo The order was 
so indorsed by B and G used it to possess himself of the 
barley and abscond. A then sued B in trover for conversion; 
the lower court directed the jury to find for the defendant 
but gave the plaintiffs leave to move for a verdict for 
them, which was granted in the Court of Exchequer. Argument 
Cit\ 
at the Bar focused attentionkelements of conversion other 
than the need for bailment. Counsel for the defendant, 
treating his client as an involuntary bailee, put forward 
three possible requirements for conversion - intent to 
convert the chattel to the use of the defendant or som•3 
other persons, an act destroying or changing the quality of 
the chatt?l, and,most generally, an act udealing with the 
property"o 0-n any of these tests his client had not committed 
conversion: the defendant intended nothing but to return 
the barley to the plaintiffs and had no thought of dealing 
with it in any way. Counsel for the plaintiffs insisted 
that the defendant was not an involuntary EB~ bailee, 
for the barley "was not in his possession, and no act of 
his was required to give the plaintiffs possession of it. 11 
The defendant by an unnecessary and mauthorised act -
that of indorsing the delivery order to G - had deprived 
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the plaintiffs of the goods; this was enough for conversion 
even if there was no intent. 
The Court, in effect, accepted the submission far.r 
the plaintiffs, including counse1 1 s rival description of 
conversion as the situation 11where a man does an unuathorised. 
act which deprives another of his property permanently or 
for an indefinite time."55 Cleasby, B. 1 said: 
-
The ground. of the decision in the :present case 
is that the defendant had no title whatever to 
the goods - that there was no necessity whatever 
for his interfering in any manner in the disposal 
of them, but that he improperly, though innocently 
••• having the indicia of title, by mistake, as 
he knew1 transferred that title to the possession 
of G. I think a person who deals with the 
property in this way does so at his peril, and 
if by means of it a fraud upon thg owner is 
accomplished, he is responsible.5' 
55. Ef1'. Bramwell, B,, at p.89. 
560 At p.92. 
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Bramwell, B. , similarly held that the defenda.vit' s unauthorised 
act of indorsing the order "was assuming a control over the 
disposition of [the] goods, and a causing them to be 
r:!M 
delivered to a person who deprived the plaintiffs of them. 11 ::.>t 
1'his was sufficient for conversion. 
The Court, then, did not hold that the defendant 
was lie.ble as an iri,;yoJJ;!J1tary ba:j,lee, and in not holding 
that it did not imply that he was a vlillunta!'Y one. 58 The 
examples of conversion c:!.ted by Court and counsel, it is 
true, were all examples where the converter had possession, 
but no weight whatever was put on this fact and the Court 1s 
~JllJlij!jmmll: judgment was generally remarkable for the way in 
which it manages not to raise the issue of possession at 
all. Bramwell 1 B. 1 s reference to assuming a control over 
the disposition of the goods an.d subsequently causing thmn 
to be m:tsdelivered suggests a certain parallel to conversion 
by a bailee; but it is no more than a parallel. The 
learned Baron, indeed, went on to lament that the word 
57. At p.89. 
50. Thr' 6omment by Edward H. Warren, Trover ;:ind ConversllloJ;J.: 
An E,SS£!..2 ( 1936), p.80 - "I<ote that in this case the pos-
session ·was not thrust upon the defendant. He voluntarily 
assumed control" - is grossly misleading: the Court did 
not treat his assum0tion of control over the disposition 
of the goods as assuming control of the goods. lt is 
tru.e that the liability of the defendant in IIiert v., ~ot~ 
was implicitly treated as being like that of a volu..TJ.tary 
bailee (for conversion: £i91li~s v..!. Fow'er (1875) L.R. 7 H.I .. 
757) and :cot like that of an trvoluntary bailee (for negli-
gent; conversion only: )l!lyin & )20';f..!Jll v...._ .PlUJJll]!er Rgg.Q;ts & Co 
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1 conversion 1 appeared in the proceedings anlsaid that the 
mere facts of the case, if set out in a non-artificial 
system of pleading, would. represent a logical and precise 
statement of a tortious act causj.ng loss to the plaintiffs. 
l:Iiort _v.! .. J2.Pll, then, is not a case of bailment; 
on the contrary, it represents a realistic and surprisingly 
non-traditional attempt by the Court to grapple with 
commercial arrangements that have made control over the 
disposition of a chattel independent of control over the 
chattel itself. Rights to possess have been disembodied 
and are capable of assuming independent existence and of 
becoming part of independent tranxactions in the form of 
paper inclicia. of title. It is true that possession of 
such paper indicia of title, with the powe.rs they confer, 
might be treated as at least 'constructive' possession 
and at most approachimg truo possession. Sending a man a 
delivery order has some similarities to sencling a man the 
key to a locked room. But the la~ter normally passes 
possession because no one else has control of the room 
58. (Contd.) 
(1933) 50 T.L.R. 158), at least if we take the Court's 
references to the "improper and unreasonable" nature 
of the defendant's act as not amounting to the finding 
that he was negligent. But again, there would be no 
more than a parallel: it is not any bailment, but the 
act of indorsing, which the Court treats as 'volunta.ry' 
and not under pressure of necessity, even in a weak 
sense. 
the former gives a right to possess over chattels which 
are n;eanwhile in the control and possession of another. 
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The receipt of a deli.very order does not make a man bailee, 
it makes him, if he accepts, a bailo...i;:. 
We have already suggested (section 2, foo:bnote 31) 
that the term 1 constructive possess:i.on1 has a use in the 
lat.; for those situations where a man has not possession, 
but the law wishes to gr2.nt him possessory remedies on the 
basis of bis right to possess. It may also be that the law 
wishes to impose liabilities on a man because he holds 
rights to possess which he confers in such a way as to 
result in interference with the chattel, even though he 
does not interfere with it himself. It is precisely this 
situation which leads to juJic:!.al uses of the word 
1possession 1 in commercial cases that bear no real relation 
to the concept of' possession as we have e:xpounded it. Such 
~ossession 1 (at the least it should be called 1 constructive 1 
possession) is analogous to the 1possession 1 of the ;bailor: 
its real content is not control, but a right. Possession 
in the sense in which we are discussing it ceases to play 
the fundamental part in this segment cf the law; conversion 
becomes 1 as it did j,n Hi0rt v..L.BQll, an offence against 
title that no longer requires possession of the chattel in 
question,. 59 
* * * 
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59. As was recognised in Oa_ltley v. L_.Y:ste;i: [1931] 1 KoB• 1lt8 
- "~here may be a conversion of goods even though the 
defendant has never been in physical possession of them, 
if his act, amounts to an e.bsolute denial ancl repud:i.ation 
of the plaintiff's right" - even though in that case 
the def<indant in fact had possession. 
The primary duty of the bailee, we have argued, 
arises from his ente1'ing into a relationship with a 
chattelj it requires neither his agreement with, nor his 
knowledge of 1 a particular bailor. Nevertheless, it is 
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not : :accurate to say, as Wi1liston said, that the rightful 
possession of goods by one who is not the owner is always 
bailrnent, and immediately implies the bailee's duty to 
keep and redeliver. If a man lose a ring on my land, we 
have auggested, I have rightful possession of it as occupier 
of the land even though I do not know of the existence of 
this ring. Jviy possession is sufficient to sustain larceny 
or trespass against anyone who takes it without my leave 
arid sufficient to defeat the claim of a 1 finder•. But until 
I become aware of the ring, I have no duties toward its 
owner a.'ld therefore am not a bailee. To become one, I m11st 
in some way consent to having possession, though in some 
situations, the law may give me little leave to reject it. 60 
60. 11A man cannot without his consent be made to incur the 
responsibilities toward the real ovmer which arise even 
from the sj.mple possession of a chattel without further 
title and if the chattel has without his knowledge been 
placed in his custody his rights and liabilities as a 
possessor of that chattel do not arise until he is aware 
of the existence of the chattel and has assented to the 
possession of it": per Cave, J., R, vJshwell (1886) 
16 Q~B.D. 190, at p.201, though the truth of these words 
should be limited - as it is not 1:::1 the C.!l,Se - to rights 
and liabilities under baiJment. Concerning rejection, 
while a man may without wrong e:xpel a stray horse grazing 
on his land when he becomes aware of it, he may not pick 
up the ring at such time and throw on the roadway. The 
principle appears to be that he should not expose the chattel 
to greater jeopardy than tbat alreadj present. 
The important th:ng to note is that the consent required 
is not that of the bailor but that of the bailee; the 
point of the bailment implied by necessity is not that the 
necessj.ty causes the bailor intentionally to deliver, but 
tha.t the bailee's knowledge of the necessity is evidence 
of his consent, in principle, to the bailment being made. 
Thus, in RidgleJ:_..Qperat;i..ng Co. v,, ~Jhi te, 61 the plaintiff 
rented anapartment on a long-term basis in the defendant's 
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apartment house (so that the relationship was not that of 
inri..keeper a.'1cl guest, but that of landlord 8ncl tenant). The 
plaintiff's movers deposited a trunk and other effects in 
the hallway outside her apartment and the truD..k disappeared. 
The plaintiff brought suit, alleging a delive111y to the 
defendant and was awarded judgment in the court of first 
instance and on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that 
al though the landlord had no actual knowledge of the existence 
of the trunk, his acceptance of bailment could be implied 
from his general knowledge that tenants left their effects 
in the hall ar..d from the necessity of doing so be!'ore 
bringing them into the roams, Acceptance has been similarly 
implied from the invitation to trade at a place of business 
and the accompanying necessity of laying down certain 
61. (1933) 1?0 So. 693 (Ala.), noted in (1933-4) 47 Harv.L.Rev. 
1433. 
articles while doing so. 62 On the other hand, the courts 
will not ir:!ply acceptance of articles that are unusual or 
uncontemplated in the circunistances. Thus, in Hunter Yi 
~ 63 Reeds vQr4!., the court held that a customer who left 
i;l41 and a diamond ring in his clothes in a dressing-room 
~6U 
of a clothing store could recover for the money but not for 
:\!he ring, since the proprietors 1 implied acceptance of 
custody should 'be taken to extend only to things usually 
carried in their pockets by prudent people. 64 
62. Feder L. Fra.nJl:lin Simon&Co. (1916) 157 N. Y. SupJ2. 895; 
kl92druf'..f v. Painter (1892~ 150 Pa. 91 1 24 Atl. 1521; De]J;!lour v. Fgrsyth<?, (1911) 128 ;.;.Y. Supp. 649. 
63. (1899) 12 Pa. Superi112. The same view was held in 
Bunnell y. Stg.rn (1890) 122 N,Y. 539,, 2')_ N.E. 910i 
Michi>?an CentJ,'_al.R,:'l .• v. Carrow (187'+) 73 Ill. 34oi 24
0 Am. Rep. 24{f; Sawyer_vi. Old IJoi:rnll .!Jillonal Bank; ~ 191 o) 
230 1'fass. 342 119 N,E. 825; Riggs v.LBqnk of Camas 
Prairie (1921} 31+ Idaho 176, 200 Pac. ffti; k!iiters v. 
Bean Site Q.Q. {1920) 114 Misc. 65, 186 N.Y. Supp.731 
rr'·~ «t ) \vll,.y l~ JfT e 
64. Barnes v. Stexri.J3ros. (1915) 89 Eisc. 385', 151 .Y. Supp. 
888 (Supr. Ct. 1915) held that proprietors accepted custody 
only of the customers' clothings necessarily laid aside, 
while in Samnles .Y •. G~Jl!:t'i (1927) 292 s.w. 1066 O·fo.) the 
G ourt of Appeel :O:XliU!'.1!ifill: held that the operator of a 
checking counter had not accepted a fur piece wrapped in 
a coat and completely hidden when the coat was presented 
for cloaking because he did not :!mow of its existence. 
One might be inclined to argue that such a fur piece is 
more like the money than like the ring Hunter v. Reed§. 
Sons and it may well be the the courts have been somewhat 
influenced by th~l dif i'iculty of checking claims rather 
than by any implausibility in implying consent. Thus in 
falo"':~o .. v._J!mia~Pa:t:,l!;.ing Garage_Q.Q. (1946) 68 ?·;.E.(2d) 70 
) , noted in { 191+6-7) ~·5 Mich.L. Rev. 625, the Court 
allowed the plaintiff 1 s claim t'or damages for his car stolen 
frol:l the garage and for the things he told an attendan~ were 
:i.n the car, but not for other things he failed to r:iention. 
In certain other cases of articles put down in 
shops, restaurants, etc., the passing of possession as 
well as consent may be in question. Where an invitation 
to put down or hang up not clear, some evidence that 
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actual control has passed may be required. In Ultzen_YA, 
Nicols65 where the plaintiff sought S.anages from a 
't'estam?anteur in respect of a stolen coat ,,.,hich his servant, 
a waiter, took from the ple,intiff without being asked e.nd 
hung on a hook, Charles, J., upheld the decision in the 
lower court that there was bailment and liability. The 
learned judge emphasised that the Wlfiter took and disposed 
of the coat 
interest of' 
where he chose and that his action was in the 
the restauranteur. 66 On. the other hand, in 
RigJ7 1>'here a guest at a restaurant hux1g his 
over coat on a hook provided for the purpose a few feet 
from his table, and in '!lt.eobald v, Satt!l_:t;:t~;i te 6f where 
65. (1894] 1 Q.B. 92. 
66., The same line has been followed in a large n11mber of 
American cases 1 brcr<lght together in 1 A. I .• R. (2d)803f. 
67, (i913) 159 App. Div, 899, 143 N. Y. 9551 5 N.C.C .. ll.. Slt-8. 
68. (1948) 190 P.(2d) 714 (Wash.), 1 A.L. (2d) 799, noted 
!!in (1948-9) 47 ~'1ch.L.Rev.268. 
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the cnstomer of a beauty salon hung her coat in an unattended 
waiting-room, the courts held there was no bailment. America.11 
courts, h11rwever 1 have been willing to entertain. claims for 
negligence whel'e there is no bailment but evidence of 
cleficieniby in the general ~u:f supervision of the premises 
and customers 1 belongings upon them. 
We are now in a position to see how WiJ.J.iston 1 s 
definition must be ar~ended. Bailment arises from the 
bai.lee 1 s entrance into a relation to a thing. But for 
baiL11ent 1 entering into this relation must be a se 
conscious activity, like intending or controlling, Like the 
two latter, in law, it is viewed objectively: the knowledge 
from a situation even 
where there is evidence that thare was no subjective 
knowledge or consent. Once that knowledgeable consent has 
been given, and the relationship of bailment entered into, 
the consent cannot be carelessly withdrawn on the pretence 
of ending the bailment. 69 
discussing the problem of finding, we strove 
to show that a correct understant'!ing of the issues relating 
69. Thus in RyanJ.1-.9how11 (1910) 160 Mich. 2o4, 125 N.W. 46, 
the finder of turkeys who had taken them into her 
possession without k.-iow1ng lld<E the owner, but later, on 
learning his i:lenti ty, had released the turkeys onto the 
hj:ghway at night, without notifying the owner, was found 
liable for conv~rsion after the turkeys were lost. 
to possession led to a solution of the problem. In the 
field of bailmBnt, one cannot say the same. There are 
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many problems in bailment, a.nd one - the determination of 
the specific liabilities in specific circumstanC•3S - has 
had by far the greatest share of attention. lJnderstanding 
about possession will not provide the complete solution 
to this problem; it is no more than a first step on an 
ardous path. The importa.11ce of :;iossession is that it is 
necessary for hailment (axid hence often becomes an issue) 
and that it provides the primary foundation for duty. The 
mani.fold modifications of the bailee's duty will be better 
understood when we grasp that they are modifications whose 
nature is determined by features &'1cillary to the passing 
and acceptance of possession: by the express or implied 
purpose of such passing, by the character in which the 
bailee acc~pts, by· any undertakings or agreements entered 
into. On the other hand, the principles of possession in 
bailment are no different from those we have examined else-
where and thus help to illuminate the concept of pos ssion 
in general. 
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PART III ; 
THE GENERAL CRI'rERIA OF 
-~-~ __ _....__,,.. ____ ~-=--· ~ -~-,--·--
P o S S E SJLJ;~ O N 
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9. 
In our discussion of the historical origin and 
legal function of the concept of seisin, and in our 
examination of seemingly special problems of possession 
associated with servants, finding and bailment, we have 
sought to show that there is a basic proposition in terms 
of which decisions in differing periods and situations can 
be understood. This is the proposition that possession, 
2F6 
for the purposes of law as ~ of every-day life, is control. 
The plausibility of this proposition as the fundamental 
criterion of possession, and its suitability for justi~ng 
and explaining a multitude of decisions, have been obscured 
or rejected only through the failure to grasp fully the 
ramifications of the term 1 control•. Control implies a 
man's power to deal with the thing ~ son gr6; this in turn 
implies that he excludes it froui the control of others 1 and 
acts, in the final analysis, on his own behalf, expresses 
his OW'11Will. 2 Control, however, is a 1self-conscious 1 
1. Hence two persons cannot have possession (control) of the 
one thing unless they form for this purpose a single legal 
person and thus have ljoint 1 but not separate possession: 
du.a net.'1 possunt in solido unam rem 12osside~. 
2. Thus the servant qua servant cannot possess because in 
principle he does not deal with the thing according to his 
own will; he expresses the master's will and cannot 
exclude. the mastero The bailee, on·';the other han4Lexoresses1 
. his own (conditioned) will. Those who find ~~ curious 'to speaK 
\/-t. + ... ~"" 'J of the servant as not hav:i.ng possession of nis master's chattel 
.;,,t., l.';s fail to notice that it would be even more curious to give a i;;:ar: 
c .... shid':ii.uosseS..:>u ,, thing- +.h'lt hA hn" in n1'inrdn1P no newer to re.us 
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relation, speaking a language or counting: it requires 
knot'iledge of what one is doing ana the intention to do it 
an exercise of' control~ These two sidas of possession 
the power of exclusive dealing anct the intention to exercise 
or maintain this power - have been recognised by the writers 
under the not:ions of corpup and j!;!imus, though. thoy hiive 
failed to relate these two sides into the single control-
situa.tion of which they are aspects. 
The great wrong with which Common. La.w begins 
is that of trespass: the most obvious h.z_rn1, the most 
obvious potential source of social disturbance, cccur when 
one man invades the are of a.n.other. A man's a..".'ea, for 
these purposes, what the world at large would take to be 
his area - the go9ds lands which he no other c0r,trols.3 
3. C!. Kenny, Cut1 in_!ll.'l of~ CJ:'~!i!1l}J3J_L.§Ji. (16th ed. ? ed. by J • W, 
Cecil Turner) 1 p. 2otr: "If a 101an had a tb.ing in such a pla.ce 
ar.d in such conclitions as the ordinary gng:lish 011;ner usually 
kept it, then he controJ. it sufficj_entl.y to make it a 
felony dishonestly to tkke it away ·without his consent. Thus 
for the purposES of the la;w of larceny a man held in his 
possession all his goods in all parts of house, all his 
domestic P.nimals in his stables and fields, the fish in_ 
fish pond, the bees in his hive, so on." Turner, w110 
has somewhat glossed over the problem of the :fish in the 
fish pond (see section 1 o, footnote 6 infrflc), goes on to 
deny t.hat this concept control inciudes control tl>..rough 
another person such as a servant or guest. The concept of 
possession protected is, as we argued earlierJ an individual-
istic one. As the Court: put it in Rogers v. "li?~ll.93 (1841,) 
13 & w. 571, at p. 581, 153 E.R. 239 at p.24.:>, the rights 
of action given in respect of immediate and present violation 
of i:;ossessj.on "are an extension of that protection wbich the 
law throws around a person". It is not necessary, in 
recognis this, to follow those jurisprudential writers 
who wish a quasi~Kant:tan fashion to pratect possession 
as the concretj_s ion of individual will; the Coinmon 
Law has sho1,;n no metaphysical tendency to treat a.ni~'t as 
standing ethically above corpuJi• 
If such control has been attained by wrong, if it hides 
faulty title or rests on the suppression of better claims, 
there are legal ways by which the non-possessing clain:.a.nt 
may seek to alter possession, but whether the existing 
possession be wrongful.or rightful, it is protected against 
the world at large;4 for this purpose, "possession alone"5 
or abare naked possession"6 is always sufficient. The law 
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l+. ''Whoever is in possession may maintain an action of trespass 
against a wrongdoer to his possession": ner Lord Mansfield 
in Hark~ v. Birkbeck (1761+} 3 Burr. 1556 at p.1563, 97 E.R.. 
978 at p.9S2; 11Any possession is a legal possession" - ~·, 
lawful and maintainable - "against a wrongdoer": J2..Br Lord 
Kenyon, C.J., in Graham v. Pe~t (1801) 1 East 21+4 at po246, 
102 E.R. 95 at p.,96; "There can be no doubt whatever that 
mere possession is sufficient, against a person ~
invading that possession without himself having any title 
whatever •••• The slightest amount of possession would 
be suffj.cient to entitle the person who is so in possession 
pr claims under those who have been or are in such 
possession, to recover as against a mei:ie trespasser11 : 
yer Lord Hatherley in BristQ.'l:L..Y• Cormican (1878) 3 App. Caz. 
L.) 641 at p.657, recently quoted with approval in 
1tiict~Mil Wuta-Ofei v. Danauah t1961] 3 A.E.R. 596 at p.600, 
a Privy CO!L~cil appeal from Ghana. 
5. See 1 for example, B~st1 C.J., 1 in Revett vi Brown (1828) 5 Bing. 6 at p.9 1 150 ~.R. ~b, at p.962; Crompton, J., in Buckj_ey v,. Gross (1863) 5 B. & s. 566 at p.5'73 1 122 
E.R. 21j at p.216; Blaekfla1Jts Case, 1 Salk. 290 1 91 E.R. 257. 
6. See, for example, Cockburn, C.J., in Buck+e2 v. Gross, 
supra, at p.572, ?.R. at p. 215; Patteson, J., in RyaU 
v. Clark (1846( 1~ Q.B. 65 at p.71, 117 E.R. 2o at p~2. Qt. the .Ame~ican case Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick. 255, where 
Shaw, C.J., bases the right to an acti0.n of trespass on 
11mere naked possession, without other title." 
thus sharply distinguishes the fact of possession from the 
'J 
right to possess,. just as it distinguishes the fact or 
7. Vernon v. Goodrich (1716) 1 Str. 5, 93 E.R. 348; Cary Yo 
Holt (1746) 2 Str. 1238~ 93 E.R. 1154; In Kenrie~ v 9 Taylor (17~2) 1 Wils. 326, 95 !'A.R. 643, where Lee 1 C.J., said: "It is a rule of law, that one in possession need not show any 
title or consideration for such 2ossession against a 
wrongdoer" {at p.327, E.R. at p.644); Ryan v, Clark 
supra; Grajlam v. Peat, supra, where trespass was heid 
maintainable by one in possession of glebe land under a 
lease vpid by the statute 13 Elb!:.I 1 c.20, Lord Kenyon~_ C.J., givimg the judgment of the Court for the plainti:ir.r, 
saying: 11Suppose a burglary committe!:l in the dwelling-
house of such a me must it not be laid to be his dwelling-
house notwithstanding the defect of his title under that 
statute?" (at p.2l+6, E.R. &.t P• 96). In Sµ.tton v. ~ 
(1810) 2 Taunt. 302, 127 E.R. 1094, where trover was brought 
on possession, it was held that possession of a ship under 
a transfer void for non-compliance with the register acts 
is sufficient ground for trover against a stranger for 
parts of the sh;i.p cast ashore., In !§.Ji.er v! Whitlock (1865) 
L.R. 1 Q.B. 1~ 35 L.J.Q.B. 171 it was held that a disseisor-devi~ee1 and therefore her heir-at-law, could bring 
ejectment in circumstances in which the devisor himself 
might have brought such an action. nAll the old law on 
the doctrine of disseisin was founded on the principle 
that the disseisor's title was good against all but the 
disseisee ••o [A]t lawi the right of the original possessor 
is clear. On the simp e ground that possession is good 
title against all but the true owner, I think the plaintiff 
is entitled to succeed ••• ": per Cockburn, c. J., at p.9, 6. 
Also, 1•rt is necessary to distinguish between the case of 
the true owner and tr.iat of a person having no title. The 
law gives credit to possession unless explained ••• n: 
per Mellor 1 J., at p.6. Abankrupt who has been permitted by the assignees to remain for a considerable time in 
possession of property acquired after his bankruptcy also 
has a goo1 title against all the world bUt the assignees; 
Fyson v. Chap!bers (1837) 9 }~ &W. 460 1'2 E.R. 19'· 
Also, Webb v, Fox (1797) 7 T.R. 391, 101 E.R. 1037, where 
a banltrupt was said to have trover against strangers fl11!' 
goods coming to his possession after his bankruptcy, other-
wise mt would be'!tn invitation to all the world to scramble 
for the possession of them" (at p.397, E.R. at p.1040). In 
Rogers v. Snence, supra, trespass guare clausu.m fregit was 
held not to pass to an assl.gnee in bankruptcy. 
It should be noted, as we shall see below, that when.the 
facts of possession are not sufficient for clear decision, 
--~ .... "'>'h1',,......,,,"l ,....f!> """"'~""-""'"'""~~ .. - ,..,...:,, ....... ~~~.t:l<"l~~----:1 "'(,,,.~~ .J..,.!.L."t ... 
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possession from the rights of possession which it awards 
on the basis of this fact. It is therefore necessary to 
separate.clearly the true problem of possession in the law 1 
which is whether someone in fact possesses, from the 
recognition of title or right to have possession and from 
the award of rights that normally stem from the fact of 
possession but which are occasiona.lly awarded on grounds 
not amounting to possession.8 Possession, therefore, is a 
(legal) fact and not a (legal) right, tho~gh rights follow 
directly from it. The public respect for such rights 
following from possession and men's avoidance of the 
sanctions imposed to protect them, it is true, may become 
part of the factual situatiOE of control and either strengthen 
or provide most of the evidence for the possessor's power to 
exclude~ To say this is not to blur the distinction we 
have made, for it is the public behaviour in response to 
real or imagined rights and not the legality of these rights 
that oolmts. 9 
8. Thus, rights normally sternming from possession have been 
granted to the bailer-at-will on the basis of the immediacy 
of his right to possess, to servants on the basis of their 
charge (which implies both custody of the goods and 
responsibility fol' them) and to the man who has title to 
land and subsequently enters upon it in respect of trespa.sses 
after the beginning of his title and before his entry, 
on the basis of a title given substance by the subsequent 
assumption of control. In e.11 these cases, the clatmants are 
treated, for some other reason, as though they were poseessors; 
theirs is a fictitious possession. 
9. Precisely for this reason, the reputation of right rnay be 
g;uite as effect.ive as rignt itself; cf. Pollock & Wright, 
~ssion 1n the C~,nmQn. iaw, ppo1~-~ 
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The "' L . h - -· ' • . it" vommo:r:t aw, we ave ai·c;ueu, oegins w 'L1 a 
concept of seisin tied fairly closely to :;;rj_sible control. 
The most usual case is control based on a physical proximity 
that prevents others from approaching, i,e., the occupation 
of land or the detention of chatt.els. Generally, earlj.er 
law was able to confine its attention to the obvio1.1s and 
uncontroversial case of subh occupation and detention, 
defined as one where there was nconstant and exclu,sive Ue". 10 
In such o'rwious cases, there was no reason to single out 
and discuss the various aspects or elements of control. 
These aspects do appear, however, when we consider more 
borderline illustrations of detention, such as frequently 
recur in the literature. Consider the following: 
The player who strikes a ball in motion does not 
detain the ball, but the player who catches it 
has a momentary detention althO!f'h he throws the 
ball at once to another player. 
He who takes water from a well in common with 
other pers<l.'l,S does not have detentioo of' the 
well, though he dr~s have detention of the water 
taken out by him. L 
If' a child. picks up a pocket-book in the pr~sen9~ 
of a powerful ruffian, the chi1d has detention. 
10. Per Best, C.J., and Park, J., in Revett1~ BroJ:m, supra. 
11. Cf• Pollock, £:.:\.J?.§t Book of Ju;rJsprudence ( 1904), p.169. 
12. Pollock, i'bid., p.170. 
13. Holmes, The Comn1on Lai•, p.235. 
A madman may detain an object 14· and through his 
guardian and receiver in lunacy may sue in 
trespass. 
But an object placed in the hands of a person 
asleep is presumably not in his detention,15 
because there is no power to deal with the 
thing till he wakes. 
Similarly, a mau in chains does not have detention 
of the chains, 1° since he has not power to deal 
with the chains except in the most limited way, 
which in practice he would scarcely seek to 
protect from interference. 
These examples bring out that even detention is not merely 
holding in one 1 s hands; it is holding in one' s hands in a 
certain manner, i.e., visibly controlling. Even detention, 
then, requires a manifest power to deal with the thing to 
the exclusion of others and a consciousness that one is 
doing so, from which intention to do so may be;presumed. 
The manifest power to deal with the thing to the exclusion 
of others, it should be noted, need not rest on a 
preponderance of physical strength on on invulnerable 
14. Roman law, seeing possession as a form of candidature 
for title, grants the madman detention or custody but 
denies him possession: D. 41. 2. 1. 3. Common Law 
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grants him possession, though procedurally he can vindicate; 
rights flowing from it only by suing through another. 
15. Though there is no authority, it would seem that a passer-
by taking the object befof'e the man had woken and become 
aware of it could not be sued for trespass to this man 
or indicted for larceny from hj,m. "Possessio asinina" -
":Ilene re potest ut asinus s el lam", the glossators said, 
is not possession: D. 41. 2. 1. 3. 
16. "It is easier to say that the chains have possession of 
him": Savigny, Possession_in i;,_he Civil Law, p.147. 
physical safeguards. The child picking up the pocket-book 
may obviously he incapable of defending its exclusive 
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control against the powerful ruffian, but the law is concerned 
with the control that is there and not with its precarj.oo.sness 
in the light of possible f'uture attacks upon it. It will 
not presume that such attacks wi11 occur before they occu:f', 
17 and especially when such attacks would be wrongful. It 
is in terms of the general notion of control, too, and as 
an implication from it, that the exclusion of others is to 
be understood. A man does not cease to occupy land because 
he allows a visitor to walk upon it; a man does not lose 
possession of things, as we have seen in section 6 t because 
he passes them to someone to inspect or deal with in his 
presence. But it is not sufficient that any incursion 
into a man's area of control should have been by his consent; 
the power of excluding required for possession is not simply 
the power of excluding if the possessor pleases (a power 
which the possessor snres with ·. the bailor-at-will). If 
the incursion such as seriously to infringe upon the 
possessor's power to deal with the thing according to his 
17. nThe weakest human being may enjoy the corpus element so 
long as he breathes, even though he may be too your1g or 
feeble to have the animus possidendi. Corpus, therefore, 
depends more upon the general expectation that others 
will not interfere with an indiiridual 1 s control over a 
thing, than upon the physical capacity of an individual 
to exclude others": Keeton, The Elementary Principles 
of Jurisprudence, p .11t2. . 
will, ~., if' it undermines his control, his possession 
is at best in danger, regardless of his consent to the 
incursiono 18 Intention, similarly, is also not to be seen 
as a separate element with its own requirements, but as 
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the self-consciousness of control. In the case of detention, 
where control is visible, self-consciousness or in.tention 
is normally presumed; in general, for someone to have 
possession it is not necessary for him to have formulated 
a conscious intention as a separate element of his control. 
But evidence or reasonable presumption that he has nil such 
intention (to deal with the thing according to his will 
and to exclude others) sufficient to show that there is 
no possession. I do not occupy vacant land by walking all 
over it in search of my losjl dog; when I sit alone in anotherts 
closed room playing with the we.llet someone has left on 
the table I do not have it in my possession even though I 
have the power to do with it what I wish, for the law will 
not presume, in the absence of any evidence, my intention 
to behave wrongfully. That the intention to be presumed 
18. I do not lose my possession of land by letting friends 
walk upon it or my possession of a ring by letting a jeweller exemine it 'lhl.le I wait in his shop; but if I 
consent to my fi::ten<ls coming upon my land at any time 
while I am away, or if I permit the j!tleller to take the 
ring to another shop, I may well lose possession. Similar 
considerationsapplji to the occupierts possession of things 
dropped on land he controls. If he allows this control to 
be negated (by letting picnickers take over a paddock or 
by letting church-goers wear a path across his land) he 
will not have possession of things dropped on the land 
and 'found• before he resumes control. 
is that reasonable in the circumstances, and that its 
relevance is as a sine qua non of control, may be brought 
t b th ,_ . v ~ "'· 19 ou .crom e bJ.11er1can case .. eron v, c;asu,nan, One of 
several boys walking along a railroad track had found an 
old stocking 1 which he tl'l.rew to one of his companions in 
initiation of a be.11-game. The stocking was thrown from 
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hand to hand and .fint:tlly burst in the ha::i.ds of the orgginal 
finder, revealing its contents to be several hundred dollars. 
In a suit brought in eQuity, the Court found against the 
finder of the stocking in vour of the eic.tire group of 
boys &s 1 joint finders' on the grounds that the original 
finderf s action revealed an absence of intention to control 
the contents until the stocking broke open in joint play. 
Much of the attack on Holmes, and some of the 
attack on Salmond, has depended for its plausibility on 
discussing the element of intention, correctly emphasised 
by them, as though it were an isolated requisite for 
possession, to be fou,-:id as a distinct element in all cases 
of true possession. Naturally, the critics have been able 
to demonstrate that it is not so found.20But norm.ally, as 
we have argued, where a man manifestly exercises exclusive 
19. (1896) 33 Atl., 1055 (N.J. Eq. ), noted in (1896) 10 Harv. 
L.Rev. 63. 
20. See for example, Burke Shai'tel, "Meanings of Possessiona, 
(1931-2) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 611. 
power over a thing his intention to do so and to exclude 
others will be presumed from the manifest exercise itself. 
Intention does not enter here as a se!{a:ra'!;;i element in the 
situation; neither, I sh~ild argue, is it true that 
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manifest exercise of power interests the law only as evidence 
of intent. 21 Mat-ifest power and intention, o,~ the contrary, 
are closely interwoven in a single control-situation. The 
man who occupies land may impose his physical presence on 
only a small part of it; the man who holds a briefcase 
may fall asleep a:nd let it slip fro.m his grasp to a spot 
besillle him; the man driving a car may park it out in the 
street while he goes to work. ,. ... k.C there is no reason to 
suppose that the man is acting as servant, or as a visitor 
given a licence to use, we do not ask whether a man walking 
on land, holding a briefcase, or driving a car, intend{2 to 
control or possess; we assume it. Once we have assumed 
it, we allow this presumed intention to bridge the inevitable 
gaps in his manj.fest power or exercise of control~ the car 
in the street, the briefcase that has slipped from his 
grasp, the Jribm!k paddock he has not visited since last 
year, remain in his possession unless his intention to 
control can no longer plausibly be assumed or h:ts power or 
control has been success~ully displaced. 
21. As Holmes suggests in one passage: 
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In the precedi:;:;.g 1 as i:n what follows, we take the 
view that 1possession' re rs to a s~ate of affairs, that 
possession has a certain nature. This approach - which we 
have in places expressed by saying that possession is an 
infra-jural relation of fact - .b...as been queried by Professor 
Gle.nville L. Williams. Professor Williams wf'ites; 22 
• '" it may be well to consia.er in greater 
detail a specific example of confusion between 
definitions and non-verbal facts. Let us take 
the usual legal or jurisprudential giscussion 
of "the nature of" possession •••• lT]his 
discussion is in reality a discussion of the 
def1ni ti on of the word "possession" a This, 
however, is not the way in wh~ch the participants 
usually regard it. They seem to think that :l.n 
discussing "the nature ofn possession they are 
discussing, at least in parti sone non-verbal 
fact. This assumption under ies the division 
of possession into "possession in fact'~ and 
"possession in law'J• Although the meaning of 
"'possession in fact" is variously interpreted 1 
the usual sumption is that possession in fact is, 
as the name imp1ies 1 possession that is somehow 
visible in the facts of the case. Let us consider 
how far thls assumption is true. To start with, 
we may picture a situation that raises difficult;ies 
in applying the idea of posession. In describing 
this situation it will be necessary to use words" 
but the reader is asked to imagine the sc)'fene :i.n 
a non-verbal way, in order to reproduce as nearly 
as possible the raw material with which we have 
to deal. A has a pocket-book containing his name 
and address and some banKnotes. He unknowingly 
drops it on the street and walks on. Many people 
pass, and eventually B finds the p ocket-'book and 
forthwith decides to keep it for himself. E gives 
it to his S')n C to hold for him1 but shortly 
afterwards C is pursued by bandits 1 who succeed in wresting the pocket-book from h:un. This is 
22. '*Language and the Law-IV", (i9lt5) 61 L.fi.R. 384 at p.390. 
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the factual situation, and we have to apportion 
the possession of the pocket-book between A, B, 
c, and the bandits, In doing this, since we are 
speaking of possession in fact in the sense above 
described, we have to do withoat the various rules 
that have been developed on the subject by different 
legal systems. Probably it will become clear after 
a momentts thought that the difficulty in the way 
of determining who at eny moment has possession of 
the pocket-book is not a difficulty in ascertaining 
facts, for the material facts are practlcally all 
given, but is a difficulty in k-'low:tng what is meant 
by the word "possession". •ip0 ssession" is an abstract 
word of somewhat va,.,ue meaning. A theory of 
•tpossession in factii seems to be one of two th:tngs: 
either a sta.tement of the way in which, in the view 
of the writer, the word "possession•t, or the 
phrase upossession in fact .. , ought to be use(l 
(which is not a statement o.f fact at all, bu·t a 
a value judgment), or else a st:~tement of the way 
in which the word "possession11 is ordinarily used 
by non-lawyers (which is a statement of fact only 
in the sense that it is a statement of verbal usage). 
If the particular theory of possession fact is 
intended as the latter, a statement of' the layman's 
meaning of "possession", the writer ought, if he is 
honest, to recognise that his theory is incapa3le 
of solving any of the difficult prob.lems that arise 
in law-suits, for the simple reason that the layman 
has no clear idea of what he means by "possession", 
Let us begin with the disjunction that Professor 
Wil'.iams asserts, in this context, between 1value-judgments 1 
and 'statements of fact 1 which, however? turn ou.t to be 
mere descriptions of verbal usage. Consider the problems 
of a zoologist seeking to define 'animal', or the controversy 
in biology, current for more than a century, over the 
'correct' definition of the term 'species'. It is clear 
that the xoologist defining 18.nimal 1 or the biologist 
defining 1 species 1 is recommendi~ a certain usage, saying 
- as Professor Willia_ms puts it - how the terms "ought to 
be used"" But it is, with respect, simply absurd to equate 
such recolfu'Uenda tions, because they imply an t ought t , with 
value-judgments; 'carnivorous orchids are not an1!!!als 1 and 
1 the members of separate species carL~ot produce non-sterile 
off-spring by interbreeding' can become, in the light of 
controversy, more like 'I think this shade should be called 
red 1 or 1Black swans are still swans' than like 'All humans 
are mortal 1 , but this does not make them like 1 Honesty 
ought to be valued and approvei.t. of'. The true value-judgment 
bears and can bear no logice.l relationship to facts or 
descriptions in the sense of being implied by them or refuted 
A 
by them; as such, it plays little direct rCle in rational 
discussion. Norm:s.1ly, we are confronted with a continuum 
in language that ranges frorr, 'pure 1 description to stipulative 
definition; what 1 ought 1 to be the precise range of reference 
of the most non-normative term can become the subject of 
controversy. 23 Language as such is a classificatory system: 
it picks out and 1fixest fr01n the JJlanifold flux of experience 
certain recurring features or complexes of features. Such 
23. It for this reason that Dr Stephen Toulmin, in his 
The Place_of~n i~ Ethics, and Professor Kurt Baier, 
in h:i.s The Moral Point of V;i,~ can argue that in "Ctctual 
moral discussion there are more parallels to scientific 
discussi.on than Hume recognised: people will attempt to 
provide reasons for valuing honesty in a man:::;.er often 
similar to the FJ!!l!l:~llUX7il:~:tmg way one provides reasons 
for adopting certain criteria of classifice.tion in science: 
in both, one shuttles ck and forth between the recognition 
of facts and the pursuit of ends or aims. 
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features and complexes are not by their own nature 1 fixed 1 
and 1 eternal 1 as b:tological eci.es were once thought to be; 
they shade off into other fee.tures and comp1exes, they alter 
some of their characteristics and not others, they fall 
under an infinite nu.'llber of possible clas s. The features 
within them that are picked out as defining criteria or 
class characteristics a:re pi.eked ou.t for human purposes 
in dealing with or arranging such 'facts'; all terms are 
thus neither purely stipulative (we can, but don 1 t, say 
1When I use the word "cat11 I mean dog 1 ) nor purely descriptive 
of a range that can never become the subject of controversy 
or of stipuls.tion, Facts are given, the possible ways of 
arranging them are infinite. In law, as in science, we 
frame our terms in ways that will help to b:ring out f'rui tfttl 
or relevant connexions, and we criticise the usage of a term 
not by proclaiming a simple value-judgment, but by shm•ing 
that the classification of experience established by the 
use of this term is confusing, leads to paradoxes or 
contradictions, or is in sOllle other way an inappropriate 
means toward the ends we have in mind. The useful tinction 
here is not that between the 'descriptive' and the 1 sticiulative 1 
(most terms surrounded by controversy will have elements of 
both) b\:<.t between the eccentric or arbitrary 1'-nd that which 
is useful and il1umJnatir:g within a structure or bod;y: of' 
theory. 
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In legal reasoning, as in o·ther activities, then, 
we do break ocitside the circle of language: the meaning 
of words is not always other words or rules for the use 
of words~ though the meaning is always in part stipulated 
by the purposes for which the distinction enshrined in the 
word has been made. There is com.'!lonly a common core of 
reference about Which there is no dispute anll in which 
the element of stipulation or 1p1cking out' can be ignored; 
it is on the borders of a term's denotation or of its 
connotatj.<rn that this element becomes i.pem;l,!i!mti n:rominent. 
" . 
The point of a body of scientific knowledge, as of a bod.y 
of legal ?.nowledge 1 is that it represents the fruit.s of 
a consistent grappling with e::cperience, the picking out of 
certain features of it, their tente.tive arrangement in 
the light of certain purposes, their rr3arrangement in the 
light of additional or previously unconsidered facts, ~· 
In principle, such activity is no different from the layman 1 s 
grappling with similar questions and the interest in the 
layman's use of the word (apart from providing a check on 
unneciessary arbitrariness in the use of words) is an 
interest i!l it as providing the frlli ts of a certain initial 
grappling with the situe.tions to which the word refers. 
The layman's use, it is true, is no !'lore than a point of 
departure because the layme.n normally has neither the 
training nor the inclination for a sustained grappl:lng 
with the border-line cruestions; but the onus 1;ould be on 
the speci st ·who wishes to ignore the layman's use 
altogether to show either that the layman's use lee.ds 
to confusions or difficulties or that the layman (as a 
result of a bi-furcation of interests) is simply talking 
a.bo:.it a different question though using the same term. 
But law, it is ofter: objected, differs from science 
in that it is a normative system. Here it is :tmportant 
to distinguish two ways in which law may be considerad 
first sense in which law is normative is that it Ltnposes 
duties and obligations, awards rights, and attaches sa.i:ct-
ions to the normative decisions or rules it hands dor,m, 
cisi.ons or rules that establish obligations or rights. 
This is 1 we may say 1 the ultimate function of law. But 
like that of a man coming to a moral decision, this function 
requires an investigation of facts 1 on the basis of' which 
moral dec:tsioDs are made and legal rights and obligat:i ons 
are award<.,d. In some cases 1 it is true, moral dec:i.sions 
will be deduced from previous moral decisions 1 juiit as 
rights will be awarded as a consequ.ence purECy of previcus 
rights. .Hore genera.lly, however 1 a man ts moral choice 
depends, nt least in part, on his recognition a non-moral 
fact, just as the la:w' s granting of' a right or imposing of 
an obliga.tion will depend on its recognition of the existence 
of ;;, certain situation of fact. It is 
---...-~ that sense that 
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we have distinguished the fact of possession as an L'lf'ra-jural 
situa1;ion from the rights and oblip;ations that the 
on the basis of such possession. In so far as the normative 
character of law lies i.n its imposition of ri.ghts and 
duties, the decision that a certain situation amounts to 
possession, though mostly inad.e for an 1.m.mediate normative 
purpose 1 is not itself a norma.tive decision: it is ni!lt like 
telling Tomrey he ought not to hurt the cat, but like 
:becognising that his pushing p::tns into her claws hurts her. 
(Where courts impute fictitious possession for normative 
purposes they are thus like TouUlly 1s mother falsely tell:lng 
Torrlllly that he 1:1 hurting the cat in order to stop him from 
doing whatever he is doing.) 
There is a second sense which law may be said 
to be normative. This is the sense in which we say that 
the meaning of legal terms is defined by law. We have already 
afgued that in this sense all lane;uages all sub-systems 
of teclli-ij"cal language are to some extent normative. The 
differences between systems ancl. terms for this purpose are 
merely differences or degree, differences to be found 
within each system as well as between them. Scientists, 
cornmon men, legislators and judges where there is no 
1 authority 1 can define a term as they please, provided they 
then use it consistently and do not substitute it for other 
terms in such a way as to turn a true descriptive statement 
into a false one. But if the term has any denotation at 
all, as it must have (even a private language could not be 
composed of terrr,s all parallel to 1 a horse = a tallting 
quadruped with wings' and be a language of anything but 
dreams iLnd beliefs), then discussion of the term is, at 
least in part, a discussion of non.-verbal facts 1 in the 
way that Professor Willi.ams seems to deny. If wives were 
defined, as they could be, as beings married to husbands, 
it would be by drawing on a non-verbal fact that we would 
acquire the information that on this definition they are 
always women. The criticism of any particular definition 
stipulated af!d of its manner of singling out certain 
features or situations will be in terms of the use to which 
that def:tn:i.tion j_s put ~'nd the function it serves :i.n a 
coherent language designed for the achievement of certai11 
aims. The reason why it is often felt that law has a high 
degree of normativeness in th:!.s ;oouua second sense is that, 
since the primary function of law is not to describe the 
world, law can create its o~m distinctions more freely: 
Parlia_ment can is late, as the wag has said, thtlt for the 
pw-poses <Jf law all women shall henceforth be regarded as 
men. The freedom, however, is not absolute: the view the.t 
for all leg2,l purposes all women are men would introduce 
gi'eat and needless complexities into many areas of the law. 
Let us now apply these cons erations to the 
definition of possession in the law. It is true that a 
legal language will have a certain freedom in rlefining 
possessj.on and may depart very far indeed from uses the 
word had or he.s in the wider language of the country. But 
once it defines possession to denote a certain range of 
situations, it will have to cons:i.der se situations as 
matters of ft>,ct in order to gain fuller appreciation of 
what is involved in its definition of possession. For 
this reason, 'possessior 1 1 hovrever fined, will have a 
1nature 1 that cari.;not be fully deduced from verbal rules 
and whi.ch may 1 in interaction with more general aims and 
rules the le system, react back to produce changes 
in the original defini.tion. This nat-.:t:re is not the same 
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for each legal systel:it because the defi~1:ltions of 1possession 1 
with which that system begins may vary stiffj.ciently to mean 
that the systems are re.ferring to quite differer:.t situations 
or fEiatures of situations - thus 1possession1 ir1 Common Lciw 
has nore in commc.n with 1detention 1 in R01Lan 1aw than it has 
with the mea-ning the Roman law gives to 1 p session'. 
,.. it·' , . f "' . . b ... , 1...-r -LCJ .. SllL 0 v.:tSCUSS1.0!) OJ. ;.,fie 'nature of possession' 
is made rather more inapposite in the Common Law by the fact 
ths.t Common Law does not initially approach possession 
a technical term of (irt 1-rhose mear;.ir,_g prio.arily stipulated 
by law~ It begins on the contrary, we have seen, with a 
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fact of every-day Saxon and Norman life, the fact that men 
normally have and hold land and chattels for their own 
exclus:Lve use and tend to repel any challenges to such use. 
As social life becomes more complex, and as more border11ne 
or uncertaln situations demand the attention of the courts, 
fact 
this simple/has to be examlned more carefully and the elements 
and limits of such possession need to be considered more 
fully. Certainly, in the complex cases, there is more room 
for a certa1n arbitrariness of definition (though always 
within the confines of the actualities that would confront 
the courts); and as the functions of possession in the law 
multiply there is the growing possibility of defining 
possession in different ways for different purposes, just 
as the distinction between 1fruit' and •vegetable 1 may be 
d $ .. • ~r ,., · f d · "'f t rawn in a:u .e-·ing ways or 1,; ·eren purposes. But in 
fact, as we have striven to show, this has not been the 
main trend in the Common L2w; its protection of possession 
and its de~pening of ~he concept of control have remained 
closely tied to the elements of the factual, non-legal 
situation with which it began and the exercise of stipulative 
definition has not been prominent. Where we find an initial 
suggestion of arbitrary definition of possession specific 
to a particular area of law, we generally find that this is 
a transitional stage in a movement in which possession as 
a requisite ingredient is being replaced by rights based on 
ownershipo 
Th ere ist then, not the sharp gulf between 
( 1normative 1 ) definitj.on and {factue.1) descript:Ion that 
Professor Williams suggests; whenever we use words, the 
two activities inters.ct. The points we have been making 
may be illustrated from the example of the dropped pocket-
book which Professor Williams cites to support h:Ls thesis. 
Firstly, even those who distinguish sharply (and on my 
view in the Comr:ion. Law misleadingly) between 'possession 
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in fact 1 and possession in law' do not suggest that the 
r:i.ghts and obligations that law -will impose in :il:Rl!i!:im this 
situation could be ':.elicited without reference to ar:.y 
pa.rt:tcular legal system: the basis for such rights :L'l many 
legal systems,~., in the Roman law, not the situation 
Hhich these writers call possession in fact. Secon.rlly 1 in 
the context of the CO!lllllon Law, Professor Williams 1 example 
su;sports the points we are making and not the points which 
he is making. Let us consider what he calls the problem 
of 1 apportion:Lng' possession among the partieso In rleciding 
whether A has possession. at various stages after dropping 
the pocket-book, we need no more then the 1'11.ctual control-
criteria vJla have been suggesting; we will not resolve our 
problem by compiling a handbook of stipulative definitions 
of possession in the law 2.r1d looking for the appropriate 
one. Precisely when and in what circu:mstances a man 
dropping a thing loses possession is not, in Corrilllon Law, 
the subject of arbitrary definition but is to be deci.ded 
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by looking at the facts of the situation and seeing whether 
they al:lount to or e.re sufficiently near the fact of control. 
B1 when he picks up, has possession not because his action 
falls ur1der some specific stipulative definition of 
•possession by finders 1, but because he has assumed controlo 
Thee question whether B commits larceny, we have argued, 
rests primarily on intention e.ncl his appreciation of the 
fact thet the owner is traceable: the imputing of possession 
to A for the purposes of larceny is analogous to the lie 
told by Tommy's mother and is best treated as a fiction 
smoothing the way to mEkine larceny merely 2.n offence 
against tttle. (Alternatively, one could concede t.hat 
there has been a 'special1 lj.se of the terM possession in 
this area, which does not invalidate the fact that there 
is a dominant genera.l use in te:r-ms of whi.ch even the special 
use has initially to be understood.) The interesting case 
the son, C, since the possession of the bandits is again 
a simple case of taking control. Professor Willi11.ms 
presun1ably h2.s in mind the question whether the son has 
possession or only a charge. To begin with, this cannot 
be d te -i~E" fr th f ts p fe~ ?•1]' S b c ~•ven• e '""' "' Jci . om e ac ro ,,sor .1:L .. .cam .a., 0 .i. . i. 
we need to look at the factual situation more carefUlly and 
to ascertain precisely how C accepted the pocket-book from 
. . _,, th nis -'a 1er according to vihose will he dealt with it. 
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Further, if we are in doubt we will not be helped by simple 
stipulative definitions in the law; we will have to look 
at factual situations recounted in the cases which have been 
accepted as the basis for rights and ask whether this 
situation is sufficiently like them. In other words, the 
1vagueness 1 or 'abstraction• of the term 'possessi.on' is 
not to be remedied in the Common Law by further legal 
definition, but by looking at the rc.anner in which people 
may control. To say that this mElT'..ne:r is a fact is not to 
say that it is in every respect visible as brute material, 
1i1te en iron rod, or that it can be crystallised within 
sl:1arp spatial 01• te!:lp oral limits. Given a certairt 
stipulativeness - that is, t . ~ J.. he t"' .,.,, 1 na t.. ll-~ ,,. v Q;_iJB .• on Law focuses 
attention on possession 1n the sense of control as the 
tial 
o~r i1nport8r:_t obJ.igations ri.ghts - the difficulty 
pocket-boo}:: .1:i a difficulty 
their (equally .I'a 
* 
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The three crucial areas of possess:i.on discussed 
in Part II, taken together, are often regarded as creat:tng 
di:e'ficul ty for any attempt to lay down a single, fundamental 
concept of possession in the Cw.llllon I,aw or to identil"y this 
concept with a relation fact such as control. Closer 
examina;flion or these areas, we have attempted to show, 
indicates that these difficulties ha.Ve been much exaggerated. 
There are, o:!" course, conflicting decis:tons, bu.t the main 
trend of the law a.11d of the reasoning by judges has been, 
consci~1sly or unconsciously, to identify possession with 
control and to look to the lcOllilllon intendment' of that term 
rather than to propose st:tpulative definitions. 1 Tec.tm::Lcal 1 
considerations obscuring this trend have obtruded themselves 
in some cases and periods and have been sloughe1 off in 
others; control rGmains a steady theme, and even the 
technical departures can only understood against the 
background this themee Each of the areas we h.ave 
discussed highlights different aspects of control situations¢ 
The legEl treatment of servants (save for the - expla:tne(1 
and criticised - exception in favour of servants receiving 
from a stranger) brings out the t t11at 8. man may directly 
control through another 1 s hands and that a rnan is not 
normally said to control if he acts in every respect as an 
instrument. The problems associated with the dispute 
between finder a.11d occupier, on the other hand, highlight 
the questions of knowledge and intr:intion: the modern 
Commonweal th decisions, we have a:reued, bring out that a 
man, having general control over an area and intending 
generally to control.things 1•ithin it, r"'"'s possession and 
control of th:tngs within that area which he may not know 
to exist. The problems of bailment, as we have discussed 
them, highlight the power to sxclude from direct control 
as a test of possession and suggest thet control over 
means of acc'?ss without acy intention of' having powe:b to 
deal with the thing does not amount to possessionv 
That the definition of 1possession1 in a legal 
system :ls not normally an arbitrary act of will, but is 
the product of constant interaction between the purposes 
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for which the law is using a term and the najru.re of the 
situation to which that term initially re:f."ers may be brought 
out by consiclering vihy the Common Law does not stipulatively 
confine 'possession• to the manual hold:tng of things or even to 
li!OiE'l what we have balled detention. It is a matter of fact, 
arising out of the way in "hich people normally deal with 
thj.ngs or have power over them, that lllP~nual holding or 
detention :l.n prist:Lne form rarely confronts the law. Fe op le 
do not keep their belongings ch111ned to their wrists any 
more than they occupy all portions their land e.t once. 
?4 As Kocourek puts it:-
In detention, ~he emphasis is put on the physical 
relation of a hu.111an being to a material object. 
This relation involves physic!:l.l power over the 
object and usually immediate physical contact. 
It is obvious that the range of detention ••• 
is limited to such a.n extent that it is 
impossible at any given moment to have detention 
of more than a small portion of land space or of 
many material objects. It is also obvipus that 
durine the period of sleep all detention ceases 
and that at times of severe illness, detent. ion 
will be reduced to a small rangeo A co:ncept of 
such limited application clearly cannot function 
as the sole be.sis of possessory :r.ights and 
remedies. Kor, for the same reason can it be 
one o.f the necessary constitu.~nts ot possessor;y 
rights, since such rights may be fo1md on 
physical relati(;ns of human beings to mater.is.l 
objects which do not fall, even remotely, 
within the definition. 
Kocourek, in his last ·two sentences, mi:tkes the 
matter perhaps somewhat too much a question o.f logical 
necessity, but he co1'rectly hrings out the extent to which 
the facts of socia1 life will guide lalll: toward certain 
positions and 1 definitions 1 • This is especially true of a 
s tem like the Common Law 1 which ha.s tended to avoid the 
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view of law as a collection of arbitrary fiats anC: finitions 
by those who have authority or power to er.force their will? 
and sees law as arising from the combination of logic and 
experienceo It is not necessary to hold a doctrine o:f' 
fixed natural kinds in ordr,ir to recognise tr.i.at some features, 
2~. Jura1 Relations, p.363. 
connexions and distinctions are more fundamental (carry 
more associated features, connexions and cli.stinctions w:i.th 
them) than others, and will therefore be ir.ore important 
foY! most (though not necessarily all) practical and 
theoretical purposes. This is true of the distinction we 
draw between horses end other things (as opposed to the 
conparatively less illmc.inating distinction betwef1::1 grey 
horses and other things, including brown horses) end the 
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same we have suggested applies in possession. The distinction 
between holding and not holding, or between detaining and 
not detaining, is less interesting ana. sign:lficant (fewer 
things follow from it) than the distinction between controlling 
a.nd not controlling. Thus, in Bourne~y• Fosbrooke,25' a 
school girl dividing her time betwe(~n boarding-school and 
the house :tl:ili!: of the testator, received from the testator 
var:l.ous presents, some of which she put in boxes ~a left 
in the testatorts house during her absences at school, and 
others which she handed to the testator to place in a 
drawer for her. In holding that the girl had possession of 
all these presents, and. that the presents placed in the 
(1rawer 11in her possession by the hands of the testator; 
and the place of deposit was as much a'l.der her hanti as the 
25'. (1865') 18 
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circumstances would admit 0£'1126 , the Court was not arbitrar;!.ly 
stipulating a definition of 1possessi on 1 for this particular 
branch of the law, but once more recogn:l.sing th1rt control 
(by keeping the things in what we.s in effect the girl's 
hame) more significant for the whole structure rights 
and duties than the actual handling of the things which, by 
the nature of the case, the girl indulged i.n only when 
VlaS at home. 27 
28 ttTo gai':l :;ios session 1 " Holmes wrote, 11a 
must stand in a certain physical re'.'.&tioo to the object 
to the rest of the world, and nust ha.ve a certain 
intent.'' There must, he argued, be a degree of power over 
the object, 29 an intent to exclude others fror1 i t 30 and a 
"relation of manifested power to exclude others co-extensive 
with the intent" to do so. 31 These are, we have argued, 
the elements that m::,ke up a situation of control and they 
hqe1 as we have sought to show 1 been recognised by law as 
such. Precisely because control is a situation recognised 
27. The s~~e recognition underlies the dictum of Evershed~ 
M.R., in Parmee v. :rvatche1J (1950] 1 A.E.R. 872 at p.,u74, 
[~?3) 2 K.B. ·199:E,.t-D.20~: "'110"-£>ci.<1i.~ ,/.i:a..s ;,or J,y a111'f- r112~ {I or1l.<j m.U.v. • f "''f<CO.l pt;,U!i,\1<Jr,, '! 
28 ... Iolmes, £lll.i c1,,.., p .. 2'16. 
29. Ibid,, pp.216, 220. 
30. Ibid., p.220. 
31. lb;i.d.' pp.216, 234, 235. 
by law, and not a relationship created by it, the cases do 
not attempt to define 'controlt or 'possession1 in the 
m10mner in which law defines an texecutor1 or a 1trustee 1• 
At the same time, because control lts a situation the 
various elements of which may imply and act upon the other 
elements, it is misleading - as we have suggested ·• to 
look for each of these el13ments in pristine isolation, as 
32 Holmes 1 formulation pe:::'haps tends to make us do. 
This is not to say that there is no further 
guidance to be found in the cases. The law requires 
•manifest power 1 to be present for possession or control; 
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secret power, future power or present intention to exercise 
future power are not sufficient, though 1power 1 , as we 
have seen, should not ·oe interpreted to mea.u 1 physical 
capacity to deal with any possible or foreseeable interference 1 • 
Mere intention to control will not mal~e up for the absence 
of manifest power, but the respect that people have for 
rights may make a manifest intention to control, combined 
with this fespect, sufficient to presTu"!le manifest power 
32. The treatment of' these elements as distinct re-quirements 
has more plausibility in the dynamic situation where 
possession is acquired, as we seek to show in the next 
section. Holmes:[ indeedi thinks that the tJ:uestion 
confronting the aw is a 'Kays whether a man has acquired 
uossesciion and not whether he has nossession: as the 
" . 
cases abundantly indicate, this :i.s not true. 
unless there has been 1Jncontested invasion undermining 
such ·h1tended controlo Thus in Wrtta-Ofei v. Df*r;auah, 33 
a Gf'£Rnaia.;1 1h'"Ornar1 hac1 possessic11. of unused and. u~nbU11t-on 
land in 191+8 on the ba.sis that she ha.d acquired title t;o 
the ::.and in 1939, had, a(;cord:!.ng to native custom, etect 
fry.ir :pillars on its bmL.rideries marked with her initials 
and had delegated her mother to lool{ after the land, even 
though there ,,ras n© evidence t:iat she or the mother had 
exercised any other control over the land. This was so 
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even though the land w2~s vested by ordinanee in the Chief 
Secretary in trust for the Crown frea from all titles between 
1940 and 1956, when the land was released and the woman's 
title revived. The Jurlicial Committee did not<:J that the 
evidence of possession was exiguous and relied to some 
extent on the fact tha.t uaga t one who never he,d any title 
to the land ••• thG slightest amou.."lt of possession woulcl be 
sufficient. 113"" 
further point in the decision shOOlld also be 
noted. Where the ulaintiff had already acquired possession, 
for trespass. This is the poi.nt we have bee!! 
33. [1961] 3 A.E.R. ?96. 
34. At p.600~ 
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111t.1n 1'!0 npt e.nd no!'mally cannot conttnuously man.ifest their 
control or their power to exclu(1e, they sleep, leave to 
visit friends, put flown objEicts ancl p2rk cars in seemingly 
safe places while they go .?.bout other businesso The r~ein:lf(JSt 
:Lntention to retain control will here bridge the gaps in 
~0~4"est ~ct···v1 cont~ol 35 B"+. what ·it. h·rtdges J"'""t. "e <u=u.J, . '~ '-"- • • "'" .• v v. _. t>u~ • t.l 
gctps - a. n1Et!1 co.1111ot acq_ttire possession by h-,is intention to 
control alone a..n.d he abe.nc1ons possession there is no 
reason to suppose that he w:L11 ever resume manifest control. 
The contro1 or manifest power to deal with a 
thing required for possession is the power to enjoy or use 
to deal with it to the extent made possible by 
the nature of the thin.go Where there is no pawer of this 
kind - as wer wilc1 animals roaming the land or freely 
flowing water :!.n a river passinr; thratJ.eh land - there can 
be possession (though: there may be rights to reduce 
into . ) 36 possession • But the power required must always be 
3 5. Thus, Ro JU.., T_ownJ.e;11 ( 1871) 12 Gox Co c. 59 a poacher 
who retluced rabbits to his nossess:!.on on anDther 1 s land. 
and then hid them a d:Ltch on that land covered. 
thern with leaves was held to retain possessior:. agairst 
the occupier cf the land, who prosecuted him for larceny 
after he h[-ld returr1ed and ta-.ken the r,s~bbi ts f1•c)r{1 t11e ditch* 
36. See, e.?., McKee v. Grjltz, supra (section 5, footnote 13). 
understood ~-gwi<l.um sul;lject21ll..l!La,j;eriam: 3 7 "By possession 
is meent possession of that character of which the th:i.ng 
is capable."38 Thus, men may have possession through such 
control as can be exercised in the circumstances of columns 
of great weight or of a large mass 
4o 
wrecks at the bottom of the sea. 
of iron, 39 or over 
The principle has also 
be( D """ ... ~ ., !-- ,!..h • • £> , d . ·l • "'PP.LJ.ea \,o c.,e occupa cJ.on 0-1. i.an : m;Jliz t acts amount 
to Q f n. • c i • t d d . b . f 
L' su r1c1e1J:0 occupacion mus~ epen upon ·c .e na-cure o 
the soil and the uses to wh:i.ch it is to be applied. }l-1 In 
land, this princ:Lple has acted pr:i.mar:tly to strengthen the 
view that intention may bridge gaps in manifest control 
and to establish a corollary to the principle appl:ted to 
the occupier of land in fj.nding cases - the corollary being 
that control of a part may imply intention to control and 
Ovmership ma.y be proved by proof of possession 
and that cax1 be shown only by acts of enj oymen~ 
of the land itself; but it is impossiblo in 
the nature of things to confine the e-1ridence to 
Pei;:_ Buller, J., in Sto_ck v 1 B~ (1786) 1 T.R. 428 at 
p.1+30, 99 E.R. 1177 at p.1179(an action on the case for 
'• c"- b" "'-b 1 .• ·I·• f·~ • b • ·) a1 .. :i 1,.V~r ing 1., ... e p_,.,ainvJ. 1 .. in. !lS pe111 • 
38. £fil: Lord F:i.tzgerald 7 in Lord A9.vocate v._ Young (1887) 
12 App. Ca. (H. L.) )'+1+ at P• 556. 
See Kocourek, ap. cit., at p.363 and the Anerican cases 
there cited. 
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41. 
The Tubant:'ta [1921+] P.78, where the ev:'tdence of control 
and intent to e:x(~lucle from the wreck amounted to the placing 
of marker bouys and the sencI:tng dol·m. of divers at :tntervals 
when the weather permitted. 
Gook y. Rider, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 186 at p.187. 
the very precise spot on which the alleged 
trespass may have been committed: evidence 
ms,y be given of acts done on other parts, 
provided there is such a common character of 
locality between those parts and the spot in 
auestion as would ra:tse a reasonable inference 
in the minds of the jury that the place in 
dispute belonged to the plaintiff if the other 
parts did. In oro.inary cases 7 to prove his title to a close, the claimmrt may give in 
evidence acts of ownership in any P"'rt of the 
same inclosure; for the ownership of one part 
causes a reasonable inference that the other 
belongs to the same person: though it by no 
means follows as a necessary consequence, for 
different pc rs ons may h2,ve balks of land in 
the sw:ne inclosure; but this is a fact to be 
submitted to the jury. So I apprehend the 
same rule is applicable to a wood which is not 
inclosed by any fence. If you prove the cutting 
of timber in one part, I take that to be evidence 
to go to a jury to prove a right in the whole 
wood, although there be no fence, or distinct 
boundary, surrounding the whole ••• So I should 
apply the same reasonj,ng to a continuous hedge; 
though no doubt the defendant might rebut the 
~Lnference that the whole belonged to the same 
person by showing acts of ownership on his part 
along the same fence. It has been said, in the 
course of the argument, that the defendant had 
no interest to dispute acts of ownership not 
opp 1Jsite his 01·Jn land; 1:n1t tl'10 grott:r1Cl on ",•rhjocl1 
such acts are admissible is not the acquiescence 
of any party: they are admissible of themselves, 
-proprio vigo£.S! 1 for they tend to prove that he 
who does them is the owner of the soil; though 
if they are done in the absence of all persons 
interested to dispute them, they are of less 
v1eight. 
Similarly, in a case where a claim of title :' .. ::ws.s founded 
pn continued acts of possession, L0 rd Blackburn said: 
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42. (18B7) 2 H~ & w. 326 at p.331 1 150 E.H. 781 at p.783. 
t~3. Lord Aovocate v.Joro Blantyre (1879) l+ App. Ca. 770 
at 9.791.~ 
••• a.1.1~ that ,_lcen::-~s prove posse.ssit)r1 as or"'1ners 
of pa:;~ts cf tk1e tra.ct teT.u:.s ·to prove the 
Oiffi<3rship of the whole tract; provided there 
such a common character of local:tty as would 
raise a l'eets onable inference th3.t the barons 
possess one part al'.: owners they possessed the 
uhole, the weight c1ependini:; on the natu.re of 
the tract, wha.t kind of possession could be hed 
of it, and what the kind of possession proved 
was. That is is very clearly expla.:lned by 
Lord Wensleydale (then on Parke) in Jone:.§ 
V¢ Willie.ms. And as the weight of evidence 
depends on rules of common sense, I apprehenc1 
that this is as much the law in a Scottish as 
in an Eni:;lish Court. And the weight of the 
aggregate of many such pieces of evidence taken 
together is very much grectter than the sum of 
the weight each such piece of evidence taken 
separately. 
;j00 
Th'l.t the principle being enu:ncie.ted here is defet1.si ble, 
indicated by Bramwe11 1 L.J., in Coverclale v. Charlton: lf4 
If tJ1ere \liere an i1~1closec1 field, an(J c.i. ruarL hac1 
turned h:ts cattle into it, and had 1ocked the 
gate, n1ight VTf~lJ~ cl£::jJrt ·!:o l1e,,ve a c1e :facto 
:posse""'ion cf the whole fi.nldi but if there 
were a.n u:ninclosed conman of a mile in length, 
~nri he tu-~ne·'1 on~ ho"~" •)~ 0~1"' e·,•i1 o""' ~he r_,< "~· , ; - ;.. 4 A. :- 1.::,, ,.. ;;;:} ,, , .<.l ,,J, t;;. },.c._.~ J.. L ..... _,, 
co~;;qon, he could not be said to hove a de facto 
po;3sess1or1 of the \~1hoJ.e J.et1gth of th$ com-rrron.W< 
As the degree of control necessary will vary 
thB c01:trol the object in (!Uestion is capable 
Of, '-' e ob' ~ on'- "' ' _ t..n . J ec 1,. c _ \.!ro.L_Leci 
will be affected by '.:he value 
the possible hRrm that may 
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L 'A. > • " ' < "" th l <" come vO i.,. r> mac J.s 110·0 requirer.. 1 '-or . e saKe ok 
mz:tnifesti11g h:ls possesr::icm, to g1l&.rd so rigoroltsly ~~gainst 
actu~,1 or possible tempora.rsr :incv.rsions not displacing 
hj"s possession ths~t 11e j.s forced to spend fa,r more tha.r1 
any forese~able d8n>t;_ge tht?_t couJ_cl resul·t fr·om these 
incur;:;ions. This m13.y h8.VS been j.n the ,Tu<Ji.ci C omrii ttee 1 s 
h"' 
·,vu tci.-Of,·°' e=i.,_,v.,.~D=ez1s1{f.~' :t; j_ t brought out clearly 
in com.bin& on \·1ith the 
subjec_~ 1 in the House o:'! Lores' cision on a Scottish 
appee.l concerning a riparian proprietor's possessior1 of 
and consequent prescriptive right to the :f'orElshore: 
';< Mt y 46 'l'h L d .. t ,,,..1voq" e v. our.k• ~ ere 1 or wa son 
It is, in my opinion, pract:!.cally impossible 
to lay do11m any precise :rule in regard to the 
character anc1 amount of possess1on necessary 
in order to give a riparian proprietor a 
prescript:tve right to foreshore, Each case 
c • d • + • t ~· mus\, oepen· upon :i.~s own c:i.rcums ances. -.rne 
benefj.cial enjoyment of wh:i.ch thE1 foreshore 
admits, consistently 1.-ri th the rights of 
navigators and of the general public, is e.n 
IDCliFlli'1rR ex.CeEJdingly variable quc:nti ty. I 
think it may be safely affirmed, that i:i 
cz.ses where the seashore ad.mi ts of an 
appreciabl0; and reasonable cf ll ?.i • J 
.c::u,n-·?ry. Pt -,.,., ?,.r-o. trrr·i-,e \..-VriA o" ~ond·unt clR1 i· r.~·:-l_·t.ca·c'.0r1 :~ J;;;::J.,.i::.i,' --~v J/•'"',; * -l... v.,,i:"~' .i. \..:.. ...,., _ --~-~-
nossession t ve.ry th the type of In the case 
0.f vaca!lt fJ.nCt urien.clo:'.3 lrJx1c1_ 1,1hj.ch is not bei.ng cv~J_-t:tvz.:te<l, 
there is little which can be cl.one on tl:v<2 land to indicate 
·~o~s~s 0 ion· " p ~ n ~ ' -• 
(1 007' 1" ' <JO, J ::::. ~PP• 
eJ';:101m.t o:f be.r1e1''j.cial pt)Ssessior1, cons terrt:ly 
1"1i tJ:i these rights, \~he I·:tpa.r~L0,n propr:ltJtor 
must be held to have hR<.i possession, 1·1:Jthin 
the meani.ng of the [Scottish] of 1617, 
c.12 if he has all the b'lnefic::Lal ust?s 
of~ foresl1-ore '"-11:Lr::;h 111ou~J_d r12~t;ur2.1J4y hv~ve 
bt:J:en e~a.j oyetJ_ by the dj~r'r::J~t g:r·ar1teE:: of the 
Cro;,·111. :::~1 estixnt::.t:j~ng the ch~.1r·acter} e:;ctent 
of his possessicrn it nrust always be kept v:iew 
that possession of the foreshlllre, iri :1 ts natural 
:cte, can never be, in the strict SAnse of the 
t a·- P.Xn'··s·lve "'hA D"o~ ·ko" c rC'ot . .,... "·i·le i,;,;i.LiMJi ""' _,,...!_v., .:.. ~• _L c:: ""A. ,i;! V _,._ Elt.t.,.. ,, 1:3.,, .. -.!.l._L_-., _ _. 
th·~ 11l14~f7>0n1" t "ir<>• ,,,,.+~" 
··-? p .... __ } ___ i.v ,... Jl ~v Et C-~n""':!' cl._J(1 .l~" J,b 
prr1ct:l.cally· irnrJos s:i.bJ,e to prevertt occas 1.011ftl 
er·"r"a,.,,i1men.J...{".< nn 'n-l t:! ·n-1· "•h"s ''e"'~U"'A A-l1e 0 c~'" 
-'" Jv a'-'{'._ \.;j.,,._,,,,' \,J,,J \. - ~•n-' ),. • £;. _,,L~ ' \.J ""Gt ;::;; -" I,; '-' \J !,, 
of preventivr~ measures will be altogether 
d.ispDoportionate to tht" value of the '~ubject. 
S pi:.t :::is -1 t': f:i'n1 _;..,<.lr~ 
'-'._.' -·• _...., o/ ,,-. ' v' "--' 
Doint 
th(:: preciSe.{at w·J1icJ1 
::J 02 
incursions or encroachments on possesslon become 
to destroy such posses cJn by it no loneer e:xclus • 
In 
The only d.ifficulty wh:i.ch I he.Ve felt :in considering 
this ce.se bem1. in regard to whe.t is sometimes 
referred to as cont~tla l2 osse.§..,~..Q, but :is better 
. 'b "' ! ~ "' ~ CLBSC-1''1. ea as concurrer1·c possessJ.on oy }nemoers 
the public who have no grant or cence from 
Crown. I att11ch not the sJightest weight to 
the fa.ct the some vramen carri.ed off sea-ware 
i:rJ creels, fo1~ the purp:::ise of mctn11rir1g tl1ei1"' 
gardAns, which were not up on the lands of 
Co1in··weJ1 rnhe -~ro,rn 1 o"" C1 "Y PUO sto~es "'ru~" """'-d ::;; ,, ---o .,,.. ,, .L l:::,.J.! ·" '> . ...1~ .L .i,,d ~,,,. ·-- c:.t. L ..J.uJ. 
the foreshore, ch is proved to have taken 
p e at ·three seve1'"fa.l periocls,. is a very c1ifferent 
m.B.tter. These were in mo roper sense the acts 
of the Crown; but s.cts that description 7 
<>lthough done thont title, tend to derog2.te 
fro~ ·~h" I}OS~·~sc1'on o·" ·"l,e "ip•n'1'n.,-; ~~o~wl~i-nl" Jc.4 v 1;.- .., ,_.~,.;;) _ .i. .;. v ... ;., .i;.,.. '-'i.- c,..,__ .P" l-'t...;..,d"'-~·' 
and, if ce.r~·ied far enough will deprive his 
i}ossession of that exclus:tve cha.racter which 
is necessa:-y ir1 cr\1er to esta1:1J,,ish o_ presc1" t:tve 
right. After care considerat:ton of the 
evidence bearing upon these acts, I am satisfied 
that they were nelther of such extent, nor of 
such fiuration in o oint of t , as to affect the 
lity of the possession by the responc1ent 
his predecessors. 
The 12.st sentence brings out the main question that a 
court would hr.1V6 to cons:ldi:;ra6i!,@:f!' and it wou1r1 hc'.lVe to 
this ques on in the light of the circumstances 
1\o one such CJ.ct is conclusive, the W!'·dght 
of e act as evidence depends on the 
circmr~sta!1ces; one ver"y in1portant circurnsta..71ce 
as :to tJ:e weight bei:t,1g 1 whether the a<;:t was , 
sucn anc1 so done tha-c -chose who were interesteu 
it. 
dispu.ting the ownership ·would be of 
that the encroachments were not J<::no;m to the riparian 
. ,. b t .· J. d t1 ' ' propr1e·i;or, , u .LS c.ec - coreec ,~y, as we nave argueo. -
be 
that ignoranc13 would not,.(sufl'icient to '.lH?.intain h:ls 
possession if the enct'aacb:ments had been longer in durat:l.on 
more marked in character. 
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3o3A 
The concept of control s.et forth here has been 
criticised, in an a priori manner, by Burke Shartel in 
the article already cited. The concept of control as used 
in the law, he argues, cannot be defined in such a way as 
to coincide with the possession recognised by law: the 
amount of control, the purpose, degree and duration of 
control, necessary for possession varies from one set of 
circumstances to another. Not only have we ourselves argued 
that duration, degree and purpose may all be relevant to 
disputes about possession, but we have sought to show how 
and why the amount or nature of control required varies in 
different circumstances. But these variations are not 
haphazard or arbitrary; they do not make it impossible to 
develop a concept of possession. The amount and kind of contro: 
required is that which, in the light of the nature and 
situation of the object controlled, gives a reasonable 
impression to the world-at-large that the object is or 
falls within' a sphere being held and/or used to the exclusion 
of the world-at~large. The possessor is he whose will 
determines the exclusion of the world-at-large from this 
area: the servant, who cannot exclude the master or anyone 
invited or authorised by the master at any time, has no 
possession; the bailee-at-will, or the bailee for safe-
Iceeping, who can say to the bailor "As long as I hold for 
you, I do not want you to do X to this object" 1 has possession. 
a whole is and mµ.st be taken to apply to its parts, whether 
they stand in the possessorts consciousness or not. The 
man who possesses a car possesses its carburettor even if 
he at no stage knew that his car had one; the possessor 
of a library is not required to know the number or books 
L11 it. If someone, unknown to him, slips a book on to 
his shelf, he possesses that too; if a passenger leaves 
an umbrella in my car, unbeknovin to me, I possess it 
because I possess the car. Where I control premises or 
land, possessing as I possess my car, things that come 
on to those premises or on to that land enter into my 
possession in the same way. There is nothing fictitious 
or constructive about such a possession. 
3o3E 
In determining possession, the Common Law has always been 
concerned with a present situation: the fact that present 
possession may at any moment be brought to an end, lawfully 
or unlawfully, does not affect this issue. Neither does 
the fact that a manls pawer to deal with what he possesses 
according to his will may be severely circumscribed, 
whether by the general law of the country or by the specific 
conditions under which he holds. The amount of control 
a possessor has, intensively or extensively, may be taken 
determL11ing 
into accbunt by the courts in/the liabilities of the 
possessor vis-a-vis the mmer or bailor or in assessing 
damages for incursions.~9 
We have stressed that ca.'itrol is a 1self-conscious 1 
relation; we have also stressed, on the basis of the 
decisions in the mode<rn finding cases, that a roa'i may 
control an object he does ~ot know of through its entering 
an area he does control. There is no contradiction here 
because the general control of and intention to control 
The extent to which the courts have done so is examined 
in J.F. Clerk, 11Title to Chattels by Possession", (1891) 
7 L.Q.R. 22~ and H.W. Burnett, "Conversion by an 
Involuntary Bailee't, (1960) ?o L.Q.R. 364~ 
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10. 'DYNAMIC' SITUATIONS : . CONTROL IN THE LOSS AND 
ACQUIS ITIQN_ OF POSSESS ION 
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Possession, we have said, is control: the rnanifest 
power to use f_tnd deal wjth the object according to onevs 
will (therefore to the exclusion of others, but within the 
11,,,its imposed by the nature and situa on 
and the law of the country) accompanied by the inten on 
to exercise this power, or to maintai.n it. The :i.ntent:i.on, 
we have argued, need not be proved as a separate fact, but 
may be presumed from the m1n1ifestation and e:xerc e of 
power. 'iYJa.>Jifes t power' , 1 t is true, contains a certain 
requisite ambiguity: it covers both actual deoling and the 
capa.city to deal. There cannot bA nos session unl!J.Ps there 
,is t SOil).filih6!"8, .evidence of l:Hltt.laJ .• _de8ling T)!ade releyant i;2 
t,Q.e clafil by temporal o:~. spatial con,'1e;x:ion, .. h::t . ..accompan;ving 
e.nd continuing in·cention, and by tne r:eal pro9nect that 
the 1J,ctu11;.Lie~,.;"[j.lL\ls.. resume\i C"" :tx:pgrprEJ!Wli exten§.ed 
to the aref!_no1;...,L2,t ~alt w:!,_tf&, byt£.,om.:i,n.r; within :f<,l:le 
ini;,,1)};1tion to _controL..and >:eneral.1:it: llreseryed to make such 
dealing and control n~sible. Possession, for the general 
recognised i.r, everyday life, a spatial and temporal serj_es 
of actual, exclusj_ve dealings, helcl togf!;her and macle to 
mark out an a by connecting tntention and the absence of 
effective aclverse control. The proc12ss cennot get going 
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unless there is an avert acj;; of dealing and controlling, 
bu.t the area of possession which such an act will support 
in the light of accompanying intention - i.e. 1 how far 
it is relevant to associatedd claims - is to be decided in 
the light of the complete c:trcumstancesj it Wh«t in 
law is called 1 a question of fact 1 • 
Possession, it is often said, follows title. 
The statewent - v:hich, as a general slogan, is simply false -
d ~ it . t f k "' ti t . i 1 1 i . . er .• ves s pcin rom ;,WO a::.s · nc prJ.nc. p_as app_ ea in 
the determination of possession. The first is the genera1 
principle that where we are confronted with coopeting claims 
that persons have control, and the factual evidence makes 
it impossible to decide for one against the other, possession 
will be a·warded to him who has b<etter title. 1 Here title 
is not any more than a tabula in t1aufi;:_agio. The second 
----
1o Littleton, Tenures, s.701 (Co, Litt, 1 368 a): "Where two b e in one hp!ll,se or other tenements c.ogether to claim the 
said larids a:nd tenements, and the one claimeth by ofie title, 
and the other by another title the law shall adjudge him 
in possession thE,t hath right £0 have the possession of the 
same tenements." The principle has been reaffirmed by :t<hule 1 
J' • , Jones ~ Cl;l.a:oman ( 1847) 2 Ex. 803 1 at p. 821 and by Joyce, J. 1 in Kynoch, Ltd. v. Rowlands [1912] 1 Ch. 527 1 at p.5'33, wherci he said: "••• where possession in fact is 
undetermined or the evidence is indecisive, possession in 
lc:w follows the right to possess,." 
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'-J>ll.o 11'd"v-~'1 (})-.}ro ~ li'l\L.1 ll'"',J- J- i'r1 1f~\ I\ 
principle is that a man with title to an area ~ be 
presli.med, in the absence of' reasons for holding the contrary, 
to intei::.d to control the whole of that area. Since 
intention is commonly the briO.ge extending or spann:ing gaps 
cont1•ol, th:ts pr•inciple will frequently favour the man 
Clef> 
lJith title: the same A that will give a squatter possession 
of s. section of a field •J.C., rf'" y give the 011rr1er possesslon of 
-• h ' r· J a 2 tne w_. a.Le J.e ..• Hov: fa1"' C <)urt;s have talcen~ such 
to control, presumed om title, may be illustrcited from 
'.> 
H&rrison v. Pa .. rlter.J. Tl1e ulc~intiff ha.d covent;)n·ted. v1i th 
-·--..,.,,.,_.-~- -
use, to keep it in good repair, and to demand no toll. 
ter, defenl'lant pulled down the bridge and c2rried 
way the mat01rials and the ;il!!lfl!!l1'! pl:?.intiff brought c-1n action 
for trespass. Considering it unnecess2.ry to decid.e whether 
spass maintainable by the pJ2intiff pull:tng 
dovm the bridge (vihich would depend on whether the grant 
vested. the soil in the plaint:Lf'f), Iord Ellenborough, 
held that the plaint! ff 1 s property i::i the materials of which 
the bridge was constructed was on1y suspended by the public 
2. See, especially, Lord AdvQ.~~te_.L_J,ord ~lant.i'J;:§LP.nd the 
other ce.ses ted in the same connexion in section 9. 
3. (18o;n 6 East 1;)1t, 102 
use of them while they are part of the bric1ge, e.na that 
when they cease to be part the bridge the possession. of 
these materials reverts to the plaintiff as holder of the 
exclusltve ght of property in them. 
The situation is orten rather diffe when we 
are dealing with acquisition of possession for the 
first time. The comparative stringency of the evidence 
required by the courts where a man cla:tms has acc1uired 
I+. There is here an interesting fU1alogy to the doctrine of 
b!E!eal.cing bulk: possesslon ,1nd cantrol revert to the 
initial :p os ';essor when the purposas for which passed 
possession or made accessible to the public have 0eBn 
frus and he is therefore Dresmned to renossess 
. " 
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This esumption is no doubt a fiction, but not 
a gross fiction one that has obvious s ve,lue 
while its extension of the criteria of possession does 
no violence to the general concept. Cne would want to 
se"y that a person who com::n.it!! no trespass by using or 
even damaging such 2, bridge (or highway) does commit 
trespass if he carts away the materiaJs with which it 
made and which has not been abandoned its suppliers. 
1'iliL Duke of N~castl~ v. Cl,erl;); ( 1818) 8 Taur1t. 602, 129 
E.R. 518, where co1mnissioners of sewers fe.:i"led in an 
act:ton of trespass against commissioners of a harbour 
for pulling down a dam er·octed by the former, should be 
d;i .. sti:iguished because the evidence showed that the 
conmis on u:nf!e.r which the pl::.intiffs worked vested i·n 
them neither property ·'· i.!1 nor possession works 
erected under their authcrity9 though, 2.s the Court noted, 
other persons bcnind to repair the a.am night uroperty 
i!,1 it~ ~In a simi.lar.
2 
case, Dys9r!.-.Y....,_£011:i.cl!; (1822) 5 B. & 
AJ..d, oO.::J, i06 E.R. 1.J10 1 the Ca,1rt held that wherHver 
property in a clam may be vested when it l:as been built;, 
those Erecting it havcJ :possession. while ting j.t. 
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with the right to possess has not only given further 
support to the maxim 1 Possessj_on follows t1tle 1 but has 
led to the vie"Vr, held by some writers, that •possession' 
for~ the purposes of acc1uisition 
from 1possession1 for the purposes of retention. It is otlr 
submiss:ton that this is not so: that the ce:lteria of 
possession remain precisely the same. But the criteria 
possession, 
negligence are open; r(3quire the court to consider 
the entire situation 2J:d, normally, to make certain 
sections and rts, me.king of these presumptions 
been much more directly tied to re&.sonable inferences from 
the facts, e.nd iriuch less i.nfluenced by direct considerations 
of soc:tal or; judicial policy, tha.n many modern wr:tters 
think. The presumpt:ton in favour cf the occupier Is control 
over objects on his 19.nd even he does not kr1.ow of them 
is qtt:lte closely linked 1.lfith a ereat;er 1~es11ect for 1 privv~te 
.,. 
socit~ty; J the presumpti.ons iri fa.vour of an ovmer' s in ti on 
to control ar<.J sira:ile.rly be.sed on ordinary facts of social 
lif'e. In one :lmportecnt case, where :possession, if it has 
5. Tht~s givir1t~ bcx3y t;o the tentj_;'"Jr1 s t.rt3ssed. b~' Lor-:1 1}o(l(1B~I'(1, 
G.J. Hibberj;_y~McK;j,errlfill [19li-OJ 2 K.B. 1l+2, where he 
upheid the convjction of the accused elc.n'l: for larceny 
in tekirc.g om the r;rolmds of a pr:i.vate club eolf-balls 
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passed, has passed by violence or wrong, judicial pcl:tcy 
has :tntsrvened But :it 112.s not intervened to 
change or tort the meaning or criteria of possession, 
it has been allowed on1y to affect the weieht tl:Ji.t will be 
eviclonce especialJ y, in consequence, the 
an 1 or ssries of acts, of trospass becomes an act of 
d:tspossession. 
The loss and acquisition of possession may be cl 
divided into five convenien·t types: ( 1 ) The reduction 
:LYJ.to possession of things in no pne 1 s possession; (2) The 
passine; of possession from one person to another by consent; 
,,. 
\.)) The aco,uisition of possession riehtfully 1 but without 
the IH'evious p~1ssessor 1 s co-operation or consent; (4) The 
ssjon from another by ,.., olence or 
··ro _, ("') mh 1 of s i ' r t" t'-1'•-·" \"J ng  .J ..1._ e oss po se s s on '1-Tne e .u.e n. .i.~~ff) 
possessed up to that point does not pass into anpi one 
else's possession. Let us consider these in turn. 
5. (Contd.) 
lost and abandoned by the players who ovmec1 them: "Every 
househol5c;T' or occup:Ler of land rrieans or intends to exclude 
thieves and wr<:medoers from property of which he is in 
possession and this confers on him a spec property _ 
'"" ,::i,.. ~ "' ' .., .:::1 Pf" " """' ,i.. ~ • J.., ~ ~".:t""'tm0r.t" t;iOOu~. rounu 011 !) i.an<J. SUL J,(!J.env t.O supporv an i:t;\,l.Lv > V,c.,l. 
lat pp.149-50; even if it WEife held, B.s we have ourselves 
suggested 1 thz.t the special property neces.·s!k:tiy to support e_n indictment for larceny may fall short of possession, here the 
occupie:rt s only nexus with the balls is in fact osseseyiop _ 
speci property should here be terpreted cording.1-y. 
1. The reduction into possessi9,n of things 
never before possessed or at the relevant time in no one 
else 1 s possession requires strong evidence that control 
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has been assumed. In the case of wild animals, fish, bees, 
..!!lJ;s., and other things - such as moving water - not by 
their state confined to a comparatively fixed locality, 
and of tlllllloving objects in places under no one's control, 
such evidence will have to amount virtually to detention 
by taking. A passer-by does not have possession of a 
wallet lying in the street u11t:il he picks it up; I do not 
possess the water in the river flowing through my land 
until I take it out with a bucket or lead it into a dam 
with no constant outlet or a stagnant pool; I do not 
possess the fish in the river running through my land, the 
birds nesting in by trees, or the rabbits in my field until 
I have killed or captured them. 6 This is so even where my 
60 There is no possession before capture even though there 
may be exclusive right to possess ratio;p.e soli tgura~ or 
ratione privilegii. A series of hunting cases - ~·J 
1? H.tJ, r.9, Sutton v. ~ood1 (1698) 3 Balke 2901 91 ~.R. 8j7t CJ:lurch:wafd v 1 StJdd.:z_ (1 II) 1 I+ East 21+9, 103 E.R.S-96,, 
Blades 11'2 Higgs { 186~ 11 H.I,.Ca. 621 1 11 E.R. 1474 -though they do not clearly make the distinction, are not 
concerned with posses sion of the killed animal but with 
the right to possess it, normally in the owner ot the land 
where it is started and not necessarily in the owner of' 
the land where it is killed. A number of differing whaling 
customs that have been recognised by law - such as the 
Gallipagos Islands cust:cm that a man strking a whale with 
a loose harpoon is entitled to half the produce from him 
who )< fiislil:: kills it - are similarly concerned solely with 
right. For the purposes of larceny, there has been problem 
intention to capture is made manifest by overt act. 11All 
but reducing into possession is not the same as reducing 
into possession. 117 In the case from which these words 
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are cited, the plaintif:t had drawn his seine to enclose a 
school of fish until only Olll.e openin~ remained, which he 
was about to close with a stop-net when the defendant 
disturbed his operations, captured some of the fish from 
within the seine and allowed others to escape. The Court 
held the plaintiff had not possession of the fish and could 
' 
not maintain trespass. As an American judge has p~t it: 8 
The Roman and the Common Law agree that in 
general fresh pursuit of wild animals is not 
enough against another who kills or catab.es 
and carries off the game, but that escape must 
have been made impossible by some means. Thus 
it has been held that an action would not lie 
60 (6ontd.) 
a special problem arisiJ'l.3 out of the requirement that the 
taking be a taking of a chattel. In the action of trespass 
trees growing on land or fish in enclosed ponds are treated 
as part of the land, and they do not become cha~tels until 
they have been cut or caught. The trespasser cutting such 
trees or catching such fish therefore commits trespass to 
land, but does not take :tml: a chattel from the possession 
of another, he reduces it into possession as a chattel 
for the first time, and there is therefore no larceD,Y. 
The same position applies to trespassers cutting haj or 
other crops. There is larceny only if the things cut or 
caught are left on the occupier•s land in such a manner 
and for a sufficientl1 long period that possession of them 
passes to the ©ccupier 1 and the trespassers then return 
and carry them away. lThe problem in respect of fish is 
recited in Ri y. Steer, 3 Salk. 291, 91 E.R. 832.) 
7. Y oung~: v. Hichens (181+4) 6 QoB" 606 at p., , 115' E.R.228 
at P• 
against a person for killing and taking a fox 
which has been pursued by another, and was 
then actually in the view of the person who 
had originally fou..".ld, started, and chased it. 
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The principle enunciated here does not mark a departure 
from the criteria of possession we have set down, but 
represents a recognition of the fact that the mobility of 
wild things, like the unprotected nature of public or open 
spaces, is such as to make the frustration of a mere 
manifest intention to control a real possibility, and that 
there is no relevant control of a general area to fall 
back upon, as there is in respect of inll:lobile things 
dropped or lying upon •private' land.9 
9. There is possession if the animal has been wOUJJ.d:ed to the 
death, even though it has not been actually seized because, 
it has been "given the effectual cause whereby it cannot 
use its native freedom; as at the whale-fishing a~ 
Greenland, he that wou.ndeth a whale so that she cannot 
keep the sea for the smart of her wound, and so must needs 
come to land, is proprietor, not he that lays first band 
on her at land": Stair's Institute::;, 4th ed., bk.2, tit .. 1, 
s.33, at p.199; 'proprietor* should be read to mean one 
who has both possession and the right to possess, the 
general proposition, here set forth as a proposition of 
Scottish law, has been accepted as generally valid by the 
House of Lords. The general criterion of control is 
reflected in many whaling customs which provide that when 
a whale is struck by a harpooner with a harpoon attached to 
a line, the whale is in the possession of the harpooner and 
remains so until and unless the line breaks and the whale 
escapes. In S)!;l.ft v. Gifford, 2 Lowell 110, where Judge 
Lowell upheld a custom of the A:merican whalemen in the 
An:tic giving a whale to the 1•11lH vessel whose iron fi'rst 
remains in it, pr0"1ided the claim be made before 'cutting 
in', the question at issue is not possession but right to 
possess. In Littledale v. Seaith {1788) 1 Taunt. 2~3n, 
127 E.Ro 826n, the Court upheld a whaling custOlll that gave 
possession of a whale held fa:.it to the first man to harpoon 
it with a line, even if that line proke, provided the whale 
continued to be held fast, though by another's line. 
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Intention and the capacity to control, we have 
argued, !llaf bridge gaps in actual cont~ol where there has 
been some actual control in the past and where the intention 
and capacity are sufficient to make possible the relllJlJllQ'!ioD 
of actual, direct control. As McTaggart, J., put it in 
Cox v, Ri:xon 19: "The true test .... appears to me to be 
the test given by the civil law of wha.t is a 'iracant 
possession' or a chattel or a tame animal - namely, whether 
(if it has not been actua1i1 abandoned) the owner, though 
he may not have the ahattel in his actual custody, bas 
the knowledge and the means necessary for re-acquiring such 
actual custody when he chooses.» That the test is a general 
one we have sought to show in our discussion of acquiring 
possession of wild animals (where virtually no means short 
of actual custody or wounding to the death suffice to give 
a man such power) and it is applied equally in law in 
determining the position when animals go out of a man's 
actual custody. The wild animal is presumed to seek 
freedom and resist recapture. Itnis out of a ma.11's possession 
the moment it :frees itself from effective detention. 11 
----·---------- ---~·------·-·------
10. (1871) 50 L.T. 222. 
11. Thus in Ke~rry v. PattiB@on (1938) 186 L.T. *7~, bees 
swarming out of a hive - here held to be fe*ae natura~ 
on the authority of Blackstone, but primarily because such 
be~s do not return - were held to have left a man's 
possession when they entered upon a neighbour's land and 
the plaintiff was denied damages for loss of the bees 
resulting from the neighbour's refusal to admit him to the 
land to retrieve them; this was upheld on appeal. 
315 
The position is otherwise with the tame animal ha:ving an 
animus revertendi, which is itself an instrument of eontrol 
and enables the possessor Do keep possession while the animal 
wanders out of his actual custl!ldy but may reasonably be 
presumed to maintain the will and have the opportunity for 
returning to it; 12 in the case of the tamed animal, which 
has not strayed to a limit where it has not reasonable 
opportunity of returning, the crucial question is whether 
it can be presumed to have retained or lost the animus 
revertendi instilled in it. 
2. :J;he pa2.§i~ of....,J;LQ§§.~SJ:Lion from one :gerscn 
to another b2~~~~ has been treated in law ccmpletely 
in accordance with the general criteria of possession set 
forth in the preceding sections. For historical and 
practical reasons, 13 a gif·!; is not cOlllplete U..l"ltil there 
12. Thus! in CQX v1 Rixo~, supr~, a straying dog picked up by 
the defendant was held to be not lost but in the possession 
of the plaintiff because, though "it had escaped frcm the 
place in which its owner had conf'inell it, and was not upon 
his premises at all: .... it was still in or close to 7 the 
village in which its ovmer lived - almos~, i:f.' not qui"te, 
within call - not beyond the limits r11ithin which many 
dogs constantly leave, and as constantly return to their 
home 11 (at po222),, 
13. Examined in S.J. Stoljar, 11The Delivery of Chattels", 
(1958) 21 M.L.R. 27. 
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has been delivery, but delivery in this a~ea, too, means 
simply the passing of possession in the nor:mal sense of 
possession. For the purposes of consensual passing 
general11,, there has not been a."ly special emphasis on 
taking into detention since, for the inanimate objects 
predominantly in question, control does not require such 
detention. 14 Normally, such passing of possession involves 
a change in the physical location of the chattel or in the 
physieal proximity of the person acqutr:tng, but it need 
not be so: p session can be passed by delivering means of 
exclusive control, such the key to a locked roam in 
which the chattel is kept. 1 '5 When it is clear that the 
Thus the tradesman who leaves an order on my porch while 
I am absent from the house normally renders the goods 
ordered into my possession, though the question raay be 
borderline if ·they are exposed to passers-by and very 
lil{ely to be taken by them. Th e fear that the passing 
or possession here may absolve frora liabilities despite 
obvious carelessness should not be all(rwed to distort 
the concept of possession: it seems simpler to :find remedy 
against the trades~an on the b asis of an implied contractual 
duty to render goods ordered into prima facie 1safe' 
possession" 
The delivery of a key in these circumstances, as Lord 
Hardwicke noted in Wa;:\l v. ~;&: (1752) 2 Ves.Sen. 431, 
28 E.R. 275, is a real and not a symbolic passing of 
control, though it could be symbolic and not pass 
possession where it gives no power to exclude. The 
passing of rights to possess - through bills of lading, 
bills of sale, e~Q• + dpes not itself pass possess1ono 
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transaction between the parties is intended by both to be 
accompanied by the surrender and assumption or actual 
control, the courts, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, will presume that control and therefore possession 
16 have passed. Thus, if a man carry a box of jewels to 
~ another's house and allows it to stand on a table 
next to his chair while he offers it as a pledge for a 
loan, possession of the box will pass to the other the 
moment money is e"ccepted even if the other make no move to 
pick or remove the box. 
The main general situation of interest, indeed, 
is of the sort just described, where possession is intended 
to pass but the physical relationship of the parties to 
the chattel in question has not changed in any way. It is 
here that the intention to pass possession accompanied by 
the passing of a right to possess has - save in the case 
of gifts - generally been held sufficient for the court 
find that possession has passed. Thus in Ramser v •. Ma.rgretj;, 17 
where a wife who had previously lent her husband money 
16.,." ••• in determining whether a sufficient possession 
was taken 1 rnuch more une\l,uivocal acts must be proverl 
when the person who is said to have taken :possession is 
a mere wrong-doer than when he has a right under his 
contract to take possession": ll! Mellish, L.J., in 
ex parte Fletcher (1877) 5 Ch. Div. 809 at p.812~ 
17. [1894] 2 Q.B. 18 (C.A.) 0 
refused to give him any more but offered to buy from him 
furniture and personal effects kept in the house they 
both occupied, the Court held that the completion of 
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this sale was sufficient to pass possession to her and 
that a receipt given by the husband was a mere receipt and 
not a bill of sale. 18 The point, in cases of this type, 
is that the physical relationship is equally consistent 
with either party having possession and the other having 
a mere licence to use19it is therefore natural for the 
Court to look to the title as establishing a presumption 
as to who is the controller and who the licences, and to 
recognise that control may pass, with the right to control, 
from one party to the other without any change in the 
physical disposition of parties and chattels. As Atkin, 
L.J., put it in French v. Gethlng: 20 
If there are three men in a boat belonging to one 
of them, the boat is in the possessio11 of the 
owner and not in the possession of the visitors 
or either or them ••• ; if the owner sells the 
boat to one of the visitors, intending to pass 
the property in it to him, then possession and 
apparent possession are in the purchaser and not 
in the former ownero 
18. Similarly, in Antoniada v. Smith [1901] 2 K.B. 589, a 
man living in the one house with his mother-in-law gave 
her a bill of sale over the furniture in the house and 
this was held, in view of her living in the house, to 
pass possession of the furniture from him to her. 
19. Ramsey v. Margrett, supra, at p.28 (~Davey, L.J.). 
20. [19&2] 1 K.B. 236. 
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The seemingly complicated facts of Cbarle§worth ~llills21 
amount fundamentally till a very similar situation. In tbat 
case, the owner of household goods which had been seized 
under a fi.fa. a.greed verbally with an aucti1:ineer tbat in 
consideration of his paying out the sheriff the auctioneer 
should possession of the goods, sell them by auc·i;ion and 
pay any balance to the o~rner. This agreement was reduced 
into writing, the sheriff' was paid out, and the sheriff's 
man instructed to remain on the premises on bebalf' of the 
auctioneer. Reversing the Ji!J!rt~t•tw~ decision of the Court 
of Appeal, the House of Lords held tbat the written agreement 
was not a bill of sale, an assurance, or a licence to take 
possession, but that the auctioneer had taken possession 
because the agreement had intended him to take possession 
and he had exercised his rights under the agreement. The 
•possession• of the sheriff 1 s man, previously for the 
sheriff, became possession for the auctioneer after the 
sheriff was paid out, the man holding as a mere servant. 
On the passing of possession by consent between 
the inmates of one house, who are often bound by other ties, 
it shouil!d be noted that the courts may require stronger 
evidence in otherwise exactly similar circumstances if they 
have reason to feel that the claim or attempt to pass 
possession could be associated with an attempt to escape 
obligations to creditors. 22 
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The situation also different where the possession 
of a chattel remaining in a house is alleged to t<B.ve passed 
from one person living in that house to a.nether by way of 
gift. Since in law the successful making of a gift specifically 
requires an act of delivery and not mere intention to 
deliver or pass title, the courts have been especially 
reluctant to resolve physically ambiguous circumstances by 
inferring a passing of possession (i,e,, a delivery) merely 
from evidence of the intention to pass possession and 
title. 23Particularly in the case of servants, whose physical 
dealing with chattels in and about the house is normally 
presumed to be' on the mastsr's behalf, the courts will 
require evidence that the control assumed was such 
22. Thus in Y oUP~ss v. Young~ [1940] 1 K.B. 760, where a man 
in arrears with alimony sold various articles of furniture 
to his house-keeper whom he ad.111itted also to be his 
mistress, giving her receipts for the money 'illd with 
attached L;ventories 1 but not moving the f'u.rniture from. 
the house, the Court held that these receipts were mere 
bills of sale and tr,,<J.t the housekeeper, whose normal 
dealing with the furniture in the house woulcl be as a 
servant, had not assumed possession. 
23. In In re Cole, a_&ankrupt [ 1963) 3 .L.R. 621 (C.A.) 1 where Cole brought nis wife into a house he had bought and 
furnished, said to her, "It's all yours" an.d then lived 
in the house, his wife handling the fu.rniture and appurten-
ances as one would in the normal course of a woman Is 
household duties, the Court held th..<i.t there was not 
suf:'icient delivery to the wife of the household goods. 
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21+ 
as to exclude the alleged donor. 
?lt 
- . In Wara. v. Turner, supra, an intenO.ed donatiq_JJ1ortis 
cauxa - "I give you all the plate and goods in this house, 
or if I die, all are yours" - addressed to a servant was 
held bad for lack of delivery. "It is said, he [the 
prospective donee] had possession by livine; in the house 
and did not wa:!lt delivery; but he lived as a servant who 
had no possession: so that if a servant hacl. them in 
custody, it wou.ld be a possession for his master": per 
Lord Hardwicke, L.C., at p.438, E.R. at pp,279-80. 
The gene:bal position we have suggested in regard. to 
gift (that the court will not presume passing of 
possession in ambie;uous circumstances from mutual intention 
that possession should pass and nought else) may seem to 
bee challenged, and is at least obscured, by the recent 
Privy Council decision in Zainab bint Abdulla Gulab v,. 
Kulsum bint Abdul Khaleo [1964] 1 W.r,.R;-~(P.c.), on 
appealHfrom the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. Here, 
Gi a Muslim, executed a document in the form of a deed 
or sale by which, for purported consideration which the 
Aden Court found not to be present, he transferred certain 
house property of his in Aden to a sister of his wife who 
was living in the house with the familj6 and continued to 
do so after the eXfocution of the deed. When G died, the 
appellants, his heirs in Mohammedan law, sought a cl.eclaration 
that the conveyance was void inter a1Ji:a because possession 
had not been effectively given by the donor to the donee. 
The JD:trls: decision of the l'.iudicial Com.mi tt.ee makes it 
clear that the case is beine determined. according to the 
Moharmnedan law relating to gifts, though this law has 
similarity to the Common Law in requiring the consummation 
of gift by the taking of possession. The Judicial Committee 
fom1d it a pvoposition of Ms;ihammedan law (on the basis of 
Indian case-law) that posse!l'sion could be taken without the 
donor having to vacate the house and remove his chattels 
even for a time, but it did go on to say 1 w~lhere, as in 
this case, the parties were living together 7 it is sufficient that an intention on the part of the donor to transfer 
possession should have been unequivocally manifested" (p.)O) 
and by going on, in the fol1owing sentence, to lj.nk this 
wlth general remarks concerning intention attributed to 
ex parte Fletcher, supra, perhaps gave the impression that 
the proposition cited is also one of Common Law. Ex narte 
Fletchel: is not authority for deducing the passing of 
possession from manifest intention in the case of gift, 
and the cases that do bear on the proposition, as we have 
s.een, refuse to make such a deduction. 
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3. The acauisi ti on of rightful ~JleS..§.:ion 
aga;i.mi_t the intenti9n of :t;he prev:tous p os_§§s~ raises 
what may seem to be special difficulties only in the 
situation first descrj.bed by Littleton (footnote 1, supra), 
where the two contesting parties are both in or about the 
premises a.'1:'l. neither has clear exclusive possession. 25 Here, 
the tabula in naufragio, that possession goes to him who has 
better title, has been applied. 26 In Lows Vo Telford,27 Lows 
(L) was the mortgagee in fee, not in possession, of premises 
used for storage; Westray (W) and Telford ('1:) were in 
possession with the a;u.thorj.sation of the mortgagor. Early 
on the morning in question, L, wishing to obtain possession, 
went to the premises without notice to the mortgagor or W 
and T, but accompanied by a carpenter and another man. L 
and his men broke llpe:n the door of the premises (which had 
been locked the previous evening) and took off the old lock. 
25. Compare Pollock & Wright, Possq_ssion in. the ColllJllQ!l Law, 
p.21: "If two men have laid hands on the same horse or 
the same sheep, each meaning to use it for his ovm purpose 
and to exclude the other there is not any de facto 
possession until one of inem has gotten the mastery ••• 
This is no reason against ascribing legal possession to 
one person in preference to another when physical 
possession js in suspense, but it is a reason against 
ascribing it to more than one:' 
26. As the maxim has it, "Property draws to it the Possession" 
in such cases. 
27. (1876) 1 App. Div. Gas. 414. 
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L remained on the doorstep, the carpenter began bor5_ng holes 
:tn the door for the purpose of putting in a new lock and the 
third man went inside. W then arrived, protested against 
the presence of L 1 and, when unable to enter by the normal 
manner 1 climbed through a window. With the aia_ of T, who 
had by then arrived, W began ejecting L's men. The case 
turned on whether the actions of W and T amounted to forcible 
ejection of L because he had acquired possession, or whether 
W and T were still continuing their previous day 1 s possession 
and defending it. In the Court of Exchequer Chamber, Keating 1 
J., had little doubt on the facts that there was "no complete 
possession exclusive of the possession of any other person" 
in Lows and therefore held th.at W a_r:id T were merely continuing 
and defending their possession. The House of Lords, on the 
facts, had no doubt that L had, for however,short a time, 
established exclusive possession: " ••• he had (when no 
one was present to oppose him) effected an actual entry 
into the premises, beyond all doubt fo~ the purpose of taking 
possession, and he by himself and his servants had already 
acquired such a dominion and control ovel:l' the property, 
when W first came upon the ground, that the respondents 
could not enter it without putting up a ladder against the 
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house and getting tr.rough the window." 28 The House of Lords 
noted that L had the right to possess, and took this right 
as further reason to believe that his entz·y was for the 
purpose of taking possession; but it should be noticed 
that on the facts the House of Lord.s was satisfied that 
exclusive possession had been gained, even if comparatively 
briefly, independently of title and it did not feel impelled 
to resort to tltle to establlsh such possession. 
wrong, too, ls not s:im.ply denied by recourse to tltle the 
moment there is the least ~ smell of ambiguity about the 
facts. Just as in Lows v~ Telford the suggestion of 
ambiguity was dispelled by using· the criteria of control 
and without direct recourse to title, so in .fil:t.parte 
Fletcher, supra, the decision against the mortgagee attempting 
wr•ongfully to gain possession l:fas be.sea on his failure to 
acquire control and not on the wrongfulness of his act. 
Because the mortgagor of certain prelflises at Newport had filed 
a petition in barJcruptcy at 11.30 a.mo of the day in 
28. Per Lord Selbourne at p.427; cf. Lord Cairns at p.422: 
~ •• at that time L had possession of the house by one 
of his agents who was inside, and he himself had command 
of the door, for Edd: L was stax1ding on the steps, and. the 
cai.}lenter was standing in the doorway holding the door, 
and puttlng a new lock on it." 
question, the issue became qwhether the rr.ortgageESg having 
earlier heard of the move a.na seeking without colour of: 
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right to take possession on that day, had gained pos sion 
by the hour of filio.g. The mortgagees had instructed 
their solicitors to take possession on the previous day; 
a clerk was sent that night ana, accompanied by a broker, 
arrived at the Nevrport premises on the day in question at 
10.,.0 a.m. As soon as they arrived, the broker affixed 
to one of the gate-posts a printed notice signed by the 
solicitors and mortgagees stating that the mortgagees and 
their agents had entered into possession of the premises 
by virtue of the mortgage deedo The clerk went into the 
manager's office, demanded possession under the deed and 
required. work (that of an ii·on-foundry) to be stopped and 
the workmen dismissed. The manager not being there, some 
time was spent in discussion and the occupier-mortgagor's 
1>.f 
possession was not givenkand work was not stopped until 
later in the day, after 11.30. The broker had in the 
antime been posting other notices purporting to take 
possession inside and vml!l'X outside the premises. Here, 
the Cour:I: held, "there was not any actual possession; 
there was only an attempt to get possession, an illegal 
attempt which failed1129 [i.eo, as viewed at 11.30 a.m .. J., 
Though the illegality of the attempt to take 
possession was much stressed by the Court a.uring its 
int€rventions in the hearing, ex parte Fletch~ is to be 
distinguished from Lows v. J&J.ford by the fact that there 
was no exclusive control, for however short a period., by 
the mortgagees Let the relevant period in the first case, 
and there was in the second. Both were deci•:led on the 
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basis of ~actual possession': the formal notice of the 
taking of :possession in ex parte_ Fletcij&.,t was held irrelevant 
unless possession had been taken. 
If the mortgagees in ~ parte ]tletche;r had been 
acting rightfully under the deed of mortgage, the decision, 
I am inclined to believe, wou~d not have gone the other 
waye Right to possess ca.."l!l.ibt remedy the deficiency that 
there no act of control i!hatever 1 even o! concurrent 
control actively clashing with that of the other claimant. 
The importance of title or right, correctly stressed 
ex pa.rte Fletcher, is in deciding bet-ween such concurrent 
and clashing acts of control and in ciding how far the 
control partly initiated and partly symbolised by an act 
will extend. nA wrongdoer is presumed to possess only so 
far as takes actual possession, pedis poss~ssio, as tbs 
phrase is,n says Terry. 30 "If a person having title to 
30. Laadip.g Principles of @J!;.lo-American Law (1884-), s.,295. 
Cf. James, L.J., in ex parte Fletcher, at p.811+: "If a 
man walks into my house thout legal right, he does not 
thereby possession of any piece of furniture 1:n my 
house. rt 
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land includes within his fence less land than he ovms, he 
may nevertheless be held to retain possession of the whole., 
But that does not apply to a person who has taken possession 
of the land or another. He can only keep that which he 
has had in his actual possession."31 The point P.ere is 
the point we have made earlier: right to control is not 
alone suf:t'icient for possession an(l does not create a 
separate concept of possession, but it will often establish, 
practically strengthen and define the area o:t:, that inl:;ention 
which is an importa..rit ingredient of possession and helps 
to free it from any requirement of constant and unbraken 
manual detention or physical occupation. 32 
There is one other respect in which a practic&.l 
difference emerges in the treatment of wrongdoer and right-
doer. Every act of ~respass in which the trespasser 
takes upon hj.mself some control does not iJJ'Jl!!ediately pass 
possession to the trespasser. Where the trespass or incursion 
31. Pe1• Griffith, C.J. 1 in Cr~1ne5''¥:.!..,k,.Ustrali@. Depo;:::J.itJl\: Mortgage Bank Ltd. ( 1912-J 1 c. L. R. 389 at p,,.:i97. 
32. Conversely, when the right ends, it becomes necessary 
for the possessor, if he is to continue possession, to 
manifest in SOl'.:le other way his continued intention to 
control: Br!2.'iJl1 v,, No~ley (1848) 3 Exch. 221 ~ 154 
E.R. 823, 1"!r L.J.Ex. 9 7 where P, who had heid land under 
a tenant for life who died, was denied trespass in respect 
of an act afte:e this death because P had no servants~ 
cattle or anything else on the lac"ld to sh0111 that he intended 
to continue in possession after the death. 
is not obviously more than fleeting, or where it is still 
being resisted in an active way, the court has the problem 
of determining how deep or sustained the incursion must be 
before it has become an act of successful dispossession. 
Heret some wri~ers have thought that the acquisition or 
non-acquisition of such t adverse' possession can best be 
explained, within the general criteria of control, by 
reference to domination and submitsion. 33 The law is quick 
to recognise the consensual passing of possession because 
the submission of the person giving up possession may 
readily be presumed; it is slow to recognise the passing 
of possession to a trespasser whose attempt to possess is 
being actively resisted. Here there may be a period during 
which physical control normally sufficient for possession 
is held not sufficient because the control has not been 
acquiesced' ·.in by the person against whom 
comm:l.tted and who is still contesting the 
the trespass was 
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control gained. 
33. E.g. 1 Albert s. Thaye1• 1 "Possession", (1904-5) 18 Rarv. L. Rev. 196. 
34. "A trespasser does not gain possession until there has 
been something l:Lke acquiescence in the physical fact of 
his occupation on the part of the rightful owner": Pollock, 
Torts q"oth ed.), p.Jf.t. .. 11A mere trespasser cannot, by the 
very act of trespass, immediately and without acquiescence, 
give himself what the law understands by possession against 
the person whom he ejects and drive him to produce his 
title, if he can without Jelay reinstate himself in 
possession": per Lord Denman, L.J • .!. in Browne Vo Dawson 
(1840) 12 A. & E. 624 at p.629, 11j E.R. 950 at p.95 , 
10 L.J.Q.B. 7• 
Thus in Browne vi Dawson, sun:ra, the master of a free school 
who had possession of a school room while employed, wa.s 
dismissed and aske:l to ve.cate his room. He did so and left 
the school, while the trustees took possession of the room 
and locked it up. The next day, no doubt havinG 6ecided 
to query the validity of his dismissal, the master returned, 
broke open the room and held it for eleven days against 
constant demands that he leave, until he was finally 
forcibly ejected by the trustees. He then brought a,n 
action for trespass, describing the premises as 11a room of 
the plaintiff". He was denied remedy for the reasons 
already cited (footnote 3r); just as the Court was quick 
to allow possession to pass from the master to the trustees, 
since he had acquiesced in their taking control of the 
roam, it wa.s then slmv to allow possession to revert to 
him since the trustees ha.1 not acquiesced in his return, 
which was from the start a trespass, and since their failure 
to eject him forcibly much earlier was no doubt the result 
of their courtesy and hope that he would bB persuaded to 
go peaceably. 
In larceny, on the other hand, where the transfer 
of possession wou.la not give rights but fftlable the application 
of sanctions, the main weight has been placed un the 
trespasser's intention a.nd not on the v1crtim' s acquiescence. 
Provided the trespasser intends to take complete dominion, 
the most temporary assumption of control he.s been held 
sufficient to pass possession - but even here, it should 
be noted, an assumption of control is still necessary.35 
R. vL_S...Ylluson (1854) 6 Cox Cro Ca. 422 where the Court 
of Criminal Appeal upheld the pr is onetl s conviction f<l1l' 
larceny - the prisoner had withdrawn a w:!;l!>ch from B's 
pocket, forcibly drawn the chain and key attached to it 
from a buttonhole and was about to make off when his 
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hand was seized a..nd the key caught mn another button of 
the vit:tim 1s; R. v'L Thompspn (1825) 1 Moody 78, 168 E;;'Ro 
I 1 q2, where a prisoner who had raised a pocket-book 
slightly in the victim's pocket and then relinguished it 
was convicted of larceny; Al1onym~ (1353) 27 Lib. Ass. 
pl.39 (Kenny, Select Cases, p.219J, where a person 
removing sheets from one room of a house to another room 
was held guilty of larcanj.l; R. v. Simson (1664) Kelyng 
31 , 84 E. R. 1068, larceny where plate was removed from 
a trunk and laid on the floor; R. v. Pi.tman (1826) 2 
C. & P. 423, 171..E.R.lql. where a prisoner coming to an 
inn and directing an ostier ignorant of the true ovmer 
to saddle and bring a horse in the stable was apprehended 
as the ostler was leading the horse out into the yard ancl 
convicted of larcae.y; R. v 0 Amitl (1834) 6 c. & P. Jl+4, 
172 E.R. 1269, where the prisoner was convicted of 
breaking into a house ancl stealing two half sov·areigns 
which he had taken from a bureau but thro~m into a 
grate in the same room when disturbed; and numerous 
other Eng±lsh caseso Note, however Anon.Y1JlQIJ.S_(1584) 
Crompton j5'-+, where it was held no larceny by a prisoner 
who cut the girdle of another so that the purse attached 
fell to the ground - no larceny bec<:LllJilL..the prisoner had 
not _llandled the .Q1J:!'.~ and thus had not even momentary 
control. 
For exactl)l: similar decisions by U.S. courts, see 
Com. v. Luckies, 99 Mass. 431 7 96 P.m. Dec. 769; lillb!:a:ll'Jix 
Edmonds v. State, 70 Ala. 8, re5 Am. Rep. 67; Delk 'i»._ 
U\:tte ti3 Hiss. 77 60 Am. Rep. 46; Drigger::; v~,jltate l1928~ 118 So. 20 ~noted in (1929) 27 Mich.L.Rev. 102); 
and Harris_o11_y0_Eeople, 50 N.Y. 518 7 10 Aro, Rep. 517. 
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'· The loss of nossession takes place when the 
possessor has lost or relinquished the power of resuming 
direct control over the object in question at will and 
other persons have at least equal right and power to take 
up the object.36 Since circumstances that do not give 
others the right to approach or take the object are themselves 
a form of control, we have argued and courts have held that 
objects lying on land generally controlled and not open 
3? to the public at large are not lost or abandoned. 
36. "(A)ctual personal control • •. does not include the case 
of a person who has put the propePty out of his present 
manual custody and d•3posited it in a place where any 
other person independently of him has an equal right a.nd 
power of getting it, and so may prevent the flrst :from 
ever getting manual custody in the future. In that event 
the property is not in his actual possession: it is 
where he may possibly reduce it again into actual possession, 
or 1 on the other hand, where the other person may hj,mself 
reduce it into his own actual exalusive possessionn; 
,HQQ~Y·~Burke (1919) 26 c.L.R. 265, where the High Court 
of li.ustralia was considering the words 'actual possession' 
in ~ Policfil. O:t'fen~es Actj cited with approval in Howie 
v. Noblet l1923] o.A.S.R. 277 at p.280. The e:i.uality of 
:right and power, I should argue, puts the object out of 
possession generally and not merely out or 'actual 
possession', the possibility that; the previous possessor 
will himself I'esu:me control here is no greater than tbe 
possibiltty walking ln the wood.s togay I shall find 
the object I lost yesterday or even last week or year. 
See the modern finding cases, section 1", su.pra, 11i....:!• 
Edwar.Qs. (supr£!1 section 4, footnote 23) 1 where diseased pies shot and ouried on the owner's land 111ere held not 
abandoned, O:".t genel'al principles of jlossession 9nc, not 
on the basis that they had become part of' the land, and 
E:Jirbbe_r'j:; .YJt_lfcKiernan, supra,, (facts in footnote 5, this 
section). Similarly, things reduced :i.ntc) a. trespasser's 
possession but then simply left on the occuptfllrfs land 
will quickly come into the possession of the occupie:c: 
R, v..,, __ Foley (1889) 17 Cox Cr,, Ca. 142 1 where mere intention 
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Sirrdlarlyt where the object is not actually upon such land, 
but is manifestly within a range of control and would 
reasonably be presumed to be an object over which control 
" 38 is intended, there is aiso possession. 
the renuncie.tion of title as well as of control, either 
intentionally or deliberately or by sust<Jined failu.re to 
assert the title. The renunciation of' title, however, is 
not .sufficient to make an object abant1oned unless it is 
also exposed in such a 'day as to give o!;hers equa.1 l'ight 
and power to assume control over it: a man cannot abandon 
objects on '.his land unless there is €1.n effective invitation 
to any passer-by to enter and take. Land cannot be moved; 
it will have to be exolucJ.ed from the possessor 1 s sphere of 
control. "h •'JJ. ere there is present title, the courts have, 
provided tthe land has been taken into the owner's posse.ssicn, 
been slo'"' to recognise the extinction of possession thrO'Ugh 
37i (Contd.) 
to return and pick up was held insufficient to continue 
the trespasserls possession [aga:i.?rnt the more than equal 
right and power of the occupier· to take control). It is 
other11;ise ii' the trespasser ta.kes steps to safeguard the 
objects left from interference by the occupier or othe~s 
through c~ncealing them: ~·~~~.ol!Plaii su:ora (section 9, 
footnote .)5) and R. v...!...J:.eJt£ll t1o78J 1 Go:x Cr. Ca. 116 1 
where a eamekeeper who discovered, the concealed rabbits 
and restored them to the place of hidin.g after clipping 
their ears for identifi.cation was held not to l:J.e,ve taken 
them into the occupierts possession, 
38. Thus dustbins ancL t!,l~ir contentf_3 _put out in the street arf 
not abandoned: 1'<1:1...i:L~.,- PhiJ.:+ps etc., fillPra, .section "'!I 
lack of positive acts showing possession: "If a man does 
not use his land, either by hj_mself or by some person 
claiming through him, he does not necessarilJjt discontinue 
possession of it. 1139 At the sairre time, the title to land 
cannot be abandoned as the title to chattel is abandoned, 
simply by renouncing it: there must be a conveyance to 
another person, a reversion to the Crown or State, or a 
positive extinction of title by the operation of law. 
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39. Per Cockburn c. J., in Leigb.__u__l'ack ( 1879) 5 Ex. D. 264 
l'C:A.) at p .. ~71; this may be strengthened by the principle 
.ll.fil!JJI1d~_te_ri&lll_sub.1eqj;am: "In decidine whetheir there 
has been a discwntinuance of possession the nature of 
the property must be locked at ••• there can be no 
discontinuance by absence of use and enjo.l'Jllent where the 
land is not capable of any enjoyment": oer:_ Cotton, L.J., 
in the same case, at p.274a 
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PART IV : 
POSTSCRIPT 
335 
11. THE LIMITS_Qf_J'OSSESSQRY ERQJ'l.~MS 
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The determinatior: of possession ca..'1. become importi<nt 
in relation to real property and to chattels, within the 
criminal law and. the civil law, in contrc;.ct, tort and bailments, 
and in connexion with a host of statutory provisions. frat 
possession is not the alpha and prl'.i~ of legal problems and 
legal knowledge. Primarily, indeed, the law is concerned 
with the distribution and vindication of rights and duties, 
for which possession provides one - but only one - impor·l;ant 
base. The possession that provides this base, we have 
argued, is the fact of control: control which, in a 
comparatively settled society, will create certain 
expectations and demancts in the controller ancl induce 
1 
recognition of his expectations arid demands in the beholder. 
1. "Protecting the coverer or first occupant is really 
part of the more general principle that possession as such 
should be protected., There is reaJ. hum.an econO!l!Y in doing 
so until somebody shows a better claim than the possessor~ 
It makes for certainty and security of transaction as well 
as for public peace - provided the law is ready to set 
aside possession acquir•ed in ways that inimical to 
public order. Various principles of justice may determine 
the distribution of goods and the retribution to be made 
for acts of injustice. But the law must not ignore the 
principle of inertia in human affairs. Continued _ 
possession creates expectations in the possessor and in 
others and only a very poor mori;r,lj_ty would ignors the 
hardship of frustrating these expectations and ren(ler:l.ng 
human relatio.11s insecurel even to corre some old flaws 
in the original acquisit· on ••• as habit is the basis of 
individual ljfe, continued pra.ctice must be the basis of 
social px•ocedure": M.R. Cohen, "Property 8.nd Sovereignty11 , 
(1927-8) 13 Cornell L.~. 8 at pp.15-b. 
Determining the range of legal problems subsumed 
under possession, like determi.ning the nature and fu.nction 
of the concept of possession in the Common Law, requires 
above all the clear demarcation of questions concerning 
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the fact or relation of possession from questions concerning 
rights, however they may be related to this fact or relation 
of possession. 2 The immediacy with which some rights flow 
from possession has led to confusions or terminology in 
wh:i.ch 'pcsses">ion' is sometimes taken, and sometimes not 
taken, to cover both the .'f'act and the rights; one confusion 
leads to further confusions, as when judges wish:i.ng award 
a right normally ~cssociated with possession, speak of the 
right-beareis (constructive) 1possession 1 • The resultant 
slovenliness and imprecision of terminology, as many w:r.i ters 
he.ve noted, have obscured both the nature and functional 
ljmits of possession in the Common Law. 
True possesso:ry problems, we have argued, are 
confined to those circumstances in which a court is seeking 
to decide whether a man has or has not that control which 
--
2. A demarcation which has been made clearly by Hil:t, J., in 
Th~ Ju2ite~, supra, at pp.135-6 and in nu.merous cases d 
such as Coverdal~ v! Charl~oll <l878) 4 Q.B. Div. 104 (C.A.), 
esp. at p.127. 
the law recognises as cons ti tuti:ng poss€ssion.. The 
recognition of the function such possession has in the law 
and that rights and obl:lgations will tilow from it, we 
hafe endeavoured. to show in detail, has affected. or 
distorted the determination of such control in particular 
circumstances far less than many writers have claimed. The 
law, we hi:rve sought to demonst1·ate, has not crea~ed disparate 
concepts of possession in various areas and it has not set 
up a •legal1 concept of possession in opposition to the 
'lay« concept; it has merely explored more ·carefully the 
limits and ramifications of control and the way in which 
n;:;.tural presumptions are affected by varying circumstances. 
The failure to recognise thi.s, the belief tw.t there e.re 
disparate rules for 1possession' in various areas, stems 
largely from the i\tilure to separate out the question of 
control.3 When this separation is made, the limits of the 
3. One has only to read some of the da:isions in cases arising 
under the 11.K. Bills of Sale Acts, Rent anG. Mortgage 
Restriction Act (192J) and other Acts in many Corrcnonwealth 
countries where legislative provisions require the court 
to foc1is its attention on the question whether there is 
'apparent' or 'actual possession' to see the immediate 
ge,i:n in clarity and consistency tbRt arises from clearly 
sepe,rating possession anrJ. the rights to it or from it. 
'!Actual possession', it should be notea., has not been 
iI1terpreted by the courts as meaning detention or control 
very close to detention, but in fact has been treated along 
the general principles of control in possession set forth 
in this work. The same has annlied to the "actual sei?.ure" 
that a sheriff is nmr required.' to mrke. On these points s 
see: _::-Ulcona v.:!. Rogers, supra; ~.parte Fletcher, ,supra; 
fa.}1'1.v. Rof:er,s (1925') )33 L.T.l+l+; Holt v. J!awso11 .. J1939] 3 E..kb.,.~. 635, +Iowie v_._ 1¥oblet 1 .§JJ.Dl'ei Cfui.:rlesworth vi Mills, 
.. 
role played by possession in the Common L;xw readily 
appear. ?ossessory problems arise,·, and possession is at 
issue, when possessory control is a necessary (in some 
cases sufficient) element for the award of the rights or 
the imposition of the duties claimed. In the early law, 
such situations made up the bulk of situations confronting 
the courts outside of the actions of covenant, debt and 
account. In modern times, law is confronted by social and 
economic requ.irements that have produced a social and legal 
situation in which title and right can exist and be readily 
proven independently of any possession whatever; such 
titles and rights become commercial coro.modities passed 
between people who me.y never have seen or possessed the 
l2nd or chattel in question. 4 In these circumstances, the 
criminal law has unconsciously been shifting its attention 
f'rom offences against possession as the paradigm of re-
prehensible violence to offences against title as the 
paradigm of reprehensible dishonesty. The civil , at 
the se.me time, has been increasingly concernect with rights 
that :follow :fram title or other rights independently of 
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possession. Confusion has been. ce,used, both areas, by 
attempts, especially in the earlier stages of the development, 
to mask the novelty of the decisions by stretching the 
word 'possession' to cover whe"t it does not cover. Thus 
the right of the unpaid vendor to stop in transit, which 
rests entirely on former title and former right to 
possession but requires no former actual possession, has 
sometimes been referred to as 'constru.ctive' possession, 
even though the goods are patently in the possession of a 
bailee-carrier. But most of the difficulties :in these 
co1runercial s1·t1;tElt.ic)nS, ir1 ftict, t:io not concern possession. 
One common difficulty arises from the fact that the person 
possessing the goods (a cari·ier or warehouseman) is a 
bailee possessL'lg at a time when the bailor is surrendering 
his t;itle to another; the Question is precisely when that 
other becomes the bailor and depends on the specific 
agreements forming pa.rt of transaction, on the arrangements 
made for carriage, storage, :lnsurance 1 payment of fees, etc. 
and/or on the passing of indicia of title or right that would 
> t' i i t t' . 1 t .. ' d ~ .. ' · 1 ' give ne rec p en - ne rigT, ,o oeman irom "ne oai. ee. 
Other problems in the sale of goods come closer to the 
question of posses:sion 1 but st:tll do not coincide with it. 
'faking into possession will be sufficient evidence of 
'delivery' or 1 actual receipt 1 , but in both cases the 
realities of commercial life have mac'le the taking of 
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possession not necessary. The receipt of indieia of title, 
the acqui3ition of the right to dispose over the goods, 
the attornment of the vendor as bailee or of a third-party 
bailee, will serve in place of control, if the rights given 
. +h l i oy v .em are exc us ve. There is, in these latter situations, 
a certain analogy to possession in the exclusiveness of the 
right to take possession. But a coherent ux1dersta.nding of 
the pla.ce and function ot possession in the Comma.n Law will 
not be furthered by trying to extend possessi'..ln to take 
in the inci•easing number of situations concerned. with rig.h:l;s 
in themselves. On the contrary, it because these situations 
are separating themselves out, that our understanding of 
possession has become clearer since the beginning of' the 
20th century. 
The 1 definition' or brief elucidation of the 
1natu.re 1 of possession ce:anot replace a knowledge of the 
cases bearing on posse,ssion and. the detailed consideration 
of the variety of proh1ems surrounding the exercise of 
control. Defin:ttions that ere not highly ::;d;;t•qi't stipulative 
come at the EHl<l ar1c: not at the beginning of serious 
enquiry; they will be in terms of words or concepts that 
raise furthe:t" problems; they will recognise difficulties 
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of borderline adjudication. The nn1ltiplicity of' siti:tatio ns 
a_r1d decisions may be organised in different ways; there is 
no ultim<ite test of futabilitp 1 the test only that 
of expla.natory power. We have stfliven to s , as a matter 
of historical :fact, that the Comraon Law begins by 
l'eoognising and protecting possession as an infra-ju1•al 
relation of fact, and that treats thj.s possession as 
exclusive occupation or control.. (Thus there was 1 close 1 
a:n.d there was i common 1 • ) We have further striven to show 
tha.t the concept of control, treated in a coherent and 
commonsense way, provides a basis ancl an explanation for 
the important uses of lpossession1 j,n the Common Law 1 arid 
that the departUBes in the use of the terrll can be accounted 
for as pr.oducts the confusion of contr and rights to 
control, an amalge~i.ation bound to impede rather than to 
facilitate the clari~ication of the law. The changes of 
emphasis that remain and even the c1•iticised deviation in 
the case of servants can best be u..r1derstood and explained 
in terms of the different forms that control can take in 
different situations and the dif:l'.'ering relations between 
human bein~s. The term 'control', indeed, suggests this 
readily, end the s oepticism of n1any modern lawyers regarding 
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the possibility that a concept of possession can be made 
to cover all these situations ca..11 only be explained on the 
assumption that their uru:ierstanding of possession has been 
tied too closely to its literal meaning of tsitting on 1 • 
Against those who prefer to see the law as a set 
of' oisparate r1aws 1 - a 'law' of finding, a 1 law• of servants, 
,_ 6 d l I • 1· 1 I •I ~· - an ru es - possession in arceny, possession 
in bailment, ~· - one can only flourish Oc,~am 1 s Razor and 
remind them that William of Occam was a good English 
empir:l.c and not a Continental jurisprudentialist. 
--~·--,-·----·~--~---~· 
6. And within each such 1 law 1 1 of course 1 they discover further 1laws 1 : the 1 law' of finding in shops 1 the 1 law1 
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